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This thesis functions as a comparative exercise juxtaposing reconciliation politics in Rwanda and 
Burundi from a bottom-up perspective. Rwanda and Burundi have been labeled 'twins' before. Both 
countries have a very similar population structure and history of mass violence. However, their post-
conflict processes differ. This fact renders them ideal candidates for comparison. Rwanda's 'maxi-
mum approach' is compared to Burundi's 'non-approach' to reconciliation politics on two levels: 
official and informal. The 'official' level examines intention and politico-economic context from the 
government's side, the 'informal' level looks at how these policies have been perceived at the grass-
roots and if they succeeded in reconciling the population with regard to the key objectives memory, 
acknowledgement, apology, recognition, and justice. 
The thesis analyzes and compares the advantages and disadvantages of both models thoroughly and 
identifies pitfalls and solutions with regard to breaking the cycle of alternating revenge and domi-
nance by re-orienting national reconciliation politics towards the perceptions and insights of the 
rural population at the grassroots. The thesis concludes that the strong governmental focus on con-
trolling the reconciliation discourse in Rwanda and the self-absorption of the political elite in Burundi 
in politico-economic power struggles are the main obstacles to reconciliation as they risk to margin-





This thesis examines and compares the domestic political efforts towards reconciliation in Rwanda 
and Burundi. It understands reconciliation in the broadest sense of the word, incorporating national 
approaches towards identity politics, commemoration and historical memory, governmental assis-
tance for victims, and transitional justice. Rwanda and Burundi have been characterized as 'twins' 
before. They share very similar traits: size, population, language, ethnic composition and, sadly, par-
allel histories of civil war and genocide. They however differ with regard to how their respective 
conflicts ended: in Rwanda, Paul Kagame's RPF achieved a complete victory after the genocide of 
1994. In Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza came to power after an internationally brokered power sharing 
agreement in 2005. With regard to reconciliation politics, these two East African states become al-
most ideal candidates for comparison because of their diverging post-conflict points of departure.  
The thesis approaches reconciliation politics from a bottom-up perspective, trying to uncover the 
relationships of power and dependency that drive actors towards aggression or reconciliation. Deriv-
ing from qualitative research (semi-structured life story-interviews) in five communities in Southern 
Rwanda and Northern Burundi as well as Kigali and arguing from the perspectives of rural dwellers, 
the thesis refuses to take the publicly stated aims of reconciliation politics at face value and instead 
examines the politico-economic backgrounds of policy design and the grassroots perception of policy 
implementation. Even though the governments of both countries display increasingly authoritarian 
features, their approaches could not differ more. While Rwanda relies on controlling its population 
and political discourse through unifying the conflictive identities and narratives into an encompass-
ing Rwandan identity and narrative, Burundi attempts a consociational solution that balances out 
the interests of Hutu and Tutsi but (until now) leaves the interpretation of the past to the population 
itself. 
The thesis assumes a rather critical stance towards top-down social engineering and re-education 
programs in Rwanda. At the same time, it recommends achievements and approaches towards 
bridging the societal trenches that genocide and mass violence have left, if the participants' evalua-
tion is positive. Particularly when comparing the overarching Rwandan policy of unity and reconcilia-
tion to the essentially absent Burundian strategy towards reconciliation and justice, certain ad-
vantages of the rather partial but nonetheless ambitious approach towards reprocessing the past to 
come to light. Apart from establishing quota regulations for a Tutsi minority representation in the 
army, administration and government in 2005, concrete steps to address the atrocities of the past 
have continuously been postponed in Burundi until very recently.  
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The thesis analyzes and compares the advantages and disadvantages of both models thoroughly and 
identifies the pitfalls and seeks out solutions with regard to breaking the cycle of alternating revenge 
and dominance by re-orienting national reconciliation politics towards the perceptions and insights 
of the rural population at the grassroots. The thesis concludes that the strong governmental focus 
on controlling the reconciliation discourse in Rwanda and the self-absorption of the political elite in 
Burundi in politico-economic power struggles are the main obstacles to reconciliation as they risk to 
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Introduction to the Thesis 
For centuries, Rwanda and Burundi’s histories have been inextricably intertwined with each other. 
The historical dynamics in one country have always exerted a great influence far beyond neighborly 
coexistence. They have shaped each other’s history. In the past decades, sadly, both countries have 
risen to notorious fame for their recurring episodes of mass violence and genocide. These episodes in 
particular cannot be analyzed from a single state-perspective without ignoring some of the most 
crucial factors contributing to the massive death tolls that have been amassed in the Great Lakes 
Region. Each outbreak of violence in one country has always evoked violent repercussions within its 
twin3. Conversely, reconciliation and reconstruction in one state are bound to affect the situation in 
the other as well. 
Next to their parallel history of mass violence and genocide, these two small, land-locked African 
countries share a considerable number of similarities such as size, language4, heritage, and culture. A 
comparative study of their experiences with peace building and reconciliation thus appears promis-
ing. Most particularly with regard to their differing political developments in the “post-conflict5” 
phases after the genocide in Rwanda 1994 and the end of the Burundian Civil war in 2003 resp. 
20056.  
The intertwined history of the two states has produced similar societies erupting in closely resem-
bling and overlapping dynamics of violence. Even though genocide and crimes against humanity 
should not be conflated, the dynamics of violence and the genocidal form violence has taken are very 
                                                          
3
 Chapter 1.1.3. in particular analyzes how Rwanda's so-called Hutu revolution in 1959 led to an ethnic polariza-
tion of politics in Burundi and eventually shaped the reaction of Burundi's Tutsi elite to Hutu uprisings, culmi-
nating in the immense bloodletting of 1972. Cf. Lemarchand, 1970. 
4
 Kinyarwanda and Kirundi, the two national languages share the same structure, grammar and a great part of 
their vocabulary. Rwandans and Burundians usually understand each other’s language. At times, the two lan-
guages have even been described to me as mere dialects of each other. 
5
 In reference to Paul Collier’s (2009, pp. 75-100) and Bruce Baker’s (2006, 31ff ) thoughts about the tendency 
of many African wars to reignite after relatively peaceful “post-conflict” periods, I actually prefer to speak 
about “post-settlement” (Burundi) or “post-genocide” (Rwanda) rather than “post-conflict” societies because 
the conflicts as such are still in the process of being resolved. For purposes of generalization, I will however use 
"post-conflict" frequently when I speak about both countries together. In this context, “post-conflict”-Rwanda 
refers to the period after 1994 and “post-conflict”-Burundi signifies the time after 2005. 
6
 For the purpose of this dissertation, I consider the swearing in of the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD’s 
leader Pierre Nkurunziza after the elections of 2005 which were widely considered democratic as the official 
end of the civil war that begun with Melchior Ndadaye’s assassination on October 21, 1993. Many sources, 
among them Vandeginste (2011, 2012) however consider the signing of the last protocol of the Comprehensive 
Ceasefire Agreement (CCA)  by the last remaining rebel movement, the PALIPEHUTU-FNL in December 2008 
respectively its transformation into the political party FNL in early 2009 as the official end of the war. In my 
opinion, this interpretation, although legally correct blocks out that from 2009 on, the political climate actually 
worsened and grew more violent again whereas the years between 2005 and 2009 had been comparatively 
calm. Please refer to chapter 1.3. 
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similar in both cases7. Particularly the highly localized nature of violence (neighbors killing neighbors) 
has been a recurrent feature in both countries and implies that a strong focus on local processes 
would be warranted with regard to reconciliation as well. These similarities are contrasted by the 
converse paths that these societies, their leaders and citizens chose to reconstructing and reconciling 
their countries after the hot phase of the conflict. Comparing two relatively similar country settings, 
their parallels as well as their uniqueness, and studying the popular reaction to diverse approaches 
towards reconciliation and reconstruction might teach us a great deal about the nature of reconcilia-
tion in the Great Lakes Region. 
In a nutshell, the objective of this dissertation is to compare national politics aimed at reconstruction 
and reconciliation after mass political violence with regard to their perception by the rural population 
affected.  
The thesis will try to assume a perspective as holistic as possible. Observing Rwandan and Burundian 
reconstruction efforts through the lens of popular perception, it will compare processes of recovery 
and the ways in which diverse political strategies have permeated towards the grassroots. It takes an 
interdisciplinary, exploratory approach, combining research techniques from social and political sci-
ence in order to analyze the current state of affairs regarding the distinctive post-settlement/ post-
genocide reconstruction. Research has been conducted in communities in Southern Rwanda (Huye 
and Gisagara districts in Southern Province) and Northern Burundi (Kirundo and Ngozi Provinces) in 
close proximity to each other. The multi-sited investigation provides a descriptive account of local 
views of national post-conflict politics collected during my field research in 2011, focusing on the 
nature and perception of political intervention for reconciliation in the local context. Specific subjects 
touched upon include the management of coexistence and identity, memory and commemoration, 
and transitional justice. 
The purpose of the thesis is less to develop a comprehensive theory of reconciliation and conflict 
resolution in Rwanda and Burundi, but rather for the opinions of populations in post-conflict envi-
ronments to be explored and their voices to be heard. An analysis of peasants’ experiences may con-
tribute strongly to the debate about post-conflict reconstruction, particularly when comparing the 
high profile, donor-supported and top-down approach of the Rwandan regime to the protracted, 
power-sharing based process in Burundi. 
                                                          
7
 Cf. Lemarchand, 2009 and Prunier, 2009. Both of these books also cover the massacres in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) which will only be treated marginally in this thesis even though the conflict in the DRC 
is central to the developments in Rwanda and Burundi and all the conflicts in the Great Lakes region are deeply 
intertwined. Even though the dynamics of violence in the DRC are deeply correlated with (and some would say 
caused by) the genocide in Rwanda and to a lesser extent, the Burundian civil war, I chose to limit my analysis 
to the two countries I conducted field research in. 
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Twenty years after the Rwandan genocide and almost 10 years after the CNDD-FDD’s ascent to pow-
er, the time is rife for a medium-term assessment of both countries reconciliation politics. By taking a 
comparative perspective, the study hints towards strategies and sociopolitical settings beneficial to 
reconciliation but at the same time remains able to pinpoint counterproductive developments and 
constellations. Above all, the comparative view focuses on the sociopolitical context of reconciliation 
politics in both countries.  
Ultimately, analyzing the popular reaction towards post-settlement/post-genocide politics and com-
paring the results in two societies also asks about the place of reconciliation within the framework of 
reconstruction. How important are goals such as transitional justice, acknowledgement, apology or 
commemoration within the bigger societal framework? Are basic requirements such as governmental 
mediation, legalistic equality and economic development to be fulfilled in order to heal society? Al-
ternatively, is a complete transformation of national identities necessary?  Applying a comparative 
perspective, reconciliation as a guiding political concept itself has to be questioned.  Is the design of 
reconciliation politics the key to societal recovery or is their success rather determined by their 
agents or manners of implementation?  
For decades, Western governments and African elites have tried to implement their theories, values 
and dogmas on African populations from the top down, often with catastrophic consequences. 
Through the findings from over ninety semi-structured life-story interviews in Southern Rwanda and 
Northern Burundi, this thesis tries to reflect the views and insights from the rural population back 
into the political realm, producing a bottom-up assessment of politics aimed at reconciliation and 
reconstruction in Rwanda and Burundi.  
Outline 
In the first chapter of the thesis, the history and sociopolitical constellations of both countries as well 
as the principal problems they face with regard to reconciliation are roughly outlined. In chapter two, 
the theoretical definitions and backgrounds utilized in the thesis are established. As some terms dis-
cussed later are actually shaped by the policies investigated8, such an anticipation of the political 
background of the terms and issues discussed makes sense in order to understand the thesis outline. 
After the historical and theoretical settings are established, chapter three will elucidate the ap-
proach, structure and methodological tools of the thesis in detail and already delve into some of the 
more delicate problems of analyzing reconciliation politics. It will expound some theoretical concepts 
that help understanding the post-conflict environments in the Great Lakes such as a working defini-
tion of reconciliation, different notions about post-colonial statehood in Africa and some elementary 
                                                          
8
 Please refer 3.2.5 
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thoughts about nation- and peacebuilding. Chapter four will comprise a comprehensive analysis of 
the findings of my field research in Rwanda with a strong focus on the dominant discourse of unity 
and reconciliation and the vision of the RPF whereas the albeit short chapter five will be dedicated to 
the 'non-approach' to reconciliation politics in Burundi. In the final chapter six, the experiences and 
findings in both cases will be summarized and compared, followed by the conclusion. 




1. Historical Background: Genocidal Twins 
1.1. Parallel Histories 
1.1.1.  Alternating Episodes of Mass Violence and Genocide 
Similar Structure and History 
One of the main reasons why Rwanda and Burundi are ideal candidates for comparative research is 
their close resemblance with regard to size, population density, language, culture, economic struc-
ture9 as well as their unique ethnic constellation, which is strongly influenced by German and particu-
larly Belgian colonization.  
During the Belgian colonial rule that began in 1916, Rwanda and Burundi were jointly ruled as one 
territory called Rwanda-Urundi until their simultaneous independence on July 1, 1962.  Next to being 
landlocked and ranking among the most densely populated countries in Africa, the two states also 
parallel to each other in their very rural settlement patterns where most people live in small, scat-
tered homesteads typically built on one of the many hills forming the landscape. Settlement in villag-
es or even cities is a relatively recent occurrence and even in bustling cities such as Kigali, subsistence 
farming and cattle-ownership have remained culturally relevant for almost all parts of the popula-
tion. Both countries furthermore display an extreme age structure: 42-43 % of Rwandans and 46-47% 
of Burundians are younger than fourteen years10. This percentage has not changed much in the last 
ten years, resulting in a perpetual “youth bulge11”. Population density, age structure and agricultural 
settlement patterns are important factors with regard to the countries’ parallel history of mass vio-
lence and important to the understanding of why mass violence in the Great Lakes Region has taken 
the form of veritable population purges that often relied on recruiting the peasants themselves12.  
                                                          
9
 Rwanda: Area: 26’338 km²; Population: 11.7 Mio. (July 2012); Languages: Kinyarwanda, English, French; Eco-
nomic Structure: 90 percent agriculture, 10 percent industry and services. Cf. CIA, The World Factbook: Rwanda 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html (26.August 2012) 
Burundi: 27’830 km²; Population: 10.5 Mio. (July 2012); Languages: Kirundi, French; Economic Structure: 93.6 
percent agriculture; 2.3 percent industry; 4.1 percent services. Cf. CIA, The World Factbook: Burundi 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html (26.August 2012) 
10
 Cf. Heinsohn, 2003, 66 for 2003 and CIA, The World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/by.html (26.August 2012) for 2012. 
11
 Heinsohn, 2003, 13. 
12
 Gunnar Heinsohn (2008) makes a convincing point about the likelihood of war and genocide increasing rapid-
ly given an excessive number of well-fed young men with little hopes for acquiring employment or status. In 
agrarian cultures such as Rwanda or Burundi where land tenure and ownership of cattle have defined wealth 
and settlement for centuries and population pressure led to a dramatic land scarcity, the attractiveness of mass 
violence for young men with regard to gaining access to land and prestigious positions are obvious. Many of my 
interviewees saw greed as a main motivation for participating in the killings and most ex-convicts admitted to 
looting. Cf. 4.1.5. and 5.2.1. 
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The ethnic quotas in both countries, even though they are still mostly based on colonial censi13 look 
roughly the same: 85-86 percent Hutu, 14-15 percent Tutsi, 1 percent Twa14. Even if it could be ar-
gued that up to 70 percent of Burundians (and probably Rwandans as well) are of mixed ethnic de-
cent15, ethnicity has been traditionally inherited patrilineally. These ethnic identities and their forced 
stratification during the Belgian colonial rule are commonly situated at the origin of the genocidal 
tragedy and the controversies surrounding it. 
Rwanda and Burundi both were ancient kingdoms roughly sharing the size of the present states be-
fore colonization. These kingdoms were governed through a complex system of personal dependen-
cies headed by the Mwami, the king. Cattle breeding played a dominant role for social stratification. 
The question if 'Hutu' and 'Tutsi' represent actual ethnic identities or if their 'ethnic' determinant is 
the result of a Western (miss-) interpretation of the ancient social structure16 is contested. It seems 
plausible and is widely accepted that the terms originally seem to have signified hereditary social 
positions determined by personal dependencies and cattle ownership17. René Lemarchand, in his 
groundbreaking work "Rwanda and Burundi" speaks of "castes"18. The Rwandan royal house was 
traditionally Tutsi while in Burundi, the ‘Ganwa’ represented a royal class separated from ordinary 
Tutsi. Nevertheless, the social system  was permeable to a certain extent and Hutu-Chiefs as well as 
poor Tutsi (Petits Tutsi) could be found in both countries19. 
Ethnic Identities and Genocide 
The official Rwandan historiography20 adapted by the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front)21 maintains that 
ethnic identities in Rwanda and Burundi have been almost entirely manufactured by European colo-
nists in order to facilitate a 'divide and rule'-policy, which was later appropriated by colonial and 
post-colonial Rwandan elites to bolster their claims to power22. There is a consensus among scholars 
that the strict colonial categorization into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa at the very least exacerbated ethnic 
                                                          
13
 Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 6 criticizes these numbers in the Burundian context because they originate from the 
1930s, do account neither for the Ganwa-princes nor the Hutu victims of the various episodes of mass violence 
in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1991, which have also caused a mass exodus. He maintains that the estimate of 20 
percent Tutsi might not be far off but that “Tutsis” themselves represent a very heterogeneous category. 
14
 Cf. e.g. Reyntjens, 2000, 11; Southall, 2006, 202 (Burundi); Prunier, 1995, 23-40 (on the colonial construction 
of ethnicity in Rwanda); Eltringham, 2004, 1-34 (on Rwanda); CIA: World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html (26.August 2012) 
15
 Cf. Watt, 2008, 26. 
16
 Cf. Shyaka, 2004, 6ff. 
17
 Regarding pre-colonial history in the Great Lakes, please refer to Cf.  Chrétien, 2003,165- 191.  
18
 Lemarchand, 1970, xiii. 
19
 The system seems to share some parallels with the European feudal system in the middle ages. There is even 
a word in Kirundi that signifies “promotion” into another category: kwihutura – to “de-Hutuize” – cf. Watt, 
2008, 27 
20
 For a blueprint of Rwandan historiography as it is taught in Rwanda today, cf.  Byanafashe & Rutayisire, 2011.   
21
 Cf. RPF: http://www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?-history- (29.11.2012). 
22
 Cf. Byanafashe & Rutayisire, 183ff; 213f or RPF: http://www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/?-history- (29.11.2912).  
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divisions in Rwanda and later in Burundi23.  The Europeans, arriving in the late 19th century, associat-
ed the tall, slender Tutsi with the cattle breeding upper echelons of society and the royal court24. The 
mostly short, stocky Hutu were considered a lower race of poor peasants and cultivators25. Racist 
theories such as the notorious “Hamitic Hypothesis26” had their heyday during colonization. Belgian 
colonists systematically favored the Tutsi over the Hutu with regard to granting access to education 
or administrative posts. The Belgians started to reverse this policy towards the end of colonial rule. 
Their intent was mostly to preserve Belgian influence in central Africa because many educated Tutsi, 
particularly the UNAR in Rwanda, had turned into nationalist advocates of independence27. This sud-
den change of heart in favor of "numerical democracy" raised a class of radical Hutus such as Gré-
goire Kayibanda to the surface in Rwanda. In their efforts to stop the anti-colonial triumph of the 
UPRONA in Burundi, the Belgians also conspired with the PDC, assassinating premier minister Prince 
Louis Rwagasore in 1961 and probably destroyed Burundi's only hope for an ethnically unified fu-
ture28. The colonial era in Rwanda ended in the so-called Hutu revolution of 1959, pogroms that re-
moved the Tutsi royal court and displaced many Tutsi. After Rwagasore's assassination Burundi's 
post-independence period was plagued by intense power struggles within the UPRONA and due to 
the proximity of the Rwandan conflict, increasingly between Hutu and Tutsi, culminating in a coup by 
Michel Micombero in 1966. The seeds of mass violence had been sown29. 
The racial dichotomy between Hutu and Tutsi was exacerbated by post-colonial totalitarian regimes 
determined to obtain power over the post-colonial state in both countries. Once again, ethnici identi-
ty was used as a tool to divide and rule, reinforcing its divisive qualities. This struggle for state power 
is the actual origin of the recurring episodes of mass killing and genocide. It resulted in massacres 
against Tutsi in Rwanda in 1959, 1963, 1967, 1973 and the Rwandan genocide in 199430 as well as 
                                                          
23
 Cf. e.g. Chrétien, 2003, 291-347; Des Forges & HRW, 2002, 55-66;  Mamdani, 2002, 41-102. In Burundi, the 
first interethnic clashes took place after the elections of 1965. 
24 The mwami (King) in Rwanda was always a Tutsi. In Burundi, the Ganwa (princes) were considered a separate 
group. They were the holders of power during the monarchy. The Ganwa however lost most of their influence 
during and after colonization and came to be seen as ordinary Tutsi after decolonization. Cf. Watt, 2008, 23-33; 
Lemarchand, 1996, 34-58. 
25
 During my own field research, I was able to detect some remains of this mixture of social and ethnic stratifi-
cation in some figures of speech of my participants. Particularly old participants in Burundi used the words “I 
used to be his Hutu” or “they were my/our Hutu”, referring to a systemic relationship of dependency where the 
Tutsi owned the land and the Hutu tilled it – Cf. Interview “Etienne”, „Kamenge“, 29.11.11., Interview “Sylves-
tre”, „Kamenge“, 30.11.11. 
26
 This thesis, made popular by Christian missionaries, claimed that the Tutsi were of Nilotic origin, placing 
them closer to the “superior” European race. Proponents of the thesis assumed that the Tutsi had immigrated 
into Central Africa from the northeast and subjugated the inferior Bantu-culture of the Hutu. Cf. Sanders, 1960, 
521-532. 
27
 Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 201-291.  
28
 Cf. Lemarchand, 1970, 324-360. 
29
 Cf. Chapter 1.1.3. 
30
 Cf. Mamdani, 2002. 
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massacres in Burundi in 1965, 1988 and 1991, the extermination of the Burundian Hutu elite in 1972, 
and the more than decade-long civil war that started in 199331 and included “acts of genocide32” 
against Tutsi as well. 
This post-colonial heritage dominated by genocide and mass killing in both countries has to be re-
garded from a broad historical and regional perspective in order to understand the approaches that 
Rwandans and Burundians take towards reconciliation. This intertwinedness of ethnic identity and 
political exclusion leading to recurrent episodes of violence must to be seen in a regional dimension. 
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 perpetrated by Hutu extremists against the Tutsi-minority and their 
real and alleged Hutu-sympathizers alone has cost a staggering number of lives. Estimates vary from 
500’000 to over a million people33. Burundi has witnessed a genocidal purge by the Tutsi-dominated 
army against the Hutu elite in 197234 killing at least 100’00035 and a protracted civil war along pre-
dominantly ethnic lines with mass killings on both sides from 1993 to 200336 that saw 300’00037 peo-
ple killed. Furthermore, the Rwandan genocide and the Burundian civil war had a major influence in 
both wars in Zaïre/the Democratic Republic of Congo DRC (1996-1997 and 1998-2003 with regional 
                                                          
31
 Independent of the official statement of the UN Commission cited above, opinions about calling the diverse 
incidents of mass violence genocide differed among my participants. Referring to 1972, Lemarchand (1995, xxvi 
and 2009, 71) characterizes the violence as clearly genocidal as does Meisler (1990, 384-393). 
32
 UN Commission of Inquiry, Final Report, 2002, 62f. characterizes the atrocities against Tutsi in Burundi 1993 
as “acts of genocide” and recommends re-examining the events of 1972 which they strongly suggest constitut-
ed genocide as well 
33
 Cf. Des Forges & HRW, 2002, 34. Estimates about the death toll of the genocide vary wildly. Des Forges uses 
the UN numbers from demographer William Seltzer. In his article in the International Herald Tribune (2 July 
2012), Longman cites the number of 500’000 victims. Prunier, 2009, xxxiv agreeing with the official UN posi-
tion, estimates a number of 800’000 victims. There always has been a dispute about the number of victims. 
Differing from international sources, Rwandan sources such as the ministry of local government MINALOC and 
the survivor’s association IBUKA usually estimate a higher body count of over one million. Cf. IRDP, 2003,35; 
Republic of Rwanda: http://www.rwandahope.com/RPFhistory.pdf (29.11.2012). Another dispute exists about 
the numbers of Tutsis killed. While the Rwandan sources speak of 97.3 percent or 1.04 million Tutsi victims 
killed in the genocide and the civil war from 1991 to 1994, scholars such as Jennie E. Burnet (2009, 101) point 
out that according to the Rwandan census of 1991, the number of the Tutsi population in the country was es-
timated at 700’000. 
34
 Cf. e.g, Reyntjens, 2000, 7 and Meisler, 1990, 384-393. 
35
 Meisler, 1990, 384 speaks of 100‘000 to 200‘000 casualties. Lemarchand, 1996, xv, mentions 100’000 victims 
as well. 
36
 Reyntjens (2005b, 117) speaks of a “decade of war“ when addressing the civil war in Burundi. This refers to 
the period between President Ndadaye’s assassination on October 21, 1993 and the signing of the Pretoria 
peace agreement between the government and the main armed opposition movement, the CNDD-FDD, signed 
on October 8, 2003. However, the last remaining armed faction, the Palipehutu-FNL only signed a ceasefire on 
September 7, 2006 and shelled the capital Bujumbura again in 2008. Nowadays, the political situation remains 
fragile and the FNL is again active at the border to the DRC. (cf. Reyntjens, 2005b, 117-137; International Crisis 
Group, Africa Report No. 131, 28 August 2007; Southall, 2006, 201-220; Vogel, 2014). 
37
 Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 15 and 2009, 141; Reyntjens (2000, 19) speaks of 200‘000 victims up to the year 2000, 
of which 50‘000 had been killed in 1993 alone. Southall (2006, 201) speaks of “up to 350’000” casualties.The 
death toll varies to a large extent and is difficult to verify, as the conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC are 
intertwined. No government was able to keep track of all of its citizens, many of them refugees. Malnutrition 
and diseases related to war conditions sometimes are counted as well, and, particularly in the DRC, thousands 
of refugees just ‘disappeared’. 
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and low-level conflicts particularly in the east continuing to this day). In the DRC, the initial crisis in 
1996 sparked by the exodus of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the aftermath of the genocide. The con-
flicts in the DRC have produced a death toll of up to four million lives38 and seen Rwanda as well as 
Burundi engaging in military operations within Congolese territory. The war in the DRC is generally 
recognized as the bloodiest conflict since the end of the Second World War.  
While violence in the eastern regions of the DRC is still ongoing, Rwanda is currently enjoying a peri-
od of relative peace after the Tutsi-ledRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) ended the genocide and won a 
decisive victory in the parallel civil war against the genocidal interim government in 1994. The RPF 
has held power in Rwanda ever since39.  
After an internationally brokered peace process under South African leadership brought “la crise40” 
to an end, Burundi has officially managed the political transition to formally democratic rule in 
2005/2006. After the first democratic elections of 1993 plunged the country into violence, Burundi 
saw the Congrés National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Defense de la Dé-
mocratie (CNDD-FDD) rise to power in a remarkably peaceful manner in 200541 but has become in-
creasingly authoritarian ever since while the security situation remains fragile.  
Political stability and a promising perspective of tolerant coexistence and mutual respect between 
former antagonists are by no means guaranteed. In both countries, victims and perpetrators are 
forced to live together as neighbors. This proximity reinforces the acuteness of the problem and thus 
the need to strive for peace and reconciliation, though it renders the situation highly volatile.  
Refugee Streams 
Another dangerous factor is that conflict in the region is prone to regionalization. With the Banyar-
wanda/Barundi-diaspora settling in various parts of the Great Lakes Region, many conflicts have al-
ways spilled into each other, particularly in the form of huge refugee streams after episodes of mass 
violence. Notably Uganda in the beginning of the 1990s42, Rwanda, and to a lesser extent Burundi, in 
1996 effectively ‘outsourced’ their domestic conflicts. Uganda supported the RPF when it invaded 
Rwanda in 1990, the RPF and the UPRONA-led government of Burundi chose to safeguard their bor-
                                                          
38
 Cf. Prunier, 2009, xxxvi 
39
 Cf. Reyntjens, 2005a, 15-47; Waugh, 2004, 146-165.  
40
 Many of my participants used the French term “la crise” to refer to the civil war. 
41
 Cf. Reyntjens, 2005b, 117-135; Uvin, 2009, 10-17; Lemarchand, 2006, 1-20 
42
 Cf. Chapter 4.1.1. and 4.1.3. About the effects that the Ugandan “crisis of citizenship” had on the founding of 
the RPF. Also cf. Mamdani, 2001, 159-184. 
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ders from Hutu rebels by destroying the refugee camps across the border and fighting their domestic 
rebels on Congolese soil by supporting Kabila’s ADFL43. 
Lemarchand44 understands political, economic and social exclusion of certain ethnic groups as the 
principal dimension of conflict in the Great Lakes Region. With economic pressure weighing down on 
these countries and large amounts of the population being excluded from opportunities of socioeco-
nomic advancement45 , exclusion leads to insurrection, insurrection leads to violent repression and 
thus, refugee streams and regional instability. In many cases, a conflict's losers allied themselves to a 
warring faction in their country of exile. In exile, they often fight similar ethnic groups as before, fur-
ther exacerbating the tensions there. Rwandan Tutsi joined the Ugandan NRM46, Radical Burundian 
Hutus killed among the Interahamwe-militias47. In the DRC, the steadily shifting alliances between 
diverse Congolese ethnic groups and their local forces, the Congolese army, external intervention 
forces and refugee warriors such as the Rwandan Ex-FAR or the Burundian FNL actually drove the 
conflict into hyper-localization and a state of affairs where peace-builders barely knew where to 
begin and who to address48. 
The diagram below displays the diverse refugee streams and invasions. If combined with the timeline 
on the right, the temporal proximity of conflicts demonstrates how refugee streams have sparked 
insurrections and in many cases, destabilized the host country. Peace in any country remains fragile 
as long as the neighboring states remain unstable. 
                                                          
43
 Cf. Lemarchand, 2009a, 3-45 and Prunier, 2009, 37-72. 
44
 Cf. Lemarchand, 2009a, 30f.  
45
 Cf. Chapter 2.3. 
46
 Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 159-184. 
47
 Cf. Des Forges, 173-177; 510.   
48




Regionalization of Conflict: Refugee Influx and Invasions 
1.1.2. Post-Settlement/ Post-Genocide Period: Differing Points of Departure 
Post-settlement periods in African conflicts are all too often shaped by political instability, wide-
spread low-level violence and authoritarian tendencies49.  
In the post-conflict period, the comparative dynamics between Rwanda and Burundi become particu-
larly interesting: not only do their historical parallels set up the two states as perfect candidates for 
comparison, but also diverging recent political developments have rendered comparison even more 
interesting. Furthermore, enough time has passed since the official end of the 'hot' phase of the con-
flicts in both countries to speak about long-term developments and challenges. Since the success of 
reconstruction and reconciliation efforts ultimately requires long-term monitoring to reveal itself, we 
are in the fortunate situation to already assess and compare some of the short- and middle-term 
strategies employed. 
The points of departure resemble each other: two poor Central African countries with similar histo-
ries of colonialism and inter-ethnic violence that choose to address their violent past. They however 
address this past in multiple ways, ranging from radically differing to rather similar. Even though both 
countries have implemented new laws to deal with ethnicity, their approaches differ wildly.  
                                                          
49
 Cf. Furley, 2006, 1-5 
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Rwanda has decided to ban ethnic identities while Burundi opted for quota regulations, anchoring 
ethnic identities in law. While Rwanda chose to prosecute the entirety of perpetrators of the geno-
cide, transitional justice in Burundi remains largely stalled. Such differences account for radically 
different strategies in dealing with reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation. With regard to 
gaining a deeper understanding about how to build peace in the Great Lakes Region however, new 
policies and laws only account for largely theoretical developments. Rather than the policy itself, the 
socio-political context of its emergence and implementation often is the determinant factor. This 
context often defines the success or failure of projects aimed at reconciliation. Keeping this in mind, 
this dissertation will concentrate and emphasize upon the local and individual contexts within the 
analysis of reconciliation politics. 
 
1.1.3. 1959: The initial Spark of Mass Violence 
The different episodes of ethnic mass violence and exclusion in the Great Lakes Region have followed 
distinct patterns, starting with the so-called 'Hutu revolution' in Rwanda. These events from 1959 to 
196250 supplanted the Tutsi-monarchy with a Hutu-dominated republic under radical PARMEHUTU-
rule. Although circumstantial politico-economic factors and societal structure were probably more 
important for the subsequent outbreaks of violent confrontation between Hutu and Tutsi than the 
mere existence of juxtaposed ethnic identities, the events of 1959 delivered a blueprint for ethnic 
division and violence, which all subsequent episodes essentially followed. The revolution of 1959 and 
its after-pains until 196451 were eventually determinant for both Rwanda's and Burundi's conflict-
laden history in three different respects: 
 They consolidated the ethno-political Hutu-Tutsi antagonism in Rwanda and successfully ex-
ported it to Burundi 
 They shaped the reaction of Burundian Tutsi-elites to political challenges from the Hutu ma-
jority. 
                                                          
50
 Officially, the 'Hutu revolution' ended when Rwanda was granted independent as a republic on July 1, 1962. 
Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 299ff. 
51
 Incursions by monarchist Tutsi rebels continued until 1963/64, when the last 'inyenzi'-invasion from Burundi 
failed, causing widespread massacres against Tutsi in Rwanda and another 200'000 refugees. As a conse-
quence, the Rwandan regime banned the parties UNAR and RADER and executed its memebers. Cf. Lemar-
chand, 1970, 197-227.  
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 They laid the foundation for the RPF's understanding of Rwandan history and thus coined 
their nationalist, anti-colonial ideology and the narrative, which shapes current Rwandan pol-
itics52. 
In order to reconcile or even overcome the antagonistic identities emerging from the turbulent final 
period of colonization, it is of fundamental importance to bear in mind the intimate correlation be-
tween the enterprise of nation building in the Great Lakes and the genesis of ethno-political identi-
ties. The questions of ethnic affiliation and exclusion are situated at the heart of these seemingly 
endless cycles of insurrection and repression, populist incitement and elitist appetites for moderniza-
tion. 
The 'Hutu Revolution' 
Before colonization, Rwanda was, apart from a few autonomous fiefs in the north, a Tutsi-kingdom. 
"Despite occasional instances of cultural syncretism, the Rwandan monarchy was a Tutsi creation53," 
writes Lemarchand. Mwami Kigeri IV Rwabugiri had conquered northern Rwanda in the 19th centu-
ry54 and established a unified and centralized kingdom with a two-tiered class system, in which the 
Tutsi formed a 'hegemonic' caste in the Gramscian sense, meaning that they were politically and 
economically dominant and considered themselves morally superior. This "premise of inequality55" 
was reinforced during the period of Belgian tutelage. The ‘Hamitic’ myth propagated by the colonial 
elite successfully reconstructed the identity of Rwandan Tutsi as a non-indigenous race of settlers, 
‘black Caucasians’ that filled the contradictory middle position of a subject race between white colo-
nizers and Hutu ‘natives’56. Favored by the colonial administration, Tutsi formed the native authority 
left in charge of customary law, an intermediate class between colonists and their subjects. The ra-
cialization of the Tutsi, their construction as a nonnative settler community by law ‘naturalized’ the 
political differences between Hutu and Tutsi57. A big percentage of Tutsis, the ‘petits Tutsi’, however 
remained excluded from colonial benefits, but still could not escape the stigmatization as members 
of this ‘intermediate race’58. 
When demands for modernization and popular participation became more and more pressing in the 
1950s, the Belgians reversed their sympathies and started backing the Hutu majority. The Hutu intel-
lectuals, among them a seminarist called Grégoire Kayibanda, were few, and much more likely to 
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 Cf. Chapter 4.1. 
53
 Lemarchand, 1970, 490. 
54
 Cf. Chrétien, 2003, 160f. 
55
 Lemarchand, 1970, 473. 
56
 Cf. Eltringham, 2004, 1-34; Prunier, 1995, 1-40. Cf. chapter 1.1.3. 
57
 Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 34f 
58
 Cf. Prunier, 1995, 122; 249 
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uphold tight connections to the colonial power in order to 'prepare the population for democracy' 
than the royalist Tutsi elite, which pushed for independence in order to maintain its oligarchic control 
over the majority59. Rwandan colonial society hence was split vertically along ethnic lines. Inter-caste 
mobility was minimal. A reversal of caste superiority would have put monarchic rule in jeopardy. 
Thus for the Tutsi elite, who had only conquered the north shortly before German colonization, the 
choice was suppression rather than accommodation. For the Rwandan Hutus however, independ-
ence and equality implied the abolition of the monarchy. In particular, among northern Hutus, inde-
pendence was primarily understood as emancipation from indigenous imperialism. The yoke of Eu-
ropean colonialism was only considered of secondary importance because the Belgian trusteeship 
was never meant to be permanent.60. Demands for modernization and political participation joined 
hands with protest against ethnic oppression, fueled by the general frustration about the bureaucrat-
ization of clientage, land hunger61, and the pre-modern, messianic tradition of peasant revolts in the 
north. The fact that in Rwanda, social stratification coincided with ethnic division made the system 
vulnerable to social change and revolution.  
The ‘Hutu revolution’ started after the death of king Mutara Rudahigwa when the radical Tutsi 
formed the UNAR to bring about an immediate end to Belgian rule.In November 1959, mutual provo-
cations between Hutu and Tutsi turned into a PARMEHUTU-directed jacquerie that rapidly devolved 
into ethnic cleansing, killing several hundred62 Tutsi and displacing thousands. The Belgian colonial 
administration's decision to throw its weight behind the Hutu insurgency and thwart the crown's 
attempt to repress the jacquerie when Hutus started to burn houses and attack Tutsi officials, accel-
erated the downfall of the monarchy considerably63. The Belgians and PARMEHUTU subsequently 
formed an autonomous Belgian-Rwandan government and deposed king Kigeli V in a coup on Januar 
28. 196164. Tutsi started to flee the country in an exodus that continued up to 1994, among them 
Paul Kagame’s family. The revolutionary government formed by the radicalized Hutu-counter-elite 
uncritically adopted the ‘Hamite’ construct and propagated a Rwandan democracy for the ‘indige-
nous native’ majority while excluding the ‘non-indigenous’ Tutsi. Kayibanda, author of the 'Hutu 
manifesto' became president. With regard to institutional discontinuity, the events from 1959 to 
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1961 can be considered a revolution: Rwanda abolished the monarchy and became a republic. For 
the peasants however, not much changed. Clientage and patrimonialism were not abandoned, the 
clientage ties merely shifted to a new class of patrons that recruited itself from the Hutus who had 
before formed the "rural proletariat65". Despite its revolutionary rhetoric, the new government did 
not exact fundamental democratic changes but inherited the monarchy's centralism and paternalist 
attitude focused on advancing rapid modernization. Social change and modernization remained 
bound by the tradition of exclusion. The new government merely substituted the guiding principle of 
Tutsi superiority with the numerically legitimated concept of Hutu supremacy. PARMEHUTU not only 
reversed the colonial roles, but also factually transformed the Tutsi into a minority with very limited 
rights, barred from the army and with very restricted access to government jobs or higher educa-
tion66. With the initial displacement of ten s of thousands of Tutsi and by depriving the domestic Tutsi 
community of their rights, the PARMEHUTU and its Belgian friends initiated the dynamics of exclu-
sion, oppression, mass violence and bitter ethnic antagonism that plague the Great Lakes Region up 
to today. Mamdani considers the refusal to transform the political legacy of colonialism to be the 
biggest failure of the postcolonial state and the greatest liability of Hutu rule67 from 1959 to 1990. 
Burundi's Destabilization 
Sharing Rwanda's ethnic structure but not its rigid two-tiered political structure and absorbing a large 
percentage of Tutsi refugees, Burundi was strongly affected by the Hutu revolution. The weak regime 
of Mwami Mwambutsa IV was not able to prevent ethnic polarization. The demonstration effect of 
the Rwandan revolution did not fail to inspire Burundian Hutus who transferred the supremacist 
motives of the Rwandan Tutsi-leadership to Burundian Tutsi, whereas the Burundian Tutsi became 
increasingly scared of the vast numerical superiority of Hutus. Even though neither ethnic group ini-
tially had the motive of capturing state power exclusively, their behavior subsequent to the Rwandan 
revolution elicited exactly the feared reactions in the other group, rendering ethnic polarization a 
"self-fulfilling prophecy68". 
Burundian politics up to the 1960s were mostly defined by factional rivalries between clans of the 
ruling Ganwa-princes. The Ganwa had Hutu as well as Tutsi clients, and the horizontal rather than 
vertical cleavages in society allowed for much greater upward mobility than in Rwanda69. The Ganwa, 
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few in number, considered themselves to be a group apart and behaved rather flexible with regard 
to caste relations. Prince Louis Rwagasore, probably the most able Burundian leader at the time, 
winner of the elections of 1961 and the only hope for national unification, catered to both Hutu and 
Tutsi, a behavior unimaginable for a prince in Rwanda. Sadly, Rwagasore was assassinated on Octo-
ber 13, 1961 on behalf of his Ganwa-competitors and their Belgian backers. For Belgium, the tem-
plate of the Rwandan Hutu revolution was a much more attractive scenario than a nationalist Burun-
dian regime with a charismatic leader pushing for independence70. 
After Rwagasore's assassination, his political successors fought for the spoils and the multi-ethnic 
nationalist UPRONA-party rapidly disintegrated into different factions, which soon behaved like sepa-
rate parties. The 'Monrovia'-group consisted mainly of Hutu politicians such as Paul Mirerekano or 
Pierre Ngendadumwe and was supported by Belgium and the USA. The 'Casablanca'-group comprised 
mainly Tutsi- and Ganwa-politicians. It was supported by the Rwandan Tutsi-refugees, for whom a 
Tutsi-dominated government in Bujumbura was the only chance for reinstalling Tutsi-rule in Rwanda, 
and, at least up to 1965, by Communist China. 
Since the riots in Kamenge sparked by the radical Tutsi youth wing Jeunesses Nationales Rwagasore 
(JNR) in early 1962, Burundian politics polarized rapidly due to three main factors. First, the escalat-
ing refugee situation71 and the repeated incursions of exiled Tutsi fighters from Burundi into Rwanda 
led to tensions between the two countries. This as well as inner-Burundian confrontations between 
radical Tutsi and Hutus multiplied the disintegrating effect of the Hutu revolution. The Burundian 
Tutsi elite saw the Rwandan refugees as a safeguard against Burundian Hutus and natural allies, par-
ticularly when a Hutu-government came to power. This culminated in the assassination of Hutu 
Prime Minister Pierre Ngendadumwe by a Rwandan Tutsi refugee on behalf of the Casablanca faction 
in 1965. Second, repeated attempts of incumbent Tutsi governments (Muhirwa, Nyamoya) to elimi-
nate their Hutu competition through plots, counter-plots and assassinations consolidated the ethnic 
factions, weakening the moderates. Thirdly, in order to mobilize followers, politicians from both 
groups sought to politicize their segments of society, especially the students radicalized. 
The only institution that introduced a modicum of stability into this muddled scenario was the mon-
archy. From 1962 to 1965, King Mwambutsa acted as an umpire between the rival factions of 
UPRONA, alternating Hutu-dominated with Tutsi-dominated governments. Mwambutsa was not a 
strong ruler and mainly relied on the traditional oligarchy and patrimonialism to uphold his reign. Il-
equipped with an erratic, instable and neo-traditionalist system of rule, Burundi stumbled into inde-
pendence in 1962. The court balanced Hutu and Tutsi-interests but it could neither control them nor 
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prevent the influx of powerful modernist ideas such as popular participation and mass mobilization. 
The new Burundian elites comprised of army officers, foreign-educated intellectuals, youth leaders 
and bureaucrats hated the monarchy but their hatred against their ethnic antagonists eclipsed their 
hatred against the monarchy72. Hence, precisely because of its relative weakness, the crown was able 
to capitalize on ethnic divisions. This situation changed when the elections of 1965 brought a Hutu 
majority to power. The elections activated ethnic loyalties. Worried about the implications of majori-
ty rule, Mwambutsa attempted to regain control over the National Assembly by appointing the 
Ganwa Léopold Biha as Prime Minister and drastically curtailing the rights of parliament, factually 
reducing it to a rubber-stamp. The Hutus, deprived of their electoral gains, protested and perceived 
themselves as victims of discrimination in an ethnically biased system. On October 18, 1965, a group 
of Hutu officers attempted a coup against Mwambutsa and Hutus in the provinces, particularly Mu-
ramvya and Cibitoke, started rioting. Even though the coup was quelled by loyal elements of the ar-
my under Captain Micombero, the minister of defense, Mwambutsa fled the country, never to re-
turn. The retaliation of the Tutsi officers left in charge was swift and ruthless. 68 Hutu leaders and 
politicians, among them Paul Mirerekano and ex-prime minister Joseph Bamina were summarily exe-
cuted. Many Hutus in the provinces lost their lives. The army was purged from most Hutu officers73. 
With the abortive coup of 1965, the monarchy collapsed. Even though the Mwami's teenage son, 
Charles Ndizeye assumed the crown as Ntare V in June 1966, thereby deposing Mwambutsa, this was 
only an ultimately secondary intermezzo. Factually, the army had taken power in October 1965. In 
November 1966, Micombero also dethroned Ntare V while he was abroad and proclaimed the repub-
lic under 'revolutionary' rule. In three subsequent coups, the army, headed by a tight-knit group of 
young Tutsi-officers had become a political actor and ridded itself from the political competition. In 
1965, they defeated the Hutu elite, in July 1966, they destroyed the hopes of the old Ganwa-
aristocracy for a political comeback, and in November 1966, they ousted the monarchist competition. 
Subsequently and up to 1967, the army proceeded in remodeling the party, dissasembling the na-
tional assembly and purging Burundian politics from the radical Tutsi elements from the Union Etudi-
ante Burundaise (UNEBA) and the JNR who were able to challenge army rule from the left74.  
In a way, Micombero initiated a revolution from above to avert a revolution from below. The 
'Micomberist' revolution however was an 'interrupted' revolution. Despite its rhetoric, the army act-
ed largely similar to the monarchy, shying away from democracy. As in Rwanda, the new class in 
power did not introduce any fundamental societal changes75. Kayibanda as well as Micombero uti-
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lized the authoritarian tools the monarchy had used before them but disguised them in revolutionary 
rethoric. 
Threatened Army-rule and the Genocide of 1972 
Like the crown before it, the army consistently tried to root out its competition. The hierarchic tradi-
tion suited the army's needs and fear of the Hutu majority drove Burundian politics back into clien-
tage and patrimonialism. Caught between revolutionary aspirations and traditional ethnic underpin-
nings, Micombero acted increasingly isolated and was never able to eliminate threats to his rule 
permanently. A minor Hutu revolt in 1969 prompted another purge against Hutu in politics, the army 
and education. By now the army was almost exclusively Tutsi and the potential for ethnic violence 
was steadily rising as the Hutu sought support among the rural population. The Hutu peasant masses 
were traditionally minded. They had accepted the legitimacy of kingship in the early 1960s but had 
no loyalty towards the new elite who had broken the monarchic tradition. Furthermore, another 
royalist plot was uncovered in 1971. Thus, when a Hutu revolt broke out in Rumonge and Gitega in 
April 1972, Micombero acted fast, against both Hutus and Monarchists. He placed Ntare V who had 
been flown in from Uganda under house arrest only to execute him shortly afterwards and ordered 
the army and the newly founded UPRONA youth wing Jeunesse Révolutionnaire Rwagasore (JRR) to 
kill every Hutu possessing influence or a higher education76. 
The influence of the Hutu revolution of 1959 on the decision of the Tutsi-dominated army to 'decapi-
tate' the emerging Burundian counter-elite can hardly be overemphasized. The Burundian Tutsi wit-
nessed the displacement of over 50'000 Rwandan Tutsi and heard harrowing stories of massacres in 
1962 and 1963, when the Hutu population killed thousands of Tutsi and ethnically cleansed whole 
regions77. In 1964, the Tutsi-parties UNAR and RADER were prohibited in Rwanda and the last Tutsi 
politicians murdered78. With regard to the demographic numbers, a political comeback was all but 
closed off to Tutsi in the Rwandan ethnocracy from 1964 on. Since the elections of 1965, the new 
Burundian Tutsi elite understood that without the monarchist symbols of legitimacy (which 
Rwagasore had possessed), they would not stand a chance in elections. They had furthermore re-
pressed two Hutu-led coup attempts in 1965 and 1969. Confronted with the wanton killings of Tutsi 
in Rumonge, Micombero and his fellow Tutsi officers decided that the only way to subjugate the Hu-
tu for an extended period of time was to eliminate every possible Hutu leader for the foreseeable 
future. Even though this strategy succeeded it simultaneously dramatically increased subsequent 
Burundian leaders dependency on armed force and also sowed the seeds for another round of geno-
cidal violence in 1993. 
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The Failure of UNAR and the RPF 
With some qualifications, UNAR could be considered the ideological predecessor of the RPF. It was 
essentially a nationalist party with a strong anti-colonial stance and mainly Tutsi-dominated. Next to 
the fact that the UNAR ultimately failed whereas the RPF succeeded, the great difference between 
the two is owed to the fact that the UNAR was essentially monarchist and thus bound to the 'premise 
of inequality'. The RPF on the other side is a decidedly republican movement that, despite being 
founded and led by Tutsi, emphasized its accessibility for all ethnic groups from the beginning79. Fur-
thermore, both UNAR and RPF were political parties in exile. The latter was founded in Ugandan ex-
ile, the former became exiled due to its prohibition by the Kayibanda government. Whereas the 
UNAR was unable to fight for a return of the diaspora and quickly faded into obscurity after the in-
yenzi attacks petered out in 1966, the RPF successfully overthrew the genocidal interim government 
in 1994. 
Kagame did have contact with UNAR-veterans in his youth80 and the RPF must have learned from 
UNAR's mistakes. For one, the dedication to upholding the monarchy and with it Tutsi privilege de-
prived UNAR of any meaningful Hutu support. They thus suffered a crushing defeat in the local and 
parliamentary elections of 1960 despite Hutu- grassroots sympathies for the mwami. Paradoxically, 
UNAR combined its monarchist stance with a left-leaning ideology, receiving financial and diplomatic 
backing from the socialist members of the UN trusteeship council81. This 'communist influence' later 
turned against the party when it sought international backing against the increasing Hutu oppression. 
The inyenzis' attempts at fighting their way back into Rwanda were repeatedly blundered by internal 
discord, political and military incompetence, cruelty against Hutu, and personal differences, involun-
tarily strengthening the inner cohesion of the first republic and eventually committing political sui-
cide.In the end, the UNAR in exile "achieved precisely the opposite of what it had set out to do82." 
The RPF learned a great deal from these failures. When they invaded Rwanda in 1990, Kagame's sol-
diers already were a unified, disciplined, combat-hardened army, which was even able to stomach its 
initial defeat and the loss of its commander in the first days of war. The RPF's extremely well-
managed information politics and its obsession with controlling its external image are well docu-
mented83. Tutsi privilege today remains well hidden under a guise of meritocracy84. The discipline 
during the civil war and the rigid top-down hierarchy structured around Paul Kagame as undisputed 
commander have attracted considerable international backing which steadily increased through dis-
                                                          
79
 Cf. Waugh, 2004, 27-46. 
80
 Cf. Waughm 2004, 28. 
81
 Cf. Waugh, 2004, 234. 
82
 Lemarchand, 1970, 227. 
83
 Cf. Pottier, 2002; Chapter 4.1.4. and 4.2.2. 
84
 Cf. Reyntjens, 2005, 15-40. 
Page 20 
 
seminating the carefully crafted 'liberator' narrative, controlling the diaspora and maintaining very 
active public relations with the West. An integral part of the RPF's PR-work is to convince the Rwan-
dan population and the international donors that the RPF is in fact a Rwandan, not a Tutsi-party. 
Nevertheless, they make sure that this claim will not be challenged in elections with unpredictable 
results, which happened to the UNAR in 1960. Like its external image or its centralized development 
process, even elections are tightly controlled and part of the RPF's PR-work85. I will go into further 
detail about the RPF's system of internal dominance and external accountability in chapter 4.2. Suf-
fice it to say, that the RPF took the example of the Tutsi counterrevolutionaries to heart and devised 
new strategies where the UNAR failed, notably with regard to abandoning the idea of officially 
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1.2. Rwanda: A Victor’s Peace 
“Rwanda has undertaken what is, in all probability, the most ambitious attempt any society has ever 
undertaken to ensure accountability for atrocity86.” 
RPF: Politics of Unity and Reconciliation 
Rwanda’s politics in the years since the genocide could be characterized as a high modernist experi-
ment of social engineering. Not even the names of cities and villages have remained the same as 
before the genocide. President Paul Kagame’s government, emerging from the victorious rebel force 
that chased the génocidaires into the Congolese jungle in July 1994, has taken a very active stance 
with regard to reforming the ills, which in its eyes, caused the genocide. In Rwanda, forging national 
unity and reconciliation has become the official government doctrine. 
The divisions of the genocide are an immense obstacle to overcome. Confronted with an unprece-
dented outbreak of popular violence, the government of national unity has opted for a maximum 
approach towards accountability and changing social identities. 
Coined as a cautionary tale about the effects of 'divisionism', the officially propagated narrative of 
the genocide against the Tutsi manifests an ideological cornerstone of the "New Rwanda87” which 
the RPF erected from the ashes of the genocide. Not unlike the Holocaust's significance for the Jews, 
the genocide represents a unique and harrowing experience to every Rwandan Tutsi. It stands as a 
drastic example reminding Tutsi of what could happen if they lose the power to defend themselves88.  
The RPF has dedicated itself to maintaining this power. It presents a nine point-program of national 
unity and reconciliation: 
“1. Restoration of unity among Rwandans; 
2. Defending the sovereignty of the country and ensure the security of people and property; 
3. Establishment of democratic leadership; 
4. Promoting the economy based on the country’s natural resources; 
5. Elimination of corruption, favoritism and embezzlement of national resources; 
6. Promoting social welfare; 
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7. Eliminating all causes for fleeing the country and returning Rwandan refugees back into the coun-
try; 
8. Promoting international relations based on mutual respect, cooperation and mutually beneficial 
economic exchange; 
9. Fighting genocide and its ideology89” 
Most of these points are at least partially relevant for national reconciliation. This is however not the 
place to explore the Rwandan approach to unity and reconciliation in detail90. The complementary 
strategies employed by the Rwandan state and its main agents concerned with the legacy of the 
genocide, particularly the NURC91 (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission) and, to a lesser 
extent, the CNLG92 (Commission Nationale pour la lutte contre le Génocide) will be fleshed out in 
chapter 4. The point to take home here is that Rwandan society has been rebuilt and remodeled 
from the top down in order to make sure that genocide will never happen again.  
The annual commemoration of the “genocide against the Tutsi” as is it is officially referred to, is the 
biggest public event in Rwanda all year and the slogan “never again” has become not only a credo, 
but also a source of legitimization for a government that proudly calls itself “nationalist93”. The new 
patriotic pride of ‘being Rwandan’, which particularly inspires the more well off and urban segments 
of the population, has been propagated as a natural rallying call for the regime, seemingly replacing 
the sectarian ethnic ideologies. Ethnic references have been banned altogether. Seeing itself as the 
main guarantor for peace, justice and development, the RPF imposed laws against ‘divisionism’ and 
‘genocide ideology’. The party enforces the anti-genocide legislation very strictly to the point where 
NGOs and scholars94 criticized the practice as actually exploiting the genocide in pursuit of authoritar-
ian political goals.  
Top-Down Reconstruction 
Today, there is no meaningful opposition against the RPF in Rwanda. The few officially admitted op-
position parties are weak and mostly serve the purpose of ‘bridesmaids’ in elections, providing dem-
ocratic legitimation for the unusually high election-victories of Kagame and his RPF95. On the other 
hand, Rwanda’s economic recovery in the last few years has been remarkable and the state has 
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made genuine efforts towards good governance, which have translated into attention from investors 
and the creation of new jobs for all ethnicities alike96, even though increasing aid cuts poorly affect 
the job situation97.  
At least on the surface, Rwanda today conveys the image of a dynamic state that has successfully 
overcome its genocidal past, has abandoned its conflicted ethnic categorizations and makes room for 
the new, seemingly inclusive “Rwandan” identity. Today, the regime faces increasing international 
criticism because of its alleged human right violations in the DRC98 and its very limited tolerance for 
political dissent99. Despite that, Rwandan elites proudly promote a picture of societal stability. The 
current opinion leaders regard the tensions of the past as a harrowing, but mostly resolved experi-
ence. Remembering is necessary but optimism prevails. The homepage of the National Commission 
for the Fight against Genocide (CNLG) states: “Africa is often dismissed as the home of bad news, but 
Rwanda today is quite the opposite; peaceful, stable and increasingly prosperous. It would be naive to 
think that the legacy of the genocide can be ignored, but optimism is never far away in a land this 
beautiful100”. 
Such a remarkable recovery measured against such extreme odds sounds almost too good to be true. 
The depicted success of the ideology of unity and reconciliation has to be placed under meticulous 
scrutiny in order to distinguish between official propaganda and reconciliation as perceived by 
Rwandan peasants in the countryside. Remaining an ultimately contemporary document, this thesis 
will not be able to provide a definitive assessment of the successes and failures of the Rwandan top-
down reconciliation process for “the challenge of crafting appropriate responses to legacies of past 
violence, and particularly violence involving genocide or mass atrocity, is the work of not one, but 
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many generations101.” It may however provide a more nuanced picture by comparing the propagated 
success stories to individual experiences on the ground. 
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1.3. Burundi: A Deteriorating Democracy 
Burundi, for its part, has implemented a consociational constitution since the government and the 
main (Hutu-) rebel movement CNDD-FDD signed an internationally brokered agreement on power 
sharing in Pretoria 2003. This agreement followed a long and arduous peace process102 and an even 
longer civil war that left over 300’000 dead. The first ceasefire agreement was signed in Arusha in 
2000 already. The war, however, raged on until the CNDD-FDD and the Tutsi-dominated army signed 
the Pretoria Protocol under considerable international pressure, notably from chief negotiator South 
Africa103. Several other rebel groups, among them the longest-standing Hutu rebel movement, PALI-
PEHUTU-FNL however never were part of the agreement. Even though the FNL remained active and 
periodically raided Burundian territory from its rear bases in the DRC, culminating in the shelling of 
Bujumbura in 2008, a period of relative peace followed Nkurunziza’s election. In 2009, even the FNL 
abandoned its armed struggle and registered as a political party. Violence, however, increased again 
around the elections of 2010, culminating in a series of political murders, attacks and arrests104. 
Probably the most remarkable factor for defusing ethnic tensions in the post-settlement political 
structure of Burundi is the implementation of binding ethnic quotas for Hutu, Tutsi and Twa with 
regard to parties and political institutions105. On the political level, the consociational power sharing 
agreement has visibly reduced the ethnic dynamics of the conflict. Competition and political opposi-
tion have lost their ethnic character to a certain degree106. Nevertheless, the peace is very fragile. 
Political progress and sincere efforts to deal with the violent past are largely stalled. Three UN com-
missions of inquiry have produced rather negligible results and the country remains severely under-
developed107. In recent developments, even the ethnic power balance runs the risk to be unraveled 
as Pierre Nkurunziza plans to alter the constitution in order to run for a third term. The altered con-
stitution would arrange for the two vice president posts that need to be occupied by a Hutu and a 
Tutsi to be abolished in favor of a powerful prime minister post, which is guaranteed to upset the 
old, mainly Tutsi ruling party UPRONA (Unité et Progrès National), which has cooperated with the 
CNDD-FDD108 up until now. 
Growing Political Tensions 
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Since 2005, the democratic credentials of Pierre Nkurunziza’s CNDD/FDD-government have increas-
ingly shed feathers. Worrisome trends such as the growing dominance of the ruling party since 
2010109, inter-party violence, banditry, widespread corruption110 as well as quarreling political 
elites111 acting largely isolated from the population have consolidated themselves. On a positive 
note, the violent struggle for political power has lost much of its ethnic character. The societal fault 
lines now run across ethnic identities. Nowadays, antagonisms are rather based on party affilia-
tion112. 
Tension rose again in the forefront of the turbulent 2010 elections, which, boycotted by most of the 
opposition parties, left Pierre Nkurunziza and his party in a position of absolute power113. Agathon 
Rwasa, the FNL’s leader went into hiding shortly after the elections and remained absent for three 
years. New rumors about rebellion and extra-judicial killings by the government have since been 
once again a consistent part of Burundian daily life114. The increasing number of disgruntled politi-
cians, officials and ex-guerillas is reflected in frequent news about newly armed groups such as 
FRONABU-TABARA or FRD (Front pour la réstauration de la démocratie), emerging in remote prov-
inces or the DRC. Frequent violent clashes of party youth wings115, increasing numbers of politically 
motivated arrests116 and even extrajudicial killings of opposition members117 have become the status 
quo. 
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Even though recent developments in Burundian politics strongly evoke the assumption that Pierre 
Nkurunziza’s government is trying to mimic the RPF’s success118 in Rwanda, Burundi’s approach of 
dealing with the consequences of its violent past differ fundamentally from the maximalist strategies 
in its neighboring country. The government is largely absorbed by retaining its power and is not push-
ing a reconciliation agenda in any meaningful way. 
Transitional Justice: A Stalemate 
The power-sharing agreement between UPRONA and CNDD/FDD in 2003 and even the agreement 
between Nkurunziza’s government and later the registration of the FNL as a political party in 2009 
supplied most major players of the civil war with positions of power. Efforts to introduce transitional 
justice were thus never a national priority and have largely been stalled by political stalemates, even 
though transitional justice is a publicly declared policy goal119. Debating historical tragedies in Burun-
di has the potential to seriously destabilizing the political establishment. Hence, Burundi is hoping to 
bring about peaceful coexistence by acknowledging and defusing existing ethnic tensions rather than 
by establishing new identities by governmental decree and ending impunity through maximum jus-
tice. Reconciliation politics are oriented towards the recognition of continuing struggles and divi-
sions. Such goals could be described as more "minimalist120" than the complete transformation of 
identities which Rwanda pursues. Burundi, however, experiences difficulties implementing even min-
imal proceduralism despite the popularity of ‘forgiving and forgetting’ among many Burundian peas-
ants121. Disillusioned by decades of mass violence and quarreling elites, the idea of  overcoming the 
logic of mass violence through chosen amnesia gains additional momentum because of the popular 
understanding that both sides have committed massacres in Burundi. The logic of mass violence is 
much less straightforward than in the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. 
Geographic Segregation 
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Although the political quota system defuses ethnic tensions on the top-level to a certain extent, par-
tial geographic segregation and conflicts over land ownership have the potential to drive a new 
wedge between Hutu and Tutsi. The multiple crises culminating in the civil war have increasingly 
segregated the two ethnic groups, particularly in rural areas. While many Tutsi fled to settlement 
centers and refugee camps under army protection, most Hutu remained on their hills or fled to 
neighboring countries, particularly Tanzania122. Many internally displaced persons still distrust the 
fragile peace and prefer to stay where the war has pushed them. The former camps for internally 
displaced persons, where predominantly Tutsi and sympathizers of the old ruling party UPRONA 
sought refuge have grown into villages nowadays. Many of their inhabitants remain estranged from 
their old neighbors, as my research in the camp-turned-village „Rohero123” in the province of Ngozi 
demonstrates. Over 100’000 predominantly Hutu refugees are still living abroad and expected to 
return home as the camps in Tanzania and the DRC are closing124. In a country where over 90% of the 
population are dependent on agriculture and arable land is scarce, this situation provides for con-
tinuing conflicts over land ownership between returnees and occupants. Given the miserable state of 
Burundi’s judicial system125 and the rising crisis of corruption stemming from the governing party’s 
dominance of the public sector, the prospects for resolving land conflicts in a timely and impartial 
manner do not look promising. 
The Burundian civil war could be interpreted economically as a very brutal distribution battle for 
controlling the spoils of the state126. The warring factions utilized ethnic identities and grief over his-
torical injustices to rally up their followers. Interpreted in this way, politically defusing ethnic ten-
sions might be a fruitless endeavor as long as the country stays poor and its sparse resources remain 
in the hands of a small, albeit ethnically diverse, oligarchy. Even though the first steps towards rec-
onciliation have been successfully undertaken, particularly with regard to the ethnic power-sharing 
design in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (APRA) of 2000, extensive rec-
onciliation programs as in Rwanda are nowhere to be found. The population is largely left to its own 
devices. Most attempts to account for the crimes of the past, such as the formation of a national 
truth and reconciliation commission or the implementation of a special court, have been delayed for 
years. They have fallen victim to what Vandeginste describes as a “sophisticated bypassing mecha-
nism127”, subordinated to the preservation of political stability and convenience. This is particularly 
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problematic when regarding impunity from a historical perspective. The purge against the Hutu elite 
in 1972 has never been processed or even investigated. Ingelaere speaks of an actual “policy of am-
nesia128”. Unadressed anger about this unpunished crime has served as a catalyst in the killings of 
Tutsi in 1988 and 1993. Many Hutu saw these killings as acts of revenge129. Without at least symbolic 
acts of justice and reconciliation, nobody knows if a political crisis would not result in a new episode 
in this “cycle of revenge130”. 
Even though a truth and reconciliation commission under the leadership of catholic bishop Jean Louis 
Nahimana (a Hutu) and Anglican archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi (a Tutsi) was installed in December 
2014, it is largely perceived as the CNDD-FDD's commission. President Nkurunziza has handpicked its 
members and the opposition parties UPRONA and FRODEBU as well as most Burundian CSOGs boy-
cott its work131. 
Strongly simplified, the comparative perspective thus contrasts two fundamentally different ap-
proaches: the Rwandan politics of unity and reconciliation are governmental projects with enormous 
ambition and scope, aiming at nothing less than re-inventing the country itself. In Burundi, top-down 
measures aiming at reconciliation up to now mainly addressed the ethnic balance in government, the 
administration and the army. Up to now, they contented themselves mostly with implementing the 
main reforms agreed upon in the peace process. Apart from localized issues, such as solving land 
disputes or re-integrating refugees, official efforts to assist the traumatized population address the 
past, are kept at the minimum. Comparing the post-conflict experiences of Rwanda and Burundi thus 
not only contrasts power sharing with a victor’s peace but also pitches highly interventionist reconcil-
iation politics against a political de-facto attitude of governmental amnesia. 
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2. Theoretical Background: Defining Reconciliation Politics 
2.1. Working Definitions and Key Objectives 
2.1.1. Restoration or Creation of a Relationship? 
Armed conflicts do not end with peace by default. Sustainable peace is the desirable result of an of-
ten decades-long post-conflict phase. Next to power sharing, institutional and economic reconstruc-
tion, rule of law and justice, reconciliation has become increasingly recognized as a fundamentally 
significant goal for a successful peacebuilding process to address, particularly in the aftermath of 
genocide and mass atrocities132. 
Reconciliation after mass violence is a long and arduous road. Communal and interpersonal bonds 
and relations are destroyed, often with the most brutal intent possible: to dehumanize the ‘other’ as 
completely and utterly that even common humanity is denied. Perpetrators break even the last cul-
tural taboos in order to do so133. Unspeakable crimes such as beating people to death in front of their 
relatives, targeting infants or hacking off limbs are applied consciously to divide communities. Facing 
such atrocities, joining the killers or becoming a pariah – us against them - becomes the only viable 
option for the members of the perpetrating group134. In the moment of committing the crime, the 
thought of a collective future that includes the victim has already been rejected definitely and irre-
versibly. Restoring a shared society takes time and effort, not only for survivors and perpetrators, but 
for their families, communities, the state and the international community as well. Confronted with 
such atrocities, we have to ask: can a normal, peaceful status quo ante be established? Is the status 
quo ante even desirable in countries with a long history of ethnic, social or economic discrimination?  
In his Arendtian argument, Schaap135 postulates that society is not a fixed entity in need of restora-
tion but a process shaped by the actions of its participants. In his opinion, the act of reconciliation, 
(re-) integrating former adversaries into a shared world and changing this world by introducing new 
perspectives, is by definition political and continues perpetually. The act of reconciliation thus practi-
cally incorporates every aspect of political change. I agree with Bashir136 that Schaap’s theory of rec-
onciliation as a complete and exhaustive framework for politics stretches the concept too far. It loses 
its distinctive value as a precise concept suited for addressing historical injustices in a transitional 
phase. Nevertheless, I concur with the idea that reconciliation is an inherently political concept and 
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that we should focus less on restoring a status quo ante from decades ago137, but instead, on con-
stantly developing an increasingly tolerant society at peace with itself.  
Following this reasoning, reconciliation politics could be understood as the totality of a society’s di-
verse efforts ultimately aiming at the achievement of a new societal structure that integrates erst-
while adversaries. First, we have to define reconciliation. 
2.1.2. An Attempt at Definition 
Transitional Societies 
Lederach calls reconciliation “the building of a relationship138”. Mass violence destroys the bonds of 
social cohesion. Societies in transition deal with the problem of reconstructing these bonds, respec-
tively the creation of new bonds. Successful peacebuilding thus has to address the specific underlying 
causes of conflict, particularly within the local population.  
In principle, politics of reconciliation need to accommodate difference instead of trying to eliminate 
it. While recent debates in consolidated Western democratic systems have been focusing on con-
cepts such as multicultural citizenship and “politics of difference139”, ‘reconciliation politics’ rather 
emerged in the context of ‘transitional’ post-colonial countries moving towards democracy. In this 
context, the South African model of truth and reconciliation commissions140 and the idea of restora-
tive justice often influence reconciliation politics heavily. The South African model has influenced 
both post-conflict environments covered in this thesis: while Rwanda, like South Africa, adopted the 
idea of de-ethnicizing citizenship in favor of an inclusive ‘one-nation’ model, Burundi’s peace process 
was actually minted by the South African leadership during the peace process. Mandela pushed 
through the consociational power sharing agreement141. 
Interestingly, the two ideas of reconciliation politics and western politics of accommodating differ-
ence have rarely overlapped with the effect that in many transitional societies, the victims seeking 
reconciliation are minorities that first have to fight for the recognition of their distinct identity142. 
There is a broad consensus that a peaceful coexistence between Hutu and Tutsi is the ultimate goal 
of reconciliation politics in Rwanda and Burundi. Nevertheless, defining the complex process of rec-
onciliation itself is already a challenge. Peace and stability are probably the best we could hope for in 
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the short term in a region historically prone to crisis such as the Great Lakes region. Sacrificing cer-
tain difficult challenges of reconciliation in favor of superficially peaceful coexistence however, 
breeds discontent and all too often only postpones the renewed eruption of conflict.  
Key Objectives of Reconciliation  
It is important to note at this point that this discussion of reconciliation only refers to reconciliation 
as a societal endeavor, and not to the psychological journey that is necessary for a person affected by 
genocide to reach the point of reconciliation and forgiveness. The manifold challenges in addressing 
trauma, denial and living in the past deserve a treatment of their own and surpass the scope of this 
thesis143. 
Thorough, encompassing reconciliation represents the ultimate aim of social reconstruction and the 
foundation of sustainable peace. Reaching normative goals such as forgiveness, mutual respect, re-
storative justice, rule of law, acknowledgment of guilt, apology, restitution or reparations and an 
equal democratic footing between former antagonists simultaneously in a few years and proceeding 
to business as usual, however, is utopian. Objectives like e.g. (retributive) justice and reconciliation 
might even oppose each other on certain levels and will strongly affect governability. Nevertheless, 
each of these key objectives is at the same time necessary and in itself insufficient to achieve recon-
ciliation. The process is multi-faceted, uneven and, should reconciliation be successful, occurs on 
multiple levels of society. Given the enormity of the task, a realistic set of goals is necessary. Mini-
malist solutions that equalize the former adversaries legally and recognize their identity can serve as 
a starting point but a nominal recognition of coexistence is usually too thin a layer to bridge the gaps 
in a society polarized by mass atrocity. Likewise, maximalist approaches often advanced by religious 
peace scholars propagating willfully embracing the ‘other’ and turning disdain into esteem with the 
ultimate goal of social harmony may work very well in individual cases but probably aim too high for 
entire societies divided by genocide. The other party has to be acknowledged in its inherent value, 
respected as equals. Nevertheless, political conflicts and disagreements will and should persist as 
they do in every society. A peaceful society is not an apolitical society. The important point is that a 
continuous relationship is sustained. 
Verdeja’s definition of reconciliation emphasizes moral respect and tolerance among former adver-
saries as a realistic and morally defensible basis for transitional societies: “Reconciliation, I argue, 
refers to a condition of mutual respect among former enemies, which requires the reciprocal recogni-
tion of the moral worth and dignity of others. It is achieved when previous, conflict-era identities no 
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longer operate as the primary cleavages in politics, and thus citizens acquire new identities that cut 
across those earlier fault lines144.” 
Next to the emergence of mutual respect between former enemies, Verdeja considers the public 
dissemination of the truth about past atrocities, the accountability of perpetrators, the public recog-
nition of the victims and a commitment to the rule of law as essential to reconciliation145. These 
normative goals are almost congruent with Sebarenzi’s146 requirements for reconciliation: acknowl-
edgement, apology, restorative justice, empathy, reparation and forgiveness. Furthermore, in Rwan-
da’s case, Sebarenzi insists on the accompanying measures consensus democracy, peace education 
and international assistance as crucial for reconciliation. With regard to reconciliation’s complex and 
encompassing nature, we could however broaden the definition almost at random until it encom-
passes politics completely as in Schaap’s view. Hence, I will limit my analysis to the three core princi-
ples identified by Bashir “memory, acknowledgement, and responsibility and apology147” and add 
justice for three reasons. First, justice is necessary for ending the culture of impunity, which lowers 
the inhibitions for partaking in ‘retributive’ atrocities in every new episode of mass violence. Second, 
justice is important with regard to appeasing survivors and providing closure. Third, justice fulfills an 
important function as it reveals the truth and creates a common foundation of knowledge upon 
which society may build and move on, hence the expression ‘transitional’ justice148. 
Rigby defines reconciliation as the “restoration of fractured inter-group relations between former 
antagonists in violent conflict”, embracing “both initiatives intended to bring about socio-economic 
and political institutional changes that might facilitate the restoration of new relationships, and initi-
atives aimed at changing people’s perceptions of themselves and former enemies as such that new 
constructive relationships might be created149”. The critical points in Rigby as well as Verdeja’s defini-
tions are restoring inter-group relationships and establishing the framework conditions for the emer-
gence of new and mutually respectful identities. These changing identities resp. self-perceptions in 
turn alter the former fronts of conflict. In Burundi e.g. the political fault lines are less about being 
Hutu or Tutsi today than before 1993. The faceless, “essentialized150” enemy whose utter dehumani-
zation enabled the perpetrator to execute the actual crime has to be 're-humanized' into an individu-
al human being who deserves respect. The 'other' needs to be re-inserted into society as an equal. 
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This transformation requires the combination of the key concepts mentioned above and the struc-
tural and relational transformations that Lederach151 emphasizes for peacebuilding as well.  
Reconciliation Politics and Peace Building 
Lederach152 maintains that the key characteristics of contemporary conflicts derive from their inter-
nal nature: the conflicting groups are both neighbors and enemies. Both groups associate experi-
enced trauma and grievance with each other, sometimes accumulated over generations. Ethnic en-
trepreneurs exploit these deep-rooted, subjective animosities fueled by “the imaginary constructs of 
social destructiveness153” in times of crisis. They produce cycles of violence, which render statist di-
plomacy, and rational methods of conflict resolution such as peace negotiations ineffective. Tradi-
tional conflict management often fails to implement basic structural changes essential to long-term 
peace and stability, such as the protection of human rights and the promotion of tolerance and plu-
ralism. What Lederach calls ‘Peace building’ comes very close to what Rigby calls ‘reconciliation’, 
meaning the sustainable construction of society-wide frameworks focusing on the restoration of 
fractured relationships. According to Lederach, peace building “must be rooted in and responsive to 
the experiential and subjective realities shaping people’s perspectives and needs154.” Just as reconcili-
ation, Lederach comprehends conflict transformation as a long-term process that requires the con-
textualization of our immediate actions with regard to the ultimate aim of designing social change155.  
Considering the points above, we could define reconciliation politics as the totality of a society’s 
diverse efforts aiming at creating or restoring constructive relationships between erstwhile adver-
saries that cut across the cleavages of the conflict-era identities. This definition however has to take 
into consideration the key objectives mentioned above and must also pay attention to their various 
levels and interdependencies. 
 
2.2. Framework Conditions for Reconciliation 
2.2.1.  Elite Behavior, Economic Development, Democracy 
Interdependencies in Field Research 
Concrete political programs usually emphasize one particular key objective of reconciliation over 
others. The topic of reconciliation politics being incredibly extensive, I chose to focus on the core 
principles commemoration, acknowledgement, recognition and justice as mentioned above and how 
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they manifest themselves with regard to identity politics and sociopolitical culture, memory and 
commemoration, governmental assistance and transitional justice.  
The anticipation of eventual side effects, which the primacy of one objective might have on other 
objectives, constitutes the main difficulty in analyzing programs aiming at reconciliation. The analysis 
of the context of implementation represents one of the main tasks of fieldwork. Designing a national 
policy oriented towards reconciliatory core principles, as extensive as they may be, does not guaran-
tee reconciliation. The framework conditions of society as a whole, the political system, elite behav-
ior and economic progress may at times be more critical to the success of social reconstruction than 
reconciliation politics themselves. 
The Dilemma of the Elite 
The visions of elites and the political establishment for balancing ethnicity or forging a new national 
identity may contribute greatly to reconciliation. They may enable the public discussion and reflec-
tion of the past through the establishment of commemoration ceremonies or sites, by adhering to 
principles of non-violence, furthering the rule of law and being committed to reforms aiming at the 
above-mentioned key objectives. Elite-driven reconciliation, however, also carries a number of risks, 
which clearly become apparent in the Rwandan and Burundian examples. By definition, post-conflict 
politics have to be concerned with the immediate needs of legitimacy and stability. Tasks such as 
establishing a working environment and political ground rules with former adversaries are particular-
ly difficult after power sharing agreements. In situations of persisting threats to peace or if a post-
conflict coalition is still tenuous, demands for restitution, justice or apology, which are of great im-
portance for the victims, may be shelved because the new government needs to strengthen its legit-
imacy and efficacy. In the worst cases, members of the elite have an active interest in hiding the 
truth or deferring justice because they were implicated in human rights violations and war crimes 
themselves. Burundi’s transition serves as a prime example of how particularly substantive justice 
claims that might jeopardize political power holders get postponed and sidelined in favor of 
strengthening the precarious balance of state stability and legitimacy. Even if the Burundian govern-
ment respects the UN’s prohibition of amnesties pro forma, it has stalled the matter and little has 
been done so far to address the complex challenges of guilt, responsibility, apology and memory156.  
Economy, Security and the international Community  
Although they have not explicitly been mentioned as key objectives in the definitions above, physical 
as well as social security and particularly poverty alleviation are crucial prerequisites to post-conflict 
reconstruction. Even if demands for reconciliatory key objectives are sidelined in favor of stability, 
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the population assesses reconciliation increasingly positive if security and economic stability are giv-
en. Stover and Weinstein157 along with specialists on disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and 
reintegration such as Johanna Spear158 insist on economic development and transformation as critical 
elements of social reconstruction, particularly regarding the aftermath of civil wars. Paul Collier159 
maintains that economic factors such as rebel movements' war-related opportunities for financial 
gain160, a national dependency on primary commodity exports, and financial aid from the diaspora 
for ‘the cause’ actually are more important factors with regard to renewed outbreaks of conflict than 
the attitudes of the domestic population. Economic development and the opportunity to lead pro-
ductive lives are crucial for reconstruction as well as reconciliation. Secure jobs in multi-ethnic work 
places establish interaction across lines of social demarcation. Employment provides idle men and 
youth with self-worth and the opportunity to care for their families while unemployment and lack of 
perspectives furthers alcoholism, domestic violence and ultimately the temptation to take up arms 
again161. Longman, Phuong and Weinstein’s studies in Rwanda detected a strong correlation between 
perceptions of improved economic conditions and approval for transitional justice162 even though 
most of their participants did not explicitly link poverty alleviation and reconciliation163.  
For objectives such as economic and institutional reconstruction as well as for monitoring and safe-
guarding the peace process, funding and assistance from the international community is needed164. 
Facing the arduous task of rebuilding poor states ravaged by war, the temptation for former rebels 
and warlords coming to power is high to simply use the state as a ‘cloak of sovereignty’ in order to 
gain access and redistribute the spoils of the state among themselves and their supporters165. A pop-
ulation used to violence, unaddressed grievances, polarized politics and an intact rebel infrastructure 
double the risk of a relapse into  conflict during the first decade after the settlement166. Next to ex-
ternal checks and balances provided by the international community, regional alliances, neighboring 
states or donor countries, mechanisms need to be established, so that the population could hold 
elites accountable. 
Reconciliation Politics and Democracy 
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Even if the key objectives are reached, reconciliation politics are not suitable as a replacement for 
ordinary politics in divided pluralistic societies. Bashir understands reconciliation politics as a back-
wards-oriented “supplement to deliberation167”. Reconciliation can only fulfill a complementary role 
next to (deliberative) democracy and vice-versa. Most authors perceive a strong connection between 
democracy and reconciliation, particularly with regard to the importance of equality between victim 
and perpetrator, as well as the balance of power, democracy seems to be the only alternative. Survi-
vor Joseph Sebarenzi clarifies: “without fairness, there is no democracy, without democracy, there is 
no reconciliation168.” Even if deliberately separating both concepts, it is very difficult to talk about 
reconciliation without any kind of democratization process because reconciliation is all about the 
population itself. One of the few but very interesting treatises about un-democratic politics of recon-
ciliation is Raftopoulos and Savage’s “Zimbabwe. Injustice and Political Reconciliation169”. Mugabe’s 
experiment in reconciling Shona, Ndebele and white farmers from the top down however was a 
complete and utter failure. It resulted in brutal ethnic cleansing against the Ndebele in Matabeleland 
1982-85 and the expulsion of white farmers in 2000. Without democratic control, reconciliation poli-
tics rapidly deteriorate into cultural imperialism where the dominant group universalizes its perspec-
tives of history, culture and memory and constructs them as the norm. People who do not share this 
perspective become outsiders and dissidents associated with negative stereotypes and considered 
inferior. All too often, the dominant group soon starts to perceive the views of outsiders as defective 
and in need of re-education or correction. In this logic, dissenters need to be civilized, controlled, 
administrated, educated or even imprisoned. Progress and the common good then legitimize the 
exercise of coercive policies and even structural violence in the eyes of the dominant group170.  
Thus, demands for inclusion ultimately have their roots in historical exclusion and discrimination. 
Demands for reconciliation function as an insistence on co-determination and the acknowledgement 
and redemption of historic wrongs. This happens via the inclusion of the discriminated in the deci-
sion-making processes that shape a country. The democratic element is inseparable from a genuine 
debate about reconciliation. Moreover, with regard to the pluralistic nature of most post-colonial 
states such a democracy needs to accommodate ethnic diversity. “Any process of democratization 
that does not make conscious attempts to ensure the fair recognition and representation of diversity 
will quickly become (and become perceived as) a form of domination by one group over others. To be 
successful, therefore, the politics of reconciliation must itself be framed in lights of ideals of demo-
cratic inclusion for a pluralistic society171.” It is important to note that elections and majoritarian de-
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mocracy alone do not necessarily promote reconciliation. Habyarimana’s Rwanda was a nominal 
democracy but with Hutu making up 85% of the population, it was a ‘dictatorship of the majority’ 
with the Tutsi being marginalized. If the minority remains in power on the other hand, like in Burundi 
before 2005, the regime cannot trust democracy because it does not trust the majority and has to 
rely on oppression and discrimination of the majority172. As Mamdani173 notes about Rwanda - the 
Tutsi demand justice, the Hutu demand democracy. Reconciling the two demands is difficult without 
alienating one group. This dilemma can only be resolved by reconciliatory strategies as outlined 
above: either changing the group identities or codifying political representations, e.g. in ‘consocia-
tive’ models174. 
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2.3. The African State, the Elite and the Peasantry 
After having established the parameters for reconciliation politics and emphasizing the importance of 
an approach towards reconciliation that includes multiple levels of society and the state, we now 
turn the focus towards the post-colonial state. One of the main interests of this thesis175 is investigat-
ing feedback loops between the rural population and the central government with regard to coping 
with the past, overcoming divisive identities and working towards reconciliation. If the government 
aims at engaging the energy and loyalty of local farmers, traders and craftspeople, legislature and 
executive have to incorporate feedback loops and extend patronage to society as a whole, not mere-
ly a selection of beneficiaries or urban areas176. There are however several difficulties when it comes 
to assessing politics with regard to their popular or democratic credentials. One area often over-
looked by political theorists focusing on mass violence is the mode of operation and the limitations of 
the African post-colonial state.  
 
2.3.1.  Elite Reproduction and Peasantry 
The State as economic Facilitator 
Bayart, in his seminal work “The State in Africa 177” regards the elites’ hegemonic quest for the accu-
mulation of wealth and political domination as the primary raison d’être of the post-colonial African 
state. He emphasizes the state’s function as an ‘incubator’, a principal economic initiator that is ex-
ploited to the benefit of its developing dominant classes. In underdeveloped countries where the 
importance of the private sector is negligible and officials appropriate the few lucrative business op-
portunities such as e.g. the commodity trade, the patrimonial state often represents the only possi-
bility for socioeconomic advancement178. The personal advantages of positions within the state allow 
functionaries to over-exploit the peasantry and enrich themselves. Thus conflicts considered ‘ethnic’ 
by Western observers are often little more than struggles for the control of the state’s means of 
wealth accumulation. Wealth enables the maintenance of powerful patronage networks, which in 
turn often function along ethnic lines.  
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The arbitrarily drawn colonial borders of post-colonial African states179 provided for a merely weak 
basis of nationalism. Hence, ethnicity or kinship presented themselves to politicians as pre-existing 
entities to fall back upon when aiming at enlisting popular support. The supporters however expect 
their share of their leader’s success. “The social struggles which make up the quest for hegemony and 
the production of the State bear the hallmarks of the rush for spoils in which all actors – rich and poor 
– participate in the world of networks180”. Bayart does not differentiate between the domains of 
state and civil society, as both penetrate each other and many actors are active inside as well as out-
side state institutions. Whereas the political discourse in Western countries is often shaped by the 
exchange between official politics and the protagonists of the economy or civil society, these lines of 
distinction are blurred in the African state. The vertically integrated “system of reciprocal assimila-
tion181” between elites and their clients is reflected in the tendency of African elections to divide the 
electorate along ethnic lines as well as the tendency that African incumbents get re-elected because 
they have already established networks of politico-economic dependencies182.  
Hyden’s ‘Economy of Affection’ 
Bayart strongly emphasizes on this interpenetration of state and society but for the main part, he 
considers it detrimental to the peasantry, which in practice is overexploited to fulfill the elite's hun-
ger for wealth. Noted Africanist Goran Hyden183 on the other hand understands the dynamics of pat-
ronage networks mainly as an effect of elites adapting to the dominance of an independent peasant-
ry. Analyzing the relationship between the peasantry and the post-colonial state, Hyden speaks of 
the “economy of affection184” emerging from the pre-capitalist peasant mode of production. In his 
opinion, capitalism has never perpetrated African societies because an independent peasantry own-
ing its own means of production has largely remained uncaptured by colonial and post-colonial poli-
tics. The African peasantry does not need the political class as much as the elites are dependent on 
the peasants’ agrarian surplus for their reproduction. Thus, the uncaptured peasantry can rely on 
subsistence farming as an “’exit’ option185” from the market economy and is able to manipulate and 
influence the political class to further its own socioeconomic existence within the economy of affec-
tion. The economy of affection functions according to conservative peasant egalitarian values: the 
corporate household, lineage or group needs are superior to the needs of the individual; status 
trumps wealth; competition is about positional access rather than direct acquisition. In practice, the 
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modern post-colonial state is permeated by the obligations that the economy of affection produces 
and the only way to change the peasant mode of production in keeping with Hyden is through coer-
cion. Hyden however does not consider the typical African state strong enough to transform its 
economy through the coercion of its citizens such as e.g. the Asian tiger states. The African state is 
too swamped by its patronage obligations - its primary raison d'être. According to Hyden, the post-
colonial state has no structural roots in society, and resembling “a balloon suspended in mid-air, is 
being punctured by excessive demands and unable to function without an indiscriminate and wasteful 
consumption of scarce societal resources186." Employing a case study of the the Ujamaa-villagization 
project in Tanzania, Hyden comes to the conclusion that the subordination and coercion of the inde-
pendent peasantry is a necessity for development but considering the limited capacity to transform 
the peasants’ structural environment, the elite adopts the peasant mode of social reproduction 
based on patronage relations rather than capitalist logic to survive. 
Hyden’s theory is of great value, particularly with regard to the mode of social reproduction. Never-
theless, there are certain essential points of criticism, particularly if we try to apply the theory to 
Rwanda and Burundi.  
First, Hyden, as a critic of the dependency-theory en vogue among Marxists at the time, might have 
underestimated both the role of capitalism as a driving factor of ‘tribalism’ and the heterogeneity of 
the peasantry in order to make his point.  
Second, the ‘exit option’ of the peasantry depends on a surplus of land. With a land surplus, produc-
tivity is negligible elsewhere and Tanzania during the Ujamaa-campaign was able to provide land to 
settle on. Rwanda and Burundi on the other hand are two of the most densely populated countries in 
Africa. Land scarcity demolishes the fallback option of subsistence farming and makes the need for 
higher productivity acute. 
Third, Hyden did not factor in the huge economic importance of international assistance, alternative 
or external funding187. With international assistance accounting for shares as high as 50 percent188 of 
the national budget or even more, international donors have in many cases replaced agricultural 
export and thus, domestic patrimonial networks as primary sources of wealth. International donors 
supplanting the local population as most important claimants of accountability create a new problem 
in its own right. Furthermore, warlords and elites have become increasingly efficient in meddling in 
the international commodities market, exploiting natural resources such as timber, diamonds or pre-
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cious metals and selling them through clandestine networks189. These incomes reduce the elite’s 
dependence on the agricultural surplus and further destroy the advantages of the peasantry.  
Despite the points of criticism above, Hyden’s economy of affection, especially with regard to the 
peasant value system, is integral to Rwanda’s and Burundi’s political history in general and the dy-
namics of conflict in particular. The salient point in these cases is less the potential for resistance 
among the peasants, a potential that is diminished significantly by population pressure and the grow-
ing significance of external funding, but the adaptation of the economy of affection by the elite.   
If we compare Hyden’s and Bayart’s conclusions directly and adapt them to the cases in question, I 
would rather understand the peasantry in Rwanda and Burundi as ‘captured’, as a part of the eco-
nomic network that gets exploited by the elite. Nevertheless, the peasants’ value system and mode 
of production as described by Hyden permeates these networks, at least to a certain degree. The 
blurred limits and ambiguous relationships between the peasantry and the political class molds elite 
behavior into an explosive hybrid between the officially desired politics of modernization and the 
reality of the ‘peasant mode’ of social reproduction – patronage, clientelism – what Bayart calls the 
“politics of the belly190”. Even if the peasantry is captured, its traditional mode of thinking still heavily 
influences the behavior of its captors. In a political context that demands majorities to access the 
state's spoils, group identity and positional access once again trump purely capitalist or meritocratic 
values. Some important consequences of this hybrid mode of political management – attempts at 
modernization while remaining rooted in ‘traditional’ notions of social reproduction – are demon-
strated in Nyerere’s Ujamaa-campaign that aimed to resettle Tanzanians into model villages as well 
as in the Rwandan genocide, at least to a certain extent. The following examples explain how high 
modernist ambitions interact with the value system of the “peasant mode of production191”. 
2.3.2.  Traditionalized Modernization and Genocide 
Ujamaa: An Example for the Mass Mobilization of Peasants 
We could interpret the character of violence both in the genocide in Rwanda as well as in the various 
ethnic massacres in Burundi in the context of the hybrid way of thinking. Looking at the high degree 
of peasant compliance to what Straus calls the "order of genocide192”, we automatically assume a 
highly organized and efficient state apparatus and a bureaucracy effectively capturing the peasantry 
to the point where peasants followed even the authorities' most gruesome commands.  
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Although it is certainly true that Rwanda as well as Burundi could be considered hierarchical societies 
where authority is rarely questioned, one factor that made the inclusion of peasant society in the 
genocide so eerily successful was its adoption of the ‘peasant mode of production’. Hyden comes to 
his conclusion about the uncaptured peasantry through analyzing the failure of Nyerere’s Ujamaa-
campaign in the 1970s. The campaign however succeeded in an entirely different aspect than origi-
nally intended. 
James C. Scott, also analyzing the Tanzanian experiment of (ultimately) forced villagization193 as well 
as James Ferguson examining development policy in Lesotho194 both come to the conclusion that 
high modernist attempts at social engineering under the aegis of ‘development’, although failing with 
regard to their immediate goals of transforming the economy, succeeded in asserting government 
control over the peasantry.  Scott maintains that gaining total control over the peasantry became 
increasingly important to the Socialist cadres in Tanzania as the resistance to the villagization cam-
paign grew. From this perspective, the Tanzanian government actually followed Hyden’s argument 
that the subjugation of the free peasantry is necessary to transform the economy. It succeeded in 
subjugating the peasantry, but it failed with regard to economic transformation. The officials, viewing 
themselves as reformers and following a modernist aesthetics and teleology, failed to comprehend 
that the peasants with their intimate knowledge of the soil and local conditions were the true empir-
icists195. Blindly following ’modern’ assumptions about agriculture and ignoring local knowledge, 
Ujamaa performed catastrophically concerning its primary goal of agricultural reform. Nevertheless, 
it succeeded in resettling the peasants into model-villages designed for purposes that effectively 
facilitated the central management of the population and thus enhanced government control. In 
their self-serving paternalist attitude towards the peasantry, the emancipated post-colonial Tanzani-
an elites mimicked and even expanded Mbembe’s “commandement196”, the colonial practice of gov-
erning by coercion. Through the glorification of progress and development aesthetics, state power 
became a fetish for the post-colonial elite in the context of the development state.  
If we argue along Hyden's lines, the peasants withdrew from the transformative enterprise of villag-
ization in Tanzania because it did not support their own socio-economic existence within the econo-
my of affection, producing a massive socio-economic failure. Scott on the other hand considers the 
elites' unilateral fixedness on generic development aesthetics, their stubbornness, the lack of feed-
back loops and the paternalistic attitudes underlying the drive towards political control of the peas-
antry as the main reasons for failure. 
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Peasant Support during the Genocide 
As pre-colonial kingdoms with administrative continuity throughout the era of colonization, the reach 
of the state in Rwanda and Burundi was already refined for African proportions. Mandatory obliga-
tions towards the state such as ‘umuganda’ (communal work) had a long, even pre-colonial tradition. 
The killing methods practiced during the genocide and the words that Rwandan peasants used for 
the killings such as gakura - “work197”, suggest that they understood killing their neighbors in the 
context of the ‘commandement’. Killing was understood as a service they were required to perform 
due to coercive orders from the authorities. Drawing from a traditional practice (mandatory commu-
nal work) and altering its substance however was not the only reason why the genocidal Akazu-elite 
and the instigators of violence in Burundi succeeded. Whereas the Tanzanian authorities failed to 
garner the support of the rural population because the peasants did not see direct advantages in 
villagization, the incitement to genocide exploited the peasants’ deepest fears and desires. The 
promise of looting the land and cattle of their neighbors were powerful motivations for peasants 
suffering from abject poverty and population pressure198. Fear that the other group would take lethal 
revenge was equally based on a long history of recurrent and alternating episodes of mass violence. 
Hutu hardliners in the Rwandan interim government did not only wield governmental authority, they 
exercised this authority through local networks, peer pressure199 and a re-interpretation of tradition-
al practices in order to achieve total and exclusive political dominance of the state200. Applying the 
logic of the ‘economy of affection’ or the ‘politics of the belly’ to the genocide, state power was in-
terpreted in ethnic terms by using a societal fault-line generally understood by peasants (Hutu vs. 
Tutsi). The peasants had to be captured at any cost to safeguard the power gained in the 1959 Hutu 
revolution, which was threatened by multiparty-politics and civil war201.  
Ethnic strife in the Great Lakes Region has always been interpreted as a bipolar struggle deciding 
between absolute rule or servitude respectively elimination. There was no middle ground for the 
extremist elites. Taking into account the history of ethnic violence, the atmosphere of turmoil within 
the civil war and the mentioned circumstantial factors such as peer pressure, fear, poverty, economic 
decline, a culture that greatly values conformity and an open political power struggle, the Akazu 
rightly assumed that peasants could be polarized and mobilized along ethnic lines. Political domi-
nance had to be complete because the Hutu hardliners did not want to risk having to share the spoils 
of the state with the resented enemy. Even if the RPF would win the war, the argument goes, they 
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would rule over an empty country because the genocide eliminated the RPF's ethnic power base and 
thus its economic foundation. This genocidal argument resonates deeply with the logic of a political 
system predominantly understood as a vertical network of loyalty and ethnic kinship aimed at the 
accumulation of wealth. Even the mode of killing, hunting the victims down one by one with machet-
es, a common tool for field work, was adapted from the ‘peasant mode’. 
Arsène, a teacher from “Gakombe”, Kirundo, exemplified the successful adaptation of the ‘peasant 
logic’ by the elite perfectly, when we talked about his interpretation of the Burundian civil war (‘la 
crise’): Interviewer “Do you think the crisis was ethnic or political?” Arsène: “It was political but when 
Burundians are [were] trying to do those politics, they found out that, maybe they don't have sup-
porters. They don't have them, they need the population. Then the only thing the population can un-
derstand is the ethnic groups, so they just started that because they knew that it would be under-
standable in the population and then they used it for political ends202. “ 
Politics: Transformation from Above or Adaptation from Below? 
Hence, violent politics in both countries sought to mobilize their respective power bases, drawing 
from the 'economy of affection' and aiming at capturing state power in order to assess its economic 
potential. Now the question is how the current political leaderships of Burundi and Rwanda interpret 
these experiences with regard to rebuilding their societies. The fact that Pierre Nkurunziza needs the 
support of the peasantry is strongly reflected in some of his most popular policies. Free healthcare 
for pregnant women and infants as well as free primary education have made him very popular 
among Hutu peasants. His pious public presence as a devout born-again Christian also suggests that 
he is aware of the fact that swaying the generally very religious peasant masses is a surefire way to 
guarantee him public support despite a very mediocre economic performance. Thus, the CNDD-FDD’s 
system could be interpreted as a fairly traditional form of clientelism in a fragile security situation. 
The Rwandan government on the other hand is trying to completely transform its society and econ-
omy in a decidedly paternalist manner resembling the high modernist schemes described by Scott203. 
The official aim is to erase corruption and to replace the ‘economy of affection’ with a ‘modern’ polit-
ical system and a detached administration. With the Imidugudu-policy starting in 1996, the RPF has 
embarked on a similar villagization204-project as Tanzania in the 1970s. Even the practice of prescrib-
ing cash crops to peasants, which also had been practiced in Tanzania, has already been implement-
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ed205. The result is similar as in Tanzania: although the Imidugudu-policy seems not to have produced 
substantial results in regard to transforming rural income-generating activities206 and with elite ambi-
tions surpassing rural realities by far207, the grasp of the state has increased greatly since 1996208.  
Nevertheless, Rwanda has produced an impressive number of economic successes in the past 20 
years. It could be argued that high modernist experiments mainly failed in Africa because of the dis-
crepancy between the envisioned transformation of the economy and the rent-seeking behavior of 
the bureaucratic elite still entrenched in the economy of affection. These trends effectively often 
neutralized each other. In the face of overpopulation and land scarcity, the need for enhanced 
productivity is obvious. If however the state wants to succeed in convincing the peasantry of a mar-
ket economy’s advantages, it has to grant these exact advantages to the peasants through the con-
sequent application of the rule of law. Instead, the relentless pursuit of high modernist utopias under 
authoritarian pretensions mainly benefited the elite. No peasant opts for difficult transformations 
voluntarily without the opportunity of raking in the benefits. 
Rwanda has achieved a great deal with regard to service provision for all citizens and the develop-
ment of a bureaucratic elite that is effectively detached from its constituents. On the other side, cli-
entelism and favoritism on the local level are still wdespread and the current government strongly 
relies on coercion to build modern structures. 
 
2.3.3.  Straddling Public and Private Spheres 
Bayart’s observations about the economic significance of the state for its elites are important for 
both Rwanda's and Burundi's reconciliation processes. If we would characterize the conflict in Bu-
rundi as “a struggle for power and control of the state apparatus and its sinecures209”, its reconcilia-
tion politics would have to be seen less as an attempt to resolve a purely ethnic conflict, but rather 
through the lens of a continuing opportunistic struggle for the spoils of the state with changing alli-
ances. Even though Burundi is not a failed state of Congolese proportions, the behavior of certain 
politicians and their clientele closely resemble the strategies of guerilla-entrepreneurs during the 
Liberian civil war as Stephen Ellis describes them in “the mask of anarchy210”. This behavior also bears 
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certain hallmarks of “warlord politics211” in William Reno’s sense: maintaining unstable alliances 
aimed at occupying state power for profit, profiting from uncertainty in the provinces (at least the 
guerilla movements), embezzling and appropriating taxes and development aid and generally foster-
ing a culture of impunity. In such a lawless environment, actors strive for political positions of power 
in order to gain access to the few lucrative opportunities an empoverished state such as Burundi can 
still provides such as e.g. palm oil plantations. Since the internationally recognized elections of 2005, 
and bolstered by international aid, the state has become a much more potent distributor of positions 
of wealth and power than the guerilla movements, which also might have been a factor for the FNL 
to join peace talks. 
Bayart and Mbembe remind us that, in the context of the African state, the distinction between the 
political domain and civil society is by no means categorical. Their boundaries overlap and penetrate 
each other212. In Rwanda, the traditionally strong governmental control of NGO’s and grassroots or-
ganizations or the state’s interconnections with genocide survivor CSOGs are examples for this 
‘straddling’ of public and private domains by political players. Despite increasing signs of a develop-
ing Western state with its pronounced focus on good governance and its emphasis on institutionali-
zation, Rwanda exhibits characteristics of a typically post-colonial and paternalist state. A 'benevo-
lent dictator' who seeks to educate his citizens with little tolerance for dissent rules the country 
without meaningful opposition. In this respect, Kagame is an ‘old’ new leader in the tradition of 
Kwame N’Krumah or Julius Nyerere whose Ujamaa-campaign resembles Kagame’s Imidugudu-reform 
very closely213. Like the first generation of post-colonial leaders, he is aiming at reforming the rural 
population, improving the access to services, aligning village structures and encouraging non-
agricultural ways of generating income. Furthermore, the RPF places emphasis on fostering reconcili-
ation and alleviating conflicts over land214. Reforming the political sphere is not enough, the Rwandan 
as such is to be reformed.  
A cautionary Approach to Peace and Transformation 
We have to be cautious about seemingly simple democratic resolutions to conflict and development. 
Actually, we should remain skeptical with regards to the benefits of state intervention in general.  
Collier215 hints at the fact that implementing democratic processes such as elections in a post-conflict 
context when power is still obtainable often fails to establish popular support for sound political 
strategies or candidates. Elections rather divide society into different camps expecting exclusive ben-
                                                          
211
 Cf. Reno, 1998 
212
 Cf. Bayart, 2009, 207-227; Mbembe, 2001. 
213
 Cf. Scott, 1998, 223-261 and Newbury (D. & C.), 2000, 832-877. 
214
 Cf. Isaksson, 2013. 
215
 Cf. Collier, 2009, 15-50. 
Page 48 
 
efits if their candidate wins. Merely establishing a new government by power-sharing or election 
processes without transforming the conflictive identities or the dynamics of wealth accumulation will 
perpetuate the conflict in all likelihood. At the latest, when the funds deplete or a group becomes fed 
up with the results of the peace process, the peace process will unravel. The worst scenario hap-
pened in Rwanda after Habyarimana allowed democratic competition: sudden democratization radi-
calized group competition between vertical networks to such an extent that it devolved into an anar-
chic struggle for national resources. Simply transferring the power to the people by staging elections 
is an ill-advised strategy in the context of a state that is primarily seen as a socio-economic facilitator 
or an 'election prize' by its population and political parties. 
Scholars focusing on the state, such as James C. Scott216 or Zygmunt Bauman217 warn against high 
modernist transformative top-down experiments, particularly audacious social engineering on a 
grand scale. Such endeavors encourage proselytizing by ignorant elites and often produce strong 
authoritarian undercurrents while failing with regard to their proclaimed goals. The risk of violent 
escalation is fundamentally ingrained in the high modernist ambition to make society work in the 
manner of a well-functioning machine. The ‘backwards’ peasant subjects are usually the last people 
to be asked about their own ideas regarding their developmentand the temptation of coercion in the 
tradition of the colonial 'commandement' is high. 
Thus, the permeability and direction of state politics is a very sensible subject integrative of reconcili-
ation politics, but exceeding its borders by far. Suffice it to say, this thesis is interested in the exist-
ence and particular constellation of popular feedback loops and economic opportunities and how 
they influence Rwandan and Burundian politics.  
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3. Approach and Structure of the Thesis 
3.1. Comparative Research at the Grassroots 
The thesis attempts to contribute to a holistic understanding of reconstruction and reconciliation 
after mass atrocities in the Great Lakes. The interviews were compiled shortly after elections took 
place in both countries, deliberately opting for a less charged political atmosphere218. The findings 
are based on a series of 95 semi-structured life history interviews that mix quantitative (sur-
vey/questionnaire) and qualitative (life history interviews) parts. The participants219 are rural (and to 
a lesser extent) urban dwellers in both countries that were at least six years old in 1993 resp. 1994. 
The interviews focus on the impact of politics on personal life-stories with a special focus on over-
coming the violence of the past and fostering a culture of peace and reconciliation.  
Even though the sample is not representative in a strictly quantitative sense220 and the decision to 
follow personal networks of trust and affinity adds an impressionistic connotation to the analysis, the 
sociopolitical trends it identifies are easily comprehensible through the method of data triangulation 
explained in chapter 2.2.7 and open to scrutiny for every keen observer of the region.  
 
3.1.1.  Identifying the Problem 
The underlying assumption of the thesis is that a profound, open and pervasive effort towards recon-
ciliation221 is necessary to overcome the recurring cycles of intra-communal and inter-ethnic violence 
in Rwanda and Burundi. Due to the popular nature of violence in these conflicts, the reconciliation 
process should involve the population as much as possible and ideally be driven by it. This assump-
tion about the necessity of a defined and stringent policy of national reconciliation will be questioned 
in its own right, particularly when comparing the effects of the Rwandan approach of maximal “ac-
countability for atrocity222” to the consequences of the Burundian practice of delaying matters of 
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transitional justice for reasons of short-term political stability223. On a very general level however, 
most relevant political groups, power-holders and every single participant I had the pleasure to inter-
view identified the need to reconcile as necessary for a peaceful future, even though definitions, 
expectations and ways to achieve it vary to a great degree.  
Considering the difficult societal conditions described in chapter 1, a simple and elegant strategy 
addressing acknowledgement, apology, restorative justice, reparations and forgiveness224 seems 
almost impossible in this poor region prone to war and political instability. During the post-
settlement resp. post-genocide phase, both countries have implemented strategies to resolve socie-
tal divisions and recalibrate the social balance. To me, the effects of these differing approaches on 
the people affected by the violence triggered the strongest interest. I wanted to understand how 
ordinary citizens in two countries with similar points of departure rebuild their societies after having 
been divided by genocide and where their approaches and views differ. 
3.1.2.  A Bottom-Up Perspective 
The direction from which I chose to approach the theme of societal reconstruction is mostly bottom-
up. Extraordinary analysts working on Rwanda and Burundi such as Scott Straus225 or Bert Inge-
laere226 convinced me that if politics of mass mobilization, regardless of their intentions, shall suc-
ceed, they have to be assessed with regard to their impact at the grassroots and seen in historical 
context227. While well-conceived national programs and sufficient international assistance might 
promote and facilitate or predetermine the path of reconciliation, forgiving and overcoming the 
harm done in the past ultimately is left to the population itself. Focusing on local perceptions, reac-
tions and context allows us to understand whether official measures are perceived as actual solu-
tions to the problems that caused mass violence. Analyzing local perception also strongly hints at the 
reasons why policies fail, if they are based on and responsive to popular feedback or if their imple-
mentation might actually pursue a hidden agenda driven by the political economy of internal conflict. 
My research in Rwanda puts a strong emphasis on understanding the national politics of unity and 
reconciliation in the context of the RPF’s history and vision, but it does so by looking at the RPF's 
policies from the peasants’ perspective. 
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Given the popular character of violence in both conflicts and taking into account Hyden’s theory of 
social reproduction in the 'peasant mode'228, I figured that reconciliation would have to take root in 
the population in order to minimize the elite's temptation to exploit pre-existing divisions in times of 
crisis. The fact that violence in both conflicts followed top-down networks, instigated by the authori-
ties but often executed by ordinary citizens, prompted me to focus on compliance and resistance to 
authority at the grassroots229. 
The historical discourse of the RPF-regime230, heavily promoted for the past twenty years, constructs 
a very specific discourse of the genocide, often interfering with scientific research as such231. Even 
though finding access to the field is very difficult, research at the grassroots is the only way to inves-
tigate reconciliation politics in Rwanda without tacitly accepting the preconceived results of the gov-
ernment-appointed National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). The official discourse 
consistently assures the global public that Rwandans are almost completely reconciled and that a 
stunning 97% of the population accepted the new national Rwandan identity232. It defends these 
findings rather aggressively against any criticism. 
In adopting a bottom-up perspective to politics of reconciliation, I hoped to discern if and how the 
political attitudes and approaches mentioned above are transferred to the local level and especially, 
if these policies address the causes or just the symptoms of violence. Personally, I did not see many 
signs of ethnic hatred in previous visits to the Great Lakes region. Recognizing that the socio-political 
key decisions between resistance, indifference or joining the killing formed in and through local 
group dynamics233, I chose to follow the networks of trust and affinity in the opposite direction in 
order to assess the popular entrenchment of reconciliation. As countless failed high modernist exper-
iments demonstrated: if reform is not (at least) appropriated by its addressees or if it is implemented 
in a context where it provokes popular resistance, it will ultimately fail. 
Except for the internal logic of power and ethnicity of the RPF, which is instrumental to understand 
the design and implementation of reconciliation politics in Rwanda234, the thesis only touches the 
intricacies of policy design and institutional logic superficially. The emphasis of the thesis rests on the 
dynamic interplay between the post-conflict state and the popular perception of politics. 
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By analyzing the dynamic relationship between the behavior of a country’s elite – party officials, ad-
ministrators and military officers on one side and the overwhelming majority of peasants on the oth-
er - and comparing their different perceptions and ideas, a comprehensive picture of two societies 
trying to leave behind their past emerges. By comparing said picture against the backdrop of the 
post-conflict state of affairs in the neighboring country, the influence of these specific relationships 
between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ allows us to identify the prospects and pitfalls of the respective models. 
 
3.1.3.  Research Questions 
My approach, based on the guidelines of the Concordia University Doctoral Program in Humanities, 
combines the academic fields of history, political science and social science. The research question 
reads as follows: 
“Which effects do the politics of reconstruction and reconciliation in Southern Rwanda and North-
ern Burundi have on the attitudes of local communities in the aftermath of mass political vio-
lence?” 
The overall objective deriving from the research question is to assess the impact of politics aimed at 
reconciliation on the coexistence of formerly antagonistic groups in the Southern Rwandan and 
Northern Burundian countryside.  
Conceptual Objectives: 
1. To determine the nature of government intervention for reconciliation in communities in 
Rwanda and Burundi and compare them with regard to their sustainability and efficiency as 
perceived by the rural population in multiple sites. 
2. To assess the significance of the political, social, cultural and economic context with regard 
to politics of coexistence and reconciliation. 
3. To examine the extent to which the attitudes of rural populations might shape local politics 
of reconciliation (feedback loops politics-civil society). 
 
3.1.4. Academic Significance 
In a very general sense, the thesis functions as a modest, grassroots-based contribution to the still 
emerging field of conflict transformation and more generally “peacebuilding235” in the understanding 
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of John Paul Lederach. The findings of the thesis are of significance for policy-makers in Rwanda and 
Burundi insofar as the thesis constitutes an independent analysis of governmental efforts to foster 
reconciliation and lets the (potential) beneficiaries of these policies speak for themselves. Despite 
the structural similarities and the parallel histories that Rwanda and Burundi share, direct compari-
sons between the two post-conflict political frameworks are still rare. Although the thesis’ main em-
phasis lies on multi-sited communal research, the two-tiered analytical approach (‘official’ and ‘in-
formal’ level) allows for a direct comparison between governmental policy on one hand and the per-
ceptions and behavior of the local population on the other. The semi-structured interview method 
utilizes relatively open life history-interviews on one hand and a predetermined questionnaire on the 
other, which furthermore, allows for precisely situating lived experiences in contemporary history 
and closely keeps track of changing individual attitudes as the transitions in both countries progress. 
The results of the thesis will help to determine the local priorities in reconciliation. Distinctions be-
tween local ‘homegrown’ reconciliation, participation in the projects of central authorities, passive 
compliance and resistance crystalize through the bottom-up view. The perspective of the thesis thus 
bridges the gap between classical ethnographic and sociological studies that focus on the lived reali-
ties of rural dwellers in the Great Lakes Region236, research on the behavior of local actors during and 
after the genocide237 and comparative studies that focus on the dynamics of genocidal violence from 
a regional and historical perspective238.  
Up to date, there is an increasing amount of excellent theoretical literature with regard to transition-
al reconciliation politics in general239 and literature about reconciliation in Rwanda240 in particular. 
Furthermore, a growing number of Rwandan agencies such as the NURC or the IRDP publish their 
own assessments of reconciliation in Rwanda241 as well. Literature about Burundi’s transition since 
2005 is harder to come by242 and accounts that compare the experiences with politics of reconstruc-
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tion and reconciliation at the grassroots in both countries remain extremely rare243. Particularly the 
post-conflict experiences of the population in Northern Burundi remain largely uninvestigated. 
Most of the authors choosing to write about the regional dynamics of genocide and mass violence 
rank among the most experienced and renowned in the field. Scholars such as René Lemarchand, 
Jean-Pierre Chrétien, Gérard Prunier and Filip Reyntjens have observed the region for decades and, 
sadly, their warnings about new episodes of mass violence have rarely been heard. This thesis at-
tempts to add a qualitative bottom-up view to their analyses. 
Although certain quantitative methods have been utilized in the scaled questions section of the in-
terviews compiled for this thesis, the analysis takes a qualitative perspective similar to the work of 
Ingelaere, Thomson, Straus or Malkki and shares their strong focus on popular perception and socio-
political context. My interview questions, particularly the scaled questions furthermore employ ques-
tions corresponding to Bert Ingelaere’s work244 with Rwandan and Burundian peasants in other 
communes and regions, which might increase the dissertation’s overall significance. 
The strategies of the Rwandan and Burundian governments should be comprehended in a context of 
limited means in a region devastated from decades of war and heavily influenced by its colonial her-
itage. In the context of the African state outlined in chapter 2.3., even reconciliation politics often 
only function as a smokescreen for the obtainment and perpetuation of political and economic pow-
er245. A perspective that follows the chains of informal influence and elite wealth accumulation is 
indispensable for understanding the background of Rwandan and Burundian politics. Hence, the the-
sis resorts to research on the mode of operation of African states as published by Bayart246, Reno247, 
Mamdani248, Uvin249 or Chabal and Daloz250. These scholars focused on patterns of informal policy-
implementation and the inner dynamics of power in African states rather than official politics as stat-
ed in programs, strategy papers and official evaluations.  
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For lack of detailed field work, African conflicts are often lumped together under diffuse genera such 
as “post-modern conflicts251” or particularly the “failed state252” paradigm often referenced in African 
conflicts. Rwanda and Burundi differ in many aspects from these paradigms, because in these ancient 
kingdoms, the state has traditionally played a strong role253. The interview data places special em-
phasis on the relationship between the interviewee and the state, it also analyzes preferences and 
discrepancies between the different groups. Although there are a growing number of authors that 
base their findings on the narratives of survivors254 or perpetrators255, reliable comparative data on 
political and social attitudes of the rural populations in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi is 
still scarce. Furthermore, the comparative perspective between the two countries might illuminate 
some perceived differences in the nature of the violence and its social effects in Rwanda compared 
to Burundi. 
 
3.1.5.  Thematic Delimitation 
Reconciliation, particularly if analyzed in a comparative setting, is an incredibly complex and multi-
faceted process. Readers expecting a theoretical recipe for ‘instant reconciliation’ or a functioning 
policy design for successful peace building in the Great Lakes region will probably be disappointed.  
If we take into account the sheer multiplicity of factors influencing reconciliation politics and the 
highly complex motivations pushing these processes, it is easy to lose sight of the big picture and to 
become obsessed with details. The thesis will thus limit itself to describing how people in Southern 
Rwanda and Northern Burundi understand ubwiyunge –reconciliation in the context of contemporary 
events and national politics. It will abastain from exhaustively discussing specific policies and assert 
no claim to completeness with regard to the different aspects of reconciliation politics.  
My participants commonly referred to the topics ethnic identity, memory and commemoration, tran-
sitional justice, and especially questions of governance and development as most important for rec-
onciliation. The thesis will thus strongly focus on the intersections of identity politics, governance and 
assistance as well as how the political management of identity and memory respond to each other. 
The analysis of transitional justice in Rwanda, arguably one of the most interesting topics in the con-
text of reconciliation politics in the Great Lakes, will however be mostly limited to its public percep-
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tion in the multiple research sites. Various excellent monographs, anthologies, and reports have cov-
ered transitional justice extensively256 and a simple chapter in this thesis would not do the complex 
topic justice. In Burundi, the institutions to deal with the injustices of the past are mostly still in their 
planning phase257, reducing most discussions about the effects of transitional justice in Burundi to 
hypothetical considerations. 
Furthermore, the thesis does not function as a comprehensive listing of different strategies under-
taken by the Rwandan and Burundian governments or political elites in order to facilitate reconcilia-
tion and reconstruction. The focus is clearly set on the context and the effects of policy implementa-
tion, not on policy design. The conditions of implementation and the views of the recipients matter 
more to the thesis than the original intent of the program itself. In particular, the constellations of 
political power that shape official policies are indispensable for grasping the manner how politics 
permeate to the grassroots level. Hence, this context will be taken into account and explained where 
necessary. Nevertheless, the details of Rwanda’s and Burundi’s political history as a whole will only 
be treated in a rather general manner as they have already been brilliantly documented by scholars 
with far greater reputations258.  
The thesis is limited to domestic actors. International impact will only be treated marginally in the 
sense of a factor that exerts influence on national policy-makers. Looking at the continued and re-
peated failings of the international community in successfully managing conflict transformation259 in 
the Great Lakes Region, it is my firm belief that an internationally brokered transition to durable 
peace would prove impossible without national and local actors taking the lead towards peace and 
reconciliation. As Séverine Autesserre260 rightly concluded with regard to local violence in the DRC, 
local tensions are one of the prime factors fueling violence in war and post-conflict situations but 
they have to be addressed from the grassroots first instead of giving precedence to international 
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intervention. The dominant paradigm in international peacebuilding however often “orients interven-
tion strategies away from local conflict resolution and toward popular, but harmful tactics such as the 
rapid organization of elections261.” 
The will to intervene in the face of genocide and mass violence is often insufficient. Harnessing sup-
port for intervention in remote countries that are not prioritized geoplitically often proves very diffi-
cult as the mixed results of the responsibility to protect (R2P) norm demonstrate262. Particularly long-
term deployments are unpopular in the West. Thus, despite growing evidence of a paradigm shift 
when it comes to humanitarian interventions263, the international community in its current shape 
may be a valuable supporting actor with regard to reconstruction and reconciliation, but it is not a 
protagonist. Domestic solutions are paramount and will be exclusively considered here. The same 
holds true for international NGOs. Although NGOs like Search for Common Ground or Studio Ijambo 
perform groundbreaking reconciliation-oriented work in Rwanda and Burundi, taking the contribu-
tions of international organizations into account would not only overextend the frame of the thesis 
but also blur the focus on the unique dynamic that the interplay between power politics, reconcilia-
tion and development has created in Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, the ruling party keeps NGOs 
on a tight leash. The RPf actively dictates its perceived needs for the country to the international 
donor community264. For the effects of international peace-building efforts in the Great Lakes region, 
please refer to the experts on the topic265. 
Although the methodology is sound, the thesis exhibits a rather impressionist nature and should by 
no means be regarded exhaustive with regard to popular positions towards reconciliation politics in 
Rwanda and Burundi. The thesis does not claim to speak for the majority of Rwandan or Burundian 
citizens, but it does let single and unheard voices speak for themselves, and nonetheless, interprets 
general trends where additional sources corroborate the findings. The voices of these interviewees 
are voices important to recognize, as they talk about problems necessary to address, should reconcil-
iation politics penetrate to the grassroots. With immense political pressure and a fragile security 
situation often complicating and muzzling free expression, detecting the nuances of perception be-
comes important to anticipate future fault lines and perils for peaceful coexistence. In many inter-
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views, omissions or evasive answers actually felt graver and more threatening than the repeated 
reassurances of peace and reconciliation provided for optimism. In cultures of pronounced silence, 
where every side seems to have their own agenda, determining the truth as an outsider is almost 
impossible. Consequently, the thesis strongly focuses on qualitative research and individual percep-
tions and not on establishing an objective and definitive narrative about reconciliation in Rwanda and 
Burundi. 
To propose readymade solutions for these two post-conflict scenarios would be arrogant and would 
grossly underestimate the incredibly complex societal problems emerging from genocide and mass 
political violence. Rwanda and Burundi face difficulties on a massive scale bordering disintegration. 
Observing reconstruction after mass violence from the somehow detached perspective of a Western 
scholar has been a humbling experience. Even with the distance of an external observer, the prob-
lems that my participants had to face on a daily basis have to be characterized as brutal, immediate 
and overwhelmingly complex. I went to East Africa with the naïve idea of compiling a roadmap for 
reconciliation based on the experiences of my participants. The success of reconciliation however is 
depending on more than sound policies – culture, realpolitik, history, ideology, propaganda, assis-
tance, popular perceptions – they all play their part and the thesis tries to highlight these cross-
connections. Assuming to have grasped the situation in all its complexity as an outsider and present-
ing a brilliant and easy solution would not only be preposterous and indicative of lacking depth in 
research, but it would further do grave injustice to the ingenuity of Burundians and Rwandans to 




3.2. Data Collection and Methodology 
Out of necessity, this chapter will already delve deep into the actual subject of the thesis. Ingelaere 
maintains: “in a society in which daily life itself is politicized, it is difficult for an observer to interpret 
or gain a balanced understanding of the social milieu. An active interference in the scientific construc-
tion of knowledge, the cultivation of an aesthetics of progress, and a culturally specific ethics of 
communication all lie at the heart of difficulties in understanding life after genocide266.” The Fou-
cauldian discourse about the genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda has been so thoroughly dictated 
and constructed by the RPF-regime that a discussion of the topic is practically impossible without 
utilizing terms coined by the official discourse. E.g. we refer to the Rwandan genocide as ‘genocide 
against the Tutsi', which has become the official wording due to international pressure from the 
Rwandan government267. This is problematic for scientific research because the RPF has been and still 
is an active party in Rwandan politics, pursuing its own agenda. Thus, already the methodology has to 
be thoroughly reviewed in order not to unwittingly perpetuate a victor’s narrative, which, even if it is 
largely based on facts, always interprets Rwandan history in a self-serving way. This is particularly 
important with regard to the categorization of interview partners treated in chapter 3.2.5. 
Academic literature covering the topics of conflict and identity transformation, genocide studies, the 
African state and society, as well as the contemporary history of Rwanda and Burundi268 serve as 
references to place the findings of the field research in context and compare the domestic impact of 
Rwandan and Burundian politics to external assessments. Being an interdisciplinary study, the thesis 
draws from different approaches with regard to data collection and methodology. The data collec-
tion mixes quantitative and qualitative methods. It functions as a hybrid between techniques utilized 
in sociological and ethnographic research (semi-structured life-story interviews, participant observa-
tion), political science (rankings, quantitative analysis) and historical (press analysis, sources from 
official agencies, oral history) techniques.  
Chapter 3.2 will mainly explain the research design and approach to field work. First, it is important 
to recognize that there was no uniform experience of conflict in Rwanda or Burundi, the character 
and the responses to violence vary a great deal. Thus, the first chapter is dedicated to the selection 
of research locations as well as a short description of research conditions. The second chapter will 
explain the interview procedure and structure in detail. Following a small chapter about the recruit-
ment and impact of translators, chapter 3.2.4 will delineate the sampling process, and, as mentioned 
above, chapters 3.2.5 (Rwanda) and 3.2.6. (Burundi) will strongly focus on the intricacies of categori-
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zation according to ethnic identity and personal history. The last chapter takes a detailed look at the 
process of verification and data triangulation. 
For a look at the Questionnaires and Consent Forms (in English, French and Kinyarwanda) please 
refer to the Appendix. 
 
3.2.1.  Research Environment 
Research Locations 
 
Even though the Rwandan genocide swept the whole country in little more than three months and 
the Burundian civil war affected all the communities in Burundi I did research in, the episodes of vio-
lence were far from uniform and were experienced differently in every community. Thus, in order to 
enable comparison, establishing variance between the regional dimensions of experiencing conflict 
was one of the main research objectives in order to identify overarching trends to deal with the past. 
A total of 95 interviews have mainly been conducted in five rural communities with differing histories 
of inter-communal violence: „Gatsata” (Gisagara District) and „Gatumba“ (Huye District) in the 
Southern Province of Rwanda as well as right across the border in „Kamenge“ (Ngozi province), „Ro-
hero” (Ngozi province) and „Gakombe” (Kirundo Province) in Northern Burundi. I opted for research 
Rwanda and Burundi with approximately situated Research Sites.  
Source: https://www.google.com/maps (24.4.2014) 
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locations in close proximity of each other for reasons of comparability. All the rural research sites are 
situated in the same region. Variance in the experience of violence, a possible familiarity with the 
neighboring country’s experience269, geographic accessibility, and a common history of violence fea-
turing differing experiences270 were decisive for the selection of research sites. The interviews were 
conducted between May and December 2011. 
Because of the personal and highly political nature of the interviews, the names of all communities 
have been changed to ensure the security of participants. In each rural community, between 14 and 
20 interviews were conducted271. A total number of eight interviews have also been conducted with 
participants in Kigali in order to highlight the diversity of perceptions between center and country-
side, urban and rural dwellers. In Burundi, two additional interview partners came from Ngozi and 
Bujumbura. To account for maximum variance, I chose four different starting points for recruiting 
participants. In Kigali, Bujumbura and Ngozi, I chose my own personal network of acquaintances, 
mainly from the educated elite. In “Gatumba”, Huye, Rwanda, I contacted a CSOG focused on recon-
ciliation work. In “Gatsata”, Gisagara, Rwanda and “Gakombe”, Kirundo, Burundi, I interviewed the 
neighbors and acquaintances of a local translator as well as their neighbors and acquaintances. In 
“Kamenge”, Ngozi, Burundi and “Rohero”, Ngozi, Burund, key informants or local members of a na-
tional human rights organization established the first contact to participants. In most research loca-
tions272, the recruitment process took on a life of its own after a few days as people informed their 
neighbors and came by their own accord or pointed us towards other possible candidates. I worked 
with alternating research assistants273 in the various communities in order to maximize diversity in 
this aspect as well. The interview process in each community except “Gakombe” took me several 
weeks during which I returned to the community daily. I often fixed appointments a day before the 
actual interview. Participants either came to predetermined interview locations themselves or we 
visited them at their homes and asked if they wanted to talk with us. 
In distinction to grassroots research done by Hatzfeld274, Ingelaere275 or Thomson276, I did not focus 
on 'hills' or 'collines' as such, the typical form of scattered subsistence farm settlements in which 
most Rwandans and Burundians live. I usually set myself up in the bigger administrative centers, 
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 Cf. Chapter 2.2.3. « Translation » 
274
 Cf. Hatzfeld, 2003. 
275
 Cf. Ingelaere, 2009; 2010a; 2010c. 
276276
 Cf. Thomson 2013. 
Page 62 
 
which could be called 'villages', perhaps best described as 'sector' (imirenge) to use the Rwandan 
administrative language. Most of the participants however resided in the surrounding hills, not in the 
center itself. Thus, if I speak of rural 'communities' or 'research sites', I refer either to sectors (Rwan-
da) or to the centers of the communes (Burundi). This distinction is particularly important in the Bu-
rundian context because many participants distinguished clearly between the 'center' of the com-
munes where Tutsi-IDPs fled for protection from the army units stationed there and the 'hills', their 
original places of residence, where most Hutu stayed if they did not flee into exile. 
Research in Rwanda 
One of the greatest challenges of my field research was obtaining access to participants in Rwanda. 
In order to receive a research permit, I had to apply at MINEDUC (the ministry of education) and hand 
in a detailed research proposal, two recommendation letters from my alma mater in Canada, as well 
as an affiliation with a Rwandan institution. Fortunately, Professor Rutayisire from the Center of Con-
flict Management at the National University of Rwanda was kind enough to receive me and fill out 
the necessary forms. After a detailed interview at MINEDUC and a waiting period of two months dur-
ing which I was lucky to find work with CLADHO, the Collectif des Ligues et Associations de Defense 
des Droits de l'Homme au Rwanda, I finally received my research permit. It proved to be indispensa-
ble for research in rural Rwanda. The permit facilitated negotiating with local authorities immensely 
and made sure I was free to choose the participants myself. Without a research permit, local officials 
would have prevented me from speaking to peasants. Even after producing a valid permit, some local 
administrators remained hesitant to grant access. Deriving from these administrative difficulties and 
the official eagerness to control the discourse about the genocide, I actually became interested in the 
discrepancies between official and informal interpretations of reconciliation. A great part of my the-
sis now is dedicated to the official understanding of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda and how it 
relates to the grassroots277. In the following paragraphs, I will shortly describe the research sites and 
their local history as far as I have compiled them from the participants' stories in Southern Rwanda. 
“Gatumba” 
“Gatumba” is situated about five kilometers from Butare-town, nestled between rolling hills, it is a 
fairly typical Rwandan settlement with a small center and a market. There are a remarkable number 
of newly roofed houses in “Gatumba”, which have been built with the assistance of the 'Anti-
Nyakazi'-program of the Rwandan government and a private organization called Abasoro cooperative 
in Butare. Two of the genocide survivors I interviewed, Annunciata and Boniphilde, lived in such 
houses. I was told by survivors that after the genocide, the new government resettled genocide sur-
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vivors in close proximity of each other in the center while most Hutu stayed on their hills278. My per-
sonal experience confirms this as most survivors and refugees lived rather close to each other near 
the center whereas the homes of ex-convicts and bystanders often took longer to reach.  
While piecing together the different narratives, I remarked that many older participants still remem-
bered the Hutu revolution of 1959279. Most participants however made a strong distinction between 
1959 and 1994. Regarding 1959, they only talked about sporadic killings of “VIPs280”, Tutsi, particular-
ly rich families, fled and some Hutus robbed cows and land but everybody agreed that apart from 
discrimination in education, coexistence became peaceful again shortly after 1959 and up to the 
genocide. In “Gatumba” as in Southern Rwanda in general, Hutu and Tutsi had lived side by side and 
intermarriage was common. Even though they could see that ethnic relations were becoming prob-
lematic from following the news and through the Gatabazi-Bucyana incident281, many participants 
described the genocide as something that broke out almost immediately and without any warning. It 
appears that the burgomaster of “Gatumba” initially resisted the violence when they saw smoke 
from houses burning in Gikongoro. He imprisoned a man who was trying to burn a house. An influen-
tial woman (she drove a car) however sprung the arsonist free and started inciting the local Hutu. 
Between the 18th and 25th of April 1994, gendarmes from Tumba and soldiers from Butare town ar-
rived and started killing people. It must have been an indescribable carnage. Every survivor I spoke to 
lost most of his/her family and survived through sheer luck or by fleeing to Burundi or neighboring 
communes282. The Hutu were then recruited by the conseiller to help hunting the remaining Tutsi 
down. When the RPF invaded Huye, most Hutu from “Gatumba” fled to Kibeho camp283 or to Gikon-
goro284. Thus, some of my participants witnessed the massacre against Hutu IDPs enclosed on Kibeho 
Mountain. Apart from that and the killing of Yohani’s son, stories of RPF-killings in “Gatumba” were 
scarce. Most of the ex-convicts however spoke of wanton arrests and very long jail stints after return-
ing home despite claiming innocence. Rumors about corruption, harassment and revenge killings 
with impunity are rife. 
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Lacking contacts in “Gatumba”, we gained access to most participants285 through a Butare-based 
CSOG called AMI (Agence modèste et innocente) that I got to know through a friend. AMI holds 
courses about reconciliation and tries to get victims and perpetrators to talk and work together, 
promoting reconciliation on the local level through collaboration and so-called 'teachings'. The or-
ganization is nominally private and church-sponsored but when observed closely, appears to follow 
the guidelines of the NURC, which supports such associations by offering “teaching and mobilization 
tool kits286”, funding as well as speakers for various sensitization programs287. A participant said 
about AMI: “it used to get funds from the government and it also follows some government pro-
grams288”. Because of these proceedings, the numbers of genocide survivors interviewed was dispro-
portionately high. In „Gatumba“, once I had produced my permit and it was established that I was 
working with a recognized association, the interviews progressed smoothly. Nevertheless, I could not 
shake the feeling that many participants, particularly the ex-convicts (Maurice, Rugango, Paul, Yo-
hani, Yohani N.) followed an ‘invisible script’ or "rehearsed consensus289", and became evasive when 
politically inconvenient questions were asked. After completing the interviews in “Gatumba”, I de-
cided that I needed to get closer to the participants in Gisagara district. 
“Gatsata” 
“Gatsata” is a community in Gisagara district next to the Burundian border. It is situated in a remote 
valley and only accessible from Butare by a dirt road, which is impassable when the rainfall is heavy. 
The experience of the genocide in “Gatsata” was similar to “Gatumba” insofar as the onset was late 
and the local authorities (burgomaster, conseiller) tried calming down the population at first. Tutsi 
from other communities fled to “Gatsata” because their houses were burnt down and in “Gatsata”, 
they were lodged in the church. According to my respondents, it was not clear at first who was tar-
geted because especially wealthy people were robbed290. The message from the authorities however 
soon started to change. First there were rumors that the refugees in the church were attacking the 
local population, so villagers of both ethnicities started attacking the refugees holed up in the church. 
Soon it became evident that only Tutsi were targeted and Tutsi from the community started fleeing. 
The bulk of the killing however took place when people from abroad, particularly police officers from 
Kibirizi as well as soldiers and militiamen from other communes arrived291. They killed all the Tutsi in 
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the church using grenades, guns and machetes. Some villagers joined them. As in “Gatumba”, looting 
and eating cattle seems to have been very popular among the perpetrators. After the church-killings, 
there was apparently a formal meeting of the burgomaster with military officers where the order 
was given to kill all remaining Tutsi, which was swiftly obeyed292. Two respondents told me that a 
dozen militiamen just rounded up hundreds of Tutsi, telling them they would escort them over the 
border to Burundi, but instead killed them next to a lake293 and threw their bodies in294.  
When the RPF started getting closer, most Hutu in “Gatsata” fled to Burundi, with a better-off minor-
ity fleeing to Zaïre. In difference to “Gatumba” however, RPF-soldiers in Gisagara seem to have gone 
on a killing spree and murdered the Hutu males they found indiscriminately295. After the Burundian 
Army296 destroyed the camps in Burundi in 1996 and forcefully repatriated the Hutu refugees, many 
male Hutu were jailed immediately upon return297and without formal charges. Others such as Yusuf 
were imprisoned later, incriminated by the people already jailed. In recent times, forced agricultural 
reform seems to be one of the main problems in “Gatsata”. 
Because of my experiences in “Gatumba”298, I tried a slightly different approach in „Gatsata”. Here, I 
worked with a translator originating from the area who pointed out people with different back-
grounds to ensure diversity. This endeavor however almost failed. It was in “Gatsata” where I had to 
recognize that I was dependent on my research permit. The executive secretary of „Gatsata” was 
very hesitant about granting me access to the village. He wanted to propose interview partners to 
me, the leading heads of the community who had internalized reconciliation reconciled exceptionally 
well, as he portrayed them. He became increasingly nervous when I told him that I needed to select 
my participants myself, but calmed down immediately when I produced the official letter from 
MINEDUC. This personal episode exemplifies where power is situated in the 'new' Rwanda. Despite a 
highly publicized decentralization-policy, officials are clearly held accountable by their superiors in 
Kigali and not by their constituents299. Thanks to the familiarity of my local translator with the inter-
viewees, many respondents in Gisagara district proved to be much more accessible and their answers 
often had much more of an individually distinct quality compared to respondents in Huye district. 
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In Burundi, pursuing an approach to field research focusing on grassroots-perception was much easi-
er. Local authorities never demanded to see governmental permits even though I received a letter 
from the minister of external relations and international cooperation that openly encouraged my 
research and proposed cooperation with the yet-to-be-established national truth and reconciliation 
commission as well as the special court that would succeed it300. Research in Burundi however was 
very challenging with regard to the unstable security situation301 and the almost negligible amount of 
secondary literature compared to Rwanda. The collaboration I established with the Burundian human 
rights organization “Ligue Iteka” proved invaluable with regard to getting around and establishing 
contacts with communities in “Rohero” and “Kamenge”. In “Gakombe”, I employed a research assis-
tant originating from the community facilitating the contacts to participants. 
"Rohero" 
„Rohero“is a village in Southern Ngozi province that has grown quickly along a dirt road leading to 
Gitega. Of all the sites I visited, it experienced the most severe outbreak of violence in 1993 and the 
army moved in swiftly. The army gathered the Tutsi in the commune center in order to protect them 
from gangs of Hutu that roamed the countryside and killed every Tutsi in sight. During 'la crise', „Ro-
hero“turned into an IDP-camp as Tutsi and Upronistes from the region flocked to the center in need 
of shelter. Most participants witnessed violence in one way or another. Even after the civil war end-
ed, the IDPs did not dare to return to their hills because they still fear their neighbors302. Some do not 
even return to tend to their fields. Thus, the camp slowly became a village. Old bags from the World 
Food Program used as covering material for ceilings and the linear arrangement along the main road 
still bear witness to the settlement’s former purpose. Many Tutsi-participants in Rohero do not trust 
the government. Even though most of them knew about the killings of Hutu in 1972, they only con-
sider the events of 1993 genocide (against the Tutsi) and often refer to a Hutu conspiracy that had to 
be quelled in 1972303. The Hutu I met in „Rohero“ were mostly UPRONA-voters who fled as well. All 
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of them shared the views of their Tutsi neighbors despite the fact that they leaned towards more 
moderate positions in their evaluation of the current government304.  
Participants in „Rohero“ in general had the most negative attitude about the current state of affairs. 
Opinions such as “everything was better before305” or that Tutsis are discriminated against or even 
killed today306 were prevalent in „Rohero“.  
“Kamenge” 
As far as civil war dynamics go, “Kamenge” is almost exemplary for the Burundian countryside. Situ-
ated between Ngozi and the border to the neighboring province of Karuzi, “Kamenge” witnessed 
deportations and killings of Hutu in 1972, interethnic strife and continuing segregation of Hutu (hills) 
and Tutsi (center), as well as the occupation of the center by army units in 1993. However, with the 
local FRODEBU authorities keeping extremist Hutus calm in 1993, “Kamenge” was spared large-scale 
massacres in 1993. The bulk of the violence in "Kamenge" occurred in one week in 1994, when a 
gang of Hutus murdered the entire Tutsi-population of a neighboring hill. This provoked a string of 
revenge killings by the soldiers stationed in “Kamenge”-center assisted by some local Tutsi307. I actu-
ally interviewed both a Tutsi IDP whose family was murdered in said night and the Hutu he blames 
for killing them. Although the situation seems to have improved from 1996308 on, Etienne, the Tutsi 
whose family got killed still lives in the center among the larger part of the displaced Tutsi who still 
fear returning to their hills. The continued presence of a large group of Tutsi in the center however 
causes much discomfort to Hutus from the surrounding hills that think that the Tutsi are against rec-
onciliation309, and that they should return to their hills. The military also seems to have armed the 
Tutsi IDPs in the center310, which is congruent with stories about marauding “Sans Echec”-Tutsi mili-
tiamen in “Gakombe”311 and in Ngozi-city312. Many participants described what happened between 
1993 and 2005 as mutual “revenge313”-killings between Hutu and Tutsi. Defining which episode of 
killings amounts to genocide or which side is to blame varies from participant to participant. 
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“Kamenge” was the only research location where I exclusively relied on a key informant. “Pierre”is a 
school headmaster, former FRODEBU cadre and member of the Ligue Iteka. He knew the life stories 
of many participants and selected them according to our need for diversity, which helped greatly. In 
1993, "Pierre" had helped to prevent the violence from escalating in "Kamenge", making use of his 
function as a local administrator. Hence, people from many different groups trusted him.  
“Gakombe” 
“Gakombe” in Kirundo province borders the Gisagara district in Rwanda. While many inhabitants 
remember that “rich people314” or “abamenja315” got deported and never returned in 1972, the 
community faced its main crisis in the middle of the events of ‘Ntega-Marangara’ in August 1988 that 
claimed the lives of about 15’000316 to 25’000317 people. The events that started the violence in 1988 
are still heavily disputed, even among citizens of the commune. Most likely, the driving factors polar-
izing the population along ethnic lines seem to have been a mixture between the general sociopoliti-
cal climate of unrest after Buyoya’s coup in 1987, provocation by local Tutsi, cross-border PALIPEHU-
TU-instigation thriving on Hutu fears of a repetition of 1972318 and desires for revenge with regard to 
1972319. According to several sources, a Hutu uprising seemed to have started when a reknowned 
Tutsi notable opened fire on a group of Hutu. According to different sources this either happened at 
a wedding320 or because his house was under siege by a gang of Hutu321). The shots prompted the 
Hutus to attack and kill him and his family, the violence rapidly spreading to Tutsi in general. The 
army intervened shortly thereafter, slaughtering Hutu indiscriminately322 and provoking ten thou-
sands of Hutus to flee to neighboring Rwanda. Other sources speak of a Hutu conspiracy to over-
throw the government, which attacked Tutsi officials and families unprovoked and had to be sup-
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pressed323. Fréderic, an old man who survived four crises (’72, the Tanzanian-Ugandan war of ‘79, 
’88, and ’93) invoked strong parallels between the dynamics of a Hutu uprising and relentless army 
reaction in 1972 and 1988. Almost all of my participants in Kirundo lost family members in 1988.  
In the crisis following 1993, “Gakombe” remained mostly calm and I only heard of sporadic acts of 
violence particularly in neighboring communes324. A local FRODEBU-administrator apparently seems 
to have tried to calm the situation down325. The general atmosphere of fear however prompted al-
most all Hutu326 to flee to Rwanda temporarily and many Tutsi327 to move into the center where the 
army and the Tutsi youth militia ‘Sans Echec’ demonstrated a strong presence. The commune only 
came close to a renewed outbreak of violence when some Hutu extremists, apparently including 
Rwandan Interahamwe, killed a Tutsi counselor in 1994328. The authorities however were able to 
calm the situation. Participants’ views diverge with regard to the improvement of interethnic rela-
tions: when asked to name a year when they thought the situation became less dangerous and strife 
calmed down, opinions differed widely329. Even with regard to the issue of segregation, “Gakombe” 
seems to be polarized. Whereas some claim that there are no more Tutsi IDPs in the center330, others 
still regard the community as segregated331 or even claim that the notorious 'Sans Echec' are still 
operating in “Gakombe”332. Contrary to “Kamenge” or “Rohero” however, the Burundian government 
seems to have made an effort to rebuild burnt down houses after the crisis of 1988333. 
As in “Gatsata” in Rwanda, I worked with a research assistant originating from the community, a 
Hutu university student called Pascal334. This simplified access to the community and shortened the 
time for research significantly. As Pascal knew some of the local teachers, we were invited to set up 
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Tutsi-neighbors killed her mother (also a Tutsi) for marrying her father) but as far as I understood, this seems to 
have happened in the commune of Kirundo, not in “Gakombe”. Arsène. 35, Tutsi resident, says he was saved by 
soldiers who killed the Hutus who were attacking the school he was hiding in but it happened in a neighboring 
commune as well. 
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 Cf. Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, «Gakombe », Kirundo. 
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 E.g. Dominique; Fréderic; Juvénal H.; Marguerite; Marie C.; Odette; Pascal; Pascal M.; Thérèse. 
327
 E.g. Arsène (already moved to the center before); Marie-Chantal; Marie M. 
328
 Cf. Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo. 
329
 Marie M., 80, Hutu resident and Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident maintain that the conflict calmed down after 
1996-1997. Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu-resident said relations improved in 2001 and Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident 
claimed that things changed when Nkurunziza was elected in 2005. For many other participants such as Arsène, 
Marie-Chantal or Juvénal H. the situation today however isn’t decidedly better than in 1993 as the elite still 
behaves in a similar way.  
330
 Cf. Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, „Gakombe“, Kirundo. 
331
 Cf. Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo. 
332
 Cf. Interview with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo. 
333
 Arsène, a Tutsi resident as well as Fréderic, a Hutu resident claimed that the commune had rebuilt their 
houses. Pascal, a Hutu resident in "Gakombe" at least received bricks to rebuild his house. 
334
 I also did the first three interviews (Arsène, Fréderic, Viola) with Vanessa, a Tutsi translator from Bujumbura 
with whom I also worked in “Rohero” and “Kamenge”.  
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shop in a classroom of the local school. All the interviews could subsequently be conducted within a 
week because of the great assistance of the local school and the teachers who helped in recruiting 
participants from the community that fit the specific categories we were looking to interview in order 
to diversify the sample.  
 
3.2.2.  Interview Procedure and Structure 
Bypassing Political Correctness 
The post-conflict environments of Rwanda and Burundi are, as Thomson mentions, “highly politi-
cized335”. The violent history, the hazardous security situation in Burundi and the strong pressure of 
the Rwandan regime to embrace its new brand of Rwandan nationalism have resulted in a profound 
distrust towards strangers. Carelessly talk, particularly about politics, can be dangerous. In such envi-
ronments, direct questions can easily trigger politically correct answers. The participant repeats what 
he considers the officially sanctioned position in order not to put himself in jeopardy. When asking 
questions about current politics, this happened frequently in Rwanda, if the participant did know 
neither the research assistant nor me336. As a rule of thumb, the less represented or protected by the 
regime the participants felt, the more likely they were to answer in a politically correct way. Return-
ees and survivors were much more likely to speak their minds than bystanders or ex-convicts337.  
In Burundi, the group answering politically correct rather were government supporters confident in 
having won the elections whereas the group feeling most excluded, Tutsi in “Rohero”, made sure to 
express their anger against the current government even in non-political questions. 
In order to bypass politically correct answers, I chose to base my research design on a mixed method 
between individual life history-interviews including some specific questions and quantitative subjec-
tive rankings. By asking the respondent about his personal life-story, he was able to address how he 
witnessed violence, transition and possibly reconciliation in a natural way without being obliged to 
leave his comfort zone. As a researcher vice-versa, I was presented with the opportunity to tie specif-
ic political questions to the interviewee’s personal experiences in the third part of the interview. 
Following a semi-structured questionnaire338 that grew during my field research, my familiarity with 
the topic allowed me to approach the interview structure rather freely and allowed the interviewee 
to steer the interview process if he wished so.  
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 Thomson, 2010, 19. 
336
 Cf. chapter 4.1.4.  
337
 Please refer to chapter 3.2.5. “Participant Categories in Rwanda” for a detailed explanation of the groups. 
338
 Cf. Appendix. 
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The interviews were administered orally, usually with the help of a Rwandan or Burundian research 
assistant339 and utilized basic audio recording equipment (Olympus VN-2100PC). An interview took 
about 45 to 120 minutes, always depending on the enthusiasm of the respondent. Structurally, the 
interviews were divided into an introductory part that explained our work, two qualitative parts fo-
cusing on the participant’s life-story and his or her general perception, opinion and understanding of 
reconciliation politics, and a quantitative part consisting of scaled questions evaluating the partici-
pant's changing living conditions and views.  
Introductive Part 
Talking about very sensitive and at times personal topics, the security and comfort of the interview-
ees was paramount to the interview process. To most of my respondents outside Kigali, I was a 
stranger, even though my assistants and I always tried to make the purpose of the interview and the 
secrecy of the data very clear, and we usually spent several weeks in a community so that people 
came to know us. I briefed my research assistants very carefully about explaining the consent form340 
and to assure that no pressure of any kind was exerted on the participant. We needed to make sure 
the respondent understood the consent form very clearly, which is why I carried along prints in four 
different languages (English, French, Kinyarwanda, Kirundi) and always had the consent form orally 
explained to illiterate participants. It had to be unmistakably clear that the participant took part in 
the interview freely and voluntarily, that he was informed about the different levels of anonymity he 
could choose from and that he understood that he could stop the interview any time or leave out 
questions he did not feel comfortable answering. Particularly with regard to the term definitions and 
some scaled questions, many peasants made use of this provision.  
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 Except if participants spoke English or French which happened frequently with participants that enjoyed a 
higher education. 
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In order to preclude any negative consequences for participants related to being identified and 
also to minimize the pressure to answer questions in a politically correct way, I only asked partic-
ipants for their first names and made sure to carefully and openly explain the options for them 
regarding the disclosure of their identity. Regarding anonymity, participants could choose be-
tween four different options: 'Open Public Access' meant that respondents agreed to be cited by 
their first names and that their interview data (audio and transcript) would be available for fur-
ther research in the IRIBA center for Multimedia Heritage in Kigali341 and the Concordia Centre for 
Oral History and Digital Storytelling342 in Montreal. If a participant selected 'Partial Public Access', 
he provided a false name343 and furthermore, chose if he wanted the audio material plus the 
transcript stored in the two centers or just the transcript while I would destroy the audio mate-
rial after transcription ('No audio storage'). 'Complete Anonymity' translated into giving a false 
name and no data being made available to the two centers. I also pledged to destroy the data 
after finishing the dissertation. To make sure participants understood, I also used different symbols 
on the consent form in order to demonstrate the different options to illiterate participants. In the 
thesis, I chose not to use quotation marks for fake names. The only true names belong to participants 
who chose 'open public access'. A table of participants and the anonymity-options they chose is listed 
at the end of chapter 3.2.4. 
In order to ensure confidentiality and an atmosphere of security, the interviews took part in quiet 
and private places, often of the participant’s own choosing. In most cases, we visited participants in 
the privacy of their homes (“Gatumba” and “Gatsata”), were able to use the house of a neighbor 
(“Rohero”, Burundi), a church building (“Kamenge”), or a school building (“Gakombe” and three in-
terviews in “Gatsata”). If there was no such opportunity, we stayed in remote places outside or sat in 
my car. Even though I made sure to have all the necessary official permits and produced them when 
asked, government buildings were consistently avoided for interviews because my recognition as an 
independent researcher could have been tarnished in the eyes of the respondents. 
Classification 
Following the introductive part, the interviewees classified themselves with regard to seven different 
criteria: Age, gender, education, profession, residence, personal history during the conflict and eth-
nicity (in Burundi). In practice however, profession and education often coincided in the cases of 
most peasants and informal workers. No participant that enjoyed a higher education than secondary 
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 For the purpose of this dissertation, I will not  use any quotation marks for the names of participants regard-
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school worked as a farmer. Practically all respondents outside Kigali and Bujumbura that enjoyed a 
higher education worked as teachers, a small minority identified as (ex-) students and NGO-workers. 
Teachers and older men were the most valuable sources of information when it came to local history 
and societal observations, whereas most of the younger peasants and particularly peasant women 
were generally more interested in the tangible local results of politics.  
In Rwanda, categorization according to personal history intersects heavily with ethnicity344. The 
popular and encompassing character of violence made the Hutu-Tutsi divide the main frontline of the 
diverse conflicts, actually turning Rwanda and Burundi into bi-polar societies. This is where reconcili-
ation has to take root. Thus, I treated ethnicity / personal experience of the conflict as the most im-
portant distinction, which also explains the very small amount of Twa and post-war immigrants as 
well as the absence of Ganwa as interviewees. 
The introductory part ended either with the signing of the consent form or a recorded oral declara-
tion of consent. 
Life History Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews especially focusing on the last two decades of the interviewees' life sto-
ries formed the second part of the interviews. They started with short classificatory questions about 
the participant’s age, gender, place of residence, education, job and self-description of his or her role 
during the genocide or the civil war345. Since ethnic identities have officially been banned from public 
discourse in Rwanda, I did not ask people explicitly about their ethnicity here. 
The life story-questions were open-ended, but usually followed a chronological timeline starting in 
the participant’s childhood and slowly progressing to the present. Typical questions that came up 
frequently were e.g. “Can you tell me about your family’s relations to your neighbors when you grew 
up?”; “how did the relationship to your neighbors change when Habyarimana got assassinated?” or 
“What are the biggest differences between Burundi now and Burundi during the crisis?” 
The participant set the pace of the interview. In all cases, the conversation about the participant’s life 
touched certain topics about coexistence, past violence or reconciliation, which were then elaborat-
ed on in the specific questions forming the third part. The main objective of the second part of the 
interview was to anchor the perceptions and sociopolitical opinions of the respondent in his personal 
history. In most cases, the life stories  already indicated if participants were content with the post-
conflict transition so far and provided valuable information about the local perception of conflict. 
Specific Questions about the Understanding of political Terms and personal Views  
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 Cf. Chapter 3.2.5.  
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 Chapter  3.2.5. and 3.2.6. take a closer look at issues of classification. 
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The third part of the interview built on the life story-interview and delved deeper into the specific 
opinions of the participant. The questions were roughly arranged along following themes  
 'Identity', focusing on the participant’s self-perception and his experience with the state’s 
management of ethnic identity in the post-conflict period; 
 'Memory', examining attitudes towards official commemoration, its inclusiveness and its val-
ue for prevention; 
 'Term questions', evaluating personal understandings of core concepts such as 'peace', 'rec-
onciliation' and 'democracy'; 
 'Reconciliation and the state' analyzing the participant’s points of contact with reconciliation 
politics, assistance programs, and his opinions with reference to these programs. 
 'Transitional Justice', focusing on experiences with as well as plans for restorative and retrib-
utive justice. 
 'Fears'. Here, participants were asked about their hopes and fears for the future. 
The 'term questions' might need some elaboration: in order to understand the priorities of my inter-
viewees, I asked all respondents about their personal understanding of concepts such as peace 
(amahoro), reconciliation (ubwiyunge), and democracy (demokarasi). The idea behind these ques-
tions was to detect nuances in local and personal interpretations of these concepts, to carve out 
predominant interpretations and to compare them with the goals propagated in official politics.  
The interviewees were always asked if they could connect existing policies to reconciliation and 
peace as they had defined it in the terms before and what they thought the government is doing to 
achieve these goals. The questions about personal views and the understanding of terms allowed   
conclusions to be drawn about the degree of popular entrenchment that reconciliation programs and 
policies enjoy in local populations. Simultaneously, they highlighted the rural respondents’ priorities 
with regard to peace, reconciliation and politics in general.  
Scaled Questions 
The scaled questions attempted to generate a rudimentary quantitative measurement about how 
the participants’ subjective views of selected topics changed in the last two decades. They were not 
audio-recorded but took the form of a little survey346 that was filled out by the participants with the 
help of my Rwandan and Burundian research assistants347. 
Even though it is impossible to speak about a large-scale survey in the context of 95 interviews, the 
subjective rankings reduce the complexity of the qualitative research. While the life-story interviews 
provided thought-provoking insights about why and how people acted during the conflicts and tran-
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 Cf. Appendix: „Questionnaire Rwanda“ or „Modified Questionnaire Burundi“- 
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 Cf. Next chapter. 
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sitional phases, it was difficult to detect clear trends from interviews in which the emphasis was left 
to the interviewee. Only by layering the data, was it possible to filter out unusual elements or indi-
vidual issues and to identify returning themes. 
The subjective rankings consist of a set of assessment questions 
about different topics, which are applied to different years in the 
participant’s life. The participant awards positive and negative 
points to these dates in his life according to his personal perception. 
+5 is the highest number that can be awarded to a specific situa-
tion at a specific point of time, -5 is the lowest number with 0 
signifying indifference. The ranking system is based on Ingelaere’s 
concept of the “ladder of life”348. I also borrowed the visual to facili-
tate and visualize the interviewee’s evaluation of the different points 
in his life from Ingelaere349.  
As fixed points in time, I chose 1990350, 1994351, 2003352 (new constitution) and 2011353 for Rwanda 
and 1988354, 1993355 (election Ndadaye), 1993356 (assassination Ndadaye, begin of civil war), 2005357 
(election Nkurunziza) and 2011358 in Burundi. Ideally, the historical start date could be tied to the 
participant’s personal history and we proceeded from there, the participant tying a number to each 
subsequent date. The following topics were assessed  
 Overall relations with people of differing ethnicity; 
 Change of personal economic situation; 
 Personal approval of transitional justice; 
 Perceived political impact; 
 Perception of democratic governance; 
 Influence of ethnicity on holding a political office; 
 Trust in neighbors; 
 Trust in the army and the police; 
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 Cf. Ingelaere, 2010a, 278 
349
 Cf. Diagram on this page and Ingelaere, 2009, 35 and Ingelaere 2010a, 278. 
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 Starting date of the Rwandan civil war, time “before the genocide” 
351
 Rwandan Genocide 
352
 Rwanda adapts a new constitution, first term of Paul Kagame. 
353
 Time of Research. 
354
 Ntega-Marangara Crisis in Northern Burundi, „Before the civil war“ 
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 Election of the first Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye 
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 Assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, start of the civil war. 
357
 Pierre Nkurunziza gets elected, official end of civil war. 
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 Time of Research. 
"Ladder of Life" 
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 Trust in the government; 
 Respect for Human Rights. 
The results were compiled, analyzed and visualized in statistical diagrams that display the changing 
perceptions over the course of time.  
Economic Situation Rwanda
1990 1994 2003 2011
Bystanders 2.6 -0.9 0.9 2
Ex-Convicts -1.6 -2.6 -3.6 0.7
Returnees 0.2 -1.2 2.4 2.4
Survivors 2.4 -3.6 1.8 1.1
Rwanda Average 1.6 -2.0 0.7 1.5
 
Example: Change of Economic Situation in Rwanda 
 
3.2.3. Translation 
In most interviews, a translator/ research assistant had to be employed in oreder to translate the 
interviews from Kinyarwanda or Kirundi into English or French. I conducted the interviews with Eng-
lish- or French speakers myself without assistance. Although my knowledge of Kinyarwanda and Ki-
rundi is very limited, I was able to learn basic words and expressions prior to my field research, allow-
ing me an elementary supervision of the translation. It was however rarely necessary to intervene in 
such matters as I guided every interview and my translators, after being thoroughly briefed before 
starting the interview process.  The translators memorized the consent form by heart, displayed a 
high level of understanding with regard to the delicacy of the research. To guarantee for an optimum 
diversity and to minimize the possibility that  translator might affect the participants’ answers, I 
worked with four different translators of differing ethnicity and, if the opportunity arose, counterbal-

















The translators alternated between research sites: 
Location Translator, job Translator’s identity 
Kigali – Rwanda None (8 Interviews conducted 
by myself) 
European 
„Gatumba” – Huye - Rwanda “Christophe359” – Student (19 
Interviews) 
Rwandan student - Mixed – 
Hutu father, Tutsi mother. 
From Kigali. 
„Gatsata“” – Gisagara - Rwanda “Gilbert360” – Student (20 Inter-
views) 
Rwandan student – Hutu origi-
nally from “Gatsata” 
Ngozi & Bujumbura, Burundi None (2 Interviews conducted 
by myself) 
European 
„Kamenge“– Ngozi - Burundi Vanessa – Translator (16 inter-
views) 
Burundian professional transla-
tor – Tutsi from Bujumbura. 
„Rohero“ – Ngozi - Burundi Vanessa – Translator (16 inter-
views) 
Burundian professional transla-
tor – Tutsi from Bujumbura. 
„Gakombe” – Kirundo - Burundi Vanessa (3 interviews) & Pascal 
(11 interviews), Student 
Burundian student – Hutu from 
"Gakombe". 
Apart from Vanessa, the research assistants were university students, not trained translators, which 
were very hard to come by on a student’s budget. Nevertheless, all my research assistants performed 
their jobs with outstanding professionalism and apart from some minor mistakes, gave little reason 
to criticize.  
My first field assistant was “Christophe”, a student of mixed ethnic origin361 that I came to know dur-
ing my traineeship at CLADHO. We conducted interviews in Huye district together. As we were both 
unfamiliar with the inhabitants of “Gatumba”, we facilitated contact to participants with the help of 
AMI, a local CSOG that proved highly successful with recruitment. I however strongly suspected that 
our lack of familiarity elicited many generic, politically correct answers from participants. Some an-
swers appeared as if they were recited directly from Ingando-lessons or official texts from the NURC. 
The number of participants who refused to answer certain questions was the highest in “Gatumba”. 
In particular, 5 out of 19 participants refused the scaled question, “Do you think your country is a 
democracy?”  
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 Name changed upon wish of translator 
360
 Name changed upon wish of translator 
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 „Christophe“ was born to a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother. He once told me that during conversations with 
Hutu, they would address him as one of their own but the same would happen when he chatted with Tutsi. 
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In order to change these dynamics, I chose a local translator for the interviews in “Gatsata”. Alt-
hough “Gilbert” was a student as well, he was from a well-known Hutu-family in Gatsata. The re-
spondents in “Gatsata” knew him and his family and were much more willing to share their personal 
opinions with us than in “Gatumba”. This resulted in slightly different, rather critical evaluations of 
the post conflict situation in the qualitative parts, but did not translate to the subjective rankings. 
To keep the research in both countries comparable, I repeated the same selection of translators in 
Burundi. Vanessa hails from a middle-class Tutsi family in Bujumbura. She was not familiar with the 
research sites “Rohero” and “Kamenge” and told me that she was visiting the north for the first time 
in her life. She handled the interviews very professionally. We relied on Human Rights activists from 
Ligue Iteka to facilitate contact to the participants in the two communities mentioned above. In “Ro-
hero”, the recruiting process soon took on a life of its own after the activist from Ligue Iteka had in-
troduced us to the community. Respondents came to the house where we did interviews by them-
selves, asking to be interviewed. In “Kamenge”, as mentioned above, we relied on the key-informant 
'Pierre', who was well known in the community. 
My second Burundian research assistant was a Hutu bachelor student I met through a colleague at 
the University of Burundi. I selected Pascal specifically because he was from “Gakombe”, the com-
munity where I planned to conduct research. Still, in Burundi, my subjective feeling that the familiari-
ty of the translator with the participants influenced the interviews was less pronounced than in 
Rwanda.  
The answers in “Kamenge” and “Rohero” differed much more than between “Kamenge” and 
“Gakombe”, and the participants seemed to be generally more outspoken in Burundi. In the ex-IDP-
camp of “Rohero”, some participants might have been a little more comfortable in confiding in an-
other Tutsi, but in general, I was not able to detect measurable differences in the reactions with re-
gard to the ethnic identity of my translator. There were only two interviews, both in Gisagara, where 
the participants explicitly stated that they would only say this because they knew and trusted the 
translator who shared their history.  
 
3.2.4.  Participant Sampling and Classification Criteria 
Anonymity and Sample Size 
As mentioned above, political research in Rwanda and Burundi is difficult. Many participants were 
very reluctant about having their identities revealed even if it was just their first name and happily 
chose some form of anonymity. When asked about their consent to the interview being published, 
Page 79 
 
59.6 percent of all participants chose partial or complete anonymity, while the number in Burundi 
















Anonymity in Rwanda and Burundi (47 interviews in Rwanda, 48 interviews in Burundi)  
In such environments, compiling a representational sample of the population as scientific practice 
suggests, is difficult to achieve, particularly if the researcher is alone and plans to ask a highly vulner-
able set of the population personal and politicized questions.  
In general, I was only interested in people who were at least six years old at the beginning of the 
conflict, so they could actively remember the conflict. The average participant was 45.3 years old. In 
countries with populations of 42-47 percent362 under 14, this figure of course is not representative 
but I was primarily interested in the views of people directly affected by mass violence.  
Networks of Trust and Affinity 
In general, I chose an open-ended explorative approach to finding and interviewing my participants. I 
opted for a variation of respondent-driven or “Snowball Sampling363”, which is particularly popular in 
anthropology or ethnographic research, but combined it with some questions of rather quantitative 
character typical of political science and history, namely scaled questions and analyzing documents 
from official sources. The selection procedure of rural364 participants could probably be best charac-
terized as an open partial network analysis365, with the inhabitants of the different communities 
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 Cf. Heinsohn, 2003, 66 (in 2003). 
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 Cf. Schnell, Hill & Eiser, 1995, 282;Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Snowball_sampling (25 March 
2013) 
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 In Kigali, as well as Bujumbura and Ngozi, I mainly interviewed people that I knew personally. Nearly all of 
them had a higher education and belong to the elite (except Jean-Claude). These interviews mainly function as 
a comparative backdrop to the rural views I was mainly interested in. As many of the urban interviewees bene-
fit disproportionally from the current power settings,I expected that urban and rural views strongly differ. 
365
 Cf. Schnell, Hill & Esser, 1995, 244ff. 
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forming these neighborly networks. While following these networks, I made sure that I would talk to 
people with differing backgrounds regarding their role during the genocide or civil war. I often asked 
people if they knew somebody from the former antagonist group they had reconciled with or people 
who had experienced similar things as they had. Most participants were very open to these sugges-
tions and sent their friends and neighbors to be interviewed the next day. 
Reimbursement 
Once word had gotten around that a western researcher was doing interviews in the community, 
particularly in Burundi, many people came themselves and asked if I wanted to interview them. I 
never ran out of interviewees, which might also have to do with the fact that I reimbursed respond-
ents with a sum of 1000 RWF resp. 2000 BIF366 for their time. While this sum barely represents a to-
ken of appreciation in the west, it can amount to more than an average peasant’s daily wage in cer-
tain regions in Rwanda and Burundi. Initially, I planned to reimburse participants by giving them 
phone cards in order to reduce the material incentive but, as most of my participants had little use 
for phone cards, and would probably have sold them anyway, I gradually progressed to reimburse my 
respondents in cash. Nevertheless, many participants seemed to be genuinely thankful for the possi-
bility to share their views and experiences. Luce for example, a genocide survivor from “Gatumba”, 
talked for almost three hours and told us in the end that she was very happy we had asked her be-
cause she had never shared her story before. The promise of reimbursement may have been a strong 
motivation for agreeing to an interview. I however do not believe that it influenced the interview as 
such significantly. We always made it clear in the introductive part that we wanted to hear the 'par-
ticipant’s version' for academic purposes and made sure the respondent knew he would be reim-
bursed regardless of what he said.  
Overrepresentations 
Even though the thesis goes to great lengths to make sure that every relevant group (survivors, per-
petrators, bystanders, ex-combatants, refugees old and new) are sufficiently represented in the sur-
vey, there is a certain intended bias: Among the participants, there is a disproportionately large 
number of genocide survivors367 in Rwanda, and generally Tutsi368. This has two plausible reasons: 
Having been victimized over decades, genocide survivors are still one of the most vulnerable groups 
in Rwanda. Even if today, an ethnic Tutsi rules Rwanda and a plethora of organizations try to support 
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 This roughly equaled 2 Canadian Dollars in 2011. 
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 According to Rwanda Focus, the FARG provides assistance to 21’039 survivors (cf. Kamana, Laurent, FARG 
increases allowance for Genocide survivors, The Rwanda Focus, 2. June 2013, 
http://focus.rw/wp/2013/06/farg-increases-allowance-for-genocide-survivors/ (13.April 2014); whereas 
Kayitare (Ex-IBUKA) spoke of 30’000 survivors which makes up for 0.18-0.26% of a population of 11.7 Mio. 
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 About 35 percent (I did not ask about a person’s ethnicity in Rwanda) in all 95 interviews. By comparison: 
only 14-15 percent of Rwandans and Burundians are believed to be Tutsi. 
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genocide survivors, their desire for security as a minority with a history of victimization is naturally 
higher and their voices are crucial for a peaceful coexistence. In Burundi, where the Tutsi at risk of 
becoming politically marginalized, their plight might even be more urgent. In both countries, the 
Tutsi are in the minority, meaning they are more likely to feel vulnerable and more sensitive to politi-
cal tremors that might unsettle the process of nation building. Hence, a minority overrepresentation 
parallel to the quota regulation in the Burundian parliament369 offers itself in order to assess and 
weigh attitudes towards reconciliation. 
In Rwanda, the great focus on survivors (15=31.9 percent) and ex-convicts370  (8=15 percent) is self-
evidently not representative. These are the people who were most severely affected by the genocide 
and its aftermath, either as victims, prisoners or family members of victimized people. As their expe-
riences are more likely to have pushed them to assume extreme positions, they can be considered 
the principal targets of reconciliation politics. With politics having affected and still affecting their 
lives to such an extreme extent, their standpoints are usually rather distinctive. In Burundi, there are 
probable overrepresentations of Tutsi (18 participants =37.5 percent), ex-combatants (4 = 8.3 per-
cent) and refugees/IDPs371 (10 participants =20.8 percent). With the focus clearly lying on overcom-
ing the past, it made sense to seek out participants whose lives were strongly affected by genocide 
and civil war.  
There are furthermore overrepresentations of people with a secondary school or higher education 
(27.7 percent in Rwanda, 27 percent in Burundi) as well as urban dwellers372 in Rwanda (8 partici-
pants=17 percent). This however does not pertain to Burundi 373. As 'the intellectuals' in the centers 
generally were seen as the instigators as well as the benefactors of ethnic conflict and usually felt 
sociopolitical changes prior to the rural populations, their views were important for understanding 
the relationship between center and periphery, and also as an indicator for the homogeneity of polit-
ical views. In Rwanda, more men (29=61.7 percent) than women (17=38.3 percent) were inter-
viewed, whereas the ratio in Burundi was fifty-fifty (24 men, 24 women).  
Despite these statistical inconsistencies, the sample manages to involve a great variety of groups 
affected by the conflicts and provides an expressive and holistic overview of the diverse perceptions 
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 60 percent Hutu, 40 percent Tutsi Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 7f. 
370
 Straus, 2006, 117 estimates about 175‘000 to 210‘000 perpetrators. That would make 1.5%-1.8% of the 
population. 
371
 Even with the highest number of displaced persons I found, Uvin (2009, 15) speaks of 500’000 refugees and 
800’000 IDPs, they only make up for 10.38 percent of the population. 
372
 Kigali has about one Million inhabitants, making up for about 8-9% of the Rwandan population. 
373
 In Burundi, the figure is probably too low with two urban participants (4.2%). With Bujumbura and agglom-
eration estimated at 1 Mio. inhabitants, at least 9-10% of all Burundians live in an urban environment. However 
with the government not being nearly as concerned with shaping the population’s views in Burundi, I concen-
trated on rural environments. With 91.5% of Burundians relying on agriculture, the great majority of Burundi-
ans still live in a rural setting. 
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of reconciliation and reconstruction. Thomson374, Uvin375, Straus376, Fujii377 or Ingelaere378 have em-
ployed similar techniques. I am particularly drawing from Ingelaere in utilizing a similar set of scaled 
questions379 , and by strongly encouraging the comparison of our results. 
However, with the participant sample not being statistically representative, the frequently employed 
diagrams taken from an analysis of the subjective rankings should be mainly seen as illustration, ac-
centuation and further corroboration of the qualitative findings and not as authoritative proofs.  
In the following pages, all the participants are listed with a complete description of the categories 
applying to them. 
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3.2.5.  Participant Categories in Rwanda 
Ethnic Identities in Rwanda: A Legal Grey Zone 
In order to provide for a nuanced understanding of personal life histories, I did not categorize my 
Rwandan participants according to their ethnicity and never asked them about their ethnic identity 
directly. This also served the purpose of not getting into conflict with official Rwandan interpreta-
tions of “sectarianism”, “divisionism382” or the law on “genocide ideology383”. While these laws' aspi-
rations are legitimate, they are kept so vague that they conflate any ethnic discourse with genocide 
ideology and negationism punishable by prison. Their application suggests that they are increasingly 
used as a weapon to silence criticism384. Instead, I chose to categorize respondents with regard to 
their self-professed role during the genocide. Interviewees were able to choose freely between the 
categories “survivor”, “bystander”, “perpetrator385”, “returnee” and “ex-combatant386”. These cate-
gories helped to get a clearer perspective on personal backgrounds. I routinely asked interviewees to 
choose the category, which they believed they would fit into best. I explained the categories thor-
oughly if there were any questions, which rarely happened. These categories have already become 
such a defining part of Rwandan public life as 'Hutu', 'Tutsi' and 'Twa' had been before.  
References to ethnicity occupy a dangerous legal grey zone in Rwandan public life387. Ethnic identity 
is officially emphasized with regard to the narrative of the genocide, but at the same time, the gov-
                                                          
382
 The law against Sectarianism (Republic of Rwanda, 2001, Art. 3) forbids making “use of any speech, written 
statement or action based on ethnicity […]with the aim of denying one or a group of persons their human rights 
provided by Rwandan law and international Convention to which Rwanda is party”. The Rwandan law does not 
actually define „divisionism“but it is frequently applied in a similar way as sectarianism and considered illegal. 
This is the main problem with Rwandan laws concerning genocide ideology and the fight against denial – they 
are deliberately kept vague and thus can be applied against almost any form of criticism against the current 
regime. Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66; Amnesty International, 2010; Article 19, 2009. 
383
 Republic of Rwanda, 2008. 
384
 Cf. Waldorf, 2011, 48-66; Article 19, 2010; Gahima, 2013, 266. 
385
 Later changed to “ex-convict” – see below. 
386
 Except for Emmanuel in “Gatsata” who fought for the RPF briefly during the genocide but defined himself as 
a genocide survivor, I did not interview any Rwandan participants who fell into the “ex-combatant” category, 
RPF- or Ex-FAR-personnel, but it was an option they could choose. 
387
 Cf. Article 19, 2009. 
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ernment actively attempts to erase ethnic labels when it comes to the 'New Rwandan' identity388. 
Thus, ethnic identity has become a variable practically impossible to examine empirically in post-
genocide Rwanda. Many participants were reluctant to use the words ‘Hutu’ or ‘Tutsi’ when it came 
to current events, instead utilizing auxiliary terms such as e.g. ‘survivors’, ‘perpetrators’ or the “other 
group389”. ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ as terms have become cultural taboos, particularly for bystanders.  
Changing Connotations  
The problem is that the categorization I utilized in order to obtain official clearance for my research 
automatically adapts the new language of ethnicity390 as imposed by the RPF-government. As I will 
explain in chapter 4.1., the official narrative about the genocide against the Tutsi propagated by the 
current Rwandan government ethnicizes victimhood to such an extent that the label “survivor” is 
almost exclusively reserved for Tutsi, whereas the label “perpetrator” or even “prisoner” only refers 
to Hutu. Jean-Pierre, a teacher I interviewed in „Gatsata“ explained to me that the word “inyenzi” 
(cockroaches), which was initially used for Tutsi rebels infiltrating Rwanda in the 1960s391 changed 
significance and increasingly started to include all Tutsi392 in the months before the genocide. In a 
very similar analogy, John, an ex-convict from “Gatsata”, understood that the word “Interahamwe” 
had changed significance after the genocide. In his opinion, the word “Interahamwe” became ex-
changeable with the word 'Hutu': ”Interahamwe moved on to include not only the other band of Inte-
rahamwe-killers in Kigali, who were based in Kigali and other places. But […] it came to include all 
Hutu like that393.”  Marie-Françoise, a survivor from Gisagara used the word similarly, talking about 
“people who fled, they call them Interahamwe394”. This assessment corresponds to Jennie Burnet’s 
findings that in post-genocide Rwanda, terms such as “abacengezi” (infiltrators) or “perpetrator” 
exclusively apply to Hutu395. Even in Burundi, a participant said that in Rwanda, “Hutu” would signify 
“killer”, whereas Burundians would be more willing to commemorate all sides and did not apply 
stigmata396.  
                                                          
388
 Cf. Eltringham, 2011, 269-282. 
389
 Cf. E.g. Interviews with Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata”, 
Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Marita, 47, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.  The term “other 
group” was particularly used by Gilbert, my translator in “Gatsata”, who was very aware of the potentially ag-
gravating consequences a gratuitous use of the words “Hutu” and “Tutsi” could have. Participants may have 
used different expressions than “other group”. 
390
 Cf. Burnet, 2009, 88ff. 
391
 "Inyenzi" was the name the Rwandan government gave the insurgents. In a surprise attack from Burundi in 
late 1963, they came close to overthrow the PARMEHUTU government. The "inyenzi" and particularly the Chi-
nese-trained "Red Battalion" were a considerable political factor in Burundian politics in the 1960s. Cf. Le-
marchand, 1970, 197-227; 343-360; Chapter 1.1.3. 
392
 Cf. Interview with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
393
 Interview with John, 56, ex-convict, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
394
 Interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
395
 Cf. Burnet, 2009, 88ff. 
396
 Cf. Interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi-IDP, „Rohero”, Ngozi. 
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Exclusive Labels focusing on the Genocide against the Tutsi 
Helen Hintjens welcomes that it is no longer acceptable to reduce Rwandan history to an “age-old 
conflict between “two races”, Hutu and Tutsi397”, allowing perspectives that are more complex to 
emerge and defusing the tensions surrounding these terms. New official categories of identity such 
as “survivors and génocidaires, 'old' and 'new' caseload refugees, rural and urban Rwandans, Anglo-
phone and Francophone, have all taken on great significance in post-genocide Rwanda398." Hintjes 
expresses the need to create spaces for more complex voices, such as Rwandans of mixed Hutu-Tutsi 
descent, returning refugees and Hutu who are neither perpetrators nor survivors. While cautiously 
welcoming the refusal to publicly debate ethnic categories, Hintjens however remains skeptical of 
the governmental approach to fostering a sense of national unity by eliminating dissent and demand-
ing obedience. In her view, the foundational myth of collective victimhood exonerates the current 
leadership from its own human rights violations by comparing them with the greater crime of geno-
cide, hence continuing the culture of impunity on another level. 
I contend that the new identities have not emancipated themselves from the genocide. Quite the 
opposite, the genocide has become a strong reference point that actually determines a Rwandan's 
identity from the government's point of view. Speaking in categories exclusively relating to the geno-
cide has become so widespread that these categories have polarized the discussion in Rwanda. The 
labels exclude people with life stories not fitting the official narrative and serve to globalize Hutu 
guilt399. Even though many participants claimed that to be called a Hutu or a Tutsi “has no im-
portance400”, many scholars maintain that ethnic identities are “more rigid than ever401” despite not 
being uttered anymore. In all of my interviews, I met only two Hutu who claimed to be 'survivors', 
Annunciata and Boniphilde. Both had married Tutsi men who were killed in the genocide and both 
explained to me that they were facing problems with regard to being accepted as survivors by the 
authorities and even by other survivors. I never met a single Tutsi or even heard of a Tutsi who iden-
tified as a 'perpetrator'. Grave human rights abuses by the RPF/RPA are documented, but the charac-
ter of these abuses strongly deviates from the killings of the genocide. RPF/RPA-killings mostly took 
the form of extrajudicial executions by the army or militia in cordoned off areas. They largely exclud-
ed killings by ordinary citizens that characterized the genocide against the Tutsi, and thus, defined 
the 'perpetrator'-label. With the label 'perpetrator' invoking the picture of a potentially drugged ma-
chete-wielding peasant or militia-member, even the mental image does not correspond well with the 
picture of the disciplined soldier who liberated the country. This dichotomy between 'victims' and 
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 Hintjens, 2009, 97 
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 Hintjens, 2009, 97 
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 Cf. e.g. Lemarchand, The Politics of Memory, 2009, 65-76; Burnet, 2009, 88-100; Thomson, 2013, 16-23. 
400
 Interview with Jeanne d’Arc, 34, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye. 
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 Zorbas, 2004, 42. 
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'perpetrators' strictly reduced to the default roles during the genocide categorizes Rwandan society 
just as much and largely along the same lines as the notorious ethnic identities did before and during 
the genocide. Yes, Tutsi were the ethnic group targeted in the genocide and the expression “geno-
cide against the Tutsi” is technically correct when it comes to the legal definition of genocide as de-
termined by article II of the UNGC402. Bluntly characterizing Tutsi as victims and Hutus as perpetra-
tors however does not account for the complexity and the multiple facets of violence surrounding 
the genocide, its prologue and its aftermath. To be clear: the genocide in Rwanda 1994 was perpe-
trated against the Tutsi as an ethnic group. Rwandan Tutsi manifest the ethnic group targeted for 
elimination as a whole. The genocide against the Tutsi is also responsible for the overwhelming ma-
jority of casualties in Rwanda. In this respect, the government narrative is correct. 
The genocide against the Tutsi does however only account for part of the violence that occurred in 
the Great Lakes and the focus on the genocide in its horrific efficiency and swiftness tends to block 
out the violence that was not directed toward Rwandan Tutsi from April to July 1994. These mass 
killings remain largely unpunished. 
Ill-fitting Life Stories 
Thomson speaks of “multiple and sometimes contradicting layers of victimhood and perpetratorhood 
that go back for decades among individual Rwandans403”. Sometimes, participants even combined 
categories: Emmanuel, a survivor from Gisagara went on to fight for the RPF during the genocide404, 
Yohani N., a peasant from „Gatumba” who was imprisoned for fourteen years for his alleged partici-
pation in the genocide, asserts that he used to hide Tutsi405. Such fates surpass simple categoriza-
tions. I also encountered many life stories that defy the narrative of one-sided ethnic killing: Ben says 
his father, a Hutu businessman with MRND-affiliation was targeted by the Interahamwe not because 
he had married a Tutsi but rather because he was rich406. Thasienne claims she has to pay reparations 
for goods she used to hide for her Tutsi neighbors407 who got murdered. Marita’s408 relative, Rob-
ert’s409 father and Françoise’s410 son, brother and daughter were killed by RPF troops when they en-
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 Thomson, 2013, 17. 
404
 Emmanuel identified himself as a survivor because he only fought for the RPF for a very short period of time. 
Cf. Interview with Emmanuel, 37, survivor, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
405
 Cf. Interview with Yohani N., 58, ex-convict, „Gatumba”, Huye. 
406
 Cf. Interview with Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali. Ben asserted that the Interahamwe only came looking for his 
father to pay them for sparing the family but not for his Tutsi mother. 
407
 Cf. Interview with Thasienne, 38, bystander, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
408
 Cf. Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
409
 Cf. Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara. 
410
 Cf. Interview with Françoise, 53, bystander, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
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tered „Gatsata”. Yohani’s411 son was killed by RPF-soldiers in „Gatumba”. Gaspard’s412 family disap-
peared as refugees in the DRC when he was still a child. Rugango’s relatives were killed in Rwanda 
1995 when he was in prison413 and the list goes on.  
Mostly Hutu tell these stories even though some survivors also mention abuses by the RPF414. Other 
Hutus such as Mukaga Kwaya (daughter of an ex-convict) or Paul (ex-convict) steadfastly deny having 
seen any killings at all in 1994 or just admit to seeing single acts in order to distance themselves from 
the genocide as far as possible. For these people, embracing the new national Rwandan identity and 
rejecting ethnic identities proves to be difficult as long as they are constantly reminded through 
commemoration and re-education that although “today there is no Tutsi,and there is no Hutu, we are 
all one Rwandan [sic.]415”, they and their relatives are simultaneously labeled 'perpetrators' and 
viewed with general suspicion. 
The Use of Categories in the Thesis 
Tutsis from the Banyarwanda-diaspora who came back to Rwanda after 1994 refer to themselves as 
'returnees' in the common convention of speech. Because all Tutsi inside the country were targeted 
during the genocide and thus identify as 'survivors', the only possible 'bystanders' are Hutu. As I have 
never met any exceptions to this understanding of categories, these became my definitions: 'survi-
vors' identified as people inside Rwanda and persecuted during the genocide; 'bystanders' describe 
people who were in Rwanda in 1994 but were not targeted in the genocide; people who came back 
to Rwanda after 1994 were listed as 'returnees'.  
During most of the interview-process, I listed the fourth category, 'ex-convicts', as 'perpetrators'. 
Halfway through my research, I however started to understand that most 'perpetrators' I interviewed 
claimed to having been incarcerated innocently. From a group of eight ex-prisoners I interviewed, 
only one, Innocent416, admitted having taken part in the killings. Maurice, Yohani, and John admitted 
to looting and/or burning houses but Yusuf, Paul, Yohani N. and Rugango417 all claimed to having 
been jailed innocently. Because it was impossible for me to verify their statements, I changed the 
category 'perpetrator' to 'ex-convict', meaning people who were imprisoned for their alleged crimes 
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 Cf. Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, „Gatumba”, Huye. 
412
 Cf. Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
413
 Cf. Interview with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, „Gatumba”, Huye. 
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 Chris, a public employee from Kigali e.g. talks about witnessing the beating and killing of Hutu prisoners. Cf. 
interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali. 
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 Interview with Anasthase, 71, returnee, „Gatumba”, Huye 
416
 Cf. Interview with Innocent, ex-convict, 55, „Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
417
 Some parts of Rugango’s interview were contradictory. He claimed that he had to pay reparations for goods 
he did not steal and that actually he was acquitted by Gacaca. Later he admitted that the Gacaca court had 
only acquitted him from killing but not from looting but still adhered to the fact that he did not steal. In gen-




during the genocide. The term 'ex-convict' is also less fraught with prejudice because it leaves open 
the possibility that either the people actually perpetrated crimes or that they were jailed innocently. 
It is not my intention to raise a participant's integrity to question. On the opposite end of the scale, 
'bystander' is an accumulative category for people who claim to not having been involved in the gen-
ocide or were acquitted without being jailed. Even if it is possible that some of the candidates who 
characterized themselves as 'bystanders' actively took part in killings and just lied to me, I left them 
in the categories they chose for themselves. Hence, the defining feature of the 'ex-convict' group is 
less proven guilt as a perpetrator and rather the fact that the participant was imprisoned at some 
point because of his alleged involvement in the genocide.  
Old Identities, New Terms 
As established above, these categories do not live up to the complexity of Rwandan history in the 
past two decades. With very few exceptions418, they amount to ethnic distinctions masked in new 
terms. People who identified themselves as 'ex-convicts' and 'bystanders' are always Hutu; 'survivors' 
and 'returnees' are usually Tutsi. Pottier maintains that the “official discourse on the 1994 genocide 
maintains in practice the ethnic division which the RPF-led government denounces in theory419” be-
cause it only allows for one dominant feature and thus divides the population. Looking at post-
genocide narratives in Rwanda, Eltringham420 came to similar conclusions: by emphasizing the ethnic 
character of genocide while at the same time proscribing ethnic identity in the forward-looking dis-
course of reconstruction, the government deepens the wedge not only between 'survivors' and 'per-
petrators', but also denies Rwandans an open reflection that might lead to a relativizing of ethnicity. 
Furthermore, the official doctrine of condemning all aspects of the Rwandan state from 1959 to 1994 
puts eventually positive memories from the time before the genocide421 in a dubious light because 
the period is considered fundamentally flawed in the official discourse. Not only are the roles of 
'guilty' and 'innocent', 'bad' and 'good' periods clearly established and inalterable, but not using the 
proper terms of the official “language of recovery and restoration422” potentially makes you a propo-
nent of 'genocide ideology'. Thus, even such rudimentary labels given to categories of people with 
reference to the genocide already shape our perception of history and reflect an interpretation of 
events423 heavily propagated by the current regime. Despite the old identities being prohibited, the 
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 Annunciata and Boniphilde, the Hutu survivors mentioned above. 
419
 Pottier, 2002, 126. 
420
 Cf. Eltringham, 2004, 72-99 and 2011 
421
 Most of the people I interviewed who lived in Rwanda prior to 1990, even survivors, characterized their 
relations with neighbors and authorities as smooth and trouble-free before the civil war or even the genocide 
changed the dynamics. Cf.  chapter 4.1.2. 
422
 Eltringham, 2011, 270f. 
423
 The emphasis on the genocide against the Tutsi cancels out or justifies violence originating from the RPF 
that occurred before, during or after the genocide. 
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new identities do not “cut across those earlier fault lines424” as Verdeja’s definition of reconciliation 
demands, the old fault lines just have been given new names. 
Still, pragmatically, I needed a reference point in order to compare and contextualize my interview-
ee’s life story. The genocide is a historic watershed event. It brutally and inevitably shaped the lives 
of all Rwandans that lived through it. The thesis is interested in the views of former antagonists 
about reconciliation and its political implementation. Thus separating the interviewees into groups 
the genocide created makes sense in the context of the thesis. Even if such a categorization may 
have its flaws due to its ideological connotations, it ultimately serves the goal of making differences 
in the perceptions and attitudes of people whose lives were touched differently by the genocide visi-
ble. Even though the Rwandan state’s grip on civic (re-)education often shines through, especially in 
the ratings-part of the interview, and Rwandan participants demonstrated more criticism during the 
qualitative parts, the scaled questions are particularly interesting when comparing Rwanda to Bu-
rundi. 
 
3.2.6.  Participant Categories in Burundi 
Ethnic Categorization in Burundi 
In Burundi, no legal bans on ethnic discourse were imposed and with massacres taking place on both 
sides, the roles of victims and perpetrators in the civil war never seemed as clear-cut as in the Rwan-
dan genocide425. With the power sharing agreement implementing 60 /40-quota regulations for Hutu 
and Tutsi on the top-level of government, ethnic identities in Burundi are codified in law instead of 
being banned. Hence, it was possible to categorize people according to their ethnic identity in Bu-
rundi. Participants could identify as the following categories:  
 'Non-Combatant Tutsi residents' and 'Non-Combatant Hutu residents', designating ordinary 
Hutu and Tutsi who stayed in their homes during the civil war or only fled for short periods of 
time.  
 'Hutu refugees and returnees'; this category pertains to Hutu who came back from exile after 
Nkurunziza’s election in 2005.  
 'Tutsi IDPs, refugees and returnees'. In practice, this category was mainly reserved for inter-
nally displaced Tutsi as few Tutsi fled abroad;  
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 Verdeja, 2009, 3. 
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 Cf. Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, 2002. 
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 'Ex-combatants', identifying retired fighters from the FAB, FNL and CNDD-FDD whose stories 
proved to be rather surprising in many cases; and  
 “Twa”, a category that basically comes down to Madeleine in „Kamenge”, my only Twa-
participant. 
Even though these categories are less politicized in Burundi, which handles ethnicity in a far more 
non-restrictive manner than Rwanda, the problem here was of a different nature.  
How to categorize Refugees? 
Categorization has been a challenge in Burundi because most non-combatants fled at some point, 
but not all went abroad for longer periods. Because almost everybody had been displaced for a 
shorter or longer period, the label 'refugee' could be interpreted either restrictively or expansively in 
the Burundian context. Several episodes of violence forced hundred thousands of Burundians to flee 
their homes over the decades. The purge against the Burundian Hutu elite in 1972 which left any 
number from 100’000426 to 300’000427 dead and which Lemarchand ascribes a selective “genocidal 
quality428”, produced around 300’000 Hutu refugees429 who stayed outside Burundi’s borders for 
decades. Furthermore, the crisis in Ntega and Marangara in 1988 produced another 60’000430 refu-
gees and the civil war from 1993 to 2005 claimed over 300’000 victims and created anywhere from 
400’000431 up to 700’000432 refugees who fled to surrounding countries, mainly Tanzania433 and tens 
of thousands of internally displaced persons434. Trying to record the differences in attitudes towards 
reconciliation as meticulously as possible, I wanted to distinguish long-term Hutu refugees who often 
developed a distinctively Anti-Tutsi “mythico-history435” from Hutu who had remained in the country. 
Liisa Malkki, in her groundbreaking work “purity and exile” has noticed fundamentally differing atti-
tudes between the isolated Hutu refugees in Mishamo, an organized camp largely dependent on the 
UNHCR and the Tanzanian government, and Hutu refugees in the Tanzanian town of Kigoma who had 
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 Meisler, 1990, 384 speaks of 100‘000 to 200‘000 casualties. Lemarchand, 1996, xv, mentions 100’000 vic-
tims as well. 
427
 Mwakikagile, 2013, 563 and Lemarchand, 2009, 129 speak of 200’000 to 300’000 victims. Watt, 2008, 34 
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 Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 100, 
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 Cf. Lemarchand, 2009, 36 ; Watt, 2008, 34. 
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 Cf. Ntibantunganya & Ndadaye, 1999, 195. 
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 Cf. Lemarchand, 2009, 36. 
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 Cf. Watt, 2008, 48; Lemarchand, 1996, xxxi. Uvin (2009) speaks of 500’000 refugees and 800’000 IDPs. 
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structs how the exiled and isolated Hutu made sense of their present predicament by constructing an elaborate 
mythico-historical narrative that retrospectively validated their journey and made sense of the genesis through 
ethnic conflict. In their interpretation of history, the Tutsi were cast as the oppressor trying to keep the Hutu in 
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Page 95 
 
assimilated into Tanzanian society and were less of a “community436”. Whereas the isolated refugees 
from Mishamo nurtured and preserved their ‘pure’ identity as exiled Hutus and dreamed of a trium-
phant collective return to Burundi, the refugees in Kigoma behaved much more pragmatically, ad-
justing their identities to their daily lives in Tanzania437. Following Malkki, I presumed that a group’s 
isolation and its proximity to the former antagonists strongly influence its views on reconciliation. 
Interested in seeing which groups embraced or resisted reconciliation most actively and what their 
particular worries were, I thus chose to further divide Hutus and Tutsis into 'residents', 'refu-
gees/IDPs' and 'ex-combatants'. 
Even though the communities I researched differed from the rest of the country with regard to the 
preferred country of refuge because of their geographic proximity to Rwanda, every community wit-
nessed at least temporary ethnic segregation and flight. In „Gakombe” and „Kamenge”, the Tutsi fled 
under the protection of the army in the center of the commune while the Hutu stayed on their hills 
or fled to Rwanda or Tanzania. In „Rohero”, the army gathered Tutsis and UPRONA-supporters to 
protect them more efficiently. Whereas most IDPs returned to their hills after the crisis of 1988 in 
„Gakombe“, many Tutsi in „Kamenge“ stayed in the center after 1993 causing continuous discomfort 
among Hutus438 who feared riotous assemblies of Tutsi targeting them, which did happen frequently 
during 'la crise'. The IDP-camp in „Rohero“turned into a village over the years as the Tutsi inhabitants 
were too scared to return to their hills. In this situation, the differences between residents and refu-
gees were much more clean-cut in „Gakombe“ and „Kamenge“ whereas in „Rohero“, the lines be-
tween resident and IDP have blurred over time. Interestingly, some of the Hutu in “Rohero” call 1993 
a genocide “against Upronistes439”, not against Tutsi, thus they deliberately downplay the differences 
between them and their Tutsi neighbors. 
Refugees and IDPs in Burundi have turned residents and vice-versa, so I chose to only categorize 
people as 'Hutu refugees' who explicitly referred to themselves as such and who had remained 
abroad for more than several years during the civil war, similar to the 'returnees' in Rwanda. The 
same applied to Tutsis: if they identified as IDPs, had come to the center because they fled the vio-
lence and were still staying there, I labeled them 'Tutsi IDP'. 
Ambiguous ethnic Identities 
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Another, very surprising problem in Burundi was clearly assigning ethnic identities. Contrary to 
Rwanda, ethnicity is openly discussed in Burundi. Paradoxically however, the different ethnic catego-
ries appeared to be less determining than in Rwanda, at least in times without political turmoil.  
Despite the efforts to erase ethnic identities in Rwanda, participants’ ethnicities frequently came up 
when people told their life stories. I never asked anyone about his ethnicity explicitly, but most 
Rwandans told me voluntarily at some point. During the Rwandan civil war and genocide, knowing 
one’s identity was essential for survival and even before, most Rwandans had learned their ethnicity 
through head counting in school440. In Burundi however, some participants claimed not to know their 
identity441 or to only having learned it by coincidence442. More than half the participants told me that 
they only came to know it because massacres were taking place (in 1972, 1988 and 1993), so they 
had to choose sides443. In difference to Hutu, many Tutsi, the privileged group in Burundi before 
1993, often knew their ethnic identity since they were children444.  
Ethnic identities in Burundi (as in Rwanda) were heavily instrumentalized during the conflicts of the 
last few decades. They had a political rallying function445 as soon as the (Tutsi-) leadership was chal-
lenged. However, in between the outbreaks of violence, the Tutsi dictators tried to whitewash ethnic 
discrimination in order to legitimize their rule. Not unlike Kagame today, Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-
1987) emphasized on national unity through reforms such as making Kirundi the first official lan-
guage and embarking on a very unpopular project of villagization. Silently however, he left the bla-
tantly discriminatory policies and institutions in place446. His successor Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993 / 
1996-2003) still did not break the stranglehold of a small group of Tutsi on military and political pow-
er but he saw the need for democratization and conflict transformation and initiated limited reforms 
in the 1980s, which were however hampered by repeated outbreaks of violence447. Since the 
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UPRONA lost its multi-ethnic character with the death Prince Rwagasore in 1961, the ruling Tutsi-
elite from Bururi felt threatened by the thought of a democracy that, if ethnically interpreted, would 
marginalize the Tutsi. Ethnic discrimination however was hidden as much as possible. Talking about 
ethnicity was not received well in Burundi during the decades of military dictatorship and the paral-
lels to Rwanda today cannot be denied. This “conspiracy of silence448” also surrounds the killing of 
the Hutu elite in 1972, which has received so little attention by scholars and politicians that Le-
marchand characterizes it as “a forgotten genocide449”. Thus, it is not surprising that people often 
only came to know their ethnic identity when not knowing it became life threatening. 
Furthermore, the traditionally patrilineal heredity of ethnic identity and its prominence in the diverse 
episode of mass-killings clouds the fact that even among people from the Great Lakes region unfamil-
iar with each other, distinguishing Hutu from Tutsi quickly comes down to guesswork. There probably 
are a very large percentage of people of mixed descent450. Hence, some participants were able to 
navigate and switch between different ethnic identities according to what the situation necessitated: 
Marie-Goreth told me that she was not targeted by the military because of her “Tutsi-nose451”. Eze-
chiel452 and Abel453, both Tutsi, joined the strictly pro-Hutu FNL in 2002 resp. 2005, they were not 
eligible for integration into the new army after the ceasefire because as former child-soldiers. For 
several years, they fought on the Hutu side in order to get a better D,D,R & R-deal. David454, on the 
other hand, a Hutu from “Kamenge”, fought for the FAB in Burundi and the DRC from 1999 to 2004, 
despite his father being killed by Tutsi and the army being traditionally Tutsi-dominated455 before the 
signing of the Pretoria Protocol. All theses cases point toward a strong interwovenness of ethnic and 
politico-economic factors during 'la crise'. When fighting for economic survival, ethnic affiliation of-
ten was considered secondary. 
Despite the fact that the peace process and the subsequent implementation of power sharing by 
quota regulations has taken much of the sting out of interethnic relations in Burundi, ethnic identi-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(cf. Lemarchand, 1996,  xxv). After losing to Ndadaye in a landslide in 1993, he seized power via military coup 
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ties are still fraught with prejudice and fear in the grassroots. Marie M.456, a peasant woman from 
„Gakombe” did not trust us enough to tell her ethnic identity. She identified as a Hutu first only to 
take it back afterwards, stating that she did not want to reveal her ethnic identity. With Sadi457, an 
ex-convict and informal worker from „Kamenge”, it was similar. He hemmed and hawed claiming not 
to know his ethnic identity, but said people would call him a Hutu. Both participants are listed as 
Hutu because it is the category they first identified as. Many participants, particularly Tutsi in the ex-
IDP camp „Rohero”, such as Juvénal458, Irankunda459 or Marie-Rose460 maintain that ethnic relations 
are still hostile. Marguerite461 argues that the interethnic relations were better before the civil war, 
even though she states that Hutu were discriminated and that she lost three children during 'la crise'. 
With the authoritarian drift of the governing party CNDD-FDD perceived as predominantly Hutu, de-
claring oneself a Hutu seems to be the better option in an increasingly volatile environment. 
 
3.2.7.  Data Triangulation 
The approach towards interview-analysis consists in three different layers of analysis: The 'official' 
level focuses on reconciliation politics as conceived on the national level, the 'informal' level looks at 
their local manifestations and compares official politics with the views articulated by the interviewed 
population. On the regional level, the differences between the popular attitudes towards reconcilia-
tion politics are compared by country. 
I approached the research question in three steps: First, I compiled the 'informal' interviews as de-
scribed above. The 'informal' part did take up most of my research (three months of preparation in 
both countries and four months of active interviewing) and relied on the interview process and par-
ticipant observation in everyday life. 
In a second step, the findings from the interviews were cross-referenced with 'official' sources: policy 
documents, media, and reports from international and domestic organizations as well as secondary 
literature. The objective was to evaluate the intent and context of reconciliation politics and identify-
ing potential feedback loops between the government and the population on a national level. 
In a third step, the state of affairs regarding reconciliation politics are compared countrywise in order 
to filter out similarities and differences, chances and pitfalls of the individual approaches towards 
societal reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region. 
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The “official” Level in Rwanda 
The research on 'official' positions with regard to reconstruction and reconciliation essentially de-
scribes official state politics and delineates the narratives of the political and socio-economic elites. 
The analysis relies on official documents and reports, an analysis of Rwanda’s most important foreign 
language newspaper, the “New Times”, which reflects the views of the RPF462, as well as foreign and 
domestic commentaries by scholars, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, interviews with offi-
cials, etc.  
The body of source material regarding the 'official' position is richer in Rwanda, where the state has 
actually set up agencies such as the NURC or the CNLG to grapple with the legacy of the genocide and 
propagate a view of Rwandan history officially considered correct463. Rwanda’s exposed position as 
site of one of the most atrocious genocides in human history, its pioneering strategies with regard to 
transitional justice (particularly Gacaca), and its relative stability and security for researchers have 
led to a flood of journalistic essays, academic publications, NGO-Reports, novels and even movies 
about the difficult legacy the small central African country has to deal with. Nowadays, writing about 
Rwanda has not only become difficult with regard to creating new knowledge, it has also become 
difficult to remain non-partisan in an increasingly aggressive conflict about the prerogative of inter-
pretation as soon as the Rwandan genocide and its legacy come up for discussion464. 
The “official” Level in Burundi 
In contrast to Rwanda, Burundi’s transitional process remains severely under-researched. Although 
many official documents concerning transitional justice and reconciliation have been created, only 
very small parts of the proposed measures have actually seen implementation on a national level. 
Domestic NGOs like OAG (Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale) and Ligue Iteka however have 
proven to be vigilant observers of political action. The media in Burundi is a more reliable watchdog 
of government and generally offers a wider spectrum of views than the heavily controlled Rwandan 
media. During the civil war, some outlets in Burundi such as the “aube de la démocratie” or “le carre-
four des idées” actively disseminated ethnically motivated hate speech465 similar to Hassan Ngeze’s 
notorious Kangura in Rwanda, but in distinction to Rwanda, Burundi’s media landscape featured 
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critical and reconciliatory voices as well. Projects such as the famous Studio Ijambo466 and activists 
like Adrien Sindayigaya used the medium radio from early on in the civil war to foster reconciliation 
and to search for common ground between Hutu and Tutsi. I also briefly consulted Burundian news-
papers “Le Renouveau” (a government publication) and “IWACU” (an independent newspaper), but 
never conducted an in-depth analysis of the same proportions as in Rwanda. This omission derives 
largely from the fact that an officially sponsored narrative of the past of Rwandan proportions is 
largely absent in Burundi. Despite public consultations and regularly repeated announcements of a 
TRC and special tribunal, the ruling party up to 2014 considered the past of secondary importance. 
Furthermore, the individual opinions professed in the media and personal interviews proved to be 
much more divergent and sometimes more partisan than in Rwanda.  
To summarize: the thesis compares 'official' and 'informal' data about the following sociopolitical 
areas investigated in order to provide a descriptive account of local perceptions of reconciliation: 
 The management of coexistence and identity politics467 
 Historical narratives and the politics of memory and commemoration 
 Government initiatives aiming at peace and reconciliation 
 Approaches to transitional justice 
  
                                                          
466
 Cf. Studio Ijambo, www.studioijambo.org (24.March 2013) Personal conversation with Adrien Sindayigaya, 
5. March 2011. 
467
 Please also refer to chapter 3.2.5. 
Page 101 
 
4. Politics of Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Rwanda  
Initial Situation after the Genocide 
The prerequisites for reconstruction and reconciliation in Rwanda could not possibly have been more 
adverse from the start. When the RPF captured Kigali on July 4, 1994, the brutal ca. three months-
long genocide left practically the whole Tutsi-population of the country dead, with many of their 
Hutu neighbors belonging to the perpetrators. Over two million Hutu had fled the country in fear of 
retaliation. The conquering guerilla army had no experience in governing, and for many Rwandans, 
represented a minority of Tutsi-refugees who had fled the country from 1959 to 1973. Furthermore, 
the genocidal interim government had plundered the government coffers and the judicial apparatus 
was in ruins. The international community had done nothing to stop the genocide, but was now sup-
plying the refugee camps in Zaïre with humanitarian aid. At that point, the UN was ignoring the 
needs for rehabilitation in Rwanda itself and through its refusal to disarm the remnants of the geno-
cidal regime was actually enabling the ex-government to build a powerbase in the camps468. The 
remnants of the old army and the Hutu Power militias, the notorious Interahamwe and Impuzamu-
gambi, still ruled the refugee camps across the border, only lurking to attack again. An insurgency in 
the northwest of Rwanda already sparked in the immediate aftermath of the genocide and the con-
stant instability eventually caused the Rwandan invasion of Zaïre in 1996469. Up to today, peace and 
stability have still not returned to the eastern DRC with a plethora of rebel movements terrorizing 
the Kivu-provinces. 
Given these circumstances, even the prerequisites in Mandela’s South Africa of 1994 could be con-
sidered favorable for reconciliation in comparison. With reference to the immense tasks with refer-
ence to reconstruction, reconciliation, repatriation, stability, national security, transitional justice and 
poverty reduction, the fact that Rwanda today is an orderly, functioning state with some tendentious 
but promising progress towards unity and reconciliation is little short of a miracle. The past 20 years 
bear testament to a hard-working, forgiving and forward-looking population and a leadership un-
yieldingly determined and stopping at nothing to form a new country according to its own vision. 
Reconciliation vs. Justification to Rule 
The need for politics of reconstruction and reconciliation in Rwanda was acute and immediate from 
the beginning. The country was in a state of turmoil and lawlessness. Political solutions were direly 
needed and had to be applied to a catastrophic situation of unheard proportions. They had to be 
implemented by a guerilla movement-turned-government whose leadership consisted mainly of re-
turnees who were met with distrust by large parts of the population. Matters such as the refugee 
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crisis, the impunity of perpetrators and the instability of the region necessitated direct responses. 
They were addressed by the RPF from a victor’s position, yes, but this victor had yet to firmly estab-
lish his authority. The RPF was still fighting a war against the remnants of the old system. Given the 
permanent external challenge to its newly acquired power by the exiled génocidaires claiming to 
represent the majority of the Rwandan population, the new government was never a neutral arbiter 
of reconciliation. Even though it incorporated other parties into the post-genocide government of 
national unity, the RPF was primarily interested in consolidating its own power and eliminating 
threats to stability in order to rebuild the country470. Hence, politics of reconciliation and reconstruc-
tion in Rwanda were highly politicized from the beginning. They did not serve as ends in themselves, 
but always had to take the dynamics of political power into account. Even before the genocide, the 
RPF promoted national unity regardless of ethnic affiliation. The regime propagated that “the institu-
tionalization of unity and reconciliation is the only way that peace, security and harmony among 
Rwandans can be restored471” and that “national unity constitutes the pillar for durable peace and 
development in Rwanda472“. However, next to promoting peace and reconciliation among Rwandans, 
the politics of unity and reconciliation always had and still have an implicit mandate to justify the rule 
of the RPF and thus contribute to the stability of the ‘New Rwanda' that the new rulers built from 
scratch. Many of the problems with reconciliation politics at the grassroots stem from this conflict of 
interests. 
The goal of chapter 4 is to take a look at the context and implementation of reconciliation politics in 
Rwanda and examine their success in building new relationships that cut across the conflict-era iden-
tities. The chapter attempts to understand the Rwandan government from its own perspective and 
to comprehend how its politics relate to interviewees' perceptions of memory, acknowledgement, 
apology and justice at the grassroots. 
4.1. will focus on the RPF’s origins, its transformative ambitions and the official narrative emerging 
from it. This specific interpretation of Rwandan history will then be juxtaposed to alternative read-
ings of the genocide and its causes in order to find reconciliatory blind spots. The second chapter will 
take a closer look at Kagame’s system of rule and the implementation of politics. Chapter 4.3 will 
focus the diverse programs aimed at reconciliation, whereas the chapters on politics of memory and 
commemoration respectively transitional justice will examine the effects of specific policies on the 
population. The main findings are summarized in chapters 4.6 and 4.7. 
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4.1. The Order of Reconciliation 
The title of this chapter is a reference to Scott Straus' groundbreaking work “the order of 
cide473". Through a meticulous empirical analysis of the local dynamics of the Rwandan genocide, 
Straus convincingly argues against understanding the genocide as the result of a racist ideology of 
deep-seated ethnic hatred. Similarly to Lee Ann Fujii474, he identifies local peer pressure feeding on 
the traditional civil obedience to state power, the uncertainty of civil war and pre-existing ethnic 
categories as the primary factors driving violence in Rwanda. The call for killing the Tutsi became the 
principal policy of Hutu hardliners to ensure the loyalty of local Hutu. Genocide became “the law475” 
for coercing recalcitrant members of the own ethnicity into participation. In the 20 years after the 
genocide, Rwanda has taken huge steps towards reconstruction, peace and development.  Paradoxi-
cally however, it is at times difficult to avoid the impression that the current regime relies on very 
similar top-down mechanisms to implement reconciliation as the genocidal interim regime used to 
mobilize the peasants for genocide.   
The tendency to impose policy on the population and, reciprocally, the widespread culture of con-
formity with the authorities is a recurring feature of Rwandan politics. It surfaces often when discuss-
ing the genocide or reconciliation politics. Thus, the title struck me as oddly appropriate. Does this 
approach actually address the root causes of the conflict or does it merely suppress its symptoms? 
In order to understand the design and direction of the Rwandan politics of unity and reconciliation, it 
is necessary to take into account the motives behind the RPF's interpretation of history. This first part 
portrays the RPF. It focuses on its transformative approach and the party’s interpretation of the past 
forming the official Rwandan discourse on unity and reconciliation. The objective of the chapter is to 
carve out the discourse about genocide and reconciliation in Rwanda, to identify its shortcomings 
and to explain why the politics of unity and reconciliation are implemented top-down, evoking the 
image of an ‘order of reconciliation’. 
 
4.1.1. The RPF’s History 
To understand the approach to reconciliation and the transformative ambitions of the RPF, it is nec-
essary to understand the movement’s origins.  
Paul Kagame, like most of his RPF-fighters who invaded Rwanda in 1990 and eventually put an end to 
the genocide, was up to that point a refugee for most of his life. His mother carried him over the 
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Ugandan border when they were targeted by the so-called 'Hutu revolution' in 1959476. He grew up 
poor and exiled with the harrowing stories of his family’s expulsion in 1959. Kagame had to fight his 
way up into the upper ranks of Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) and into his intel-
ligence service, all the while dreaming of returning home477. 
After successfully staging a coup in 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana installed the ‘second republic’ in 
1973. He attempted to ethnicize478 the racialized identities in order to ease the tension between 
Hutus and Tutsi. Habyarimana, however, excluded the Rwandan diaspora that had fled the country 
since the pogroms of the 1960s. In 1990, the initially moderate president returned to a pronounced 
ideology of Tutsi-discrimination. Habyarimana’s shift can be mostly explained by years of economic 
decline, external pressure arising from demands of the international community and the threat of 
Rwandan refugees from their Ugandan exile479. Operating with decreasing means and challenged 
from all sides, Habyarimana's government limited patronage to an ever-smaller coterie of loyal Hutu, 
especially from the North. The akazu was dependent on Habyarimana's party MRND’s power over 
the state in order to maintain its socioeconomic status, thus perceiving every political challenger as a 
threat. 
The Ugandan Crisis of Citizenship 
Habyarimana’s categorical rejection of any claim of Tutsi repatriation before the Arusha Accords of 
1993, best captured in his metaphor about Rwanda as a full glass that would be spilled over if the 
Tutsi refugees would be allowed back into the country480, provoked the self-organization of Banyar-
wanda refugees in Uganda into a political movement, the RANU (Rwandan Refugee Welfare Organi-
zation).  
Although many Rwandan refugees filled high ranks in Museveni’s NRA, the Rwandans, who had been 
loyal to Museveni from the start, were loathed as ‘non-indigenous’ competitors for land and feared 
as parvenus by Ugandan natives481. The initial reasons for this fear were that Museveni, only six 
months after having come to power, announced a simplified process for the Banyarwanda minority 
to acquire Ugandan citizenship if they could prove ten years of residence. This was a major policy 
shift compared to the earlier practice that had only granted citizenship upon proof of ancestry482. The 
policy shift aroused fear among Ugandans that Museveni would favor the Banyarwanda because of 
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their support in the civil war and their influence within the NRM. The losing parties of the Ugandan 
civil war immediately applied pressure on Museveni to prevent what they feared would become an 
unholy alliance between a land-hungry non-indigenous group and a power-hungry government. They 
succeeded in placing ethnicity and indigeneity at the center of the debate on land entitlement rights, 
in which natives competed directly with Banyarwanda, thus eroding the cohesion within the gov-
ernment by 1988. A debate arising from the demands for land of Rwandan squatters in Southern 
Uganda in 1990483 then led to an increasing anti-Rwandan bias in Ugandan politics, rendering the 
naturalization of the Rwandan Diaspora in Uganda all but impossible and in fact orphaning the Tutsi 
refugees. Mamdani employs a comparison with the European Jews484. Being denied full citizenship in 
Uganda, the diaspora was trapped “between the Rwandan devil and the Ugandan deep blue sea485”.  
When it became evident that no full citizenship and no political future was to be expected in Uganda, 
the RANU renamed itself into RPF and became an armed guerilla movement negotiating and fighting 
for repatriation and political participation in Rwanda. The RPF’s core leadership was made up from 
Banyarwanda cadres of the NRM486. Uganda thus actually re-exported its political crisis to Rwanda 
after it had inherited the Rwandan refugee-problem in 1959. This pattern of exporting national con-
flict was reproduced by Rwanda and Burundi when they decided to fight their national rebel forces 
on Congolese territory in 1996. Perhaps even more than the initial Hutu revolution of 1959, this “cri-
sis of citizenship487” is a key factor for the RPF-invasion and civil war beginning in 1990488. In the cli-
mate of fear emerging during the civil war, the political identities of Hutu and Tutsi, exploited by 
extremist propaganda aimed at maintaining the control over the state, polarized Rwandan politics 
and eventually erupted into genocide. 
The Civil War and the Genocide 
The FAR could only stop the RPF’s initial October 1990 invasion with strong French support just be-
fore it entered Kigali. Despite losing its commander Fred Rwigyema, the RPF was still able to take 
hold in northern Rwanda where it set up its base until 1994. Habyarimana’s regime, weakened by 
economic decline and pressured towards democratization by growing domestic opposition and, per-
haps more importantly, the international donor community pushing for multiparty democracy, soon 
entered negotiations with the RPF. The war however gave rise to an extremist Hutu movement origi-
nating within the governmental party MRND. “Hutu Power489” also spread to other parties, notably 
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the newly founded extremist CDR. These Hutu hardliners did not trust the Tutsi-dominated RPF and 
feared that the RPF’s secret aim consisted in the restoration of Tutsi domination, turning Rwandan 
Hutus into serfs again, or even genocide490. The negotiations between the government and the RPF 
eventually led to the Arusha Accords of August 1993, which included provisions regarding the con-
stellation of the transitional government, the return of refugees, and the reconfiguration of the 
armed forces including quotas for Tutsi. The Hutu-extremists in the akazu however were never seri-
ously committed to negotiations that would ultimately transfer considerable power from the gov-
ernment to the Tutsi-dominated RPF491. They were already planning the genocide against the Tutsi. 
When the situation escalated after president Habyarimana’s assassination on April 6, 1994, the RPF 
immediately took up the fight again and systematically conquered the country while the genocide 
was raging simultaneously. It only ended when the RPF captured Kigali in mid-July 1994492. It has 
been one of the worst cases of genocide since the Second World War. Many of the RPF-soldiers who 
stopped the genocide had relatives and friends who were killed and witnessed the immense brutality 
of the killing firsthand. As refugees and later as liberators, they witnessed the consequences of the 
Hutu-dictatorship in some of the worst ways possible. When the refugees from 1959 to 1973 came 
back into Rwanda as soldiers of the RPF and realized the carnage, they immediately associated it with 
the ethnic discrimination that had expelled them and their parents. 
 
4.1.2. Residents: From Discrimination to Genocide 
Differing Memories 
Most returnees share the understanding of post-colonial Rwanda as an essentially racist ethnocracy 
that systematically excluded and periodically persecuted Tutsi and ultimately culminated in the gen-
ocide. As Karemera, a 73-year old returnee from “Gatsata” told me: “when you are cultivating; you 
always have to start cultivating. […] What happened in 1994: they started cultivating that field in 
1959. That’s when they identified who was the enemy, who was the enemy to be finished off. Then 
once already the enemy was identified, they were trying to hunt down the enemy wherever they 
could493."  In the eyes of returnees, the first pogroms in 1959 that pushed them into exile and the 
genocide of 1994 happened for the same reasons even if the intensity of persecution varied. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, both events are the immediate consequences of ethnic segregation during 
the era of colonization: “the simple reason was because Hutus, they were poor. Like Tutsis were more 
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educated than them. Even white people, like colonizers, they have been motivating them: (…) ‘Yeah: 
‘kill Tutsis then get the power!’494” The theory of a long-term genocidal enterprise that was originally 
instigated by white colonialists and started being executed by the Hutu in 1959 is popular among 
returnees because of three reasons: 
 It is consistent with their self-image as an unjustly persecuted people.  
 It portrays the first and second republic as fundamentally flawed, racist and illegitimate 
states. 
 It acquits the RPF as an army of invading returnees from any share of the blame for the esca-
lation of conflict because the genocide had been planned far ahead by extremist Hutu cir-
cles.  
Even though some rural interviewees who resided in Rwanda in 1994 mention 1959 as a historical 
antecedent of the genocide495 or speak about “cycles of violence496”, resident genocide survivors in 
general however characterize the second republic before 1990 as a time of peaceful coexistence with 
their Hutu-neighbors497. There was Anti-Tutsi discrimination in higher education498 and in the army,499 
but for most rural Tutsi residents, this was not relevant as long as the government did not interfere 
with their daily lives. As Costasie, a 65-year-old genocide survivor from „Gatumba” states: “on 
Habyarimana´s rule it was more or less good except when genocide happened500". The majority of 
pre-1994 residents actually point to the RPF-invasion (October 1, 1990), the introduction of the Mul-
tiparty-system (from June 1991 on), or even to Habyarimana’s murder (April 6, 1994) when asked to 
pinpoint the point of time when inter-ethnic relations became hostile. For the overwhelming majori-
ty of residents, the events of 1959 did not have a direct influence on the genocide. The diagram be-
low demonstrates that returnees who did not live in the country before 1994 generally saw the Hutu-
Tutsi coexistence in Rwanda in a more negative light than residents did. 
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Overall Relations Rwanda 1990 1994 2003 2011
Bystanders 1.9 -4.1 1.8 4.2
Ex-Convicts 1.7 -4.7 -0.9 3.9
Returnees 0.2 -3 2.2 4.1
Survivors 1.9 -5 1.6 3.9















Overall relations in Rwanda 
In the eyes of returnees, peaceful coexistence before the genocide was in fact repression by an abu-
sive dictatorship catering to the ethnic majority. Rwandan residents (survivors, bystanders, ex-
convicts) on the other hand, having grown up inside the system, have a much more sophisticated 
view and abstract the relationships with their neighbors from the political leadership. Even if most 
residents emphasize that life in general has improved since the genocide, not even the survivors 
evaluated the social relations during the Habyarimana-years as predominantly negative. In addition, 
the initial reaction towards the RPF when it conquered the land was fear, proven by the mass exodus 
of Hutu, and distrust.  
Internal Grievances – From Discrimination to Threat 
The divergence between residents and returnees’ points of view corroborates Collier’s501 thesis that 
a rebel movement has to create first the grievances it stands against in order to recruit combatants 
and start an armed resistance. An active diaspora who does not have to bear the costs of the fighting 
is highly instrumental to the construction of a successful rebel movement. The rebel movement, aim-
ing at political inclusion or even the conquest of political power by military means inculcates the 
grievances among the ethnic group that forms its recruitment base. “Conflict is not caused by divi-
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sions; rather it actively needs to create them. When such conflicts are viewed during or after the 
event, the observer sees ethnic hatred502.”  
It is evident that Tutsi were discriminated in Habyarimana’s Rwanda. Practically all of the survivors I 
interviewed could tell stories of discrimination such as “some of our relatives wanted to join [the] 
army but because they were Tutsis […] they were chased out503” or “a typical example I can illustrate 
is my brother Philmin who got great marks. He was supposed to continue at university. His family sold 
a cow to get some stuff, you know, school fees... […] Surprisingly, he went there, he missed his name. 
Then, when he went to school, he missed his name; they told him you are not supposed to come to 
study here. So that was discrimination504.” Nevertheless, for most peasants, this was just a part of 
daily life:  “so when I grew up, we had no problems with our neighbors. We used to cooperate and 
share, then the tragedy came in 1994 when genocide happened505.” Discrimination was a part of life 
ever since they could remember. Marcel recounts “so when it could come [to] umuganda, public 
works... Yeah. For those who could escape and go to the fields to cultivate [sic], actually they were 
supposed to pay 500, as a punishment but there was discrimination. There was [sic] the people who 
were called Hutu. So like, if Hutu and Tutsi could all escape, when it comes to punish, they used to 
punish only Tutsi and tolerate Hutu. So that was bad leadership506.” 
Ethnic discrimination was also mixed in with regional discrimination against people from the South 
who used to be called “Nduga507”. Even though Tutsi suffered under this quasi-Apartheid system, it is 
very difficult to imagine that these people contemplated active rebellion. To the contrary, they were 
mostly used to the system and frequently found ways around it. Maximilien, a Tutsi survivor original-
ly from Kibuye explained that he was refused admission to secondary school because he was a Tutsi 
even after passing the exam four times, but he eventually was admitted to a private school508. 
Faustin, a trader from “Gatsata” as well as the father of Vianney, another "Gatsata"-resident, were 
able to bribe an official and change their identity cards from Tutsi to Hutu. Most of the residents I 
interviewed were too used to discrimination and too caught up with the difficulties of their daily lives 
to be thinking about insurrection. 
Changing the Dynamics: The Civil War, the Multiparty-System and Habyarimana’s Assassination  
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Interviewees mention three events that clearly marked the passage from daily interethnic discrimina-
tion to life-endangering tensions: the start of the civil war509, the advent of multiparty-democracy510, 
which resulted in an increasing loss of power on the side of the ruling party MRND511, and the assas-
sination of Juvénal Habyarimana that sparked the genocide512. 
During Habyarimana’s reign up until 1990, the differences in status between Hutu and Tutsi were 
only visible in certain limited areas of public life such as higher education and the military. Hutu 
peasants such as Annunciata513, Marita514, Françoise515, Peter516 or Augustin517 even denied having 
witnessed any discrimination at all. The invasion of the RPF in 1990 was the first event that made the 
usually hidden differences between Hutu and Tutsi become starkly apparent and at the same time 
dangerous: “so at that age, they did not yet know to differentiate Hutu and Tutsi. So things changed a 
lot when [the] RPF came in 1990. That's when they started to know: ‘this is a Hutu. This is a Tutsi’518." 
Marie-Françoise reflects: “Shortly before the genocide, some people could say that a child is from a 
Tutsi family and the message could be passed on even to children. And children, once they are leaving 
school, or when they are going back home, some of them could get beaten up because they are from 
the Tutsi families519.”  
Still, not only the war, but also the violent quarreling between the newly formed political parties 
since June 1991 caused discomfort among many peasants in the South. Particularly the Gatabazi-
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Bucyana incident, when the popular PSD-leader Félicien Gatabazi was gunned down and Martin 
Bucyana, chair of the CDR, was killed in retaliation by an angry mob in Butare on February 23, 1994, 
left the strong impression of a country descending into chaos. Many interpreted the political quarrels 
ethnically: “The things turned to be against Tutsi with accusations and counter-accusations from po-
litical parties. People from MDR could say PSD, they are from Tutsi people. They are against us and 
MRND also could step in with their accusations. That’s how it started to turn against Tutsi. […]Tutsi 
now have attacked the country. So, they were like rallying people for their […] cause, saying ‘you see? 
Yeah, we are being invaded by Tutsi. They came to govern us once again, they are coming to oppress 
us once again.’520.” Many interviewees521 believe that the fierce political competition paved the way 
for hatred and extremism. Vincent argues, “Political parties had laid the ground for the genocide. 
They had preached everything, people hating each other and then, by that time MRND exploited that 
and that’s how the genocide started 522” The patrimonial understanding of politics, in which winning 
the election determines socioeconomic ascent or fall, accounts for the polarizing character and the 
ethnicization of political competition between 1991 and 1994. The old ruling party MRND was 
fighting a rearguard battle against internal and external opposition, opting for extremism to rally the 
Hutu. 
Despite the climate of fear and hostility that started to grow during the civil war, the genocide came 
very abruptly for most survivors. Up to that point, they still had maintained good relationships with 
their neighbors. The night Habyarimana was assassinated then marked an absolute and sudden 
change from ethnic tensions to outright war and genocide for most. Elias from Kigali recounts: 
“When Habyarimana[‘s] plane was shot down, […] it was shot down in the evening at around 8:00. I 
think after 30 minutes the killing started. So the next day, it was all the killing everywhere523.” Every-
body immediately knew that something had changed. The genocide spread very fast and it changed 
the dynamics between neighbors as a radicalized vanguard of militiamen, policemen, soldiers and 
officials aimed at uniting the Hutu community through the act of violence524. Peter525, describes this 
process in a fairly typical manner: “Shortly after the plane crashed in 1994, the president[ial] plane 
crash in 1994, that’s when things started changing for him. When they started patrols during the 
night. During the evening, they start[ed] the patrols. They used to be done by both Hutu and Tutsi. I 
mean it used to be a mix but it started to be like Tutsi were somehow isolated. They started to be left 
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out. And he also adds that people who had served in the army, who were maybe living in Kigali, they 
started coming back to their rural communities. And that they could be propagating some ideas, 
some hatred. And they were the ones who more or less started the genocide526.” 
View of the External Rebellion 
Contrary to most pre-1994 Tutsi residents I interviewed, the diaspora was highly politicized and many 
of its members already underwent military training in the Ugandan civil war527. Thus, despite the 
continued ethnic discrimination in Rwanda, the demands for inclusion and equal citizenship were 
initially carried into the country by the diaspora living abroad. Umubyeyi, a teacher from Gisagara 
assumed that Hutu killed because the genocidal mindset had developed over time in the civil war 
against the "inyenzi528": “Tutsi were accomplices of inyenzi. They were the real people who had come 
to attack Rwanda. And they were the ones who had killed their president and their final objective was 
to conquer Rwanda, and oppress everybody in the country. So it was kind of… If they killed, they were 
like counterattacking529. Regarding the fact that none of the Tutsi peasants I interviewed had any 
RPF-connections before the war, the ‘accomplice’-argument, by all means, is a Hutu Power-
fabrication. The aggravation of ethnic tensions during the civil war and particularly after 
Habyarimana’s murder however was very real, exactly because most residents regarded the RPF as a 
Tutsi-force. Françoise, a farmer from “Gatsata” recalls: “the news was that President Habyarimana 
had already been killed and they were blaming the RPF for the killing of the president. And they knew 
that there [were] rumors that RPF soldiers are everywhere. They are traveling everywhere in the 
country. They are in neighboring countries like Burundi, Congo, Uganda. So they were like, ‘So if they 
had killed our president, we are the next target. We are the next target. They are going to kill us as 
well’530.” 
To most peasants, even Tutsi, the RPF was initially perceived as an external enemy. The local self-
defense rounds, amarondo in Kinyarwanda, that were organized during the civil war at first included 
Hutu and Tutsi531. Even though nowadays Rwandans usually use the word “liberation532” when it 
comes to the RPF-victory in the civil war, many Tutsi in 1994 were just as scared of the RPF as their 
Hutu neighbors: “[I]was scared, even people in the neighborhood fled, when the inkotanyi attacked 
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the country.533.” Jeanne d’Arc, a survivor from “Gatumba”, sums up the gradual progression from 
discrimination to genocide that started with the civil war very precisely: “With the state, there was 
no problem with the parents but things changed when [the] RPF came around 1990. So that's when 
there was a bad atmosphere, saying that 'these guys from RPF are your relatives, they are Inyenzi and 
one day they will come and kill us.' So that´s the bad intention, I mean that's how the bad tensions 
started to come but before, with the state, it was okay534.” 
 
4.1.3. Returnees: The RPF’s transformative Ambitions and hidden Discrimination 
The Need to Discredit the Past 
Even with the memory of the genocide fresh in mind and the “Hutu Power” interim regime utterly 
discredited and defeated, the RPF essentially was an army of foreigners. Most Rwandan residents 
had only heard horrible rumors about the guerilla movement. Françoise remembers initially distrust-
ing the invaders: “the other chaos was brought by the RPF and they did that time when they started 
moving inside the country, that’s when the news started filtering in that they were taking people, 
putting them in the mortar and grinding them and also raping people, women and young girls. The 
other people are going to come from Burundi. So she [the interviewee] was like afraid and some of 
her relatives also got killed [in Byumba] in the meantime535.” The ‘Hutu Power’-government and its 
agents in the media had spread fear and propaganda very effectively. Fantastic and dehumanizing 
rumors such as “people in the RPF have tails536” were widespread among peasants. The stories espe-
cially emphasized on rape and inhuman ways of killing: “they could kill someone, and take your hands 
and make them enter the belly once you are killed and you [would] be like a statue, and it is a kind of, 
it’s like you are wearing a coat. You know, it is like a coat you are wearing537.”   
After the genocide, these rumors had to be dispersed. The genocide had demonstrated to most Hu-
tus that the agents of the interim government actually perpetrated the atrocities they attributed to 
the RPF on a far larger scale. Nevertheless, the genocide had utterly disrupted trust and confidence 
in the authorities as well as between Rwandans themselves, so the new regime opted for a ‘tabula 
rasa’ approach. In order to overcome the widespread belief among Hutus that the RPF had come to 
renew Tutsi-dominance538, they had to convince the peasantry that the 'majoritarian democracy’ in 
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the first and second republics had in fact been racist dictatorships in disguise and that the RPF would 
change the whole dynamic of Rwandan society.  
The RPF aimed to change everything: governance and economic structures, social identities, cultural 
norms, individual behavior, even the names of provinces, districts and towns. In the eyes of the RPF, 
the memory of Rwandan society between 1959 and 1994 or even between 1897539 and 1994 is most-
ly a dirty spot on the country’s history best to be erased. They aimed at change with the establish-
ment of the government of national unity with the Hutu Pasteur Bizimungu as acting president, the 
popular consultations at Urugwiro-village, the ostracism of ethnic identities as well as the RPF’s 
sweeping attempts at educating the peasants through ingando, itorero etc. All these steps towards 
national unity, as genuine and positive as they may have been planned, had the simultaneous side 
effect of legitimizing the rule of a rebel-movement that was initially mainly composed from members 
of the diaspora.  
The ‘Ugandan’ Elite 
Despite the readiness of most Rwandans to embrace the vision of a new society, resistance against 
the ideology of unity and reconciliation is growing wherever the pre-1994 residents detect favoritism 
from the new, diaspora-led elite. The evidence of the English-speaking diaspora’s dominance is ap-
parent: Rwanda has quit la Francophonie and has joined the Commonwealth540. English, a language 
that historically never has had any importance in Rwanda, has become the second official language 
and has replaced French as the preferred language of the elite. The RPF has also factually held power 
for the past twenty years. 
Particularly young, well-educated Hutu mistrust the rhetoric of national unity e.g., when they look at 
their own chances on the labor market: “It is like today here everybody says that there is no more 
ethnic group, but it is still inside the heart. And also you will find [if] it comes to get like [a] job, it is a 
big challenge. […]If you are not a Tutsi, if you are not from Uganda you cannot get a good job. Or 
even if you can get a job, you will be the chief but you cannot take strong decision[s]. Always they will 
put your subordinate, he will be the one to sign; you know, to take strong decisions. […]There is some-
thing like hidden discrimination541.” 
Rwandan politics are dominated by the diaspora. Next to senior RPF-personnel who already fought in 
the civil war like Tito Rutaremara or the current minister of Defense James Kabarebe, a great many 
members of the inner circle of power are Tutsi who grew up in Uganda. Important ministries such as 
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the ministry of finance led by Claver Gatete and his predecessor James Musoni or the National Secu-
rity Services, which used to be headed by Emmanuel Ndahiro542 are only a few examples. Hutus ap-
pointed to leading positions such as Jean Damascene Ntawukuriryayo, the current president of the 
senate and Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, the current prime minister, have spent most of the years 
before the genocide abroad and were not politically active before the genocide. The new elite dis-
trust pre-1994 Rwandan residents fundamentally. Evidentially so-called 'moderate Hutus543'who op-
posed the génocidaires in 1994 such as ex-prime minister Faustin Twagiramungu, political outsiders 
like Pierre Célestin Rwigema or even survivors like ex-speaker of parliament Joseph Sebarenzi got 
sidelined and declared personae non grata, the two Hutu Twagiramungu and Rwigema for harboring 
‘genocide ideology’, the Tutsi Sebarenzi for plotting for a ‘return to monarchy’.  
Distrust in pre-1994 residents is not just a matter of national politics though. It permeates down to 
the local level. François for example, a local administrator from “Gatumba” who was aspiring for a 
leading position in his local church talked about being skipped for promotion by the new leaders 
from Uganda despite having resisted the call to genocide and never having been sentenced544. Even 
young educated survivors from Kigali, despite acknowledging the achievements of the RPF, level 
some moderate criticism against the claim to leadership of the diaspora: “Les gens de l'Uganda vou-
laient aussi partager dans leur pays, posséder de pouvoir, eux aussi, parce qu'ils avaient connu une 
idée qu’ils étaient... donc c'est eux qui avaient pris ces... donc c'est eux qui avaient gagné545. “ 
 
4.1.4. Constructing Knowledge – The ‘official’ Narrative of the Genocide 
A Specific Version of History 
To build a new and inclusive society under the aegis of the RPF, the achievements of the so-called 
‘Hutu revolution’ of 1959, celebrated as the emancipation from Tutsi-rule by the former rulers, had 
to be discredited entirely, specifically the notion of being a ‘majoritarian’ democracy. In the RPF’s 
eyes, Rwandan history follows a linear trajectory from colonization up to 1994. The ICTR's ‘media-
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trials’546 against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and Ferdinand Nahimana from RTLM and Hassan Ngeze 
from the extremist newspaper Kangura demonstrated the genocidal potential of the 'Hutu Power'-
mindset to the world very publicly. According to the RPF, the genocide is the necessary culmination 
of this ideology whose roots already became visible in 1959. 
An increasing number of scholars however challenges the theory that ethnic hatred, genocide ideol-
ogy and hate media were the main causes of genocide547. The theory remains very popular among 
the returnees who form the core of the RPF’s leadership548 because it is consistent with their “fairly 
one-dimensional and sharply negative view of past Rwandan society and culture549” adopted in exile. 
Concisely, the RPF’s founding narrative reads as follows:  
“After Rwanda gained its independence in 1962, the MDR-PARMEHUTU (1962-1973) regime as well 
as the MRND (1973-1994) regime decided to carry on the segregation legacy of the colonial masters 
and the problems were compounded further. Those regimes were characterized by bad methods such 
as: openly spreading segregation propaganda; propagating hatred among Rwandans; exclusion of 
some Rwandans in school, work and politics; oppression of fellow Rwandans, destroying and burning 
their homes, killing them and sending them into exile, even culminating into the 1994 genocide; no 
democracy and no opportunity for the people to participate in their leadership; no effective economic 
agenda for the development of Rwanda, leaving the Rwandan people in poverty, disease, ignorance 
and dependence on foreign aid; promoting the profit of the leaders above the people’s welfare giving 
rise to corruption, favoritism, waste and embezzlement of national resources; the RPF-INKOTANYI 
was formed with the objective of fighting bad governance that characterized Rwanda’s history and to 
solve all the problems that resulted. Both the political and the armed struggle were aimed at liberat-
ing Rwanda from the bad dictatorial leadership in order to build a nation that abides by law, and 
upholds democracy, peace, security, justice and development550.” 
The RPF has gone to great lengths to realize its vision and most Rwandans do see progress if they 
compare the country to the time before the genocide. The diagram below illustrates how trust in the 
government has grown in the past twenty years. It however also shows how MRND-rule in 1990 was 
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still evaluated positively among bystanders. Given that 1990 marked the beginning of a war after 
years of economic decline and taking into account the dominant narrative that has discredited the 
MRND-regime for twenty years, most bystanders still do not comprehend the second republic in the 
same categorically negative manner as returnees do. Furthermore, the ex-convicts and, less obvious-
ly, the bystanders' answers with regard to trusting the government in current years appear oddly 
overzealous. Why would they have obeyed a government they did not trust in 1994 and approve 
wholeheartedly of a regime that imprisoned them today? Innocently, as most say551? It appears that 
the attempts of the RPF to foster a new interpretation of the past and promoting a negative view of 
their predecessor regimes have been extremely successful even with regard to people’s opinions 
about their own life stories. Many residents seem to have retroactively revised their originally in-
compatible opinions so they fit the dominant “mythico-history552” of the returnee-led RPF that has 
superseded the old ideology of ethnic identity. 
Trust in the government
1990 1994 2003 2011
Bystanders 0.9 -3.6 2.4 4
Ex-Convicts 0 -4.9 0.9 4.3
Returnees -2 -2 3.8 4.2
Survivors -0.7 -5 3.2 3.7
















Rwanda: Trust in the Government 
The Unifying Power of Nationalism 
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 The small spike in the ex-convict’s curve in 2003 coincides with the time around which most of the ex-
convicts I interviewed were released. 
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 Term borrowed from Liisa Malkki, 1995. “Mythico-history” describes a narrative that is shared and handed 
down among members of a group in such a way that the group’s shared interpretation of its historical experi-
ences becomes a myth of origin for the group itself, its purpose and destiny. 
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Not unlike other postcolonial regimes focused on national development, the transitional Govern-
ment of National Unity (GNU) that took power in 1994 and the RPF-government that replaced it in 
2000 demonstrate a strong focus on national unity. The promotion of Rwandan nationalism with its 
multi-ethnic assimilative power serves the RPF as a suitable vehicle to combat societal divisions, re-
placing the old ideology of ‘majoritarian democracy’ that in reality translated into Hutu dominance. 
“Nationalism is the glue that binds a nation. It means commitment to the values of the nation as well 
as commitment to the responsibilities of building the country, be it at the economic, social or political 
level. It also means being ready, if necessary, to make individual sacrifices for the good of the coun-
try553.”  
The brand of nationalism practiced by the Rwandan elite manifests itself in the promotion of an es-
sentialist, at times simplified “idealizing narrative of Rwanda’s pre-colonial past554”, painting the pic-
ture of a benevolent and in principle multi-ethnic elite that ruled the country through time-tested 
institutions and laws555. Notably, it emphasizes the facts that clan and lineage were more important 
than the Hutu- and Tutsi-identities556 and the permeability of group identities through practices such 
as e.g. ‘Kwihutura’557, the co-optation of wealthy Hutu into the dominating class of Tutsi558. Never-
theless, even if the identities were less stratified, precolonial clientship-practices such as ‘ubuhake’ 
and ‘uburetwa’ that revolved around cattle-ownership actually attributed a serf-like status to Hutus. 
Sylvestre, a 69-year old man recounts about his childhood: "He got to know that he is a Hutu when he 
was a child because his father had asked for a cow to a Tutsi person and then from the day he gave 
him the cow, they were his Hutus559." Even if it might not have been explicitly ethnic in nature, there 
was definitely a difference in status between Hutu and Tutsi. These status differences are more diffi-
cult to trace in Rwanda where social engineering during two Hutu-dictatorships and the rule of the 
RPF largely superimposed the remains of the traditional system. In Burundi however, where the 
change from colonial rule was only gradual under the rule of the Mwami and later Tutsi officers from 
Bururi, participants reference the word 'Hutu', signifying 'dependent serf of a Tutsi', frequently560.  
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The official Rwandan history focuses on shared aspects of the past and mainly ascribes ethnic conflict 
to the morally tainted, negative impact of the colonial practice of ‘divide and rule’561. In doing so, the 
narrative builds a nationalist foundational myth not unlike the ones cultivated by Western nations562. 
It however also inadvertently reconnects with the views of the privileged, monarchic elite that felt 
entitled to rule Rwanda by tradition.  
Mamdani563 emphasizes the need to historicize the identities of Hutu and Tutsi because we are facing 
the existence of two fundamentally opposed paradigms regarding the origins of these categories. He 
dismisses the ‘no difference’-thesis brought forward predominantly by the proponents of the new 
regime which concentrates on common culture and only concedes socioeconomic differences, yet he 
also dismisses the ‘distinct difference’-thesis, predominantly articulated by the Hutu potentates in 
the first and second republic emphasizing sociobiological aspects. Instead, Mamdani opts for an 
overarching perspective that takes into account the truths of both theses. He does not consider the 
misty historical origins of Hutu and Tutsi as Bantu-agriculturalists or pastoralist Hamites of primary 
importance but thinks of Hutu and Tutsi as one cultural group with distinct and polarized political 
identities whose definitions changed with each shift of power in the Rwandan state. The Rwandan 
historiography acted largely corresponded to these shifts of power. ‘Ethnic’ identity as such hence 
becomes a highly dynamic vessel that may be charged with diverse meanings made to fit the needs 
of political entrepreneurs. As long as an identity is of relevance to a sufficient group of persons, it can 
be charged with sectarian or uniting meaning. To return to our definition of reconciliation politics: 
the cleavages of conflict-era identities have not entirely been bridged or cut across. The conflict-era 
identities have rather been re-configured. Compared to the ‘objective’ ethnic identities of the geno-
cide, which were defined by ID-cards, exclusion nowadays is much more subjective from the power 
holder’s perspective and not as encompassing564. The authorities demand absolute interpretational 
sovereignty on what it means to be ’Rwandan’. Disagreeing or recalcitrant citizens may be excluded 
or subjected to re-education by governmental decree565. 
The promotion of Rwandan nationalism and the establishment of a consciousness of national unity 
appears to be one of the areas where the RPF’s attempts to change the population’s mentality has its 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Interviews with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Gertrude, 46, Hutu refugee, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; 
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greatest success. The expression “we are all one Rwandan566” is very popular among all categories of 
participants and has become something like a slogan. The reaffirmation of the new national identity 
was usually brought forward in direct response to questions about ethnic identity: “there is no im-
portance of that because it brings divisionism in Rwanda, there is no need to say this is a Hutu this is a 
Tutsi we are all one Rwanda567.” In fact, the answers resembled each other so strongly that it ap-
peared as if they had been learned by heart. Here is another answer from a different participant: “it’s 
a very bad saying to say this is a Hutu, this is Tutsi because it brings divisionism. The good thing is to 
say one Rwandan, not to say this is someone from an ethnic group568.” And yet another interviewee 
from another community: “we all want to be Rwandans and not talk again about ethnic identities569.” 
Furthermore the usage of words such as 'divisionism', 'genocide' or 'genocide ideology' were fre-
quently used by English-speaking interviewees and, according to my research assistants, these loan-
words were also used frequently by peasants. Even the term definitions of ubwiyunge-reconciliation 
resembled each other closer in Rwanda than in Burundi. This implies that the population has ab-
sorbed the nationalist discourse about 1994. 
Complete Dissociation from the Past 
The insistence on a flawed colonial and post-colonial Rwandan culture that divided a once united 
people and caused the genocide goes a long way to explaining the high modernist attempt at social 
engineering that characterizes the politics of post-genocide Rwanda. Nowhere is the focus on ‘divi-
sionism’ as the main reason for the genocide more apparent than in the publications of the CNLG and 
the NURC, the organizations commissioned with maintaining the memory of the genocide respective-
ly implementing the policy of unity and reconciliation: “The miss interpretation [sic] and falsification 
of history that saved to spread divisionism among Rwandans are over. To day [sic], Rwandans are 
proud to be what they are and are in the way [sic] to make themselves what they want to be570”, 
writes Bishop John Rucyahana, chairperson of the NURC in the foreword of the ‘Rwanda Reconcilia-
tion Barometer’. These words exemplify perfectly, how unity, patriotism, nationalism and reconcilia-
tion merge into one encompassing virtue in the ideology of the New Rwanda whereas the culture of 
the past and divisionism, denial, and genocide ideology merge as well: they become the realm of evil. 
Even the NURC’s ‘Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer’, an official surveys that compiles the views of 
Rwandans on reconciliation, does not ask its participants freely about their opinions. Rather, it sup-
plies answers such as “before the genocide, the way history was taught and understood in Rwanda 
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created divisions in society571” or “today, teaching and understanding of true Rwandan history en-
courages reconciliation572” and only measures the participant’s rate of approval. On one side, this 
kind of research produces stunning quantitative approval rates for the politics of unity and reconcilia-
tion. On the other side, it effectively conveys the state’s expectations towards the participants. The 
survey itself already serves as a re-educational measure. Deviation or even criticism is beyond the 
accepted discourse. It becomes a ‘sectarian’ opinion, which in turn becomes ‘divisionism’ and ulti-
mately ‘genocide ideology’ because according to the official discourse, societal division is what 
caused the genocide573.  
The trend towards juxtaposing current events with the evils of the past and justifying policies by the 
act of dissociation from the ancient regime frequently repeats the same expressions and spreads 
throughout most government publications. For example: in its Facilitator’s Manual for the National 
Civic Education Programme (NCEP), the NEC states “divisions led to war, massacres and the 1994 
genocide. Post genocide government policy establishes the imperative that all Rwandans distance 
themselves from divisionism ideologies and stand together to work for sustainable development574”. 
In the Annual Activity Report of 2002, the NURC explains the background of its establishment in simi-
lar words: "since the advent of colonialists, Rwanda has been characterized by anti-people leadership 
that institutionalized sectarianism and discrimination among the Rwandan population. This system 
led to the culture of impunity that enabled leaders to institutionalize ruthless and despotic admin-
istration575.." Thus, the genocide becomes the foundational myth for Rwanda's journey into the fu-
ture. The new Rwanda does not celebrate its independence, it only mourns the beginning of the 
genocide on April 6. 
On the surface, this strategy of dissociation with pre-genocide Rwanda appears to work well with 
peasants. Optimistic statements, especially about the president, are frequent: “if it keeps on going 
the same way and if we should remain with our president, even there would not be any danger in the 
future, citizens should stay peaceful576.” Nevertheless, most peasants also speak positively about the 
time before the genocide. Young educated Hutu like Robert do understand the underlying motives, 
e.g. when talking about undergoing Ingando: “What I am hating [sic] now about what they told me is 
that they interpret the history in their favor. They have their version of history. I mean history, wheth-
er it is bad, whether it is good, you teach it as it is because it is your history. So they were saying only 
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the bad things of the past government.577." How far does the new ideology reach? Have the old ideas 
actually been replaced or just covered up? Furthermore, given the very small number of unapologet-
ic Hutus I interviewed578, was this genocidal ideology as pervasive, widespread and significant for 
genocide as the official discourse claims? 
Root Causes or Legitimation of Rule? 
For the RPF-government, it is abundantly clear which factors were responsible for the genocide 
against the Tutsi. Bad governance, the Anti-Tutsi ideology originating in 1959, institutionalized ethnic 
discrimination inherited from colonial rule, political sectarianism, the hate media and the uneducat-
ed peasantry. They all contributed to a culture of impunity that inevitably culminated in the long-
term planning and execution of the genocide579. The unjust patrimonial system of the past, the geno-
cide, the racist propaganda and discrimination against Tutsi, the international inactivity and the fact 
that they were the only ones to fight and end the genocide are the parts of history the RPF and its 
academic supporters chose to emphasize on with regard to their program of national renewal. The 
grievances are real - their case is legitimate.  
But are conflictive ethnic identities and ethnic discrimination actually the determinant root causes of 
the genocide or have the focus points of the country’s national unity and reconciliation politics also 
been chosen because they conveniently legitimate RPF-rule and discredit the old system? 
The general outlines of the narrative are true. The Tutsi were the principal target of the genocide. 
Members of the extremist Hutu-elite planned at least its initial stages by organizing militias, distrib-
uting weapons and drawing up death lists. The Tutsi were discriminated against from 1959 to 1994. 
Colonialism had exacerbated the Hutu-Tutsi divide, and perpetrators of earlier massacres against the 
Tutsi during that time were never held accountable. These facts all resonate in the work of interna-
tional scholars580. Nevertheless, this narrative about the genocide is partial and somehow unilinear.  
Interpretational Sovereignty 
The problem that poses itself with the narrative of the genocide as taught by most recent Rwandan 
sources is less one of historical correctness but one of weighting the diverse factors and finding what 
was deliberately left out. Given the regime’s emphasis on having stopped one of the greatest atroci-
ties of our time, perhaps the most important blind spot is the role of the RPF itself with regard to 
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Human Rights violations during the civil war, the genocide, and particularly the conflict in Zaïre/ DRC 
starting in 1996.  
Pottier attributes the RPF’s narrative a simple yet persuasive quality, which, in connection to Rwan-
da’s donor-friendly behavior, managed to convince many foreign journalists, diplomats and aid 
workers, particularly in the Anglophone world581. Within international academia however, the RPF’s 
version has been increasingly raised to question by academics familiar with the region’s history such 
as e.g. Alison Des Forges582, Johan Pottier583, Nigel Eltringham584, Filip Reyntjens585 and René Le-
marchand586. The Rwandan elite never accepted what they understand as malicious external inter-
ference with problems they consider quintessentially Rwandan. In a nutshell, the argument often 
heard in speeches by RPF-politicians works as follows: ‘the West and the international community 
have left Rwandans to fend for themselves during the genocide, now who are these Westerners to 
criticize the way Rwanda manages its own problems’. Analyses of the genocide focusing on the im-
portance of underlying circumstances, local networks, peer pressure and compliance with authority 
instead of the “ideology of ethnic hatred587” or the “climate of corruption, hegemony and exclu-
sion588” are rarely considered worthwhile by Rwandan sources. If academic articles or books are per-
ceived to have an anti-RPF undertone, it occurs that they are actively fought589. “The mobilization of 
academic RPF-supporters and the consistency with which they ignore or misrepresent post-
independence scholarship on Rwanda took British [and international] academia by surprise590.” Any 
criticism of the RPF’s actions is suspiciously absent from the discourse about the genocide or tagged 
with labels such as “negationism591” or the discredited “theory of double-genocide592.” The RPF and 
their academic supporters do not consider diverging views as part of an academic debate but rather 
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as attempts to sabotage either their efforts towards unity and reconciliation or even the memory of 
the genocide itself593. Ingelaere characterizes the government's behavior as "active interference in 
the scientific construction of knowledge594." 
The Rwandan state and its institutions assert absolute interpretational sovereignty with regard to the 
genocide and Rwandan history in general. Rwanda disseminates its own version actively and aggres-
sively defends its interpretational sovereignty against any form of criticism. The official narrative of 
the genocide represents the centerpiece of Rwanda’s unity and reconciliation politics. This stream-
lined ‘mythico-history’ is heavily propagated among the Rwandan population through diverse 
means595 and constitutes one of the pillars of Rwandan foreign policy when dealing with criticism or 
applying for budget support. The state also actively encourages and commissions a growing literature 
on Rwandan history that incorporated national history lessons in Rwanda's school system for the first 
time. MINEDUC strongly relies on new literature from Rwandan scholars596.  
Not only are politics of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda inextricably linked to the RPF and Presi-
dent Kagame’s claim to leadership, they have become the rationale for the RPF’s dominance. The 
official narrative’s bias however does not necessarily annul the policies’ effectiveness for reconcilia-
tion. To the contrary, many interviewees seemed to be pleased with recent political developments 
and claimed to be completely reconciled597. Despite strong pressure for conformity from above, 
many of these statements seemed honest, genuine and were backed up with credible and logical 
arguments. In other interviews, e.g. with Mukaga Kwaya598 , Maurice599 or Rugango600 in “Gatumba”, 
the answers appeared politically correct and learned, conveying the image that these participants 
had believed in a different version of history before but opportunistically accepted the new version 
in order not to run into problems with the authorities. In general, Rwandans appear very educated 
about the genocide and reconciliation, which is probably related to the relentless government cam-
paigns. The NURC e.g. claims that a total of 115’228601 people passed through Itorero ry’Igihugu, 
92’835602 Rwandans did undergo the Ingando'solidarity camps' up to 2009.603.   
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Thus, if we are to dissect Rwandan politics of unity and reconciliation and the discourse underlying it, 
it is important to note “that history is invariably politicized and that Rwanda’s future hinges on the 
ability to navigate divergent interpretations of the past604” 
 
4.1.5. Gaps in the official Discourse – The Genocide from Below 
Contextualizing the Genocide 
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, there are alternative more grassroots-oriented 
explanations with regard to the root causes of genocide than the version of the RPF. The official nar-
rative focuses heavily on the role of the extremist regime and its ideology but mostly omits the pat-
terns of execution of the genocide. Even if the official version is based on facts and should not be 
dismissed as pure propaganda, it’s the emphasis on root causes such as ‘bad governance’, ‘division-
ism’ or ‘genocide ideology’ that have to be scrutinized meticulously. If the 'official' analysis misinter-
prets the root causes, politics at the grassroots consequently address the wrong problems.  
The carnage in the Great Lakes Region has erupted along ethnic lines. There is no doubt about that.  
The thesis present however tries to understand ethnic polarization in the context of the sociopolitical 
and economic processes that caused society to break up along these lines in such a violent manner. 
The colonial practice of 'divide and rule' was not only implemented in Rwanda or Burundi. Corrupt 
and/or incompetent elites at some point have governed most African states, yet recurring episodes 
of mass violence and genocide have been an oddly specific feature of the Great Lakes’ history.  
Broad categorizations often obstruct important nuances. I am very reluctant to classifying Rwanda’s 
experience as a “dispossessive genocide605” or “retributive genocide606“.  The thesis does neither de-
fine the killings of 1972 in Burundi as “politicide607” nor 1993 as “ethnic civil war”. These labels may 
have their merits for broadly summarizing what happened in the Great Lakes Region or for reasons of 
comparison. Nevertheless, they tend to reduce the complexity of the conflict either to a simple Hutu-
Tutsi dichotomy based on revenge (‘retributive genocide’), land-hunger and state control (‘disposses-
sive genocide’) or an elite-driven extermination of political competition that happened to be ethnic 
(‘politicide’). These general descriptions all have their merits. Nevertheless, a rather elusive mixture 
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of factors drove perpetrators. Scientific terms focusing on one specific aspect of conflict such as e.g. 
revenge usually neglect other, equally important factors. The primary fault lines of the conflict, Hutu 
against Tutsi, can be historically explained - as the official narrative does. Nevertheless, the question 
why peasants joined the genocide is probably more important to reconciliation than the question 
why ethnicity became the distinguishing feature of persecution. Thus, a great part of the semi-
structured interviews I conducted revolved around the topic of motivation. Why did people kill? Why 
do they think their neighbors killed? Understanding the reasons behind participation in the genocide 
allows us to draw conclusions on the efficiency and responsiveness of reconciliatory efforts. 
Peasants: No 'Tribal Hatred' 
One of the most fascinating aspects of my field research was the earnest assurance of many rural 
participants that they had in fact reconciled with their neighbors. Regardless of the category they 
belonged to, the majority claimed to having laid the past to rest and living together without major 
problems. Participants, especially members of AMI, frequently talked about sharing beer, a very 
common Rwandan symbol for peaceful relationships, Costasie, a survivor: “so we are trying to live 
together like my[self] personally, I have cleaned my heart. For example, I drink beers, sometimes we 
go in the pub. He [the perpetrator] can buy a bottle, we drink together and I also buy another one, we 
drink it together. So there is... We no longer look at someone then we say 'this is a Hutu, this is Tutsi' 
because we are doing the good things between us. Because they also saw finally that the people who 
lied [to] them to kill, they took the airplane, then they went abroad608.” Costasie deemed the political 
instigators responsible, not her neighbors. Maurice, an ex-convict shared her assessment: “if you 
would come back here in the evening and look at us when we are sharing the beer in the pub, so you 
would see that things are smooth now609.” Actions symbolic for peace and reconciliation such as shar-
ing traditional beer or intermarriage were brought up frequently when talking about the current 
relationships between the former antagonists. “When you can see perpetrators going and asking for 
forgiveness to genocide survivors, when you can see intermarriages, when you can see people sharing 
everything, people chatting. For him, he thinks the state is doing enough. People he says, people have 
already reconciled610.” If not for the occasional critical or disappointed voices encountered when 
talking to people who were not members of sponsored ubudehe organizations such as AMI, it would 
have been easy to just believe Boniphilde that “today, almost all Rwandans have reconciled, there is 
no more fear between Hutu and Tutsi611.”  
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A crime such as genocide usually divides victims and perpetrators for generations. So what distin-
guishes Rwandan peasants from e.g. the population of Ex-Yugoslavia where people considered sus-
tained coexistence inside a common state unbearable? 
One main difference is the strong popular conviction of having been manipulated by the Akazu-elite. 
As Yohani, the former head of cell in “Gatumba” recounted: “They used to tell us that the airplane 
was shot by Inyenzi and Inyenzi were Tutsis, so as we ordinary people who were governed, we 
couldn’t escape. We thought that what our leaders told us was true.612.” Coercion through the state 
and dangerous resistance are popular rational explanations for participation in the genocide among 
Hutu. “A soldier could come in the community and say: ‘look if we are to be winning this war, you 
have also to start killing those Tutsis because they are the accomplices, you have to kill them. It's like 
we are on the battlefield but you also, that is another battlefield of yours.’ Yeah…” Interviewer: “Did 
you believe the soldiers?” Augustin: “Yeah, [I] believed the soldiers because otherwise you could be 
beaten up or even like killed[…]613.” Ex-convicts in general passed on the guilt. They depicted them-
selves as small cogs in the wheel who failed to understand the sociopolitical dynamics at work: “As 
ordinary people we didn´t know how it changed into... I mean into killings. Except, like members of 
different parties, they knew already what is going to happen but us we didn´t know anything614.” 
 In “Gatumba” as well as “Gatsata”, soldiers, police officers or Interahamwe from other places en-
tered the community before the massacres started on a grand scale. The fact that “soldiers came to 
tell the rest of the population that Tutsi and the Inkotanyi are the ones who killed their president, that 
they have to get rid of them615” is very important to Hutu. Being pressured into acting out the plan of 
the 'Hutu Power'-elite at least partially absolves them from the guilt of having taken part in the geno-
cide. François recounted: “some Interahamwe who killed the people from this hill were citizens of this 
hill but there was other Interahamwe from other hills because there was a sensitization. Like the ar-
my, some soldiers sensitized that there is killing on the other side, [so] you should also kill616.” As we 
will see with reconciliation programs, the ‘sensitization’ and the ‘order’ in the sense of conditioning 
by the state are very important to many Rwandans.  
In an attempt of perpetrators to reclaim their innocence respectively of survivors to live among Hutu 
without constant fear, the genocide is conceived as the result of elite interference with the popula-
tion: “It’s always the high officials that bring divisionism but us ordinary people we don’t have any 
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problem617.” The killings were commanded from above and executed by the population, just as clear-
ing the bush in umuganda. The Kinyarwanda-word Muyaga (wind / wind of destruction), which 
Rwandans adopted for violent episodes before the genocide, particularly in 1959618, captures the 
character of interethnic violence perfectly: a sudden, extremely violent change of the societal pa-
rameters that suspends the basic rules of humanity and is over as swiftly as it started. It begins and 
ends upon the command of an official. Most interviewees agreed with Cécile who stated that there 
were orders to kill which “came from top-leaders, from leaders at the upper level619.” 
After these episodes of violence, Hutu and Tutsi go back to being good neighbors again. As bizarre as 
that sounds, Hatzfeld620 and Fujii621 have made similar experiences and the answers of my partici-
pants corroborate their findings: ‘tribal’ hatred between the groups was not the main motivation for 
killing. Even the settlement patterns of Hutu and Tutsi suggest otherwise. Groups that fundamentally 
distrust each other tend to move into segregated sectors of the community, trying to live closer to 
members of their own group. This happened in Burundi during the civil war, “Rohero” being the per-
fect example622. To a lesser extent, it also happened in “Gatumba” after the genocide, when the gov-
ernment provided new houses for survivors and grouped them together. If we look at the scaled 
questions, we can detect that returnees assessed neighborly relations before the genocide much 
worse than residents did. Bystanders and survivors described the relations with their neighbors posi-
tively, similar to today.  
Trust in Neighbors 
 1990 1994 2003 2011 
Bystanders 3.3 -2.6 2.2 4.3 
Ex-Convicts 2.3 -3.1 0.6 4.3 
Returnees 0.3 -0.8 2.2 4.3 
Survivors 3.8 -4.8 1.8 4 
Rwanda Average 2.9 -3.1 1.8 4.2 
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Rwanda:  How much would you trust your neighbors if you compare your situation in….? 
The diagram corroborates that the population never saw their neighbors at the origins of the geno-
cide. It was less a matter of ethnic hatred but a matter of governmental intervention. A study from 
the Rwandan think tank IRDP also confirms the findings that the majority of Rwandans (53 percent) 
considers the social relations very good623. The assessments of my interviewees could even be inter-
preted as being more positive than the NURC’s ‘Rwandan Reconciliation Barometer’ where 24.7 per-
cent agreed to the statement, “it is difficult for me or my family to trust Rwandans who found them-
selves on the other side of the conflict during the genocide624.” 
If the genocide however was not the product of interethnic hatred among neighbors but a product of 
massive governmental manipulation, why did the population comply? 
Motivations of Perpetrators 
As mentioned in chapter 2.3., the Rwandan genocide could be interpreted as a struggle for absolute 
dominance of the state, which the extremist Hutu elite reinterpreted as an ethnic life-and-death 
struggle in order to exert pressure to participate among the population625. Even though this aspect 
plays a tangential role in the official narrative, some interviewees understood it similarly: “I think it 
was more economic and power play. Because these people were killing these other people because 
they didn’t want them to take the property.626.” Motivations for joining the genocide however are 
heterogeneous and manifold. They have to be understood in context, not as a linear trajectory. 
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Regarding thoughts and motivations during the genocide, Rwandans speak of a unique mixture of 
feelings mostly based on war-related rumors: fear627, greed for Tutsi-properties628, lack of education 
and proper information629, rage about Habyarimana’s assassination and the consequential desire for 
self-defense630. 
When it came to the question “Why do you think people killed?”, there was an interesting but very 
clear difference between ex-convicts, survivors, bystanders and returnees. ‘Greed’ or ogling Tutsis’ 
land and property was one of the most stated reasons why participants thought Hutu had joined the 
genocide631. This motivation however was mostly proffered by survivors and late-born bystanders. In 
a poor and overpopulated country such as Rwanda, the material incentive seems plausible. Never-
theless, material gain as a main driving force of genocide was supported neither by Straus632 nor by 
the statements of ex-convicts whom I conducted interviews with. Although “eating cows633” and 
looting was a popular practice among perpetrators, only Yohani actually considered “getting their 
properties634” a principal motive behind the genocide. The other ex-convicts cited different reasons. 
The ex-convicts testimony that greed was only understood as a secondary motive for joining the 
genocide runs contrary to what most other Rwandans and Burundians believe. Etienne for example, 
a Burundian IDP explained the violence with the sentence "a hungry man is an angry man635.” There 
is no doubt that poverty exacerbates political tensions but according to almost all ex-convicts I inter-
viewed, ‘greed’ does not seem to be a strong enough motivation on its own to taking part in the per-
secution and murder of one’s neighbors . Next to ‘greed’, the practice of ‘bad governance’ in the old 
regime636, the pre-existing history of violence between Hutu and Tutsi637, ignorance and illiteracy, as 
                                                          
627
 Cf. interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; John, 56, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; 
Vincent, 43, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Augustin, 50, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
628
 Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, “Gatumba”, Huye; Annunciata, 58, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; 
Costasie, 65, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jeanne d’Arc, 34, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; 
Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Yohani N., ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye. 
629
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with François, 52, bystander, “Gatumba”, Huye; Paul, 44, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye; 
Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye. 
630
 Cf. A surprisingly high number of Hutu in “Gatsata” said that the killing of Tutsi was perceived as an act of 
self-defense. Cf. interviews with Innocent, 55, ex-convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, “Ga-
tumba”, Huye; Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
631
 Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, “Gatumba”, Huye; Annunciata, 58, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; 
Costasie, 65, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jeanne d’Arc, 34, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; 
Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Yohani N., ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye; Dusabe, 50, bystander, 
“Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
632
 Cf. Straus, 2006, 150f. 
633
 Interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye. 
634
 Interview with Yohani 68, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye. 
635
 Interview with Etienne, 59, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi, Burundi. 
636
 Cf. interviews with Canisius, 61, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Christine, 49, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye.  
637
Cf. chapter 4.1.2. and Interviews with Vianney, 52, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Teresa, 72, survivor, “Ga-
tumba”, Huye; Karemera, 72, returnee, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye. 
Page 131 
 
well as the influence of supernatural evil forces such as the devil638 were the most-quoted reasons 
among all participant categories combined.  
Bystanders and ex-convicts mention obedience to orders639 and the circumstances of war640 much 
more frequently than survivors641 and returnees. Ex-convicts emphasize on the increasing fear and 
insecurity invoked by officials, soldiers or Hutu refugees from Byumba and Bugesera642 that pushed 
them to follow the extremist script in a perceived act of self-defense643. “They used to tell us that the 
Tutsis who had fled in 1959, they were the ones who were back to take again the power644.” Innocent 
explains that "had to kill them as a kind of self-defense vis-à-vis the unfolding leadership of the Tutsi 
regime645.”  
The one aspect that practically all646 of the ex-convicts focus on most is that they had to obey the 
orders of the authorities647.  Many ex-convicts believe that trapped between their outraged neigh-
bors and the extremist authorities, they had no choice but to join the killing648. Both John and Mau-
rice made an analogy between killing and public work: “When there is Umuganda - public works, so if 
you see all the people they are going to Umuganda, how can you stay alone? So you have to follow 
them. So it´s like my neighbors plus local authorities pushed me to [do] the killings649.” Asked about 
the recruitment of peasants during the genocide, John answered: “you simply have to obey. If they 
say go to the community work, you go to the community work650.” 
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Irrespective of the question if Maurice or John participated in the genocide willingly or were pushed 
to do so, we can proceed on the assumption that every Rwandan was well aware of ethnic identities 
as part of a script of violence dictated by the Hutu extremists struggling for power. Still, in most cases 
this ethnic awareness did not translate into indifferent hatred or racism. Peer pressure, fear and un-
certainty seem to have been more important. According to Straus, racism and exposure to propa-
ganda only explain which perpetrators behaved the most violent, not why they joined651. No, the 
reasons for joining the genocide, according to the ex-convicts themselves, were mostly circumstantial 
and not possible outside of wartime conditions. 
 
4.1.6. Gaps in the official Discourse II – Civil War and Pressure from Above 
The Significance of the Civil War 
The view of the genocide as the culmination of the ‘divisionist’ Rwandan culture of the first and sec-
ond republic deemphasizes the effect of the RPF-initiated civil war652. The fact that the civil warexac-
erbated interethnic tensions is a connection that the majority of Rwandan residents from 1994 still 
are aware of when asked about the start of the genocide653. Even survivors such as Emmanuel state 
that the genocide could not have taken place without the circumstances of war654 or at least that the 
war poisoned the interethnic relations655. Some Rwandans, particularly Hutus, even use the word 
‘war’ as a substitute for ‘genocide’ when speaking about the events of 1994, emphasizing on the dire 
situation of both sides.656 Rwandans however also often use the politically correct word ‘liberation’ 
instead of ‘invasion’657 when speaking about the RPF, as if to emphasize the victims on both sides 
while at the same time not offending the powers that be.  
Scott Straus emphasizes that the ‘law’-character of mandatory participation in the genocide and Hu-
tu peer pressure in general intensified through the circumstances of war, which drove most Hutu 
perpetrators to join 658. Jacques Sémelin, a comparative scholar of genocide, concurs that the trau-
matization from four years of war had set the stage in which the genocidal propaganda could flour-
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ish659. Manus Midlarsky makes the case that genocide requires for a regime to be in the “domain of 
losses660”, thus already involved in a war and suffering from repeated defeats (the loss of the north to 
the RPF) for massacres to cross the threshold into genocide. Jean Hatzfeld, a journalist who inter-
viewed a group of killers for a prolonged time, doubts if his interviewees even hated Tutsi at all661. 
Finally, Lee Ann Fujii’s empirical study of interpersonal networks during the genocide postulates a 
“constructivist theory of mass violence662”. She comprehends the genocide itself as the actually divi-
sive endeavor, not pre-existing ethnic divisions: “What the data show most clearly, in other words, is 
that ethnic hatreds seem to have been a consequence of the genocide, not a cause663.”  
We thus have to question 'ethnic hatred' as well as 'genocide ideology' as primary motivations and 
should focus more on the conditions under which the genocide happened. Here, the comparison 
with Burundi elucidates certain dynamics. 
Parallels to Burundi 
An interpretation focusing on the influence of framework conditions instead of the diabolical plan-
ning of Hutu extremists places the genocide against the Tutsi much closer into the vicinity of the 
large-scale massacres following Ndadaye’s assassination in Burundi 1993. In Burundi, despite a 
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Assassination of M. Ndadaye 
by Tutsi. Extremist Cartoon 
from La Médaille-
Nyiramacibiri, November 
1993, Nr. 17, p. 10  
Un assistant : Achevez ce 
stupide Hutu, les organes 
génitaux que vous lui enlève-
rez, suspendez-les sur notre 
tambour. 
Ndadaye : Tuez-moi mais vous 
n’exterminez pas les Ndadaye 
au Burundi. 
Kagame : Achevez-le vite. Ne 
savez-vous pas qu’à Byumba 
et à Ruhengeri. Nous avons 
fait du travail. Les  femmes, 
nous leur avons retiré les 
enfants de la matrice, les 
hommes, nous leur avons 
enlevé les yeux. 
Le tambour : Kalinga du Bu-
rundi 
in: Chrétien, 1995, 365. 
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speech by the future FRODEBU-leader Jean Minani who called on Hutus to resist the putschists664, 
there is no evidence of planning mass killings at the national level665 . Even a former FRODEBU-cadre 
explained to me that the Anti-Tutsi violence was largely determined by local dynamics666. Neverthe-
less, the dynamics and methods of violence were similar: public outrage about the president’s death, 
a culture of impunity, roadblocks, burning houses, and ordinary Hutus forming killing squads armed 
with machetes and traditional weapons. The body count was stunningly high667 and many Burundians 
speak of genocide668, sometimes on both sides669. Except for the national army intervening early and 
mercilessly on behalf of the Burundian Tutsis, the mass killings followed a script very similar to the 
genocide but apparently without central planning.  
Furthermore, we should not underestimate the significance of the Burundian massacres of 1993 for 
the unfolding of the Rwandan genocide. The first time the extremist propaganda radio RTLM adapted 
a radical anti-Tutsi stance was after Ndadaye’s assassination by Tutsi army officers670. If we look at 
the headlines of extremist Hutu media in Rwanda, the observation of the progression of the Burundi-
an civil war might have had two consequences. First, it might have instigated a plan among Hutu 
hardliners to kill the president in order to provoke a Hutu uprising, which happened in Burundi. Sec-
ond, it certainly reinforced the fundamental distrust against the Tutsi, who in their eyes did appar-
ently neither shrink back from murdering the president nor the whole Hutu elite (in 1972) in order to 
retain power over the state671. In this respect, it was the inverted situation from the early sixties, 
when a leery Burundian Tutsi elite vigilantly observed the 'Hutu revolution'in Rwanda and decided to 
strike pre-emptively  in order to stifle any possible Hutu uprising672. In the eyes of Rwandan Hutu 
extremists, the RPF had invaded Rwanda in 1990 to re-establish Tutsi dominance just as in Burundi. 
Taking into account the rumors about killings in RPF-occupied territory, the Tutsis' alleged plan for 
renewed domination and even extermination was considered general knowledge to many Hutu, not 
just extremists. Canisius e.g. states that he “was really scared about the Inkotanyi because he knew 
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that they were coming to kill them673.” Nevertheless, an argumentation about the causes of genocide 
focusing on the circumstances of civil war would place partial responsibility on the RPF who started 
the war, thus compromising the image of the guerilla army who stopped one of the worst atrocities 
in human history. After an acknowledgement of partial guilt, it would be much more difficult to de-
mand justice and reprimand the international community for their inaction during the genocide674. 
Hence, the RPF emphasizes on the central planning of the genocide against the Tutsi675, the ideology 
of ethnic hatred and the discriminatory and nepotistic features of the ancient regimes. 
The Leviathan 
After Habyarimana’s murder, the extremists acted fast. They quickly filled the vacuum of power by 
immediately eliminating the moderate opposition that challenged their claim to Hutu leadership and 
rallying the outraged but completely disoriented Hutu-mob behind them. The context of the lasting 
civil war, the rage about Habyarimana’ s murder676 and the frequent rumors about the RPF’s vicious-
ness in the occupied territories in the north all worked in favor of the extremist conspiracy677. The 
extremists’ allegations sounded plausible to many Hutus. Françoise, a bystander from “Gatsata” had 
relatives in Byumba who were allegedly killed by the RPF and she believes the reason for “her friends 
and other people from her family who partook in the genocide, it was partly self-defense’678.” 
From the 6th of April on, the extremists summarily denominated Tutsi residents as ‘accomplices’ of 
the RPF that had to be exterminated as a part of local self-defense, interpreting it as a further stage 
of the war679 and mimicking established public practices such as umuganda. Straus, comparing dif-
ferent local dynamics of the genocide, even argues that the rapid expansion of the genocide was less 
the result of meticulous planning by the Akazu and more the result of circumstances of “acute uncer-
tainty, heightened anxiety, fear, and confusion680”. The hardliners were able to successfully convinc-
ing the population that they were controlling the state after having eliminated the moderate compe-
tition. Fujii postulates that for people joining the genocide, these groups of killers became “sites of 
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sense making681”. The act of killing created “order out of disorder, certainty out of uncertainty, and 
power out of powerlessness682.” The new unification of Hutus was forged through killing. It did not 
exist prior to it. When the first peasants started to kill, instigated, instructed and supervised by the 
army and the militias, violence gained momentum. The peasants who killed did not want to stand-
alone and coerced other peasants to follow the “script of violence683”. The dynamics of fear, rage, 
peer pressure and opportunity quickly devolved into “Rwanda’s leviathan684”. The “conspiracy to 
murder685” on the central level existed but local dynamics driven by the uncertainty of war might 
have been more important for the rapid expansion of the genocide than the genocidal ideology itself. 
The Culture of Obedience 
“Uko zivuze ni ko zitambirwa – One dances the way the drum is beaten” Rwandan Proverb 
One last interesting aspect I became familiar with during my fieldwork in Rwanda is the ‘culture of 
obedience’ already broached above and thematized by scholars of the region686. This topic is mostly 
mentioned in connection with the unusually powerful state apparatus in Rwanda. It often gets 
brought up as a reason for genocide by Rwandans themselves687. Joseph Sebarenzi, ex-speaker of the 
Rwandan parliament characterizes obedience as a defining Rwandan character trait. “It’s customary 
to listen to your parents and your teachers but above all else, you listen to your leaders. […]And you 
listen closely, for what he says could mean the difference between life and death. When you hear him, 
you don’t form opinions. You nod your head in agreement688.” Straus speaks of “high levels of civilian 
compliance before the genocide689”. Since the precolonial kingdom, the state has a long tradition of 
commanding citizens to perform certain duties such as mandatory public labor. Even the integration 
of the local population into the defense framework of a territory is customary. Amarondo, the prac-
tice of nightly patrols by squads of neighbors has been mentioned frequently in the interviews690.  
Rwandans are used to carrying out governmental demands.  
In a densely populated agrarian state, mutual cooperation and intact group ties can mark the differ-
ence between death and survival. With rumors about impending extermination through the hands of 
the RPF691 and shaken up rage because of Habyarimana’s murder, peer pressure to participate in the 
genocide was immense. Noncompliance could mean pariah-status, punishment or worse. As Lee Ann 
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Fujii692 remarks, many perpetrators hence played a double role, saving the Tutsi they cared about 
despite joining the genocide and hunting down other Tutsi. The roles of rescuer and killer, perpetra-
tor and victim are interchangeable with regard to different episodes of mass violence and sometimes 
even within the genocide of 1994 itself. John recounts: “having a Tutsi wife he got a lot of people 
coming to his house for rescue. And in kind of self-defense and just showing to other killers that he 
was with them, he could just go out a little bit, and wave his machete as a symbol of saying: ’yeah I 
am together with you693.” Surviving outside of the community is extremely difficult in Rwanda. So 
many Hutu men waited to see which side would take control in their community and when the Hutu 
extremists gained the upper hand, they joined the genocide because it was the less costly alternative 
and directly addressed their deepest fears.  
The violence snowballed very rapidly and took most Tutsi by surprise694. The sudden shift from coex-
istence to killing was so inexplicable that for many interviewees, the work of the devil himself is the 
only plausible explanation for the course of events695.  
Even though many Hutus figured out that the connections between the RPF and their own Tutsi 
neighbors were artificial and pure propaganda, they followed, fearing the consequences of dissent. 
Maurice claims that they were pushed to join by the local authorities. “At a point local leaders made 
us to kill, if I could see my neighbors joining them, so I could not go aside, so I had to follow them to 
show that I participated, even if I couldn´t kill but I had to prove that I agree, I participate696.” Mau-
rice’s case is interesting because it crystallizes this tendency to comply with authorities against better 
judgment. However, even after eight years in jail and his Gacaca trial, Maurice does not seem to 
question his behavior in relation to authorities in general. He complains about the reparations he has 
to pay697 and generally appears to understand the genocide as something bad that primarily hap-
pened to him, not because of his actions but because he followed the authorities. To him, Gacaca 
was a positive experience because it set him free. He wrote a confession as was demanded, and the 
government, not the victims, “forgave us 698”. Therefore, in Maurice’s eyes, his behavior of compli-
ance with authority works. He seems content with the politics of national unity and reconciliation but 
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he just exchanged one authority for another. This can be described neither as genocide ideology nor 
as reconciliation. It is plain opportunism. 
Hatzfeld made similar experiences while interviewing perpetrators in jail: “the killers worry only 
about their own fates and essentially feel no compassion for anyone but themselves699”. Neverthe-
less, this almost compulsive conformity is not limited to the genocide or ex-convicts, it pervades the 
attitudes of participants regarding their behavior towards authority. Rwandans often mention the 
state’s influence with a certain amount of fatalism. Thasienne, a bystander from Gatumba e.g. states 
the following about having to pay reparations for her parents’ deeds during the genocide: “as it is a 
rule, it’s like our cross we have to carry every day. So, at the beginning it was hard but today we came 
to understand because there is no other choice we have to pay 700.” What the state, embodied by the 
person of the president orders, is the law, regardless of the topic being reparations, commemoration 
or ethnic identity: “So the president, the parent of the country said we are all one people, so there is 
no importance to say this is a Hutu, this is a Tutsi, we are all one701.” The culture of conformity even is 
reflected in Yohani's view of reconciliation. It strongly affects the perception of reconciliation politics. 
Politics are less seen as the will of the people but as unalterable laws imposed from above - like forc-
es of nature. With president Habyarimana killed, his ‘lawgiving’ authority was up for grabs and the 
Hutu hardliners exploited the population’s fear and disorientation to the fullest. 
Thus, involvement in the genocide should perhaps be considered less as the enthusiastic fulfilment of 
orders but as choosing conformity because of fear, social pressure, disorientation, convenience and 
opportunism. This obedient behavior is not limited to participation in the genocide but with certain 
qualifications, also applies to reconciliation politics702. Unsurprisingly, it corresponds to a sense of 
paternalistic responsibility on the side of intellectuals. Even among critically thinking members of the 
elite who do not believe in exclusive top-down measures, there is a tacit consensus that peasants 
should be 'guided' in their way of thinking, particularly with regard to identity: "For example, for 
those people in the rural areas, these people who are illiterate. These people who just follow, who 
need a head, I mean someone to lead them, someone to guide them, a mentor. So for those people, 
it’s really good not to rely on ethnicity as we have had the preachings of ethnic hate a lot of times. 
Yeah, between Hutu-people telling 'do you know Tutsi have colonized you after the white people?' 
Telling people, 'yeah you know the Tutsis have killed your people afterwards, after genocide.' So it’s 
good for people not to think, or talk about, or do things on the basis of their ethnic groups. But for us 
who are, let’s say eloquent, who have been to school, who have some capacity of analysis and under-
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standing, we believe banning the ethnicity doesn’t mean setting up a good relationship with peo-
ple703.” I principally agree with Chris' argument that more education is necessary. The subject of my 
criticism is the coercive and unidirectional manner in which knowledge is transferred, a discourse 
which leaves no room for dialogue nor dissent which I criticize. 
If we take the statements of ex-convicts and residents into account, the fear to be left alone and the 
compulsion to conform to external demands were far more important for the rapid expansion of the 
genocide than hatred or racism., even though ethnicity determined these groups.  
Reconciliation: Addressing the wrong Problems? 
To summarize: if we look at the reasons why the peasants killed during the genocide, manipulative 
state intervention within circumstances of extreme instability and rooted in a culture of conformity 
with authority seem to have been the main driving force.  
Unfortunately, the RPF-government tries to reverse the effects of the genocide and the conditions 
that caused it by relying on manipulative state intervention as well. Circumstantial factors such as 
paranoia under war conditions or genocidal group dynamics are difficult to tackle by state interven-
tion from above. The culture of conformity and the pervasive state apparatus that were instrumental 
in the implementation of genocide are actually conducive to the RPF’s plans for fundamentally 
changing Rwandan society. As Waldorf and Straus state: “Interestingly, the RPF partly blames a 
Rwandan culture of obedience for the genocide, but its social engineering has sought only to reinforce 
habits of obedience in the population704.” 
Chapter 4.1. established the official interpretation of genocide by the Rwandan state and its percep-
tion from below. As we have seen, the RPF assumes a very dominant role with regard to the public 
discourse about the genocide and dealing with its consequences. Before we however delve deeper 
into the design and implementation of reconciliation politics in Rwanda, it is necessary to take a clos-
er look at the power political context forming these policies and their relation to the core principles 
of reconciliation determined above, memory, acknowledgement, responsibility / apology and justice. 
Is ‘the order of reconciliation’ actually aiming at the restoration or creation of new relationships 
based on mutual respect that cut across the conflictive identities or might factors such as the provi-
sion of stability, the historical prerogative of interpretation or the retention of power be equally de-
cisive for Rwandan reconciliation politics in practice?  
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4.1. Kagame’s System 
“Everyone fears Kagame, from ordinary citizens to generals.” Joseph Sebarenzi705 
Paul Kagame always had and still has ambitious goals for Rwanda. His statement that he would turn 
the poor, landlocked, agrarian country into a knowledge-based economy, the “Singapore of Africa706” 
is on record and Rwanda is well on its way to reach at least two Millennium Development Goals: uni-
versal free education and promoting gender equality. Kagame is renowned and internationally laud-
ed for reaching almost impossible objectives in the past two decades, yet he has also gained notorie-
ty with regard to unceremoniously removing people from power who do not share his vision. 
The strength of Kagame’s government and the attraction it exerts on Western donors mainly rests on 
three pillars: Post-genocide Rwanda’s outstanding record with regard to effectiveness, order, securi-
ty and economic development; its exceptional standing with regard to Western guilt because of the 
international reaction to the genocide; and the desire for African success stories in the aid indus-
try707. Whereas the reasons for Rwanda's development can be mostly ascribed to Kagame’s close-
meshed management of the state, the rationale for the other two parameters lies in Rwanda’s com-
plex historic relationship with the international community. Kagame's system could be described as a 
hybrid between introversive dominance and extroversive accountability. 
 
4.2.1. Introversive Dominance  
“Ijambo rigukunze rikuguma mu nda – The word that loves you stays inside” (Burundian proverb) 
In its own way, the RPF has advanced Jean-François Bayart’s colonial notion of “extraversion708”, the 
ability of African dominant classes to exploit foreign occupation and using the state as an ‘incubator’ 
for their emerging dominance and accumulation of wealth, into the 21st century. Kagame has suc-
cessfully eliminated any meaningful domestic competition for dominance and has transformed large 
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sections of Rwandan society into a highly effective network of dependents709. This network includes 
the governmental administration, most parts of civil society, the media, and even reaches individuals 
at the grassroots through various means such as workshops, summits, conferences710, solidarity 
camps, associations and propaganda. These networks have been thoroughly instructed about the 
official narrative of the past and its failures711, the sociopolitical topics worthy of promotion or hush-
ing up, and the president’s vision for the future, summarized in Rwanda's "vision 2020". Order-
recipients usually understand and follow explicit as well as implicit demands from the center swiftly 
and efficiently, often even with preemptive obedience, thus creating the external image of an effec-
tive, harmonious and unified system that does not fail to impress casual observers. In deviance to 
Bayart’s model, the 'dominant class', the RPF’s inner circle, has not bypassed official institutions in 
order to accumulate wealth. The state has rather been socially re-engineered so thoroughly that local 
officials, civil society organizations and even individual citizens gear themselves to what they inter-
pret as the will of the elite on top712. This behavior ranges from wholehearted support to outright 
self-censorship. 
CSOGs 
The government supports and promotes certain grassroots organizations, particularly genocide sur-
vivor associations like AVEGA or IBUKA713. They allow the government to cultivate its international 
image as “post-genocide spiritual guardian714”. Many of these groups display strong ties to political 
institutions. The RPF for instance installed a member of its central committee as president of IBUKA 
in 2000 and IBUKA has supported the RPF in elections715. Despite this close relationship, the govern-
ment does not accept fundamental criticism by interest groups, at least not officially716. Although 
there is an overwhelming abundance of associations, clubs and CSOGs dedicated to reconciliation, 
the paternalistic tendencies associated with post-colonial elites resurface in the little confidence that 
the Rwandan government displays in the self-organizing capabilities of its society. “For the sake of 
political steering, most associations are either dependent on the state or confronted with discourag-
ingly bureaucratic requirements717”. 
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In 2004, the government crushed down on 13 domestic and international CSOGs, including the coun-
try’s largest human rights organization LIPRODHOR. They accused them of ‘divisionism’ and the pro-
motion of ‘genocidal ideology’, and ultimately dissolved five organizations718. LIPRODHOR, threat-
ened with dissolution, issued an apology and several activists who refused to sign it fled the country. 
Subsequently, many CSOGs started to engage in self-censorship to avoid prosecution. 
In the spring of 2011, I volunteered with CLADHO for three months. CLADHO is the umbrella organi-
zation for Human Rights Organizations in Rwanda in which all other Rwandan human rights organiza-
tions are mandatory members. I had the opportunity to follow the work of the organization closely 
and was able to attend their meetings and official government hearings for CSOGs. In official meet-
ings, delicate human rights questions that would put the RPF or the government in a negative light 
were never publicly uttered even though my co-workers voiced sophisticated opinions about these 
topics in private. In conferences with high officials, most civil society representatives stuck to theo-
retical keynote speeches about human rights and the intricacies of government-CSOG cooperation. In 
other cases, they limited their advocacy to less politicized topics which allowed room to maneuver 
such as details of national budget allocation or RPF-approved core issues such as women’s and chil-
dren’s rights or the right to food and shelter heavily promoted in the 'Anti-Nyakazi'-program719. Alt-
hough the work of Rwandan CSOGs in the mentioned areas is nothing less than outstanding given the 
difficult circumstances, the Rwandan CSOGs I witnessed never publicly addressed the elephants in 
the room such as extrajudicial killings, the stifling of political dissent or Rwandan involvement in the 
DRC. On the contrary, an acquaintance even told me that he was fired from CLADHO for “being to 
frank720”. Considering the repeated crackdowns721 on international and domestic NGOs and human 
rights organizations, focusing on government-approved topics seem to be the only viable survival 
strategy for CSOGs in Rwanda. 
Politics 
Opposition against the RPF from parliamentary committees has been observed, particularly during 
the early years of the transitional Government of National Unity but the parliamentary opposition is 
very weak. Opposition parties that could become real challengers to the RPF have repeatedly been 
excluded from political competition on accounts of 'genocide ideology' and promoting 'divisionism'. 
Ministers and members of parliament acting out of line are removed unceremoniously. Prime Minis-
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ter Faustin Twagiramungu, along with ministers Seth Sendashonga722, Immaculée Kayumba, Al-
phonse-Marie Nkubito, and Jean-Baptiste Nkuriyingoma resigned or were made to leave in 1995 
already723. In 2006, the strongest opposition party MDR was banned724 and before the elections of 
2010, three opposition parties, the FDU-Inkingi, Parti Social-Imberakuri and the Democratic Green 
Party were excluded from the elections because they did not comply with the National Electoral 
Commission's requirements725. The Green Party’s vice president André Kagwa Rwisereka has been 
found assassinated soon thereafter. The other parties in the Rwandan parliament, PSD and PL, who 
accounted for a combined voter share of 20.63% in the parliamentary elections of 2008726 and less 
than 7% in the presidential elections of 2010 are little more than ‘bridesmaids’, providing the RPF 
with a democratic legitimation727. With the creation of the forum of political parties in 1999, the RPF 
has devised an effective way to control members of parliament because the forum allows the parties 
to enforce loyalty to the fraction up to effectively firing an insubordinate MP728. Since the RPF took 
power, dozens of politicians have been sacked or even imprisoned and killed. Many fled the country 
after losing their position729. Murdered or disappeared politicians, officials, businessmen, and jour-
nalists such as most recently Patrick Karegeya or Théogene Turatsinze are rarely genocide suspects. 
These victims are most often RPF-dissidents from the inner ranks of the party730, people who alleged-
ly possessed or disseminated politically charged information about RPF or its cadres731, or opposition 
figures with a clean slate that could have become popular threats to the RPF732. Genocide suspects 
usually are arrested and face trial. 
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Even though the RPF's totalitarian tendencies are worrying and have been criticized frequently by 
Western observers or the opposition in exile, for many of my participants, security, stability and de-
velopment were more important. In many interviews, intact perspectives for socioeconomic advance 
within a secure environment were considered equivalent to democracy and participants did not care 
much about political parties or free speech but rather about societal harmony: “democracy is when 
people have the same understanding, when people have the same ideas733.“ Consistent with the cul-
ture of obedience cultivated over years of autocratic governance, many peasants did understand 
politics or democracy as an exclusive domain of intellectuals and saw the government's task in the 
provision of freedom, peace and development, largely independent of the participation of the peas-
ant population. The concept of democracy is rather vague and often heavily influenced by the public 
sensitization with regard to unity and reconciliation: "Whenever you have unity and reconciliation, 
that’s democracy. Development can come. Also democracy for her implies freedom, I mean human 
rights, stuff like that, that’s democracy734.” 
There however are critical voices: "Democracy in African countries, it is just rhetoric. We don't have 
democracy. That’s what he is saying. Because he is saying let's take an example: I see it even here in 
elections. Let's give, let’s share with you what I see in elections for instance. Have you ever seen elec-
tions where you go to elections and someone is there to dictate you and write there for instance? […] 
This is commonplace here in Rwanda.735” Concerns about the totalitarian direction of Rwandan poli-
tics are particularly prevalent among young intellectuals and students. Robert: “Democracy for me... 
means dissent voices. […]. Someone with a, who is voicing different ideas than yours, you label him 
just as an enemy, that's not democracy. That's not democracy. Because for me in my country today, 
you can't tell me that we have genuine political parties because in the end for me, we don't have po-
litical parties, we have something to present to the west. We say: 'look we have a system, we have 
whatever but everything is kind of RPF. It's kind of RPF political party. Others just… It's kind of an um-
brella, it's an umbrella political party where other political parties are inside and whoever is voicing 
different opinions, they just say that you are serving, you are serving a particular interest736". Older 
peasants are usually content with peace, security and development. Members of the younger, well-
educated generation however do worry that the repression of dissent and the absence of genuine 
democracy might lead to a new crisis. "When people keep repressing things they think they feel, or 
because they can’t talk about it in public, when people keep repressing this ethnicity idea, at some 
point, these things will have power, or control over them. And they will burst out and appearing up in 
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other killings737.” To these citizens, the RPF's utter dominance over the discourse about the past is 
politically explosive because it creates taboos that may prove a liability for politics in the future: “The 
big danger is that some people can't talk openly what happened. It is just a detonator738.”  
Media 
The independent media is subjected to severe limitation, legal repression and even harassment739. As 
mentioned above, disappearances and even murders of journalists have had their precedents. Next 
to not being very diverse, the media is also concentrated in Kigali. Journalists censor their work be-
cause speaking about certain topics such as human rights abuses by the RPF leads to defamation 
charges, prosecution740 or worse e.g. in the case of the director of the newspaper Umuco, Bonaven-
ture Bizuremyi, who disappeared in 2006 after publishing critical reports741. To give censorship and 
political limitation a sense of popular legitimacy, the practice often seen is that quasi-governmental 
supervisory institutions representing ‘civil society’ such as the Office of the Ombudsman or the High 
Press Council recommend the government to ban certain parties or suspend media institutions. The 
government subsequently acts according to the recommendations of these bodies it effectively con-
trols742. Many Rwandan newspapers closed down and several journalists had to flee.  Others, like 
Jean-Léonard Rugambage743 in 2010 or Charles Ingabire in 2011 have been killed or disappeared. In 
2013, reporters without borders list Rwanda 161th out of 179 with regard to press freedom744.  
Similar to democracy, most rural interviewees in Rwanda did not consider the absence of a critical 
media to be a fundamentally worrying issue. Many still remember RTLM. They expressed a certain 
appreciation for a tight governmental control of the media to prevent further incitement745, even 
though particularly Hutus and intellectuals consider the censorship too heavy-handed746. Intellectuals 
criticized the instrumentalization of the media to disseminate the official discourse: “Sometimes I 
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think the media is quite opinionated. Like it just says things that they want people to hear about the 
genocide. In my view, I think they would display the genocide as it was. And then about reconciliation, 
they would try to talk about everyone equally instead of keeping on bringing out the fact that it was 
the Tutsis that were killed all the time, I don't think that is right747.” As with politics, the absence of 
differing opinions makes people wonder if the media as de-facto agents of the government are ra-
ther interested in reconciliation or in the propagation of a certain narrative. "If helping people to 
reconcile means […] airing the government policies in line with reconciliation, then the media is doing 
a great job. But if reconciliation rather means also looking at the other side of the story, I mean other 
people who were killed - not necessarily because of the genocide - well, other killings. I mean, if media 
is to be holding accountable, if we look at the 'holding people accountable'-aspect of media, then I 
don't think journal-, I mean media is doing a great job to reconcile people748.” 
Participants frequently mentioned examples of radio soap operas and programs aimed at reconcilia-
tion such as Urunana749, Musekeweya750, and Isano751. Interviewees felt that these radio programs 
helped them to understand the issues of reconciliation in their communities and that they followed 
them frequently. The NGO "Search for common Ground" has pioneered many of these programs 
aimed at reconciliation. Its most recent radio program is called "Turi Umwe752". 
Population 
Individual interviewees often followed the government narrative's 'invisible script' when it came to 
questions about politics, trying to orient themselves with reference to what they perceived as the 
'official' position. This behavior is called kwibwizira – a mix between indoctrination and self-
censorship that is applied when confronted with questions that could get the interviewee in conflict 
with the values of officially promoted 'Rwandanness'753. When I asked interviewees to voice their 
opinions about controversial topics such as transitional justice or the banning of ethnicity, many fol-
lowed the 'official narrative' of the genocide outlined above as close as possible or just steadfastly 
clung to the notion that what the ruling party or the president did was the right thing to do. In gen-
eral, many participants dreaded being perceived in opposition to the government: “we follow what is 
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accepted, what is accepted in our country is genocide against Tutsi, that’s what we follow, that’s 
what we are remembering.  […]You can't tell me that someone maybe went to Congo, because he 
was tired, maybe he fell down and died, stuff like that. So we are not remembering those people. We 
are remembering what is accepted and what is accepted, it is genocide against Tutsi754.”  
In some cases, participants feared questions about politics altogether. When Jeanne, a 32-year old 
returnee and farmer from Huye saw my recording device before the interview, she half-jokingly 
asked the translator "do you want the government to kill me?" Even if it was meant as a joke, her 
answers became very evasive and pro-government as soon as I started the recording device.  She 
usually dismissed sensitive questions by repeating fragments of official policy and assuring me that 
everything was okay: “Today, you know there is unity and reconciliation, you know, today people give 
one another the water, the fire, yes, things are going well there is no more problem in Rwanda755.” 
The interview was very short. Particularly peasants repeated catchphrases or sentences they must 
have heard during community meetings, in government workshops, or on the radio. They sound like 
interchangeable sound bites from a propaganda speech: 
 “Democracy is when Rwandans are together, there is unity among Rwandans756.” 
 "I strongly refuse [to talk] about ethnicity problems. I don´t belong either to Hutu or Tutsi be-
cause we are one Rwandan as even God has created us as one people, so we are one Rwan-
da757.” 
 “We all want to be Rwandans and not talk again about ethnic identities758.” 
  “Yeah, the government always looks for the reconciliation and unity of Rwandans. It never 
brings divisionism among people so it can bring reconciliation759.” 
Through clubs such as the aforementioned AMI or SCUR, meetings and ‘sensitizations’ offered by the 
NURC, the RPF’s own brand of patriotism and unity has been successfully disseminated among the 
population. However, regarding this culture of silence and conformity, the question remains if people 
are truly convinced that they are reconciled or, if in reality, it is rather as Stephen Kinzer describes it: 
“citizens are required to repeat platitudes about reconciliation but hatred festers in many hearts760.” 
Even though the multiple publications of the NURC and other Rwandan associations such as the IRDP 
or the ARJ appear to be very well-informed about popular perceptions and fulfill all the statistical 
necessities to provide sound research, their often benevolent assessments and approval ratings of 
government policies raise suspicion among independent researchers. In a country with a long tradi-
tion of obedience to authority and one all-powerful party, the person of the inquirer might actually 
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be more important than the question itself. Thus, NURC-publications such as the Rwanda Reconcilia-
tion Barometer should be read cautiously. Because non-compliance historically always had undesira-
ble consequences, many peasants are eager to comply with what they perceive as the consensus: 
“The government has said that way, they have to live. I mean, it is favored by the government. It’s 
okay, they are living well, there is no problem761.” As soon as a policy becomes “the law762”, most 
Rwandans rather adapt to the new directive than protesting against it. My conversation with Jean-
Claude, a bystander from Kigali, illustrates this attitude very well: “Yeah to bring reconciliation, so 
that is the program of the government. It's not the program of the people. The people remain in that 
ideology [of ethnicity]. The ideology remains inside with them, […] in their minds but it can, it cannot 
remain in public763.” 
My own experiences during field research corroborate the observation that many Rwandans are very 
reluctant about revealing their political opinion to strangers. Especially participants in “Gatumba”, 
were much more prone to following the official narrative, the 'invisible script' described above and 
rather cautious about voicing criticism against government policies. In "Gatsata" a interviewee ex-
plicitly stated that he only felt at ease to speak their minds because of their familiarity with the re-
search assistant: “So he is saying that he is telling, he is able to be open to this extent, because he is 
seeing me, he knows me. He thinks nothing bad is going to happen to him because of what he saying. 
But if you had come with another person, he couldn’t be telling you this764”. 
Kagame's Popularity 
Despite or perhaps even because of his draconic policies and paternalism, Kagame remains very pop-
ular among many Rwandans. Even participants like Chris, Christine765 or Françoise who were critical 
of many policies, genuinely believe that Paul Kagame is a great leader. Tutsis such as Chris are very 
worried about what will happen when Kagame steps down. Others are genuine supporters and as-
cribe most of the positive developments to the president while the blame for failure comes upon 
local officials: “In Girinka-policy, usually Kagame gives cows to widows but there is still corruption in 
local authorities766.” The top-down system of policy-implementation imihigo767 where local officials 
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are held accountable by Kigali regularly, makes sure of this perception, so in a way, even his policy of 
greater accountability perpetuates Kagame's dominance: “there’s no problem with our President 
Kagame. There’s no problem with him. The problem is with people who govern with him768.”  
Paradoxically, Kagame might not even have had to imprison Victoire Ingabire or ban the FDU-Inkingi 
before the elections in 2010 and win by a suspicious margin of 93.08 percent. Rwandans of both eth-
nicities do appreciate his politics and might have elected him anyway. As Peter said: “it is a pleasure 
that we have our president today. He has done everything possible, everything in his power to facili-
tate reconciliation. So he thinks he can't add anything more769.” 
Sebarenzi’s statement at the beginning of the chapter however holds some truth too. Many partici-
pants, particularly ex-convicts, were almost too eager to profess their love for the president that had 
imprisoned them. In many cases, a participants' silence with regard to criticism did not come across 
as contentedness but because of outright fear770.  
 
4.2.2. Extroversive Accountability 
Obsessed with external perception 
Joseph Sebarenzi, the exiled speaker of parliament, calls Kagame’s vision an “ultracapitalist economy 
and a multiparty communist type of democracy. Free market, totalitarianism, and elections paradoxi-
cally coexist771.” The expression ‘communist type of democracy’ aims at the RPF’s transformative 
agenda with such ambitious projects as forging a 'New Rwandan identity, renaming the Rwandan 
territory, sweeping agricultural reforms and the unity and reconciliation policy. Elsewhere, Sebarenzi 
calls Rwanda a “cosmetic multiparty system772”. The word 'cosmetic' is at the essence of the RPF-
government’s success with donors. Kagame has incorporated the “aesthetics of progress773”. He 
knows what donors and the international community expect and he makes sure they will see what 
they paid for. The RPF has proven repeatedly that it has thoroughly studied information management 
and knows about the importance of external appearances774. Contrary to Burundi, you will not see 
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any peasants dressed in rags and walking barefoot on Rwandan streets. The government has im-
posed a system of heavy fines for failing to look and behave like a “self-respecting Rwandan775”. Even 
if obeying instructions such as dressing the part or paying the mandatory health insurance places 
heavy financial burdens on the poor peasantry776. The consequences of non-compliance to official 
policy are often dire, as ex-convict Yohani N. explains: “the problem that we always have is that the 
government always asks us [for the] mutuelle de santé [health insurance] and we are poor we cannot 
afford that money. So they come and they take our livestock they go to sell them in the market to get 
that money of mutuelle de santé777.” With the enforcement of a mandatory per capita payment for 
the mutuelle de santé, the government has furthermore introduced an artificial poverty trap for fami-
lies with many children, thus effectively supporting its own policy against overpopulation. However, 
considering the fact that survivors and even returnees are de facto more likely to receive govern-
mental assistance than other Rwandans, this might deepen the gap between former antagonists778. 
“Genocide Credit” 
Complaints as the one above rarely reach the donor community and if they do, they apparently fail to 
impress. Considering its size, post-genocide Rwanda receives assistance above average, a relation-
ship that is inextricably linked to the international inaction during the genocide. The government 
constantly reminds Western donors of their guilty conscience and their failure779. It claims an excep-
tional status for Rwanda’s post-traumatic recovery when criticized with regard to democratic deficits. 
It justifies the Rwandan involvement in the DRC with security concerns stemming from the genocide. 
The government constantly reminds Western donors of their guilty conscience and their failure to 
prevent the genocide780. It claims an exceptional status for Rwanda’s post-traumatic recovery when 
criticized with regard to democratic deficits and they justify the Rwandan involvement in the DRC 
with security concerns stemming from the genocide. It uses references to the genocide to assert that 
its unchallenged authority in allocating aid resources. In most cases, this reasoning has been accept-
ed781.  
Kagame’s strongest argument remains having stopped the genocide in the face of international fail-
ure, rendering him almost immune against human rights-related criticism. “[…]For a long time it was 
not considered politically correct to acknowledge the reality of widespread ‘disappearances’, assassi-
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nations and massacres782” writes Filip Reyntjens, a veteran analyst of the region and long-term critic 
of both the Habyarimana- as well as the RPF-regime. Reyntjens speaks of a “genocide credit783” the 
regime enjoys. “Of course, the genocide is a massive reality with a lasting impact, but it has also be-
come a source of legitimacy astutely exploited to escape condemnation, not unlike the way in which 
the holocaust is used to deflect criticism of Israel’s policies and actions towards the Palestinians784. 
Despite strong growth rates matching and surpassing donor expectations, particularly in the first 
decade after 1994, Rwanda is still heavily aid-dependent. Rwanda’s ministry of economy and finance 
quantifies the percentage of foreign grants in the country’s budget with 28.5 percent785 as well as 
23.9 percent deriving from foreign borrowing786. International sources speak of over 40 percent aid 
dependency787. This number seems to have declined from over 50 percent in 2008788. 
Donor concerns 
Donors have repeatedly voiced concerns about authoritarian policies such as the Imidugudu prac-
tice789 of resettling as much as 20 percent of the population790 or the law on 'genocide ideology' and 
'divisionism791' becoming effective before the election in 2003. However, with the exception of the 
repeated Rwandan involvement in the DRC792 that at least temporarily resulted in some severe aid 
cuts from the UK in 2004793, Kagame has managed to disperse donors’ reservations. Already in 2006, 
when concerns about the DRC were raised again, the RPF chose a different route, arresting CNDP-
leader and Rwandan proxy Laurent Nkunda, intensifying relations with Joseph Kabila and launching a 
joint military operation with the Congolese government in 2009794. The donors were appeased. 
Even though Kagame’s image in the international media has suffered considerably in the past few 
years, the donors stuck with Rwanda, the voicing of political concerns notwithstanding. Rachel Hay-
man says that despite evidence to tinkering with elections and excluding candidates not convenient 
to the party, Rwanda's key donors “consider the country moving sufficiently in the right direction on 
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democracy to quality for continuing support795.” Kagame is aware that aid agencies are under increas-
ing pressure to produce results to justify their budgets. His governance thus exhibits features reso-
nating with the donors' needs: good governance, anti-corruption, unity and reconciliation, institution 
building etc. Western recommendations furnished with an African 'homegrown'-label. Here, Ka-
game’s streamlined apparatus comes in handy. His policies actually show results. Moreover, even 
though the aid agencies are far from naïve, they become caught up in the 'phoenix from the ashes'-
story that development in post-genocide Rwanda represents. The story and the survey results796 are 
too good; hence, they are willing to compromise and accept “good enough democracy797.” 
 
4.2.3. Parallels to Habyarimana 
The patterns of interaction between the state and the aid system observed above, although held 
decidedly anti-ethnic, display some strong parallels to the Habyarimana-regime. Uvin798  compre-
hends development aid as “symbiotic to the process of structural violence799.” He identifies both a 
direct and an indirect relation between the aid system and structural violence, understood here as 
inequality, prejudice, humiliation, desperation, infantilization and exclusion from progress800.  
Unequal Distribution and Development Focus 
Under Habyarimana, the direct impact on inequality derived from the top-down implementation of 
development assistance in Rwanda that favored the urban class of Hutu évolues while excluding the 
Tutsi, the poor and generally non-northerners. Uvin demonstrates how the economic and techno-
cratic focus of development aid in Rwanda willfully ignored the channeling of resources and benefits 
to certain regions and groups. Participative programs providing incentives for new ‘progressive’ farm-
ing techniques or microcredits801 generally benefitted the wealthy participants and the bureaucracy 
disproportionately802. Just like Kagame today, Habyarimana was the darling of the aid industry up to 
1990 and displayed a strong development-focus in his rhetoric.  
In the perception of farmers, development aid and the state under Habyarimana were essentially 
two sides of the same system that paternalized, disempowered and infantilized them803. Regarding 
the still thriving culture of conformity described in chapter 4.1, little has changed with regard to the 
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 Hayman, 2011, 127. 
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 Cf. NURC, "Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer", 2010. 
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 Hayman, 2011, 127. 
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 Cf. Uvin, 1998, 141-150 
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 Uvin, 1998, 141 
800
 Cf. Uvin, 1998, 122-136 
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 Cf. Copestake, 2002, 743-755 
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 Cf. Newbury, 2011, 223-238; Isaksson, 2013. 
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 Cf. Uvin, 1998, 123-136. 
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top-down direction of development policy. Marita, a farmer from Gisagara mentioned that the pat-
ronization even increased to the point where the government is ordering farmers which crops to 
plant: "they are asking us to uproot our sweet potatoes, our tomatoes, our eggplants. They are asking 
us to plant one crop yet that one crop can’t feed us, can’t help us live804.”  
Excluded from the benefits, frustrated by the absence of progress and constantly on the receiving 
end of the political and technical messages of the dual system of aid and state power, the pre-1994 
population became a fertile soil for the ambitions of ethnic entrepreneurs. The structural violence 
against the poor majority combined with state-sponsored prejudices against the Tutsi lowered the 
barriers for the transition from structural violence to actual violence. According to Uvin, ethnicity 
provided the script for genocide; structural exclusion produced the framework conditions and helped 
the extremists recruit frustrated young men805. Even though corruption was much more widespread 
under Habyarimana, many Rwandans today feel excluded from the benefits of development and 
harassed by the strict guidelines of the government806. 
Economic Situation Rwanda
1990 1994 2003 2011
Bystanders 2.6 -0.9 0.9 2
Ex-Convicts -1.6 -2.6 -3.6 0.7
Returnees 0.2 -1.2 2.4 2.4
Survivors 2.4 -3.6 1.8 1.1
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 Interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about 
Marita in the third person. 
805
 Cf. Fujii, 2009, 11-18 
806
 Cf. interviews with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; 
Teresa, 72, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Paul, 44, bystander, "Gatsa-
ta", Gisagara; Karemera, 72, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Rugan-
go, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. 
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Economic Situation in Rwanda 
The satisfaction with economic progress is highest among returnees who became part of the new 
elite. Survivors, despite being eligible to assistance still find it hard to cope with economic realities 
and feel even more disadvantaged when seeing the ex-convicts leaving prison (the ex-convicts I in-
terviewed left prison after 2003) and advancing economically. Bystanders did not feel the impact of 
the genocide as hard as other parties and may even have been able to profit, whereas ex-convicts 
often assess every aspect of the period negatively either because of what it did to their life, because 
of pressure for political correctness or  because of what they learned in ingando. Neither survivors 
nor bystanders consider their economic situation significantly better than before the genocide.  
Similar Perceptions among the Population 
Another commonality between the two regimes is the popularity they both enjoyed among peas-
ants807. Both presidents are viewed as the "parent of the country808". Many peasants, survivors as 
well as bystanders compare the interethnic relations today with the situation under Habyarimana 
before 1990, considering both to be equally well adjusted: "prior to the genocide, ethnicity was not 
such an issue. I mean people didn’t even worry about that, it was like they used to be living well, they 
were in good terms with neighbors.809." Regarding such statements, assertions of unity and reconcili-
ation should be taken with a grain of salt and the absence of open criticism should not be premature-
ly interpreted as a sign of peace and general contentment. 
Whereas Tutsis complained about higher education or the army being closed off to them during 
Habyarimana's reign, nowadays ex-convicts and their families remonstrate the financial burden of 
paying reparations810 and their renounced voting privileges. Hutu in general complain about being 
sidelined with regard to 'real' power811 or receiving reduced governmental assistance compared to 
survivors812. Even though the army is mixed nowadays, its highest positions are filled with old 
'Ugandan' RPF-cadres, as are the intelligence services and the key ministries813. Effectively the army 
and security services are controlled by a small group of Tutsi similar to the Akazu before. Even the 
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 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", 
Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", 
Gisagara; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; 
Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
808
 Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. 
809
 Interview with Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Jeanne d'Arc (34) and Annunciata (58), both survi-
vors from "Gatumba", Huye said similar things about coexistence before the genocide.  
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 Cf. Interviews with Thasienne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 53, bystander, "Gatumba", 
Huye; Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. 
811
 Cf. E.g. Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara 
812
 Cf. e.g. Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Françoise, 53, by-
stander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
813
 Cf. Sim, Classified cable from the American Embassy in Kigaly to the Secretary of State, August 5, 2008, on: 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (March 12, 2014). 
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political window-dressing was already present during Habyarimana's reign: Habyarimana's govern-
ment featured Tutsi-ministers to look inclusive814 and even though Kagame appointed Dr. Jean 
Damascène Ntawukuriryayo, a Hutu, as the speaker of the senate, judging from Joseph Sebarenzi's 
memoir, the speaker has no real power in Kagame's system815.  
Paternalism 
Even in official texts highlighting good governance, citizen involvement and high degrees of govern-
ment trust, the paternalist attitude often shines through. Paternalist expressions such as “mentoring 
leadership816”; “transformation of negative attitudes and ideologies817”; “molding a self-respecting 
[sic] Rwandan818”; or the wish for an “[…] efficient state capable of unifying and mobilizing its popula-
tion819” are very popular.  A declaration from the NURC’s 15-year-anniversary-report captures the 
attitude very well: “Considering that national unity was such an essential element in the life of a na-
tion, it was resolved that unity of a nation was not an option that an individual can choose to accept 
or reject at will820.” This paternalist attitude towards the 'backward' population has been observed by 
a plethora of scholars who worked at the grassroots level in recent years821. They come to similar 
conclusions about the way politics are handled in Rwanda as analysts of Habyarimana’s regime822.  
Democracy in Rwanda
1990 1994 2003 2011
Bystanders 0.2 -4.2 2.2 3.9
Ex-Convicts -0.2 -5 -0.2 3.3
Returnees -3.5 -2.4 0.9 3.3
Survivors -0.9 -4.9 1.5 3.1
Rwanda Average -0.5 -4.3 1.5 3.6  
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 Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 140. 
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 Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 139. 
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 NURC, 2009, 6. 
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 NURC, Annual Activity Report 2002, 2004, 4. 
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 NURC, 2009, 12. 
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 Shyaka, 2004, 32 
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 NURC, 2009, 8.  
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 Cf. Burnet, 2009; Thomson, 2010, 2011 & 2013; Ingelaere, 2010a, 2010c & 2011; Longman & Rutagengwa, 
2004, 162-182. C. Newbury, 2011, 67-78. 
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 C.f. e.g. Des Forges, 2002, 67ff.; Mamdani, 2001, 132-158; Uvin, 1998, particularly 23ff. about “development 
as legitimization”;  For a comparison of Habyarimana’s and Kagame’s development politics, please refer to 






















Question: Do you consider your country a democracy in following years? 
Fact is that even though Rwanda prides itself with being a democracy823, surprisingly few Rwandans 
think that they actually can influence politics. In the quantitative part, I asked my participants a few 
questions about democracy. One of them was: “Would you consider your country a democracy in the 
following years?” The other one was “how do you think did your family's impact on politics changed 
in …?824” 
The outcome reveals that the keyword 'democracy' triggered the reaction of affirming the positive 
developments during the reign of the current government and condemning the old regime. If the 
question however omitted the keyword 'democracy' and referred to the individual participant and 
his family’s political impact, which is arguably what democratization should further, the ratings, ex-
cept for returnees, were not significantly higher than what people remembered from Habyarimana’s 
rule, who, in the years before the genocide also implemented some democratic reforms825.
Political Impact Rwanda 1990 1994 2003 2011
Bystanders -1.1 -2.3 -0.6 -0.1
Ex-Convicts -0.5 -1 -1.6 -0.9
Returnees -2 -1 1.8 2.2
Survivors 0.1 -3.1 0.9 1.2
Rwanda Average -0.7 -2.3 -0.1 0.4  
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 Cf. e.g. Musoni, 2004; NURC, 2009, 26. 
824
 As mentioned above, Rwandan participants were to assign a number between -5 (very bad) and +5 (very 
good) in four different years: 1990 (begin civil war), 1994 (genocide), 2003 (new constitution), 2011 (today). 
825




Although most of my participants perceived improvements of their political impact, they are still 
largely indifferent towards politics. This question being more personal than the question about de-
mocracy, the assessments of different groups start to differ much more, moving away from the ho-
mogenous picture from the 'democracy'-question. The diagram also indubitably illustrates, which 
groups feel politically represented in Rwanda nowadays. Tutsis, survivors and particularly returnees, 
reckon that they can advocate their interests through politics whereas bystanders are largely indif-
ferent with regard to their political impact and ex-convicts are not even eligible to vote or to take 
public office826. The rising tendency of ex-convict ratings from 2003 to 2011 should probably be 
viewed in relation with their release from jail, as the same spike can be seen in diagrams about their 
economic situation or their approval of transitional justice after being released. 
Pressure from Above 
This evaluation parallels the demonized ethnocratic practice of the second republic, disguised in the 
rhetoric of unity and reconciliation. Although ethnic discrimination officially does not exist, the ru-
mors of “twinned827” representative Hutu officials with Tutsi executive secretaries as actual decision-
makers are shockingly persistent and not just limited to disgruntled dissenters longing for power. The 
old identities have not vanished but they are concealed. A ban on ethnic identities is no guarantee 
for inclusive politics. Habyarimana spoke about all Rwandans 'being one' after his Putsch in 1973828. 
Tutsi dictators Micombero and particularly Bagaza in Burundi did the same829. 
Habyarimana's regime mainly radicalized and rallied behind the Hutu-identity when it was challenged 
by the RPF and domestic opposition. The fear of losing power prompted it to devise the genocidal 
plan. The RPF still is far from being fundamentally challenged. Kagame’s continued involvement in 
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 Cf. Tertsakian, 2011, 210-220. 
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 Cf. Cf. Sim, Classified cable from the American Embassy in Kigali to the Secretary of State, August 5, 2008, 
on: http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08KIGALI525_a.html (March 12, 2014); Waldorf, 2011, 25-47. 
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 Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 11 & 28. 
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 Cf. Interviews with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Ka-
menge", Ngozi. 
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the DRC, the RPF’s sweeping attempts at history construction, the repression of dissent and the 
sheer number of critics imprisoned, exiled, killed or missing however speak an unmistakable lan-
guage about the self-perception of a leadership under siege.  
The strong pressure from above with regard to the national policy of unity and reconciliation is, iron-
ically enough, the strongest parallel to Habyarimana’s regime830. Both governments relied heavily on 
social control. On one side, peer pressure has been used extensively by the Akazu-network to exe-
cute the genocide, the RPF on the other side instrumentalizes Rwandan history, identity and memory 
in order to stifle domestic and international criticism and justify its rule. With reference to his dedica-
tion to re-educating ordinary Rwandans and uniting the country under his specific brand of African 
nationalism, Kagame is rather a 'traditional' African leader than a new breed of politician and some 
features of his state resemble his predecessor's more than meets the eye. Furthermore, the West, 
particularly its aid industry, supports Kagame in almost the same naïve and apolitical way as it did 
Habyarimana. 
 
4.2.4. Remodeling the Rwandan State from Above  
“Without government, without the state, there wouldn't be any reconciliation.” Luce, 42, genocide 
survivor, Huye. 
Covert and militaristic Politics 
The RPF approaches the task of changing Rwandan society with militaristic discipline. “The RPF’s en-
tire background and experience, first in Uganda and later in Rwanda made it rely on a military mode 
of managing political situations and spaces831” writes Reyntjens. The government is very aware of its 
external perception832 and enforces many of its 'unpopular' measures covertly while using every 
channel open to it for publicly promoting their achievements and 'popular' policies such as the em-
powerment of women or their anti-corruption programs. Even orders are often given implicitly and 
only on a need-to-know-basis. This brings about the paradoxical situation that a CSOG-representative 
in Kigali regrets that the perpetrators were never forced to pay reparations in the course of transi-
tional justice833 whereas ex-convicts and their families in „Gatumba” and „Gatsata” complain about 
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 Cf. chapter 4.2.3. 
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 This awareness of the international opinion is probably both the reason why the RPF government hasn’t lost 
the goodwill of the donors despite serious and ongoing allegations of human rights violations as well as why 
Rwanda effectively pressured Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP (2009) and Bosco Ntaganda’s M23 to stop their rebel-
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the massive amounts reparations they have to pay834. Similarly, peasants in „Gatsata” were com-
plaining about the army uprooting their crops if they refused to plant the crops demanded by agricul-
tural reform835. However, when I confronted a high-ranking RDF-officer I knew about the policy, he 
claimed that they would have stopped that practice long ago and that he did not know about it836. 
Joseph Sebarenzi, the ex-speaker of Rwandan parliament, describes this behavior as follows: “the 
more I dealt with the RPF, the more I felt that they were behaving like rebels fighting a guerilla war in 
the bush837.” Filip Reyntjens considers the strict control of the population by army and secret services 
“an obsession since the beginning of the war in 1990838.” Reyntjens839, as well as a growing number of 
other authors such as Sebarenzi840  or Waldorf841 list an abundance of strategies the RPF uses to si-
lence its international and domestic critics, ranging from suing and denying visa over character assas-
sination and imprisonment to murder842. This covert culture is accentuated by the mutual distrust 
that the genocide sewed into the social fabric of the Rwandan communities. The silence, particularly 
with regard to massacres perpetrated by the RPF in the aftermath of the genocide and in the DRC is 
even comparable with the “forgotten genocide843” of 1972 in Burundi, where the Burundian elite 
pretended it did not happen for years The resulting grid of distrust and deferral makes it very difficult 
to receive honest answers. A culture of silence and mutual observation however is not without merit 
for the people in power. Constant observation and uncertainty about one’s position reinforces the 
position of the persons in the center who know everybody's secrets, in other words: Paul Kagame 
and the inner circle of the RPF. 
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 Cf. e.g. Interviews with François (bystander, „Gatumba”), Gaspard (bystander, „Gatsata”), Maurice (ex-
convict, „Gatumba”); Rugango (ex-convict, „Gatumba“), Yohani (ex-convict, „Gatumba”), Thasienne (bystander, 
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4.2. Reconciliation Programs in Rwanda 
Among Rwandan peasants, reconciliation programs are mostly associated with receiving or providing 
assistance. Ubudehe844 – associations for mutual self-help, Girinka – a governmental program that 
donates cows to poor families, the above-mentioned 'Anti-Nyakazi' public housing-program, the 
genocide survivor's fund FARG, Health Insurance, and equal access to education were mentioned 
most frequently when participants were asked about programs that benefit reconciliation. 'Teach-
ings' and 'sensitizations' were also mentioned quite often, particularly in „Gatumba“. Here, many 
participants were part of AMI and attended these sensitization programs as a part of Ubudehe. Gov-
ernmental assistance is an important factor with regard to coexistence and reconciliation but also 
divides the population when people perceive themselves treated unfairly and accuse authorities of 
corruption or nepotism. Peasants very rarely mentioned governmental programs aimed at civic edu-
cation (Ingando, Itorero) or justice (TIG, Gacaca) in the context of reconciliation. Intellectuals, local 
leaders and ex-convicts – people who have gone through Ingando, referred to sensitizations more 
frequently. Commemoration was generally not mentioned as a program aimed at reconciliation. The 
NURC lists Ingando, Itorero ry’igihugu, Gacaca, Umuganda, abunzi (communal mediators) and the 
Girinka-program as “homegrown approaches”845. Abunzi846 were mentioned very rarely by partici-
pants and thus will be left out here. The other programs however were mentioned frequently and 
will be discussed in detail below. 
 
4.3.1. Official Agents of Reconciliation: The NURC 
The NURC was established in 2003 as a means to promote unity and reconciliation among Rwandans. 
Relying on multiple strategies of communication and homegrown concepts for transitional justice 
and civic education847, the NURC intends to sensitize and educate the population about the official 
discourse of genocide, unity and reconciliation. Complementary projects such as workshops, recon-
ciliation summits, leadership academies, and inter-community exchanges are employed, addressing 
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 The literal translation of Ubudehe is "mutual assistance". The expression was used in many slightly differing 
contexts. According to the IRDP, ubudehe is a "community-based poverty reduction scheme" (IRDP, 2010, 48). 
As far as I understood, local associations get involved in community development planning, collaboration in 
community work and helping each other out, thereby increasing the positive social interactions between vic-
tims and perpetrators. Furthermore, such associations were also instrumental in disseminating the govern-
ment's message of unity and reconciliation. It never became clear to me in how far these associations were 
financed or even established by the state, (Luce, a survivor from "Gatumba" told me that AMI used to receive 
state funds) and to what extent they were a grassroots-based initiative. 
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different causes of the genocide and diverse subets of the population such as university students, 
party cadres, politicians, or ex-convicts.  
The NURC maintains a vast and very detailed system, which addresses all crucial parts of Rwandan 
society and reaches down to the community level. In a country where most adults have only a few 
years of primary education, this equips the civic education programs of the NURC with a factual mo-
nopoly concerning the creation of political knowledge in rural regions. The three pillars of the NURC 
system are “civic education; peace building and conflict management; support to unity and reconcilia-
tion community initiatives848.” Its official tasks read as follows:  
 "Preparing and coordinating the national programme for the promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation.  
 Developing and implementing strategies to restore and consolidate Unity and Reconciliation 
among Rwandans.  
 Educating and sensitizing the population on matters relating to National Unity and Reconcili-
ation.  
 Conducting research, organizing debates on unity and reconciliation, disseminating ideas and 
producing publications to strengthen that process.  
 Denouncing and banning any acts, writings and attitudes of discrimination, intolerance and 
xenophobia and making suggestions for appropriate measures in order to eradicate division-
ism among Rwandans and strengthen Unity and Reconciliation849.”  
While these aims are laudable in theory, the last point de facto transforms the NURC into the en-
forcement agency of the national discourse on genocide. 
The following points are core issues of the politics of unity and reconciliation. They are imple-
mented by a mix of governmental agencies such as the NURC, the FARG and the CNLG and NGOs 
and CSOGs such as e.g. IBUKA, AVEGA, IRDP (Institute for Research and Development), CLADHO, 
or LIPRODHOR, often under informal governmental supervision and with funding from interna-
tional donors: 
 Ending impunity: Strict laws banning the use of ethnic affiliations combined with an approach 
towards maximum justice aiming at the punishment of every génocidaire have been con-
ceived to act as deterrents against the culture of impunity. 
 Rule of law and good governance: Rwanda has gone to great lengths to promote good gov-
ernance and the rule of law850, resulting in a professional and streamlined administration and 
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a steady flow of international financial aid in the 1990s and 2000s. Kagame’s “Vision 2020” 
intends to transform Rwanda into a prosperous, information-based economy modeled after 
the Southeast Asian Tiger States851, alleviating the huge socio-economic pressure and com-
bating cases of blatant nepotism typical of other African states.  
 “Never again”: Official, memorials, memorial events and the above-described, carefully 
crafted narrative of the genocide against the Tutsi promoted through schools, charitable or-
ganizations, parties and official organs make sure that nobody forgets the genocidal tragedy 
and its causes. Commemoration ceremonies and prevention research are mainly the tasks of 
the CNLG. 
 Justice: Next to transitional justice institutions such as Gacaca, Genocide survivor's associa-
tions such as IBUKA852 or AVEGA853 have been established to assist the victims and their fami-
lies. A public fund, the FARG854 provides financial assistance to survivors. Convicted perpetra-
tors (and their families855) are forced to recompensate victims in monetary form and work for 
the benefit of society in TIG . 
 Enhancing social cohesion and sustaining peace: National unity and mutual forgiveness are 
encouraged through multiple public and private associations, promoting a better collective 
future for all Rwandans.  
The more educated participants in Kigali generally felt more at ease with the government and con-
sidered themselves as being part of the 'New Rwanda', which needs to hear critical voices to ad-
vance. These people, with whom I was personally familiar in most cases were much more eager to 
voice criticism against government policies. In the rural sites, many participants reacted with 
preemptive compliance to the official discourse to political questions. This compliance to official di-
rectives, 'the law', is reflected strongly in the NURC's surveys. My experiences in field research thus 
convinced me that the overwhelmingly positive ratings of the NURC with regard to unity and recon-
ciliation856 should be taken with a grain of salt. The national reports were compiled by government 
officials or at least people the peasants associated with the central authority and thus were probably, 
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 It however has to be mentioned that the RPF’s promotion of the rule of law has been repeatedly compro-
mised by the party itself when it came to matters of state security or maintaining their tight grip on power. 
Joseph Sebarenzi, former speaker of the Rwandan parliament e.g. tells a gripping account about the party’s 
growing autocratic tendencies beginning in the late 1990s. Cf. Sebarenzi, 2009, 137-182.  
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if not certainly met with anticipatory compliance in many cases. In this case, the status of the iunter-
viewer might actually be more decisive for the results than the questions he poses. 
If we e.g. compare the official NURC-publication Rwanda Reconciliation Barometer with my quantita-
tive findings about the perception of political impact above, 56.5 percent of participants in the NURC-
publication strongly agree or agree with the statement "I have space and opportunities to influence 
those that make the laws of the country857". 34.2 percent strongly agree or agree with the statement 
"I have very little say in the public decisions that affect my life858". In my assessment, which also has 
to consider a certain amount of political correctness, Hutu participants evaluated their impact in 
2011 negatively (-0.1 for bystanders and -0,9 for ex-convicts), Tutsis positively (1.2 for survivors, 2.2 
for returnees) and the Rwandan average evaluation is 0.4. Apart from the differences between Hutu 
and Tutsi, transferred to the NURC-scale, this would assessment would have to be interpreted as a 
majority that regards its political impact rather skeptical than a majority of satisfied citizens. 
 
4.3.2. Re-education 
Participants referred to Ingando, Itorero ry’igihugu and other civic education programs such as AMI 
or SCUR generally as “teachings859”, “workshops860” or “sensitizing861”. Except for ex-convicts, who 
were re-educated in prisons or re-education centers like Gishamvu, participants generally made no 
difference between receiving civic education by a state representative or by a nominally private or-
ganization such as AMI. The teachings usually transmitted the same Foucauldian discourse about the 
genocide, unity and reconciliation. Participants in such workshops were usually encouraged to spread 
the message in their villages. Students such as Robert or teachers such as Umubyeyi were specifically 
chosen to disseminate the government's unity and reconciliation-message: "One time, she was cho-
sen alongside other people in her Umudugudu community. In her Umudugudu, they were chosen to 
take part in trainings by the government aimed at unity and reconciliation. And they were told that, 
once they have come, once those trainings were over, they could come to their community, to their 
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respective communities and try to spread that message to the rest of other children for instance. […] 
She thinks that it helped her a lot862.”  
Through this pyramid of communication incorporating communal opinion leaders, intellectuals and 
even ex-convicts into the circulation of the narrative, the 'official version' is disseminated. The gov-
ernment attempts to influence and ultimately overwrite the 'informal' discourse, forming the 'invisi-
ble script' mentioned above. This does not have to be interpreted negatively. The message after all is 
reconciliation and the NURC also facilitates communication by "encouraging setting up the coopera-
tives that gathers both, the offended, the genocide survivors and the genocide perpetrators863." Itore-
ro for example is a program conducted at the community level where people talk about what hap-
pened and exchange experiences in the style of a self-help group. 
Ingando 
The essential program to "sensitize genocide perpetrators to tell the truth about what happened and 
to confess and repent while at the same time sensitizing surviving victims of the genocide to have the 
courage to forgive those who offended them864" however is Ingando – Peace Education. Ingando is 
mandatory for certain key groups such as convicts, prostitutes, génocidaires, ex-combatants, soldiers, 
Gacaca-judges, and university students and it is highly encouraged for people who want to assume a 
leading position in Rwandan society such as university professors, church leaders, military officers or 
politicians865.  
According to the NURC itself, Ingando's most important objectives for participants are "to clarify the 
history of Rwanda; To analyze and understand the origin of divisions among the people of Rwanda 
and decide on what should be done to eradicare [sic] them; To have active participation in finding 
permanent solutions to Rwanda's problems and contribute to national unity; to promote patriotism 
and learn to resolve their conflicts peacefully and support government programs; to participate in 
national reconstruction and shun divisive tendencies; to fight genocide ideology866." The objectives 
read like guidelines to complete re-education.  
Ingando derives from the word "kugandika" – stopping normal activities to reflect and find solutions 
for national problems. There however is an important distinction between ingando solidarity camps, 
which are for politicians, civil society and church leaders, Gacaca judges and incoming university stu-
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dents, and ingando re-education camps for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, génocidaires, released pris-
oners, prostitutes, and street children867. 
In official texts, Ingando is often praised as a revolutionary program that yields immediate benefits. 
The NURC e.g. claims that the "majority of people who past [sic] through ingando won the trust of the 
citizens and were elected in various positions of leadership868." In reality however, most participants 
view these camps rather soberly. “It’s a kind of training where every student who are getting [sic] to 
the higher universities, or other higher institutes have to spend at least a month, or three weeks. They 
study about the different government policies but they also bring different persons. Like the people 
how have been ex-FAR in Congo forest. They can talk about how much they killed. They can talk about 
how much they suffered from Congo forest. On the other side you will find, you will listen to people 
who lost their relatives. So when you listen to both sides you can feel guilty then you say we have to 
reconcile, because both sides have suffered869.”  
The opinions are divided. Some Rwandans such as Chris claim that they learned a lot about reconcili-
ation from Ingando: "We were told that we are one people, with one language, we don’t have differ-
ences despite the differences that were talked by the former government. So from then on, when I 
was encouraged to think in this line of, you know, reconciliation, being with people, considering each 
other no matter how different we are. I learned from Ingando that we can live in harmony despite the 
diversity of characters or things. […] Actually we were given the reality as they thought it, and so this 
really shaped my thinking870." Others such as Robert believe that Ingando is an attempt to indoctri-
nate citizens with the government's narrative and see it as a compulsory chore for advancing in soci-
ety: "there you have no choice. You have to. By our time, we had to go. Either you had to attend the 
ingando or your place at university, you couldn't get it because you had neglected871.” Critics as Susan 
Thomson, who spent some time in a solidarity camp herself, maintain, “Ingando teachings are an 
instrument for consolidating state control872.” 
Ingando approaches reconciliation by teaching ex-convicts that génocidaires are actually victims 
themselves, that their leaders, which made their life miserable, indoctrinated them873. Hence, not 
unlike a religion, Ingando provides them with a fresh start where the sins of their past life are forgiv-
en. Mgbako characterizes the  12-week Ingando re-education camps874 for génocidaires as follows: 
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"the RPF-dominated government has employed ingando, or solidarity camps, both to plant the seeds 
of reconciliation, and to disseminate pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination875." At the end 
of ingando, there is a test to make sure the génocidaires have understood their lessons. If they fail, 
they will not be allowed to join their communities. Mgbako also maintains that génocidaires are re-
imbursed for completing Ingando, invoking the resentment of survivors just as reparation payments 
do reciprocally876.  
Regarding the fact that Rwandans from all walks of life are required to undergo ingando, this sheds 
some light on the peculiar uniformity of answers regarding history and the current government. This 
hypothesis is underlined by the fact that the NURC, already in 2005, believed that the frequency with 
which civil society approached the organization to hold ingandos was an "indication of the main-
stream status ingando currently enjoys in Rwandan society877." Taking into account that it has be-
come necessary for a great many careers in Rwanda, the number of Ingandos has multiplied over the 
years. Next to its own camps, the NURC has started to offer Ingandos in collaboration with communi-
ties878. Up to 2009, 92'835 people have undergone official Ingando-workshops879. After the success of 
the program, the government launched Itorero ry'igihugu, an even more ambitious program of 
communal reflection focusing on the objective of re-creating "a Rwandan characterized by values 
founded on culture and on national vision880". From 2007 to 2009 alone, 115'228 Rwandans complet-
ed Itorero. This amounts to re-education on a truly grand scale. Its benefits however are controver-
sial. First, the impact on people's opinions is doubtful because the time spent within ingando or ito-
rero is probably too short to change people's way of thinking beyond merely paying lip service. Sec-
ond, ingando is very one-sided. It steadfastly orients itself towards the official narrative, thus denying 
an open discussion of such fundamental topics as ethnicity, and finally because"the focus on political 
indoctrination also severely undermines ingando as a reconciliation mechanism. Moreover, the gov-
ernment’s continued attacks on civil society and perceived political opposition threaten to undermine 
reconciliation programs like ingando881." 
 
4.3.3. Assistance and Poverty Reduction 
Assistance Programs and the Promise of Progress and Development 
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Paradoxically, with all the efforts of the NURC to devise specific programs aimed at reconciling 
Rwandans, the most lasting contribution to peace and reconciliation might have come from projects 
that only indirectly contribute to reconciliation such as the fight against corruption, the mutuelle de 
santé, Girinka, the Anti-Nyakazi-programs or equal access to education. Contrary to the ‘teachings’ 
and ‘sensitizations’ common in Ingando or Itorero ry’ Igihugu that directly try to change the way 
Rwandans are thinking, the assistance programs, as unfair, random or clientelistic as they may be in 
certain aspects, actually render progress and poverty reduction visible and attainable.  
Even though interviewees reassured me that they profitted from the ‘teachings’ by getting closer to 
their former antagonists and learning to appreciate their worth as human beings, most Hutu also 
stated that they had in fact never hated their Tutsi neighbors and used to collaborate and even in-
termarry before the genocide. According to Sebarenzi, neighbors always resumed normal interac-
tions after massacres882. Institutions like Ubudehe certainly do have a positive impact with regard to 
(re-)building personal ties and mutual respect between victims and perpetrators and almost all par-
ticipants recommended the attempt to bring victims and perpetrators together883. However, the 
sensitization-part, which teaches the Hutu to accept their guilt and adopt the view of the civil war’s 
victor without asking critical questions, is often met with passive resistance or paying lip service884. 
The Hutu-participants who deviated from the ‘invisible script’ declared that they followed the official 
line because it was dangerous to question the official ideology. John used a Rwandan proverb: “law 
weighs more than a stone. So, the leaders are telling us this, and we are forced to do it885.” Gaspard, 
who came back from the DRC as an orphan goes even further: “In this country, if we say something 
that is against what the state says, you will be punished or will be killed886.” Dissent is unwelcome 
and socio-politically marginalized but the addressees of re-education possess intimate knowledge 
and personal experiences with regard to Rwanda’s post-genocide history as well. The difference be-
tween what is taught in Ingando and during Ubudehe and what the RPF practiced in the DRC or dur-
ing the civil war is apparent to most Hutu and it provokes resistance among the rural population, 
subtle and non-confrontational resistance for the most part, but resistance nonetheless. 
Financial Assistance 
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The difference between teachings and the assistance programs is that peasants immediately see the 
advantages that the regime brings for the beneficiary parties. The implicit promise of progress and 
development assured through neighbors’ positive experiences with programs that provided material 
benefits such as the president's cow-donation program Gririnka persuaded many to stay loyal to the 
current government. Rural dwellers and peasants are pragmatic, if policy yields direct results; they 
participate regardless of the message conveyed: “I don’t know those programs but when the gov-
ernment holds the meetings where it teaches good relations. […]So we have a cooperative where we 
meet and cultivate, then we get some sponsorship from the government887.” 
Many peasants I interviewed were very fond of the government’s assistance programs. Vianney in 
particular, a 52-year old bystander from „Gatsata“, consistently kept lauding the achievements of the 
government. When we asked him about his personal benefits from reconciliation, he mentioned that 
he hoped for a cow: “I mean I haven’t benefitted yet from the Girinka-program. But, I am hopeful; I 
have been promised that, because I can see neighbors they already have cows888.” It is easy to see 
how in a poor, agrarian country where cattle-ownership is a sign of wealth, such a promise, if credi-
ble, would keep peasants loyal. Peter and Augustin from "Gatsata", the only bystanders I met who 
had received livestock from these donation programs, talked very favorably about the government 
and its reconciliation politics889. Furthermore, peasants associated the cow-donations directly with 
the president. It is his personal program890, reinforcing his position even when the local authorities 
neglect the promise. As Boniphilde, a widow and Hutu survivor from „Gatumba“” said: “The problem 
is always those local leaders who never give those donations from the president to [their] destination. 
Like if they must reach widows and they give them to other people, so that’s where the problem is891.” 
If the program is considered one-sided however and people cannot profit for political reasons, such 
as e.g. ex-convicts, the approval rapidly shifts to criticism of the national reconciliation policy: "So 
they tell us to reconcile, unity, stuff like that. But for instance for me I can't get a cow. Then I was 
hitting back on him that GIRINKA cow project is like: if you are legible, if you have somewhere to keep 
that cow and you are poor you can easily get that cow. So he said no, that is totally wrong. Because if 
I am a convict I served some time in jail, automatically I am erased from the list, even my children 
they can't get that cow892." 
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No matter whether talking about the FARG, Ubudehe, Girinka, Anti-Nyakazi pension annuity, and the 
mandatory mutuelle de santé – participants understood almost everything that supported them in 
their daily lives as reconciliation policy. The focus was always placed on fostering greater equality 
and creating social cohesion, less on apology, recognition or acknowledgement.  
Most Rwandans desperately want to believe in the declarations of good governance. In “Gatumba”, 
the positive experiences of some members of AMI with assistance programs893 encouraged the oth-
ers to hold on, even though ex-convicts seem to be excluded from the assistance. Regardless of fre-
quent allegations of corruption894 or inequality895 in assistance programs, the equal access to educa-
tion clearly represents an improvement by comparison to the old regime. Several participants lauded 
the education system896 even though some Hutu complained that survivors would have it much easi-
er to afford school fees because of the FARG897, thus creating a new Tutsi-elite. Interestingly, many 
peasants complained about local corruption and nepotism in assistance programs898 but at the same 
time implicitly expected to be rewarded for their loyalty just as was the case during the ancient re-
gime899. The degree of contentment with the RPF-Regime is mostly related to the financial assistance 
or the possibilities of social ascension the regime can provide. As long as most Hutu consider the 
current government a credible guarantor for progress, meritocracy and a better future, they may 
tolerate the disadvantages of the current system.  
Jealousy and Necessity 
The most disaffected groups in the 'New Rwanda' are often survivors that slip through the safety net 
and do not profit from assistance for various reasons. Christine, Costasie, Teresa, Annunciata, and 
Boniphilde are examples. Next in line are young educated Hutu who see their dead disavowed and 
their criticism outlawed such as. Robert, Ben, Gaspard, Jean-Pierre, and Umubyeyi, as well as the 
families of perpetrators who are not eligible for support and suffer under the burden of the repara-
tions they have to pay to the Tutsi victims of the genocide. Even though most ex-convicts took care 
not to say anything that could be interpreted as criticism against the regime except perhaps com-
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plaining about the sum of reparations, their families were often less reluctant and at times even jeal-
ous of the assistance bestowed on survivors900. 
On the other side, many survivors who lost their families had to struggle incredibly hard to survive. 
Some Hutu interviewees might have considered the FARG's provisions as unfair advantages for survi-
vors in the educational system or perceived Gacaca-trials as partial but many survivors believed that 
Gacaca mainly helped the prisoners and the state, releasing thousands of killers901. Even though 
most survivors, particularly the well-educated survivors in Kigali, were supported by the state, they 
lacked the support of a family, the most important frame of reference in Rwandan society. Most sur-
vivors have decided to make their peace with the past and their tormentors902 only in default of an-
other solution: “Les Hutu et les Tutsi n'ont pas de choix. Ils doivent vivre ensemble. Au moins, j'ai dû 
accepter ça903.” The necessity of coexistence is the simple but often inconvenient truth in Rwanda.  
Nevertheless, survivors such as Nadine or Luce found it difficult to forgive and feel secure in the face 
of recurring trauma and fear. The new houses for genocide survivors in “Gatumba” stand apart from 
the others. Marie-Françoise stated that survivors had to forgive due to official policy not because of 
personal desires: “Yeah, the government wants we forgive. The government is forgiving, so that’s 
it904.”  
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4.4. Identity and Memory 
4.4.1. Erasing ethnic Identities and Memory 
Ethnic Amnesia 
One of the most interesting debates in the context of memory, identity and commemoration un-
furled between President Kagame himself and renowned Great Lakes scholar René Lemarchand on 
the pages of the collected edition “After Genocide905”. Lemarchand contends that the ban on men-
tioning Hutu and Tutsi identities complicates any attempt to re-examine the root causes of the geno-
cide, as even mentioning the tabooed ethnical identities offers a possible ground for indictment and 
thus criminalizes ethnic memory. Lemarchand maintains that by imposing a de-ethnicized victim-
centered narrative of the genocide, the Rwandan authorities seek to exonerate themselves from all 
responsibilities, especially from their own human rights violations. They exclusively assign the roles 
of victims and perpetrators to Tutsi and Hutu, by no means interchangeable906. According to Le-
marchand, the absolutist narrative prevents the emergence of a critical memory that would allow 
memory work, the ‘working through’ of the traumatizing events and their complex causes by both 
parties of the conflict907. Criminalizing the reference to ethnic memory while at the same time offi-
cially commemorating the genocide against the Tutsi, keeps the Hutu community in a permanent 
position of culpability as it erases the memory of moderate Hutu victims and righteous Hutu who 
died protecting their Tutsi-neighbors. It rules out the process of reckoning by denying recognition to 
the plurality of perceptions of the past, thus preventing communities come to terms with their re-
sponsibilities.   
President Kagame addresses Lemarchand’s position personally in his preface, unsurprisingly dismiss-
ing Lemarchand’s interpretation as flawed, because in his eyes, the scholar's view of ethnicity is 
based on the wrong premises. According to Kagame, the reference to Hutu/Tutsi terminologies is not 
the basis of the problem of ethnicity in Rwanda, “it is the distortions and prejudices that for decades 
were associated with these terms for political ends908.” Kagame regards Lemarchand’s attempt to 
"see everything in Rwanda through the ethnic prism909” as hardly helpful for reconciling Rwandans 
and furthermore rejects the accusation that his government globally criminalizes the Hutu communi-
ty because “the population knows who is guilty of genocide crimes910”. In Kagame’s eyes view, which 
represents the official Rwandan government narrative, there has never been a clash of memories 
because the facts of the genocide are clear and straightforward: the Tutsis have been the target of a 
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government-sponsored genocide and the RPA fought to stop it. There has been no mass revenge, 
only massacres by rogue elements of the RPA, for which these elements have been punished severe-
ly. The commemoration ceremonies remember the Tutsi primarily as the group targeted for extermi-
nation, while Hutu heroism is recognized. According to the president, Hutu guilt thus is not global-
ized911. This argumentation, of course, leaves out the fate of the Rwandan refugees in the DRC. 
The facts that “Hutu victims of the civil war and genocide remain largely unacknowledged in official 
terms912”, that no RPA-members have been tried before the ICTR913 and the common critique that 
the Gacaca-courts have neglected to address crimes against Hutu914 have to be addressed to thor-
oughly work through the country's traumatic experiences. These legacies make it easy for the emerg-
ing opposition in exile, revisionist or not, to castigate the regime as an ethnically exclusive dictator-
ship despite its anti-ethnical legislation. According to Hintjens915, the polarized ‘race’ identities will 
not vanish under the consensual carpet of Rwandan’s shared citizenship. They only take the new 
forms of ‘génocidaire’ and ‘survivor’ if the regime perpetuates its stranglehold on memory and if it 
refuses to allow the emergence of more complex political identities916. My field research corrobo-
rates Hintjens' evaluation of identity dynamics. I encountered largely consistent groups with chang-
ing denominations as chapter 3.2.5 describes. 
 
4.4.2. The Relevance of Ethnic Identity for Reconciliation 
For most Rwandans belonging to an ethnic group does not seem to have much practical importance. 
The genocide has been such a shock and re-education has been so thorough that a vast majority 
deems ethnic identities the cause for misery and nothing more. Many participants are happy to see 
them vanish: "she doesn’t have to bring back those ethnicities because they have no value at all. Like 
those who did the killings, they are even the ones who cultivate our lands. So she doesn’t see any 
importance of ethnicity today917.” They however disagree regarding the question if banning ethnic 
identities actually makes them vanish or just pushes them underground. Most participants who ar-
gue that ethnic identities will vanish bring forth three arguments:  
 Deleting the category ethnicity from the ID cards makes identifying Hutu and Tutsi much 
more difficult. 
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 By banning ethnic identity from public discourse, it will lose importance and future genera-
tions will grow up without knowing their identity, which has happened before according to 
some participants. The generation still knowing their ethnic identity will slowly die away. 
Many participants however are quick to add “it’s only God who knows what the people 
think918”  
 Rwandans are one people now, ethnic identities are irrelevant (government narrative). 
Participants who think that ethnic identities will remain relevant categories in general put forth fol-
lowing counter-arguments. 
 Even if ethnic identities are publicly banned, people know their neighbors. Ethnic identity 
slips under the surface of political discourse but is passed down within the families and in the 
private sphere, particularly if hidden ethnic inequalities remain. 
 The past lingers on: the genocide has been too much of a caesura to move beyond distrust 
and hostility, particularly for survivors and other people who have been most brutally hit by 
the events of 1994. 
 Inequalities like the one-sidedness of commemoration, stripping ex-convicts off their political 
rights and the permanent and public repetition of the government’s narrative of the geno-
cide make Hutu painfully aware of their guilt and their losses, not simplifying turning a new 
leaf for them. Many Hutu intellectuals talk about hidden discrimination under the guise of 
meritocracy. 
The hidden Significance of the Ban on ethnic Identities 
The rationale behind the 'divisionism'-laws of 2003, according to official Rwandan sources919, was to 
eliminate the principal cause of the genocide according to the official narrative. To do away with 
colonially constructed artificial categories that have brought Rwanda nothing but harm. The idea to 
ban all reference to the ethnical identities of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in order to bridge divisions among 
the Rwandan people and reconstructing Rwandan political identity along non-ethnical lines is lauda-
ble. At least it would be, if these laws had been implemented without confirming well-founded suspi-
cions among long-term observers of the region and participants alike that the laws would in fact be 
used to amplify the RPF’s political dominance.  
Article 33 of the 2003 constitution proceeded to condemn all forms of ‘divisionism’ defined as the 
“propagation of ethnic, regional, racial discrimination or any other form of division920” and made 
them punishable offenses. Article 1 of law 47/2001 defines discrimination as “any speech, writing, or 
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actions based on ethnicity, region or country of origin, the color of the skin, physical features, sex, 
language, religion or ideas aimed at depriving a person or group of persons of their rights as provided 
by Rwandan law and by International Conventions to which Rwanda is a party921.” Sectarianism is 
understood as any expression or action that might divide people or spark conflict922. The enforce-
ment of the 'divisionism'-laws have provided the RPF with the legal means to consolidate their politi-
cal dominance and quell any dissent with reference to the genocide923. Other opinions are seen as 
revisionism. This not only stands in conflict with freedom of thought and opinion, the campaign 
against ‘genocide ideology’, has actually blurred the line between actual genocide denial and criti-
cism. It lumps together legitimate critics with dangerous revisionists and conspiracy theorists. This 
complicates the fight against actual genocide denial924. Tutsis have the "monopoly on suffering925." If 
bystanders or ex-convicts are asked directly if Hutus should be commemorated, they try to ridicule 
the question926, explain that the RPF were justified in revenge-killing Hutu927, become evasive928, or 
bluntly refuse to answer929 
Young Hutus are very aware that dissent is not tolerated from their side. When asked about the les-
sons he thinks Rwandans should learn in order to reconcile, Robert answerd: "I would say it in one 
word - that whoever is with a differing opinion, be it political or whatever, is not an enemy930.” In the 
lead-up to the presidential elections of 2010, the three prominent political opponents, Victoire Inga-
bire (FDU-Inkingi), Bernard Ntaganda (PSI) and Déogratias Mushaydi were arrested on charges of 
'genocide ideology'.931  
Ethnic identities maybe have disappeared from ID cards but in daily life, they are still important. This 
is manifested in'twinned' positions mentioned above, security-relevant posts not going to Hutu932 
and in the private sphere. Jean-Claude for example a young man from Kigali, said that it would be 
difficult for him to marry a Tutsi-girl933 Ben recounted that his ex-girlfriend's family refused him be-
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cause his father was Hutu934. The same thing happened to Umubyeyi, who wanted to marry her Tut-
si-boyfriend935. One survivor also admitted that he would have personal reservations towards marry-
ing a Hutu936. Thus, contrary to the official claim that people are almost completely reconciled937, 
ethnic prejudices are still widespread when it comes to relevant matters such as careers or marriag-
es. "The greatest danger I see for Rwanda is they live together today it is like today here everybody 
says that there is no more ethnic group, but it is still inside the heart. And also you will find it comes to 
get like job, it is a big challenge.[…] If you are not a Tutsi, if you are not from Uganda you cannot get 
a good job. Or even if you can get a job you will be the chief, but are you not, you cannot take strong 
decision. Always they will put your subordinate, he will be the one to sign; you know to take strong 
decisions. […]There is something like hidden discrimination938.” 
 
4.4.3. Commemoration and its Perception 
Commemoration excludes 
According to survivors Maximilien and Kayitare939 as well as scholars such as René Lemarchand940 or 
LarsWaldorf941, Commemoration used to be more inclusive and centered on the individual stories of 
survivors in the first years of the transitional government but that changed with time. In the past 
twenty years, commemoration has increasingly become a tool to manifest dominance and demon-
strate moral superiority than a tool for prevention. This change of direction is exemplified e.g. by 
changing the name of the official ceremony to 'Kwibuka jenoside yakorewe abatutsi' - commemora-
tion of the genocide against the Tutsi, a term the Rwandan government has lobbied hard to establish 
in international use942. While from a genocide scholars’ perspective, the term itself is correct, the 
political use of the expression is problematic as it excludes Hutu victims. 
Changing the name from 'Rwandan genocide' to 'genocide against the Tutsi' not only runs contrary to 
the inclusive ideology of 'Rwandanness' but it labels Hutu as perpetrators by default and automati-
cally locates human rights violations committed by Tutsi into the realm of ‘justified revenge’943. 
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Whereas the official, unified memory of genocide serves to “consolidate Tutsi-power944”, commemo-
ration simultaneously globalizes the guilt of the Hutu-community. Tutsis are ascribed the role of vic-
tims in this Manichean interpretation, thus “the only category left are the génocidaires945”. Instead of 
bypassing them, the official memory perpetuates ethnic divisions. As Umubyeyi, a teacher from 
Gisagara explains: "there is no way for ethnic identities to vanish one day, because she says that in 
the families old people are still believing in that. And though the government is not supporting that 
[ethnic groups], there is also chances for the young generation to keep knowing that. Because she 
says each and every time when they are commemorating the genocide, they talk about genocide 
against Tutsi946." 
Hutu are forced to keep their feelings hidden during commemoration. "I have to follow the govern-
ment line. I follow what the government is telling us, during that particular period. But for me inter-
nally, it is like I am almost bursting947." This is particularly frustrating for Hutu who actually want to 
discard ethnic identities but who have a personal history that makes it difficult for them to embrace 
the re-imagined history such as Robert whose father was killed by the RPF: “I reconcile with them but 
you can't tell me that commemoration is helping with reconciliation. I'm reconciling because I'm no-
ticing that the whole thing was bullshit, those ethnic identities, just like labels on us but we are hu-
man beings. There's no need for that but you can't tell me that commemoration is helping me with 
reconciliation because I know that there is my story which is in a box, which… my father was killed 
and I'm not allowed to open that box. I know it in my heart only.” Even the Rwanda-based IRDP, 
which is generally very cautious with criticism, states "participants in the focus groups revealed that 
remembering the beloved ones is the source of conflict and is not inclusive. Since the independence, 
the regimes in place have imposed their own perceptions of remembering the beloved ones, without 
organizing any debate in the society, as if they were imposing their own perception to everyone948." 
The commemoration discourse has become so dominant and is imposed in such an aggressive man-
ner that many participants felt intimidated by the question "do you think that commemoration is 
inclusive?" In a particularly dramatic example, an ex-convict denied commemorating his son who had 
been killed by the RPF because it was not in line with the official commemoration policy. “We 
shouldn’t commemorate them because if the Hutu are the ethnic group that was killing, so how 
should we commemorate them, we don’t have to commemorate them even the one who can bring 
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that idea to commemorate them, he would be stupid.” Interviewer: “So you don’t commemorate your 
son?” Yohani: “No, I can’t commemorate him949.” 
Forced to forget 
Attendance in commemoration ceremonies is mandatory: "they have to follow the government line. 
Because if you dare staying home, while others are trying to remember, there are even fines for you. 
So you can get fines if they find, they find you home whereas others are remembering, you are ac-
cused of genocide ideology.950." Official commemoration has become so synonymous with the RPF's 
dominance that Susan Thomson951 who has conducted in-depth field research in rural post-genocide 
Rwanda actually describes conscious non-attendance to mourning week and Gacaca as "everyday 
acts of resistance952". This in turn worries the survivors who in some cases interpret Hutu-resistance 
against the dominant narrative as an indication of a secret genocidal mentality953. To avoid accusa-
tions of 'genocide ideology', bystanders' and ex-convicts' automatic reaction is to preventively deny 
that they consider commemoration for their dead to be necessary and downplay RPF-violence. "If we 
come and say: 'you know, your people got killed in the genocide, my people got killed in massacre', 
reconciliation wouldn’t be happening because no one could be going to ask for forgiveness. […] there 
is no problem that Hutu died because you can’t tell me that you come and you find that everybody of 
your family got killed and… So they just killed them, just on vengeance because it was understandable 
to kill them954.” Interviewees who did not want to criticize the government or were not interested in 
the discussion usually attempted to justify the official practice with silent recognition955. Maurice: "I 
think the government is our parent. So there are people who got killed during [the] genocide and 
there are other people who got killed out of genocide but personally I think the government com-
memorates all of them956.” The idea that Hutu are remembered as well, just not explicitly is a great 
example of pragmatic and positive thinking that is widespread among the Rwandan population. It 
however ignores that 'moderate Hutu' are rarely ever mentioned in commemoration and that partic-
ularly after banning ethnic identities, the expression 'Hutu' has often become synonymous with 
'killer'957. If the first objective of commemoration was indeed reconciliation, and it would attempt 
facilitating acknowledgement, it would have to take the government's directive of national unity 
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more seriously. To use a participant's words: "as it was a tragedy of Rwanda, we should commemo-
rate all Rwandans that were killed that time958." 
Once they talked about it for a while, the majority of my participants agreed that commemoration 
should become more inclusive for being beneficial for reconciliation and not merely as a deterrent 
example serving prevention959. Even though most participants could not spontaneously think of a 
way to integrate Hutu-victims into official commemoration as it is currently managed, most would 
welcome the thought. "If that could happen that other people who got killed could also be acknowl-
edged in any way, if there could be an advocacy for that, that would help more with reconciliation but 
today, there is fear. You can’t say that960.” 
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4.5. Transitional Justice 
To assess the whole array of transitional justice in Rwanda, including the ICTR, Rwandan courts, for-
eign courts, and the Gacaca-courts with regard to their significance for the reconciliation process 
would exceed the frame of this thesis by far. The ICTR has been rightly criticized for being too de-
tached from the Rwandan population to really affect reconciliation in the country961, thus this chap-
ter will only address the problems of balancing justice and reconciliation in the context of the 
Gacaca-courts because they are a project of the Rwandan government embedded in Rwandan civil 
society.  
As important as its impact may be for international law, I did not consider the ICTR in the context of 
this thesis. From the beginning, Kagame was furious at the international community for its passivity 
during the genocide, castigated the ICTR from the beginning for its slow bureaucratic procedures, its 
corruption affairs and its inability to bring swift justice. He always put international justice in second 
place.When chief prosecutor Carla del Ponte intended to prosecute RPF-personnel as well, relations 
had cooled down to the point where the RPF even blocked testimonies and fine-tuned releases962. 
This tense relationship combined with distance between Arusha and Rwanda accounted for the fact 
that not much information permeated to the ordinary population. Even  intellectuals such as Gaspard 
and Théodosine criticized that justice did not focus enough on the leaders of the genocide, seemingly 
unaware of the trials in Arusha963.  
The Gacaca-courts on the other hand were highly visible for everyone and had an impact on most 
Rwandans' life. The overwhelming majority of my interviewees understood transitional justice and 
Gacaca to be identical. Most peasants had individual experiences with Gacaca as defendants, accus-
ers, witnesses or attendees but only knew the ICTR from rumors964. 
 
4.5.1. An African Solution for African Problems 
“It was [necessary] to take into consideration that punishment aspect of Gacaca because given the 
scale of what had happened in Rwanda. But also keep in mind that forgiveness aspect, because at 
the end of the day people came to live together.” Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
Gacaca – Objectives and Implementation 
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Rwanda's Gacaca-courts have been called "one of the most ambitious transitional justice experiments 
in history965" and an "African Solution to African problems966". Research on the Rwandan Gacaca-
courts describes the approach as locally anchored, combining restorative and retributive jurisdic-
tion967. The emphasis lies on confession, apology, and forgiveness. According to the official Rwandan 
description, Gacaca have their origins in the Rwandan tradition to solve small disputes through arbi-
tration by a tribunal of lay elders968. In Gacaca, these judges are called Inyangamugayo. The courts 
represent the unique centerpiece of Rwandan reconciliatory justice and judged more defendants 
than the ICTR, transnational and ordinary Rwandan courts together969.  
The devastation of the Rwandan justice apparatus during the genocide, the overwhelming number of 
potential perpetrators, and the overcrowding of Rwandan prisons forced the government of national 
unity to take innovative measures in order to timely deliver justice and involve the population. Thus, 
Gacaca-courts were set up in rural Rwanda, where ‘ordinary génocidaires’ confessions were heard 
and sentenced by lay judges mostly picked from the survivor community. The idea was to establish 
participative justice rooted in tradition. Transitional Justice in Rwanda however both borrowed from 
international models TRCs and displayed a rather retributive tendency - judges were able to convict 
defendants, thus introducing a decidedly Western element970. Participation by the population was 
mandatory and great emphasis was given to debate by the general assembly971. The objectives were 
to integrate the population into the process of transitional justice, to eliminate the backlog of the 
justice system, to end impunity by trying every perpetrator and to achieve closure for the victims972. 
The Gacaca-courts officially ended in 2012 but their impact remains a very controversial topic among 
scholars, international NGOs and Rwandans973. 
Participants' Experiences 
Whereas the formal component of the courts served the purpose of punishing the perpetrators, the 
restorative component assured that the needs of victims stayed at the center of jurisdiction. For jus-
tice to bring about genuine reconciliation, the court had to earn the trust of the community, thus in 
the ideal case, respected members of communities were chosen as judges. Gacaca aimed to address-
ing victims not only in their function as witnesses. It had to take their pleas seriously, so the witness-
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es could claim ownership of the process. All of my participants were very well informed about 
Gacaca and many had taken part.  
Transitional Justice Rwanda
1990 1994 2003 2011
Bystanders 0 0 0.8 3.4
Ex-Convicts 0 0 -0.9 3.7
Returnees 0 0 0.8 1.7
Survivors 0 0 1.6 3.6















Approval of Transitional Justice in Rwanda 
In general, most of my participants perceived transitional justice as a positive experience.  
Nonetheless, the diagram above is a bit surprising, specifically with regard to ex-convicts' spike after 
2003. Half of the ex-convicts claimed having been imprisoned innocently; however, their satisfaction 
with transitional justice in 2011 even trumps the survivors, soaring as soon as they were released. 
Returnees do not deem transitional justice that important. 
Most rural participants referenced Gacaca-courts in positive terms. All participant-categories consid-
ered punishing the guilty and liberating the innocent as the main benefit of Gacaca-courts. Ex-
convicts and bystanders mostly welcomed the fact that it hastened the justice process and liberated 
prisoners974. Survivors, even though often critical about the sheer numbers of perpetrators released, 
appreciated the confessions that in some cases brought them closure975 as well as the fact that the 
perpetrators were held accountable and that justice was administered locally.  
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With reference to the approval of transitional justice among Rwandans, there was a fundamental 
difference between Hutu and Tutsi when criticizing the shortcomings of justice. Whereas bystanders 
and ex-convicts rather criticized the one-sidedness of the verdicts - that the Gacaca only punished 
Hutu and survivors as well as RPF-personnel were beyond reproach976; some survivors perceived 
Gacaca's as too lenient. In their eyes, far too many perpetrators were released too early977. Only a 
minority considered the approach to maximum justice exaggerated and would have opted for a re-
duced version of transitional justice focusing on the organizers of the genocide and the leaders of the 
interim regime978. Most participants believed impunity had to be fought in every case. Umubyeyi: 
“Everybody was to be tried and because, […] nobody took you by the rope and [made] you come and 
kill someone. It’s like there is a shared responsibility. It’s like they were also willing to kill979.” 
Ex-Convicts: Free at Last 
Contrary to my initial conjecture, particularly perpetrators and bystanders considered the introduc-
tion of Gacaca-courts a blessing. All parties agreed on benefits such as localized justice, combating 
impunity and finding out the truth. Whereas survivors emphasized on closure (burying the dead, 
confessions) and seeing justice done, perpetrators and bystanders rather focused on liberating the 
innocent and unclogging the justice- and prison system. The consequential reparation payments 
however are perceived as huge financial burdens for poor families. Ex-convicts as well as bystanders 
never fail to complain about them980. Interestingly, many ex-convicts declared their prison terms to 
having been necessary for peace and reconciliation. E.g. in Yusuf's eyes, a prisoner who, according to 
himself, was imprisoned innocently, the government had to round up almost all the Hutu men, inter-
rogate them and make them stand trial even if it took years in order to bring justice to Rwanda981.. 
Such a statements appear odd considering the fact that almost no RPF-soldiers were ever arrested 
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but the double standards of Rwandan transitional justice were notoriously difficult to address in in-
terviews with ex-convicts who have gone through ingando982.  
Other Hutu emphasized on the positive aspect of unburdening Hutu families by liberating the con-
victs. Because Gacaca and TIG released their husbands and fathers from prison, the double burden of 
earning a livelihood and supporting and nourishing a family member in jail - a reason for holding re-
sentments983 - was taken away. Robert: "it helped to get people out of the prisons. Some people 
served some, did some TIG and then they rejoined their home because most of people, at least [the] 
ones that I know have been taking food to their parents to prisons. They are no longer doing that and 
TIG kind of brought reconciliation because, I'm now more or less on good terms with neighbors be-
cause I'm no longer taking foods to my parents, it relieved me in some way984."  
For many Hutus such as Dusabe whose husband is still in prison, the situation however remains dire. 
Marita furthermore criticized that supporting relatives in prison had become increasingly difficult 
since the prison authorities now demand money for nourishing the inmates. “Well what the govern-
ment is doing with regard to reconciliation is sufficient only that it should also try to get everybody 
out, other people out of prison. Because she’s saying people who have their parents, their relatives in 
prison, they can’t know what, we don’t know what is going on in their mind. Like today, they are sup-
pressed. They are like, it’s not, no more allowed to take food to those prisoners. It’s like they just con-
tribute some money and they… it’s the penitentiary authorities who are going to take care of them as 
[long as] food is concerned. But she’s saying but now they are not getting money.985.” Peter recom-
mended the point that summary punishment combined with lighter sentences facilitated closure and 
expedited renewed coexistence: " Actually reconciliation started from the transitional justice, specifi-
cally with Gacaca. Because that’s when perpetrators could be given lighter sentences, compared to 
what they had done during the genocide. And that’s how genocide survivors and people who eventu-
ally completed their sentences came to live together. So for him transitional justice is important for 
reconciliation986.” Umubyeyi's statement sums up the main benefits of Gacaca for Hutu:“Transitional 
justice was necessary, because it kind of increased the social bonds among people. For instance she 
says at one particular Gacaca court session that she attended, she noticed that people were being 
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open, speaking, telling the truth what happened, everything that happened and thanks to it some 
people got out of prison987.” 
Participative Justice with a retributive Edge 
In Clark’s988 view, Gacaca’s importance for reconciliation and simultaneously its biggest risk lies in 
consigning the central process of transitional justice to a traumatized population. Acccording to him, 
the government hoped to kick-start reconciliation through communal dialogue and debate, driven by 
an ethos of popular ownership and participation989. This discursive approach to justice had the ad-
vantage of bringing together victim and perpetrator in a controlled face-to-face interaction. Fur-
thermore “the plea-bargaining system, and in particular the use of community service as punishment 
for certain crimes, reintegrates perpetrators more rapidly in to the community and involves them in 
labour programmes990”. Participants, especially survivors, also generally recommended these labor 
programmes called TIG, because they supplied cheap labor for community work, shortened sentenc-
es and enabled the families of convicts to meet their relatives991. 
According to Clark, the Gacaca’s emphasis on compensation and reparation as punishment underline 
the sincerity of perpetrator’s reconciliatory statements and may improve the living conditions of 
victims, hence fostering true reconciliation. In my experience however, these payments were a heavy 
burden, a source of complaints and even of intolerance against 'greedy' survivors: “The government 
can facilitate reconciliation as when it says to genocide survivors not to ask the people who did the 
stealing to pay them and they should also accept992.” Yohani, an ex-convict from "Gatumba" also 
mentioned that without signing the reparation agreements they would have to return to prison, 
where the majority of the perpetrators I interviewed had already spent more than a decade, even if 
they merely looted. There are no recompensations for Hutus, who were imprisoned innocently. They 
were released after years of imprisonment and left to their own devices, as Yusuf, Paul and Yohani 
N., who were acquitted after their trials had to find out993. This unapologetic behavior towards ex-
convicts is where the unequal treatment of Hutu and Tutsi becomes manifest most blatantly. 
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The reconciliatory achievements of the courts differ from community to community. Clark994 ob-
served communities where Gacaca provided an open forum to the communal discussion of legal and 
non-legal issues that helped survivors, particularly women, to articulate their pain and start the heal-
ing process. In other communities however, Gacaca exacerbated the tensions between the different 
groups through heated debates. Clark as well as some survivors995 identifies low public participation 
to be the biggest danger to the reconciliatory potential of Gacaca. He relates the refusal of popular 
participation mostly to the time-consuming hearings, the fear of survivors, the opening of old 
wounds, or the climate of confusion and uncertainty that was prevalent in certain hearings. 
 
4.5.2. The difficult Relationship between Transitional Justice and Reconciliation 
Is Justice necessary? 
Clark, Kaufman and Nikolaïdis996 emphasize the interdependence of reconciliation and justice. They 
consider transitional justice necessary to reveal the truth and foster a common foundation of 
knowledge necessary for a society to move on to a new state of affairs, thus the emphasis on transi-
tion. In their understanding, transitional justice describes, “The field of judicial and non-judicial 
mechanisms used to respond to atrocities, and the tensions raised in doing so997”. Because of the 
fundamental importance of truth, they ascribe primacy to justice even though it may create tensions 
with other objectives of social reconstruction such as reconciliation and accountability. According to 
Clark, Kaufman and Nikolaïdis, attempts to promote other aspects of social reconstruction without 
addressing matters of truth and justice will probably fail to encourage genuine reconciliation or even 
exacerbate tensions998. They however acknowledge that particularly retributive interpretations of 
justice may have inflammatory effects and create tensions that jeopardize the transitional endeavor.  
The importance that Clark et al. associate with justice is contested. The relation between transitional 
justice and reconciliation proves very complex and much less straightforward than one might sup-
pose. The danger of trials actually being more divisive than engaging is often bigger than their possi-
ble benefits for reconciliation. A survey on Rwandan transitional justice conducted by Longman and 
Rutagengwa has resulted in 70.1% Hutu and 43.4% of Tutsi agreeing to the suggestion “It is better to 
try to forget what happened and move on999” and Ingelaere1000, after similar field work in Burundi, 
comes to the conclusion that a majority of respondents preferred to leave the past behind. My find-
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ings in Burundi corroborate this evaluation1001, in Rwanda however, many participants favored their 
government's approach to maximum justice. The results of the scaled question-survey above should 
be interpreted cautiously with reference to kwibwizira - self-censorship - and considering the fact 
that most ex-convicts had already completed their prison terms. When the discussion approached 
the topic of reparations, a still tangible result of transitional justice, the opinions of ex-convicts and 
bystanders usually changed to rejection. Even an official opinion survey of the government in 2008 
painted a bleak picture of Gacaca's impact on reconciliation1002. The NURC however corrected its 
view to the usual positive evaluations a year later after pressure from above had been applied1003. 
The fact that Stover and Weinstein, in their analysis of post-conflict Rwanda and Ex-Yugoslavia, found 
no direct link between criminal trials and reconciliation also challenges the absolute necessity of 
bringing perpetrators to justice for reconciliatory purposes1004. 
Next to establishing the truth and ending impunity, the restoration of social harmony has to be a 
crucial component of transitional justice. Retributive justice that solely pursues the punishment of 
the guilty parties is bound to provoke resentment if one group feels treated unjustly. Anticipating 
possible tensions, the designers of the TRC in South Africa thus waived retributive justice altogether. 
The TRC in South Africa has limited itself to establishing the truth and offered amnesty in exchange 
for disclosure1005. Regarding the divided and distrustful society that Apartheid left behind, this ap-
proach made sense. In a post-conflict society where social cohesion is lacking, the introduction of 
retributive justice is quickly perceived as victor's justice, particularly if it only addresses one set of 
perpetrators as in Rwanda.  
Tensions between Reconciliation and Justice 
On the other hand, justice with regard to the genocide was necessary, not only to put an end to im-
punity but also because of closure. Nadine, a young genocide survivor from Kigali, told me that she 
considered her generation lost. She could not forget all the atrocities she witnessed. Thus keeping 
the next generation free from prejudice according to her has to be the priority, even though this ex-
acts harsh measures in the present: "le stratégie qui est là, c'est chercher comment les gens peuvent 
coexister malgré leurs différences. Ils [le gouvernement] essaient d'imposer les gens. Mais s'ils es-
saient d'imposer les gens  et que quelqu'un dit: 'mais tu vois, on impose les gens!'. Mais oui, il y a un 
problème qu'on impose les gens mais dans le stade que nous avons, nous avons besoin d'être impo-
sées pour pouvoir au moins coéxister. Parce que, avec le temps ça va alléger, ça va s’alléger. On va 
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pas tâcher une autre génération1006." Chi Mgbako states "reconciliation without accountability is nei-
ther possible nor desirable1007." Hence, in order to not creating resentment that perpetuates itself, 
justice has to address every form of violence and has to recognize and affirm the victimhood of all 
people affected.  
As Nadine mentioned, the generation that has lived through the horrors of genocide and civil war is 
forever scarred by these experiences, which have produced what Mamdani calls “a guilty majority 
alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority in a single political community1008”. The disgruntled 
among the majority conceive justice as a “self-serving mask for fortifying minority power1009” where-
as the minority fears that the hidden agenda of completing the genocide hides underneath calls for 
democracy and reconciliation. Tensions between reconciliation and Gacaca-justice include:  
 The de facto limitation of the jurisdiction to genocide crimes with the exclusion of war crimes 
 Cases of corrupt judges and witnesses1010  
 Verbal abuse, harassment, intimidation and even murder of testifying witnesses1011  
 The abuse of Gacaca-trials in pursuit of economic interests (false accusations)1012  
 Widespread popular skepticism about the truth being spoken in the trials1013  
 Manipulation of the outcomes by political and social power-holders1014  
 Enforced attendance of the population and the opening of old wounds1015  
Maximum Justice? 
When asked about the causes of the genocide, most peasants do hold the interim government and 
its extremist propaganda responsible for setting the carnage in motion. Even though a majority of 
interviewees believes that every perpetrator of the genocide had to be punished, most Rwandans 
consider their neighbors or relatives that killed as small fish who were caught up in the situation. 
Gaspard explains: “they are not those ones who has [sic] responsibility… the small people, those 
ones… Okay. Because they told them, that if you kill somebody, you will be a possessor of their prop-
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erties. That is the encouragement to the people who suffer from poverty.1016.” Apart from very few 
exceptions however, the interviewees demand that everybody who took part in the genocide takes 
responsibility. “Those who prepared the genocide and implemented it, they should be punished but 
also those who were taught to kill, they should also had to be punished because […] like I, myself,, if I 
was sensitized to follow others to the killing and I did, why did I accept what I was told? Maybe if I 
hadn’t accepted I would have been killed but if I had accepted to follow others, it means I had to be 
punished because I followed others to kill1017.” The consensus is that even though the authorities is-
sued the 'order of genocide' and incitement took place, many people obeyed all too willingly. Over-
population, scarce resources, overwhelming poverty, a history of ethnically interpreted oppression 
and a prevailing culture of impunity have made killing during such episodes a viable option to im-
prove the perpetrator’s socioeconomic status. Intimate knowledge of the attractiveness of individual 
push- and pull-factors such as greed, rage and fear under conditions of impunity and insecurity is the 
reason why many Rwandans insist on maximum justice. Participants mentioned the recurring cycles 
of violence since 1959 frequently1018. Not necessarily in the context of a long-term extermination 
plan against the Tutsi1019 but definitely as a spiral of escalation that needs to be interrupted. Kibonge 
states “transitional justice was necessary for reconciliation because if it wouldn´t have been there, 
there would be revenge1020.“ Paradoxically, the knowledge that destabilization boosts the conditions 
under which these factors become motivations for violence makes the majority of Burundians opt for 
the contrary 'forgive and forget'-option1021.  
Although justice might help the victims to come to term with their past, it does not guarantee healing 
and forgiveness. As strict as Rwandans are with respect to transitional justice for the genocide, there 
is a sense of political realism in demands for justice regarding RPF/RPA-crimes. Even though many 
Hutu would welcome an acknowledgement and apology from the government, the overwhelming 
majority does not demand the same practice of maximum justice that was administered after the 
genocide. Similar to many survivors, they mostly demand closure and knowing what happened to 
their relatives: “We can't remember because we don't know where our dead are1022." Even some of 
the fiercest critics of the regime’s politics I interviewed would be satisfied with a symbolic sign of 
remorse. Everybody knows that upsetting the RPF too much would be risky and potentially destabiliz-
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ing1023. As much as critics deplore the many inequalities and injustices in the current system, nobody 
wants to hazard the consequences of renewed polarization and potentially armed conflict in Rwanda. 
"The Government wants us to forgive" 
One of the main advantages but simultaneously one of the biggest problems with transitional justice 
in Rwanda is the government's relentless push for maximum justice, unity and reconciliation. The 
government's discourse seeks to implement a unified national identity from above. It did not only 
summarily arrest Hutus and sort out the guilty parties later but it also provided templates and incen-
tives for reconciliation and even exerted pressure on survivors to forgive. The government wants 
success-stories1024. Boniphilde recounted even being paid for forgiving: "she is benefiting a lot from 
this association AMI through the workshops they have been attending. She says there was a four days 
training where we were even paid thousand a day. So there were génocidaires and the side of geno-
cide survivors, where AMI focuses all on reconciliation. Génocidaires should confess and genocide 
survivors should forgive so that they keep on building one country, one Rwanda1025." 
Ex-convicts on the other side emphasized on the mandatory character of confessions and how the 
government prepared them before they entered Gacaca in order to make sure everything went ac-
cording to plan. For them, confession was mainly a necessary step to before amnesty and was rather 
understood as a duty towards the state than the victims. Yohani: "When I got released we went to 
Gishamvu in the centre of re-education it means rehabilitation so after we came to wait that Gacaca 
will start. […] When we were still in the prison, there were people who came to sensitize us to confess 
and apologize. Some of us couldn’t understand. They thought, it’s like [the] RPF was very clever, we 
thought they wanted to kill us after all, so but for me with the time I came to understand that I should 
confess and apologize. So, we wrote some papers to confess then they separated those who wanted 
to confess and who didn’t want to confess, so far that’s how I came out of the prison. Then we went 
to the centre of Gishamvu. So after the centre of Gishamvu, we waited the trial of Gacaca. […] I had 
like those traditional arms of Rwandan culture [Spear], so even if I didn’t kill someone but I was in the 
same group that killed. So I felt guilt, I had to confess to the Rwandan society, even to the govern-
ment1026.” Even Paul who summarily denies having done anything wrong or being accused or mis-
treated by the government, explains that they were strongly advised to write confessions and apolo-
gies: “For me when I was in the prison, they used to come in the prison then teach us the consequenc-
es of what we did. The consequences of what is happening, so that if today we are released, we 
                                                          
1023
 Interviews with Robert, 25, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; 
Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
1024
 Cf. Interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali and Kayitare, 31, survivor, Kigali. 
1025
Interview with Boniphilde, 40, suvirvor, "Gatumba", Huye. clean verbatim from translator who talked about 
Boniphilde in the third person. 
1026
 Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. About the necessity of confessions also see inter-
views with Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye and John, 56, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
Page 190 
 
should go on the genocide [survivors] and confess. Then we apologize [to] each other1027.” Regarding 
the horrors of the overcrowded prison system, the incentives to confess or accuse others were very 
strong and the reward for admitting guilt was freedom:1028.” With these incentives, repentance, con-
fession and apology become issues between the perpetrator and the government, not between the 
perpetrator and his victim. Naturally, survivors like Kayitare or Luce do not take seriously apologies 
that were forced in such a way: "she says, she's trauma[tized]. Cause... even if those génocidaires 
have apologized publicly, they should even come face to face... To those they made the crime [com-
mitted the crime against] and apologize. And talk about the thing and handle it. So but since they 
didn't come to them and apologize, whenever they meet them, they have [bad] feelings1029.” Moreo-
ver, ex-convicts know that they could be sent back to prison as soon as a survivor accuses them 
again1030. Thus, they try not to arouse any suspicion: “so if a genocide survivor can insult you for in-
stance, you just keep quiet, don't respond. […] He can punch you and it is like you can think it is your 
mistake and keep quiet.” Interviewer: “So keep a low profile.” John: “Yeah a low profile. Keep a low 
profile. Actually he is saying that’s the picture, that’s how we live1031.” The result of this mutual fear is 
a society that deeply distrusts itself and strongly adheres to political correctness. 
Impunity vs. One-Sidedness 
Clark does not consider the one-sidedness of justice to be a major factor for the retrogressive sup-
port or even the rejection of Gacaca. In the face of the horrendous crime of genocide, he claims, 
“political and legal pragmatism must shape moral responses to the crimes of 1994: in an impover-
ished country like Rwanda, whose national judiciary was decimated by the genocide, not every perpe-
trator can be prosecuted. Therefore, it is necessary focus first on the most severe cases, while leaving 
open the possibility of dealing with lesser criminals later1032”. With regard to the priority of the great-
er crime of genocide, Clark dismisses the ICTR’s former chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte’s intention 
to prosecute human rights violations by the RPF. In his eyes, such endeavors just withdraw resources 
from dealing with the caseload of the génocidaires who were already surpassing the ICTR’s capacities 
and soured the climate of cooperation between the institution and the Rwandan government. As the 
crimes against Hutu are smaller, they should, according to Clark, be addressed at a later point.  
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The problem with such a strategy is that it does not take into ac-count how such a prioritization of 
the genocide against the Tutsi affects the thinking of the Hutu community. Mamdani states:"By refus-
ing to prosecute alleged RPA crimes, the government has failed to present itself to an often skeptical 
population as an honest broker1033." Furthermore, the Gacaca-courts completed their work in 2012 
and there are still no signs indicating the RPF's will to start trying army-personnel apart from a very 
few prominent cases in the 1990s. 
Mamdani strongly advocates political reconciliation and “survivor’s justice1034”, which he interprets as 
a form of political justice that shifts the primary focus of reform from individuals to institutions. To 
finally breaking the cycle of killers and victims, the institutions have to be recalibrated instead of 
subjugating the majority of the population to the exclusive justice of an armed victor1035.  
Eltringham also emphasizes the urgent need to end the culture of impunity. He although considers 
the current approach of the government to be partial because the small numbers of convictions of 
RPA soldiers in court martials for massacres from 1990 on. The absence of any convictions against 
RPA-members by the ICTR leaves these issues unresolved1036. The international accusations of the 
RPA/RDF for alleged massacres in the DRC have not led to any significant measures domestically, 
which feeds feelings of victimization and being denied justice among the Hutu community, encourag-
ing the refusal to participate in the justice process, and even revisionist endeavors1037. I concur with 
Eltringham. Postponing the trials of RPA-members and the investigation of alleged massacres is a 
dangerous practice with regard to national reconciliation. The handing over of some RPA-cases to the 
ICTR might have served as a strong symbol towards the Hutu population that the government takes 
their grievances seriously and has nothing to hide. It however would also have meant giving up the 
aspired monopoly on the construction of memory and admitting responsibility for some of the esca-
lations of the past, thus undermining the government’s position of absolute moral certainty, which 
has become increasingly contested in recent years but, with reference to realpolitik, is almost the 
RPF's only choice1038.  
A restorative model of justice could change these dynamics of finger-pointing and allocating blame. It 
might be more fitting because it does not rely on confessions, admissions of guilt and punishment. 
Restorative justice revolves around the victim and the local community, dialogue and reparations1039. 
Rwanda has initiated some profoundly interesting programs of restorative justice. The TIG and 
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Ubudehe are initiatives where the perpetrator can atone by actually helping his victims or at least the 
community. These are very promising rudiments to make transitional justice work in favor of recon-
ciliation. The monetary reparation payments coupled with the refusal of assisting perpetrator's fami-
lies or reimbursing acquitted ex-convicts however, produce a two-class society before trust between 
victims and perpetrators is re-established. "Local justice that depends on the participation of the 
population can succeed if community trust is strong. But if community trust is weak, then local justice 
(particularly punitive justice) will fray the social fabric. The genocide and civil war destroyed social 
capital in Rwanda, and the Rwandan government did not rebuild social trust, or trust in government, 
before launching Gacaca1040." 
In conclusion, the signs of reconciliation emerging from the process of transitional justice might be 
cautiously interpreted as positive. Schabas1041  emphasizes that the process of transitional justice 
sends “odd messages of reconciliation1042”. Although he deems it implausible that a majority of 
Rwandans who mostly fall into the 'perpetrator'-camp would have voted for a government, which 
plans to prosecute a large portion of the electorate and that in a democratic context, prosecution 
would probably end, this is not what seems to happen. Rather, great parts of the population seem to 
welcome the prospect of closure and (limited) debate in the context of Gacaca. The government is 
also cautiously moving away from a purely retributive stance towards justice, illustrated by the abol-
ishment of the death penalty in 2007 and the increasing numbers of suspects being pardoned and 
released. This positive evalutation however mostly applies to the current point of time: Gacaca have 
already ended now and many prisoners are free. It does also only apply with certain qualifications 
regarding the partiality of justice and the feelings of discrimination lurking beneath the surface. 
 
4.5.3. A Nation of Prisoners 
“Rwandan society is yet to openly acknowledge and address the violence that victims in the Hutu 
community experienced during the conflicts of the 1990s. The Hutu community largely perceives the 
transitional justice processes undertaken as no more than exemplars of victor’s justice. Rwandan so-
ciety remains deeply divided along ethnic lines1043.” Gérald Gahima, Ex-Prosecutor General 
Despite the estimations of about 175’000 to 210’000 perpetrators in the Rwandan genocide1044, the 
government, according to its own estimates has sentenced one million genocide suspects through 
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Gacaca1045 by 2010. By the official end of Gacaca in 2012, the official number rose to “close to 2 mil-
lion1046”, Human Rights Watch speaks of “approximately 1.2 million1047” in 2011. Clark1048 speaks of a 
number 0f 120’000 suspects imprisoned at the beginning of Gacaca, Rettig of 125'0001049. The num-
ber gradually decreased to 59’311 in 20081050 and, according to Reyntjens1051, there were still 40’000 
genocide suspects imprisoned in 2012. Thus, Gacaca can be said to have succeeded in reducing the 
backlog of genocide cases and the congestion of the judicial system.  
Random Arrests after the Genocide 
Most genocide suspects including all of my eight participants were rounded up immediately after the 
genocide or when they returned to Rwanda from the camps in Burundi and the DRC. The extent to 
which Hutu guilt is globalized by the RPF is demonstrated very clearly in the manner how they were 
arrested. Some, like Yohani N. where arrested because of suspicions by genocide survivors: “I was 
arrested by Tutsis then they took me in the prison, it was on 16th June in 1994. So I spent some 14 
years in the prison.” Interviewer: “So the people that arrested you didn’t know you?” Yohani N.: “They 
knew me. They were Tutsi-children who used to say 'let’s put all the Hutus in the prisons1052'.” Others 
were arrested arbitrarily when coming back from refugee camps like Paul, Maurice and Rugango. 
Fleeing made them appear guilty. Hutu who stayed at home however appeared guilty as well, as Yo-
hani recounts. ”I didn’t flee, I didn’t want to leave my house, only my wife and children fled so I 
stayed there and when they came back they found me in the same house but I was arrested on Sep-
tember 15th 19951053.” When asked about the cause of his arrest, John said he was jailed “Because 
I’m a man. And as a man by that time I could take part in different battles. […] But I was jailed, be-
cause they could catch us and jail us, because they were saying I was an Interahamwe.1054.” Rugango 
describes a similar picture: “Either you killed or not, they used to say that ‘you are all killers!’ So they 
used to take us in the prison1055.” The arrests had a very global character: "men, either those who 
partook in the genocide or other people who didn’t even take part in the genocide were just being 
taken to jails1056." The practice of reducing sentences for convicts who identified accomplices and of 
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punishing the failure to assist prosecution1057 furthermore led to increasing numbers of arrests 
among Hutu who had been spared immediately after the genocide. Yusuf was one of the victims of 
this practice: “He was among the first who came back to the country, when the other people who had 
partaken the genocide came back as well, they started accusing him for his absence. […] I mean peo-
ple who had killed, they started associating him in every battle they went to kill people, saying: 'We 
were together with him’ and yet he was not there1058.” Yusuf spent six years in prison before he was 
tried and acquitted. 
Constant Fear 
As ex-convicts were often arrested under arbitrary circumstances, many feel uneasy in their envi-
ronment to this day, trying their best not to anger the authorities. John sent his son outside the 
house during our interview to see if anybody was eavesdropping; Maurice went out of his way to 
paint the conditions of his arrest and prison term as positive as possible; Innocent considered any 
criticism against the RPF counterproductive to reconciliation and Yohani even denied commemorat-
ing his son who was killed by the RPF. Except for John who was very frank, all ex-convicts claimed to 
be reformed and reconciled. They learned their lessons: "I agree in what I have been taught nowa-
days because, let me give you an example: at one particular time even president Kagame and some 
other top leaders came to teach us where we worked [TIG] and in the end they [the prisoners] noticed 
that: 'no, we were wrong in what we were saying, in what we were doing'1059.”  
Carina Tertsakian who worked with Rwandan prisoners explains: “Released prisoners in Rwanda are 
always afraid of being re-arrested. That fear is well founded and still rules their lives from day to day. 
[…] Beyond the anxieties of individual prisoners, this fear has led to a deeper, moral confusion and 
uncertainty, which runs throughout Rwandan society1060.” Human Rights Watch has a similar opinion, 
that fear to trespass the anti-genocide laws has effectively silenced the population: "Rwandans have 
come to realize that any statement given as part of Gacaca can have negative repercussions for them, 
and many individuals with relevant information chose to remain silent1061." The victim-perpetrator 
dichotomy that replaced the ethnic identities allows for few exceptions, thus Rwandans rather re-
main silent. “[…] Fear has become a way of life for Rwandans whose individual and familial experi-
ences of violence do not fit into the nationalized mythico-histories about the genocide1062.”  
Getting out of Prison 
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The Rwandan prison system was originally built to contain a number well below of 50’000 prison-
ers1063. From the people arrested in the wake of the genocide, over 10’000 died, often before trial1064. 
John compares his suffering to genocide survivors: “when he tries to think about the prison it gives 
him trauma even more than the one genocide survivors do have. So inmates he saw dying on his side 
traumatized him. He was jailed in a hole. So, he is saying that's because he didn’t flee the country, 
though he was a Hutu1065.” The horror in the overcrowded prisons is almost beyond words. Stories of 
abuse are rife: "I found many people who were killed, I mean who have died maybe because of the 
disease that was Macinya [diarrhea]. It killed many people, so I remember they used to put them in 
the bathroom and at a given time, they go to bury them on the hills. […] Yeah, at the beginning we 
were always beaten, they used even to put us outside the prison, then they beat us. So the security 
came after but the soldiers they used to beat us seriously1066.” Chris, a survivor describes the condi-
tions in the prisons that he witnessed from outside as 'revenge': "So people were beaten, people 
were, some of them were killed. I know some people who were, who immediately died in the prisons. 
Sometimes, yeah, people could go to the prisons take out the corpse. So we saw them. People were 
taking revenge in one word, yeah1067.” Considering these harrowing conditions, it is no surprise that 
most convicts did what they could to reduce their sentences. Naming accomplices and writing con-
fessions were the main avenues to stand trial fast. “As we had written all we did [confession, in 
1998], they could select like the person who wrote the true story. They could pick him and take him to 
the trial1068." The idea behind this practice was to find out the whole truth and punish every perpe-
trator but as the stakes were very high, it rather provided an incentive to lie or tell half-truths1069. 
John e.g. recounts, “If you don't accept guilt of anything [sic], you risk spending your life in jail. So, to 
some extent he is saying that, ‘I could lie. I could lie of what I did, yet I didn't do it for the sake of me 
to go out.’1070.”  
Before trial, the convicts all had to undergo Ingando, where they were taught the history lessons as 
re-imagined by the RPF and how to promote unity and reconciliation. Susan Thomson who has un-
dergone Ingando herself describes it as outright indoctrination similar to prison1071. In combination 
with the horrible prison conditions, the practice of re-education through ingando sheds light on most 
ex-convicts strict adherence to the government narrative and formidable knowledge. When I asked 
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him directly, Innocent, who followed the 'invisible script' the closest, admitted that he changed his 
way of thinking because of his punishment1072. According to Thomson, "the graduates of these 
ingando camps that I met do not believe in the national unity of the re-imagined past or in the recon-
ciliation of a re-engineered future. Rather, they see the camps and their ideological discourse as ef-
forts to exercise social control over adult Hutu men1073." Actual persuasion is only a part of re-
education. For the most part, convicts were intimidated and taught to keep their heads down. Having 
witnessed the horror of the prison system, most are ready to confess to anything in order to prevent 
being sent back. Most ex-convicts share Yusuf’s existentialism: “the most important thing to you is 
that you don’t die. [If] you don’t die in jail, you eventually get the chance to get out1074.”  
All of my ex-convict participants spent years in overcrowded prisons before trial and were released 
after they confessed. The stigma of having been in jail however stays with them, even if acquitted. 
Ex-Convicts are not allowed to vote and do not receive any reparations for their often decade-long 
confinement.  
Survivor's Grief 
As horrible as these fates are, we must not forget that many survivors still live in fear of Hutu prison-
ers. Many survivors believe that the government pardoned too fast and was contented with superfi-
cial confessions and apologies. They are frightened by the staggering numbers of prisoners having 
been released through Gacaca. As Kayitare, a survivor from Kigali explains: “J’ai visité le meurtrier de 
ma famille en prison et il m’a demandé de lui pardonner. Mais j’ai pas eu l’intention qu’il fût sincère. 
J’ai dit que ce serai pas possible pour moi dans ce moment. Il haussa les épaules et a dit que peut-être 
cela viendra avec le temps. Comment est-ce qu’on peut pardonner des gens qui n’osent même pas de 
se confesser à vous et de demander votre pardon, mais pensent en fait que l’acte de devoir est votre - 
21'000 et encore 16'000 en 2008 [released prisoners]. Tu ne penses pas que ça va effrayer les resca-
pés qui souffrent encore des conséquences du passé ?1075" 
These fears and grievances of survivors should be taken seriously and they need to be accommodat-
ed. Survivors do need governmental assistance and the guarantee of security in their communities 
more than other groups. That notwithstanding, genuine social cohesion with regular interchange (as 
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e.g. in AMI), a collective memory and shared symbols would probably have the strongest impact on 
feeling secure1076.  
It is highly questionable if long prison terms without trials and reparations that place such heavy bur-
dens upon the families of perpetrators that they often descend into poverty1077 is actually aiding so-
cial cohesion. With assistance almost exclusively extended to survivors1078, this practice rather pro-
motes jealousy, greed and further division. Re-education and indoctrination without assistance and 
opportunity will only temporarily silence and intimidate ex-convicts. It will not turn them into con-
vinced supporters of the 'New Rwanda' as long as the positive change is not also reflected in their 
daily life. The only ex-convict who argued from a personal standpoint and actually involved himself in 
a debate about unity and reconciliation, John, hated the system with a passion1079. Approaches that 
open up the debate about reconciliation and justice and do not just impose the government's per-
ception by codifying their opinions into laws, e.g. by establishing a special court that handles RPF 
crimes1080, would be direly needed. 
4.5.4. Guilt, Coexistence and Conformity 
The RPF, massacres and the G-Word 
Even though the genocide against the Tutsi and its consequences are addressed in an almost exem-
plary fashion for a poor state such as Rwanda, quite the opposite is true with regard to killings by the 
RPF before, during and after the genocide. Almost every bystander or ex-convict I interviewed knew 
stories about RPF-killings, during the genocide or in the DRC. Nevertheless, only a handful of RPF-
soldiers have been punished so far. The government steadfastly pretends no such massacres hap-
pened. The only two official reports dealing with RPF-massacres, the so-called ‘Gersony-report’ about 
RPF-massacres in the Rwandan civil war and the UN’s 'mapping report1081' were shelved before publi-
cation respectively toned down due to a mix between pressure from the Rwandan government and 
the jeopardized situation of the international community1082. However, the leaked ‘mapping report’ 
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maintains, “that some of these alleged massacres could constitute acts of genocide1083” against Hutu 
from Rwanda, Burundi and Zaïre. The accusations are heavy: “these attacks resulted in a very large 
number of victims, probably tens of thousands of members of the Hutu ethnic group, all nationalities 
combined. In the vast majority of cases reported, it was not a question of people killed unintentionally 
in the course of combat, but people targeted primarily by AFDL/APR/FAB forces and executed in their 
hundreds, often with edged weapons. The majority of the victims were children, women, elderly peo-
ple and the sick, who posed no threat to the attacking forces1084.” 
The ‘mapping report’ does stops short of issuing a final verdict about the crime of genocide in the 
DRC, neither do I. Due to the war conditions, inaccessibility of the terrain and the lack of investigative 
personnel, it’s almost impossible to determine what actually happened during the AFDL-rebellion. 
Approximately 200’000 Hutu refugees however remain unaccounted for1085. I do not want to classify 
the RPA’s actions in Rwanda or the DRC as genocide because the ‘g-word’ and its implications cloud a 
sober analysis of what is happening in Rwanda and, even worse, invite the negation of the tremen-
dous development in most areas of societal life that the country has achieved since year zero – 1994. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that mass violence in Rwanda includes various episodes, not just 
the genocide against the Tutsi and that the sides of victims and perpetrators are less clear-cut than 
the official narrative suggests. 
The lasting Impact of Genocide 
As long as I was speaking about Hutu as a group, surprisingly many Hutus displayed a strong willing-
ness to take the blame for the genocide without requiring the RPF to admitting partial responsibility 
for starting the civil war or committing atrocities in the 1990s. It would be shortsighted to ascribe this 
willingness solely to strong pressure from above. Rather, a very complex set of factors is at play here. 
First, the genocide as an experience has been a watershed-event in the life of every Rwandan. Most 
interviewees struggle to find explanations why they themselves, their neighbors, family or friends 
committed such abhorrent atrocities. Some participants like Marital1086 or Rugango1087 actually refer 
to Satan’s influence because they cannot explain how people who, according to the unanimous opin-
ion of residents, lived together as peaceful and charitable neighbors, could possibly commit such 
atrocious crimes. The shock is still reverberating in the minds of all people who lived through the 
genocide. Compared to the catastrophe of 1994, the totalitarian aspirations of the RPF are consid-
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ered relatively moderate and, with regard to the FDLR still active across the border1088, even under-
standable. 
Second, most Hutus blame the genocide on the political elite of the time, which consciously lied to 
them and would like to see those people punished harder. People only know the ICTR’s work vaguely 
and many participants think that the organizers actually escaped. On the surface, the distrust versus 
the political elite only pertains to the génocidaires. It does not perpetuate itself to the current elite.  
In the same way the interim government is blamed for the genocide, the RPF and president Kagame 
are credited with bringing peace and reconciliation. Unsurprisingly, survivors are the group that wel-
comed the government’s efforts to reconcile Rwandans the most. “without government, without the 
state, there wouldn't be any reconciliation1089.” There however are increasingly skeptical views with 
regard to government’s permanent pressure to reconcile as well. To Vincent, forgiveness should “be 
departing from the people themselves instead of having the state putting pressure on people to for-
give. Because, you can do that because the state is preaching that but internally you haven’t forgiven. 
It’s like you are still there but you have done so because you are under pressure from somebody 
else1090.” 
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4.6. Conclusion: Kagame’s “Window of Opportunity” 
Universal Recognition of Suffering 
Viewed from a general perspective, Rwanda has made tremendous progress if we look at the efforts 
concerning reconciliation for the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi. 21 years after the catastrophe, the 
country is stable and Hutu and Tutsi coexist under nominally equal terms.  If we look at the initial 
definition of reconciliation determined in chapter 2, understanding reconciliation as “the totality of a 
society’s diverse efforts aiming at creating or restoring constructive relationships between erstwhile 
adversaries that cut across the cleavages of the conflict-era identities“ with the key objectives 
memory, acknowledgement, responsibility, apology and justice, Rwandans have come a long way. 
Despite hidden antagonisms and discrimination below the surface, most of my participants genuinely 
felt the need to transform interethnic relations. Many survivors did not only coexist with perpetra-
tors, they had forgiven them. Most of the ex-convicts I worked with actively tried to apologize and 
get back into the good graces of survivors. To determine in how far these efforts were due to socio-
political pressure or how much was owed to individual initiative is difficult because the lines between 
personal opinions and conformity often blur in Rwanda. Nevertheless, most of my participants wel-
comed the national unity, reconciliation, and transitional justice in retrospective. They believe in a 
shared future for Hutu and Tutsi, maybe with the terms themselves disappearing. 
With regard to the genocide against the Tutsi, reconciliation politics in Rwanda have been exception-
al in view of the core principles memory, acknowledgement, recognition, apology, and justice: 
 The majority of perpetrators had to stand trial.  
 Ex-convicts were required to take responsibility, pay reparations and apologize to their vic-
tim’s families1091.  
 There is an official commemoration of the victims each year in a week of official mourning to 
acknowledge and recognize the grief of survivors. 
 The NURC and the CNLG have implemented a plethora of associations, workshops and assis-
tance programs to sensitize the population about genocide and alleviate its long-term-
effects.  
Nevertheless, even if we completely agree with the NURC’s assessment of reconciliation in Rwanda 
and take its achievements in working through the genocide at face value, there is a huge and glaring 
blind spot in the Rwandan discourse – the one-sidedness of the reconciliation process and the dis-
cussion about the human rights violations of the RPF/RPA. Even though the genocide against the 
Tutsi in 1994 was by far the most brutal and the swiftest episode of mass killing in the Great Lakes 
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Region and perhaps the only one that deserves the denomination ‘genocide’, it has to be considered 
one episode in a continuum of mass violence, which did not end in 1994. Encompassing reconcilia-
tion would have to take other episodes and other victims into account as well. The state should rec-
ognize their suffering even if the crimes against them do not necessarily amount to genocide. Forced 
silence about the RPF’s transgressions renders the reconciliation process dishonest in the eyes of 
many Hutus and might actually disrupt a fundamentally successful peace process if it translates into 
further suppression of critical voices.  
Transformative Appearance 
Regarding the juxtaposition between politically and economically dominant returnees on one side, 
politically marginalized ex-convicts and tightly controlled bystanders on the other side, and survivors 
trying to make ends meet while fitting into neither group, Rwanda has still not managed to overcome 
its cleavages and conflict-era identities. On the surface, ethnic identities may be banned and the 
country reconciled but in reality, they have only been superficially covered by a regime obsessed 
with the "aesthetics of progress1092". The conflict-era identities, even though now explicitly taking the 
genocide as a reference point instead of questionable historical concepts of ethnicity, have not lost 
their significance as conflictive fault lines. They have only been labeled differently and now provide a 
modicum of space for exceptions1093. Discrimination might not be as evident as during the 
Habyarimana-years. The school system in particular is open to everybody1094 but many Hutus per-
ceive a lack of equality when it comes to chances of socioeconomic ascension, commemoration or 
justice1095.  
The relative peace and order in Rwanda is at least partially the result of the RPF’s strong pressure 
from above and its ‘outsourcing’ of the internal Hutu-Tutsi conflict to the DRC. With heavily armed 
soldiers occupying every street corner in Kigali and the remaining media preoccupied with praising 
the current president, his sapience and foresight, it is clearly evident that the dominance of the RPF 
cannot be challenged for the moment. Domestic critics keep a low profile or flee into exile. This is 
partly because with the population under rigid control and the prospects of development and non-
violent coexistence intact under RPF-rule, they lack a vocal basis among the peasantry but mostly 
because any fundamental criticism of the government results in character defamation, accusations or 
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worse1096. It is difficult to predict how Rwandan society would react if the RPF loosens its tight grip on 
power. The question that poses itself is how to preserve the past twenty years’ achievements with 
regard to reconstruction and stability while at the same time creating room for dissent and the inclu-
sion of alternative views.  
The 'invisible Script' 
Institutions such as Gacaca and Itorero have pioneered transitional politics and, despite valid criti-
cism against many of their features, could serve as blueprints for involving the community in recon-
ciliation politics just like the South African TRC. By design, these institutions would actually provide 
almost ideal feedback loops between government and population. Unfortunately, the governmental 
imposition of perceptions, the latent lopsidedness of the justice- and memory work, and especially 
the barely concealed secondary objective of legitimizing and safeguarding RPF-rule override their 
participative features. Much too often, attempts at reconciliation are transformed into exercises in 
obedience and exclusion through power politics. 
Looking at the frequent use of keywords of the policy of unity and reconciliation such as e.g. ‘unity’, 
‘one Rwanda’ or ‘divisionism', the reach of the state and its ideology is easily distinguishable in inter-
views. The regime’s message of national unity however is propped up on a foundation of Hutu guilt. 
In order to preserve its image as the beacon of peace, unity and civility in the face of accusations of 
mass violence and totalitarianism, the elite has to sustain the concept of an enemy. Thus, it created a 
category of citizens that is banned effectively from political participation and attempts to connect 
criticism to genocide. These people, whose consciousness as historical losers is reinforced regularly 
by official commemoration ceremonies or public re-education, are keeping their heads down for 
now. They are often less persuaded than intimidated. In order to strengthen social cohesion among 
Rwandans, alternative life stories, which do not fit the official narrative of Tutsi victimization and 
Hutu guilt would have to be accepted. Suffering from all forms of violence, not only genocide would 
have to be recognized and acknowledged. This would also mean that public education and reconcilia-
tion politics would have to include more free debate and less teaching. They would need to be con-
sciously separated from the RPF and its vision for Rwanda.  
The RPF’s Logic 
Regarded from a realpolitik-perspective, the RPF however does not have much to gain from opening 
up the political space, acknowledging its transgressions, apologizing, and surrendering its claim to 
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interpretational sovereignty. The danger of appearing vulnerable, of an ethnic entrepreneur taking 
advantage of the RPF’s acknowledgement of human rights violations and propagating extremism 
based on ethnic identity as before the genocide, cannot be fully denied. Kagame and his party knew 
from the start that with an estimated quota of 85% Hutu, they would always have to fight against 
demographic realities. In an ethnically interpreted election, they could never win1097. Thus, they de-
cided to change the framework conditions and play for time by banking on Rwandan nationalism. 
The plan of re-educating the population according to the RPF’s vision and keeping peasants under 
tight administrative supervision while simultaneously trying to rapidly modernize the country does 
make sense from the RPF’s point of view. In fact, this might be the only strategy to realize the vision 
of a unified Rwandan state while simultaneously assuring that the RPF's original Tutsi clientele plays 
a defining role in building the nation and without the many unpredictable variables of democracy. 
Rwanda today is stable and secure for survivors and returnees. The price was waiving impartial tran-
sitional justice, freedom of speech and confining the right to political co-determination.  
Vague Notions of Democracy 
Despite many interview-questions focusing on abstract matters such as politics, commemoration or 
justice, intellectuals were almost the only ones to complain about matters such as freedom of 
speech, the cooptation the media, or the culture of silence. Just as before the genocide, the peasants 
are primarily concerned with securing their basic needs. They only mobilize when their survival or 
their livelihoods are in danger. Hence, they are very sensitive to issues such as governmental assis-
tance, agricultural administration and mandatory payments. In general, many peasants equate peace 
with security and credit the RPF with having established peace. The expression “peace is when there 
is security1098”was uttered almost verbatim by several participants from different research sites. 
Peasants also often confound peace, unity and security with democracy. When asked to define ‘de-
mocracy’, peasants were inclined to add sentences such as “democracy is peace for all Rwandans1099” 
or “democracy is when Rwandans are together, there is unity among Rwandans1100” to general 
catchwords such as “independence1101” and “freedom1102”. Elections and freedom of opinion are al-
                                                          
1097
 Cf. Mwakikagile, 2013, 585-596. Mwakikagile proposes a segregation of Rwanda and Burundi into “Hutu-
land” and “Tutsiland” as the only democratic solution for the conflict. 
1098
 Cécile, 40, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Paul, 44, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, 
“Gatumba”, Hurye. Cf. also interviews with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, 
“Gatumba”, Huye; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Peter, 46, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
1099
 Interview with Augustin, 50, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara. 
1100
 Interview with Yohani N., ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye. ‘Unity and Reconciliation’ was also stressed by 
Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara and Annunciata, 58, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye. 
1101
 Cf. interviews with Karemera, 73, returnee, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Vincent, 43, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisaga-
ra; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
1102
 Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, „Gatumba“, Huye; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jeanne, 32, re-
turnee, Huye; Boniphilde, 40, survivor, „Gatumba“, Huye. 
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most exclusively associated with democracy by intellectuals1103. Thus, one could say that the absence 
of political freedom is felt less sorely among the rural population as long as the RPF is able to guaran-
tee peace and security. 
If the ban on ethnic identities can be held up long enough, the parliament remains mixed and the 
official interpretation of history becomes the only history that future generations of Rwandans know, 
the RPF will perhaps no longer be seen as ‘predominantly Tutsi’ but as ‘Rwandan’. Preventing ethnic 
identities to become the main factor in bi-polar elections is the primary objective behind the promo-
tion of Rwandan nationalism and outlawing ethnic identities. Many interviewees actually appreciated 
the ban exactly for this reason: properly applied and under conditions of equal politico-economic 
treatment of all ethnic groups, banning ethnic identities could lay the past to rest.   
The generation that lived through the genocide however cannot forget the old labels. The horrors of 
the genocide have etched themselves into their memories. Many participants nonetheless hoped 
that their children might grow up without knowing about the divisive identities. The problem is that 
by promoting its own ‘mythico-history’ as liberators through official commemoration, the RPF coun-
teracts its own reconciliation strategy. Forgetting about ethnic identities proves difficult if repara-
tions, imprisoned relatives and annual commemoration weeks constantly remind Hutus of their col-
lective guilt or their losses, particularly when addressing these grievances publicly could be interpret-
ed as 'divisionism'1104. Altering the concept of official commemoration again, hence it would explicitly 
recognize the suffering of all Rwandans (as it did in the first years after the genocide) and perhaps 
even include casualties in the DRC, would be a very strong symbol of reconciliation even if it would 
jeopardize the carefully crafted narrative.  
Thus, Rwandans are left with a rather inconsistent approach towards reconciliation. Forgetting is 
actively encouraged with regard to the contemporary significance of ethnic identities but at the same 
time, the government constantly reminds people of their group affiliation and the burden of con-
science it implies. Despite this paradox, Rwandans seem to consider the political relevance of ethnic 
identities recede, which is a good sign for reconciliation. 
Impact of Ethnicity 1990 1994 2003 2011 
Bystanders -2.2 -3.9 1.1 2.5 
Ex-Convicts -0.9 -4.9 1.1 2.8 
Returnees -3.8 -3.8 1 3.75 
Survivors -2.5 -4.5 1.6 3.8 
Rwanda Average -2.1 -4.0 1.2 3.0 
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 Cf. E.g. interviews with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Robert, 25, 
bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Thasienne, 38, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali. 
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Rwanda: Impact of Ethnicity (Question: How would you estimate the chances of people of your ethnicity to gain access to 
political office if you compare the situation in… (- =high significance; + =low significance) 
Dangers and Opportunities 
Next to a general optimism and the pressure towards political conformity with regard to ex-convicts, 
the diagram reflects the hopes of an overwhelming majority of Rwandans that ethnicity actually is on 
retreat and this should be seen as a good premise for reconciliation. In general, Rwandans are ready 
to accept the politics of unity and reconciliation if they see its benefits for the country and their 
community. Most of my interviewees regarded reconciliation politics rather pragmatic. Karemera, an 
old caseload refugee from Gisagara, illustrates this beautifully in his comment on the wording of the 
commemoration ceremony: "if they can keep the terminology [genocide against the Tutsi] and it 
doesn’t disturb the cohesion of people, it's fine. If they can leave it out, it is also fine. What matters 
with [sic] him is the cohesion of people living, having them living peacefully1105.” 
Thus, not all is lost. The current government has a unique ‘window of opportunity’ to critically ad-
dress its own past and to prove that Hutus or dissenters are no second-class citizens. This has to hap-
pen as long as the memory of the genocide is still strong enough to deter politicians from exploiting 
ethnicity and while the prospects of development and economic recovery are still intact. The ap-
pointment of the Hutu Jean-Damascène Ntawukuriryayo as head of senate and programs that bene-
fit all such as universal health care, equal access to education or the Girinka-program already point 
into a good direction. The government has to relentlessly combat corruption or favoritism with re-
gard to welfare, scholarships and assistance. Imihigo, the performance contract, is a good start but 
the best way to hold local administrations accountable would be through givong elected local coun-
cils more power instead of appointing party officials to the positions that possess fund-allocating 
power, as is the practice nowadays1106. 
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Hopes must not be disappointed! 
The RPF’s ambitious plans for national agriculture and its proneness to coercive measures for pushing 
through its visions are a dangerous gamble. The famine of 2006 in Bugesera which the government 
flatly denied 1107, as well as the drought of 2009, when farmers suffered from malnutrition but 
weren’t allowed to change the government-selected crops clearly show the risks of a “top-down de-
velopmentalist agenda that leaves little room for bottom-up mechanisms1108”. A failure of these high 
modernist visions the way it failed in Tanzania's Ujamaa-campaign could have catastrophic effects on 
the peasantry and the economy. It would rapidly radicalize the population again. The poverty gap is 
widening already1109. 
When the pace of economic development slows down and the hopes for governmental assistance 
and progress are disappointed, many Hutu will remember that they still pay reparations but have not 
received cows, rents or even rights to co-determination yet. They will remember their unacknowl-
edged dead, the partiality of transitional justice, and long prison terms. The promise of prosperity 
and development faces increasing threats by the drying up of aid revenue due to the RPFs totalitari-
an tendencies. If Kagame and the RPF insulate themselves internationally1110 and at the same time 
refuse to open up political space, Rwanda might become a second Zimbabwe. Isolated and ruined 
with a paranoid old dictator who desperately clings to power. This scenario appears considerably 
more threatening in Rwanda because of its legacy of mass violence. The next Victoire Ingabire is 
probably not too far away and creating divisions and recruiting fighters among a society shaped by 
obvious inequalities is comparatively easy. It has been a successful strategy for the RPF itself. 
One of the most worrying points in this scenario is the extreme population growth in Rwanda after 
1994, which despite a strong governmental focus on family planning is only slowing down very grad-
ually. Despite the genocide, the Rwandan population has grown from approximately seven mio. in 
19891111 to 11.7 millions1112 in 2013. At this pace, Rwanda would need nothing short of an East Asian 
development miracle to provide the youth with jobs. Considering that 88-90% of Rwandans are still 
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 Ingelaere, 2010c, 47f. 
1108
 Ansoms, 2011, 248. 
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 Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 163-186. 
1110
 Kagame started to counteract his isolation by presenting himself as one of the only reliable African partner 
to Western countries that will send peacekeepers to instable regions threatened by mass violence. His threat to 
retract Rwandan peacekeepers from Darfur led to the shelving of the original UN mapping report about the 
DRC in 2010. Currently, he has pledged Rwandan peacekeepers for the crisis in the Central African Republic. In 
a similar step, Burundi has deployed peacekeepers in Somalia. 
1111
 Cf. Prunier, 1995, 4. 
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subsistence farmers and that most of the forests have already given way to agriculturally productive 
lands, the high-modernist experiments in agriculture1113 seem quite a dangerous endeavor. 
So far most Rwandans seem pleased with the strong development of the country and are still ready 
to blame signs of abuse on local authorities instead of the national government. The idea that “we 
are all Rwandan people, we speak one language and one culture1114” appears to be deeply rooted in 
most peasants who have lived together in peace before and after the genocide. Nobody wishes for a 
return to the state of affairs of the 1990s. Taking their statements at face value, the majority of ex-
convicts and bystanders see the death of their relatives or their own imprisonment as a necessary 
price they had to pay for the sin that was the genocide. In their eyes, they sacrificed themselves for 
peace, development and reconciliation. It is crucial for the future of an unified Rwanda that these 
hopes for an equal and free future will not be disappointed. Thus, economic development will have 
to be accompanied by much stronger measures in poverty reduction and capacity building in the 
realm of truly critical thinking and freedom of expression, including but not confined to the difficult 
past. Genocidal politics were able to rely on a peasant culture of obedience towards the state 
groomed by the monarchy, the colonial powers and two successive dictatorships. The genocide ex-
ploited bottled-up economic and political frustrations. It thrived on insecurity, impunity and relent-
less competition over politico-economic power. Many of these factors are still present. In order to 
achieve genuine reconciliation, these problems need to be openly addressed instead of suppressing 
(ethnicity) or accepting them (obedience). Readyness to voice and accept criticism from the grass-
roots is the first step to truly transforming the Rwandan state. Taking responsibility, acknowledging 
past transgressions and apologizing is first and foremost the duty of the state, particularly if the state 
in question considers itself an educator and a paragon of virtue such as Rwanda does.  
  
                                                          
1113
 Cf. interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara and Ansoms, 2011, 240-250. For earlier exam-
ples of disastrous top-down intervention in Rwandan agriculture, cf. C. & D. Newbury, 2000, 832-877. 
1114
 Interview with Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. 
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5. Politics of Reconciliation and Reconstruction in Burundi 
From Power Sharing to Single Party Rule – A Summary 
In contrast to the extensive chapter on reconciliation politics in Rwanda, this chapter will be rather-
short and focus mostly on the attempt to establish a TRC in Burundi. Burundi's reconciliation politics 
are primarily defined by their absence, a 'non-approach' so to say. The chapter will thus function as a 
summary with a pronounced emphasis on transitional justice whereas the other aspects of reconcili-
ation in Burundi will be mostly covered in the comparative part in chapter 6. 
The Arusha Peace and reconciliation agreement APRA has stipulated a 60/40 power sharing formula 
for Hutu and Tutsi, which led to parties becoming ethnically inclusive and a coalition government 
between CNDD-FDD, UPRONA and FRODEBU after the elections of 2005.On the national political 
level, this consociational solution has taken ethnic competition out of the equation. 
The power sharing agreement, combined with the fact that the last armed opposition movement 
FNL, still had to be convinced to lay down its arms, however, led to a political stalemate. All the par-
ties had been active in the civil war and as long as no party could be certain if transitional justice or 
commemoration would affect them adversely, they rather chose to stall and focused on expanding 
their influence. The country was in a state of stagnation that bordered political paralysis. Every party 
that had secured a place in the transitional government tried to safeguard its sinecures, effectively 
promoting corruption and crippling development1115. Consequentially, inter-party quarreling, corrup-
tion, and rent seeking increased, whereas assistance for the victims of the civil war, finding the truth 
or ending impunity were neglected.  
In the last decade, Burundi only had less violent episodes, but no actual peace. Human Rights Watch 
understands the transformation of the FNL into a political party in 2009 as the actual end of the civil 
war1116 but as soon as campaigning for the elections 2010 started, violence between political parties 
surged again1117. Frustrated by the behavior of political parties, most Burundians voted for the presi-
dent's party CNDD-FDD in order to end the bickering and to level the playing field. The communal 
elections resulted in a 65.5 percent-landslide victory of the CNDD-FDD, which prompted the opposi-
tion alliance ADC-Ikibiri to boycott the parliamentary and presidential elections. This resulted in over 
91.6 percent approval for Pierre Nkurunziza 1118. 
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 Cf. ICG, 2012. 
1116
 Cf. HRW, 2012,11. 
1117
 Cf. HRW, 2010. 
1118
 Cf. OAG, 2011; HRW, 2011 & 2012; Ligue Iteka 2011 & 2012. UPRONA and FRODEBU decided to take part in 
the parliamentary elections in order not to hand over the parliament to the CNDD-FDD without opposition. 
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Without checks and balances however, the CNDD-FDD quickly consolidated its authoritarian leanings 
and corruption as well as violence against the opposition continue to soar. Even though the CNDD-
FDD now commands over the absolute majority of seats in the National Assembly, the clear power 
relations still have not translated into good governance or a reprocessing of the past, except for the 
government's plan to establish a TRC1119. Violence and lawlessness are widespread throughout the 
country. The rampant corruption in the justice system is particularly grave because it makes fair and 
impartial transitional justice highly unlikely and establishes a culture of impunity where being impris-
oned is seen as “bad luck, victimization or ethnic prejudice rather than just retribution1120.” 
Immaculée stated: "from the day they started talking about transitional justice, they have done noth-
ing. She doesn’t know if the problem is the lack of willingness or it’s because of the unstable political 
situation, maybe they are still looking for positions, looking for stability where they are. Maybe after, 
they will start to do it but until now nothing was done1121.” 
 
5.1.   From “ethnic” to “political” Conflict  
5.1.1.  Power Sharing and Foot-dragging 
Differing Narratives 
One of the most obvious differences between post-genocide Rwanda and post-civil war Burundi is 
the absence of a dominant narrative such as the one of the RPF in Rwanda. Peace emerged from a 
brokered peace deal and power sharing negotiations that took from June 1996 until the elections of 
20051122 and necessitated sustained involvement by multiple international actors and from African 
political heavyweights Julius Nyerere, Nelson Mandela and Jacob Zuma. Without a definitive winner, 
the narratives of all sides remained intact and participants in Burundi often recount radically differing 
accounts of the past. This especially pertains to the question of genocide. Could the massacres in 
Burundi be characterized as genocide? In Burundi, both ethnic groups have been the victims of large-
scale massacres and depending if you speak with a Hutu or a Tutsi, an Upronist or a member of the 
ruling party, the views about which acts constitute genocide, or who the victims were, are often dia-
metrically opposed. The three most violent episodes in the north, the purge against the Hutu elite in 
1972, the massacres in Ntega and Marangara in 1988 and the civil war from 1993 on, were experi-
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 Cf. Chapter 5.2. 
1120
 Watt, 2008, 157. 
1121
 Interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1122
 Cf. Southall, 2006, 201-220. The PALIPEHUTU-FNL agreed to a ceasefire in 2006 and, renamed into FNL 
became a regular political party in 2008. Some remnants however still maintain an armed presence along the 
Burundian border with the DRC and take part in irregular raids. Cf. Vogel, Christoph: The evolving Landscape of 
armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, June 2014, on: http://christophvogel.net/mapping/ 
(July 23, 2014). 
Page 210 
 
enced radically different from community to community and by the various categories of partici-
pants. Whereas Hutus often downplay or justify the violence against Tutsi in the communities1123 in 
1988 and 1993, Tutsi often understate the violence against Hutu emanating from the military1124. 
There is a widespread consensus among Burundians that reconciliation is necessary. Many further-
more agree, at least hypothetically, that some form of justice, preferably restorative in nature1125, 
should be administered in order to leave the troubled past behind1126. Particularly participants critical 
of the current government expressed the desire that the members of the elite who were responsible 
for massacres should stand trial, but they still did not trust the impartiality of the justice system 
enough for a genuine process of transitional justice1127. Despite this general desire for justice, the 
opinions multiply in all directions as soon as the discussion approaches concrete measures.  
In many ways, this inconceivability of a clear strategy due to the plethora of perspectives, con-
straints, dangers and imponderables of Burundi’s sociopolitical reality parallels the foot-dragging of 
the Burundian political elite when it comes to justice and reconciliation. Burundi’s approach to rec-
onciliation politics and transitional justice has been shaped by tactical proceedings, cautious weigh-
ing of interests and extended risk calculations by all parties involved. The most important instru-
ments of national reconciliation stipulated by the APRA, the national truth and reconciliation com-
mission (Commission Vérité et Réconciliation - CVR) and the special tribunal, were not yet established 
during the time of my field work in 2011. Thus, some of my questions remained in the realm of the 
theoretical (e.g. “What do you think about the South African TRC as a model for Burundian transi-
tional justice?”). By design, the twin judicial and non-judicial mechanism would account for victim 
recognition and contribute to a shared understanding of history through the TRC. It would also com-
bat impunity and ascribe responsibility through the special tribunal. It is however highly questionable 
if the TRC would have any transformative potential in the current political climate of authoritarianism 
and insecurity. Furthermore, it has yet to be seen if the special tribunal will even be established1128.  
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 Cf. e.g. Interview with Gertrude, 46, Hutu refugee, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, 
“Gakombe”, Kirundo. 
1124
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Claver, 66, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Marie, 52, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, 
Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; 
1125
 Many Burundians were for a form of justice that would not upset the balance of power. Cf. e.g. Interview 
with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, «Rohero», Ngozi; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi. 
1126
 Cf. Comité de Pilotage, 2010, 62ff. 
1127
 Cf. e.g. Abel, 23, ex-combatant, « Rohero », Ngozi ; David, 28, ex-combatant, «Kamenge», Ngozi ;  Déogra-
tias, 59, Tutsi resident ; Ezechiel, 31 , ex-combatant, « Rohero », Ngozi ; Jacques, 26, Tutsi resident, 
« Gakombe », Kirundo ; Marie-Goreth, 33, Hutu resident, « Kamenge », Ngozi ; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, 
« Rohero », Ngozi. 
1128
 Cf. chapter 7.2. 
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5.1.2.  The Peace Process and Burundi’s consociational Arrangement 
The APRA 
In contrast to Rwanda, where the RPF emerged as the clear victor, the Burundian civil war between 
the Tutsi-dominated army and Hutu-dominated guerilla groups CNDD-FDD and FNL-PALIPEHUTU was 
settled in lengthy negotiations between multiple parties and a plethora of international actors. The 
first round of negotiations resulted in the negotiated Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
(APRA). On the 28th of August 2000, the APRA was signed, implementing a transitional government 
with subsequent elections; a formula of ethnic power-sharing; administrative, military- and judicial 
reform and an international military force provided mostly by South Africa as a guarantee for the 
implementation of the transition. Despite the main rebel movements CNDD-FDD and FNL not being a 
part of the agreement, the understandings of the APRA in 2000 built the foundation of Burundi’s 
post-conflict political system. It is also the backbone of its 2005 constitution. The agreement signed 
by the predominantly Tutsi 'G10'-alliance headed by UPRONA and the predominantly Hutu 'G7'-
alliance headed by FRODEBU arranges for a complex system based on proportionality, minority over-
representation, ethnic quota regulations with regard to the parliament, army and the government 
and makes arrangements for a grand coalition. The consociational system Lijphardt recommended 
for divided societies has never been as thoroughly implemented in Africa1129. Southall1130 considers 
the Arusha agreement a major achievement as a framework of reference, and considers its success 
to be intimately linked with the enormous multilateral diplomatic investment. The OAU and especial-
ly South Africa backed the peace process by deploying peacekeepers. The war lost most of its intensi-
ty when the biggest guerilla movement, the CNDD-FDD, joined the transitional government in 2003. 
In 2005, the CNDD-FDD and its leader Pierre Nkurunziza went on to win the national elections and in 
2006, the last remaining guerilla group, the FNL, joined the peace process1131. 
Ethnic Balance through Quota Regulations 
As part of APRA, Burundi has implemented a consociational system1132 that stipulated that certain 
national institutions had to mix Hutu and Tutsi in order to prevent the front lines of the civil war tak-
ing hold in post-conflict Burundi. The same stipulations applied to parties who wanted to register 
nationally. The APRA prescribes 60 percent Hutus and 40 percent Tutsis in the national assembly 
government, senate and the army, 67% Hutu / 33% Tutsi at the communal level1133.  
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 Cf. Lemarchand, 2006; Vandeginste, 2011, 193f.  
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 Cf. Southall, 2006, 218 
1131
 Cf. Prunier, 2009, 288f 
1132
 Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 1-20. 
1133
 APRA, 2000, Protocol II, 24ff. 
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In contrast to the Rwandan politics of national unity, which deny the very existence of ethnic identi-
ties, the Burundian constitution explicitly recognizes them. “The post-transition constitution is mark-
edly consociational, attempting as it does to combine majority rule with minority protection. This is 
achieved by classical instruments, such as minority over-representation, quota, and minority veto1134.“ 
By changing political competition from a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all into a perma-
nent grand coalition where policies have to be fair and appropriate to achieve a majority of Hutu and 
Tutsi, both present in legislative and executive according to fixed quotas, this approach balances 
ethnic interests. The specific ethnic quotas are of special importance in the army, which has been 
traditionally dominated by Tutsi and has always been the most erratic factor in Hutu-Tutsi relations. 
Due to the overrepresentation clause for the Tutsi minority in the constitution, traditionally Hutu-
dominated parties such as the CNDD-FDD started recruiting Tutsi representatives in the 2005 elec-
tions resulting in ethnically diverse political parties1135. Subsequently, the powerful ethnic fault lines 
that have dominated Burundian politics since 1965 lost a great deal of their populist attraction be-
cause the parties have to develop partnerships across ethnic lines to stand any chance in elections. 
Although the success of the Burundian consociational experiment is by no means certain in regard of 
the authoritarian and violent political culture that still has to assume primary accountability towards 
its citizens, its achievements regarding ethnic depolarization can indeed be seen as a possible alter-
native to Rwanda’s authoritarian policy of banning ethnical identities1136.  
Participant Views 
According to most of my participants, the quota regulations reduce ethnic tensions, but they do not 
eliminate them: "This is helpful because from what she sees, now it’s a bit better than during the past 
because now they are sharing the power there are Hutu and Tutsi in power1137.” Particularly the fact 
that one group can no longer dominate the other is appreciated: "From what she sees with the quota 
regulations, everybody has his place. And it should stay like that, because if there was no quota regu-
lation, like the big population, meaning the Hutu will discriminate the Tutsi, because they will be the 
big number1138." Critics however fear that the quotas provide the wrong, anti-meritocratic incentives 
"because they don’t really look on the competences of the person but only look on the ethnic 
group1139." Others claim that quota regulations and multipartyism have only been implemented on 
paper1140 or that political affiliation nowadays trumps ethnicity1141. The main criticism however is the 
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 Reyntjens: Briefing Burundi, 2005, 119 
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 Cf. Lemarchand, 2006, 7-12: Reyntjens, 2005, 119-133 
1136
 Cf. Lemarchand, 2006 15-16 
1137
 Interview with Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1138
 Interview with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1139
 Interview with Immaculée, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1140
 Cf. Interview with Candide, 50, Hutu resident, Ngozi. 
1141
 Cf. Interview with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
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same as with land disputes or party politics " Oui, il y a la réduction de l’ethnicité mais, il y a une 
chose qui reste le népotisme. On donne un poste à une personne à qui vous avez des relations ou il 
appartient à sa famille1142." In the eyes of a majority of participants, at least with regard to tempora-
rily changing the fault lines of conflict, the APRA seems succeeded: "Les éléctions de 2005... celles de 
2010, on a constaté que le gouvernement installée à partir de 2005, c'était un bon gouvernement 
puisque il y a...., il y a la cohésion sociale, même les Hutus, les Tutsis et les Twa sont représentés au 
pouvoir. Tout le monde est representé1143." 
Political Impact 1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident -0.8 0.6 -3 0.5 1.4
Tutsi N-C Resident 0.3 1.4 -2.4 1.6 1.2
Hutu Refugee 1.3 -0.8 -2.5 0.5 -0.3
Tutsi IDP / Refugee -0.2 0.3 -2.5 1.7 -0.3
Ex-Combatants -0.5 1.5 -0.3 4 1.3



















Burundi: Perceived Political Impact 
The diagram however shows clearly that hopes for more political impact peaked after the elections in 
2005, especially among ex-combatants. They were optimistic when the army was integrated and 
generally were disappointed after demobilization1144. Naturally, Hutu refugees felt devoid of impact 
before 2005. The gros of the population in 2011 were indifferent with regard to their own political 
impact with Hutu residents, the president's core constituency, slightly optimistic and Tutsi increasing-
ly pessimistic due to the CNDD-FDD's authoritarian tendencies and their isolation. 
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 Interview with David, 29, Hutu ex-combatant FAB, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Translation: "Yes, there is a reduction 
of ethnicity but what remains is nepotism. A post is handed out to a person with whom you have relations or 
who belongs to your family." 
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 Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, Gakombe. 
1144
 Cf. Interviews with ex-combatants Abel, 23, "Rohero"; Ezechiel, 31, "Rohero"; David, 29, "Kamenge"; Ale-
xandre, 35, "Kamenge". 
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Democracy 1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident -2.3 2.3 -4.3 1.8 1.5
Tutsi N-C Resident 0.3 0.9 -3.5 0.7 0.5
Hutu Refugee -2 1.3 -5 3 1.8
Tutsi IDP / Refugee 1.5 -2.8 -5 -1 -0.5
Ex-Combatant -0.8 2.8 -2 3.3 1.3
Bdi Average -1 1.4 -4.1 2.1 1.7  




















Despite the quota regulations, Tutsi, particularly IDPs, think that they lost influence in comparison to 
1988. Ex-combatants and Hutu refugees' confidence in democracy peaked in 2005 and diminished 
since. Hopes for democracy under CNDD-FDD-rule are fading in all groups except for Tutsi IDP's who 
always viewed it negatively. To many Hutu, Ndadaye was the big promise of democracy under Hutu-
rule. Nkurunziza disappointed them:"The thing they have in common, for Ndadaye and for Nkurunzi-
za is that they called the population and they voted for the president they wanted. But the difference 
is that Ndadaye, even if he ruled for only 3 months, during the period, there [were] no killings, nobody 
was killed. They didn’t hear about killings. But instead for Nkurunziza, since he is there people are 
being killed every day1145.” 
Despite the declining enthusiasm with regard to the economic situation and democracy, ethnic dis-
crimination seems not to be a conflict-defining issue anymore. Since 2005, ethnic representation has 
been stabilized. Hutu, particularly refugees however feel much more confident with their representa-
tion than Tutsi who were slightly happier with pre-war conditions. The authoritarian tendencies of 
the ruling party however risk upsetting the balanced system of 2005, as the approval curve wanes in 
both ethnic groups. Rwandans in general believe in the decreasing impact of ethnicity stronger.  
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 Interview with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
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Impact of Ethnicity 1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident 0.1 3 -2.4 3.2 3.2
Tutsi N-C Resident 3.9 1.6 -1.9 1.3 2
Hutu Refugee 0.5 -0.3 -5 1.5 4.5
Tutsi IDP / Refugee 1.8 -0.8 -2.5 2 0.7
Ex-Combatant -1.3 2.8 -1.3 0.8 0.3
















Impact of Ethnicity on Politics in Burundi 
5.2.  Burundi's Main Problems 
5.2.1. Poverty, Revenge and Impunity 
Poverty seems to be a much more determining conflict factor in Burundi. While Rwanda officially has 
replaced the ideology of ethnic discrimination with the ideology of national unity, but still under-
stands the conflict as “identity-based1146", the quota regulations in Burundi have cleared the view on 
the socioeconomic root causes of the conflict. In Rwanda, clever technocratic management, a care-
fully maintained image of meritocracy and sustained economic recovery cushion the public outrage 
about authoritarian tendencies and have made an extension of patronage to broad parts of society 
possible. The dismal economic performance and rampant corruption of Nkurunziza’s government, on 
the other hand, forced the CNDD-FDD to steadily reduce its patronage to its core constituency, main-
ly Hutu-peasants, leaving the application of force the only option open to deal with the opposition 
without conceding power, which would further reduce the free resources for patronage.  
Fortunately, the efforts to de-ethnicize Burundian politics from timid reforms during Buyoya’s 
reign1147 through the quota-system agreed upon in Arusha to the ethnic integration of the army in 
2006 did have a lasting effect so far. Arsène, a Tutsi teacher from “Gakombe” explains the difference 
between Ndadaye’s election and Nkurunziza’s first election as follows: “2005 it was not really... It 
was not only ethnical [sic], because even many Tutsi had been in the, the rebels.  They had been 
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 Shyaka, 2004, 8. 
1147
 Cf. Lemarchand, 1996, 118-120; 131-159 
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fighting in the bush, others had been giving money in the political party of the rebels, so most of them 
were, were really looking for something else than ethnic groups1148.” The increasing international 
pressure towards ethnic integration of the conflict parties revealed the political and economic un-
dercurrents of the ‘ethnic’ power struggle in Burundi. While the war did not threaten the economic 
dominance of the Tutsi elite, they knew that they had to co-opt Hutu in order not to become target-
ed by the new leadership. Thus, according to the International Crisis Group, the war “has increased 
corruption and favoured the rise of an ethnically diverse oligarchy1149.” Not only intellectuals, but an 
increasing number of peasants, start to think that ultimately, 'la crise' was political, not ethnic in na-
ture1150. At least from 2005 on, the conflict lines in Burundi shifted from ethnic groups to political 
parties, but even during the civil war, questions of politico-economic advantage and affiliation some-
times overwrote ethnicity. The most striking examples here are Ezechiel and Abel, two Tutsi from 
“Rohero” who joined the FNL despite its radical Anti-Tutsi leanings1151. David, a Hutu, joined the FAB 
in 19981152. Several life stories do not fit the ethnic stereotypes and instead point to politico-
economic motivations, such as Hutus who joined UPRONA and were persecuted by other Hutus 1153. 
Générose, representative for many Burundians, boils the problem down to its essence: "it's not eth-
nicity, almost everybody lacks money or food, everybody wants a piece of the pie!1154" 
Distrust in Politics and Revenge 
The perception of an elite pre-occupied with exploiting its position and dragging the population from 
one conflict into the other has led to both a certain resignation pertaining to politics and a rather 
paradoxical anti-political and anti-intellectual sentiment among many Burundians. On one side there 
is little to no sympathy for intellectuals and politicians even on one’s own side: many Hutus who 
were not personally affected by the massacres against Hutu students and intellectuals in 1972 speak 
of a “triage1155” against “bad people1156” or “abamenja1157” – traitors, people who “took money from 
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 Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo. 
1149
 Cf. ICG, 2012, i. 
1150
 Cf. e.g.  interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, 
Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, Hutu IDP, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Jacques, 26, Tutsi resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Juvénal H., 
53, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Marie, 52, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, 
“Kamenge”, Ngozi.Pascal, 54, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo.  
1151
 Cf. interviews with Abel, 23, ex-combatant, „Rohero“, Ngozi and Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, „Rohero“, 
Ngozi. 
1152
 Cf. interview with David, 28, ex-combatant, „Kamenge“, Ngozi. 
1153
 Cf. interviews with Ferdinand, 56, Hutu IDP, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Générose, 43, Hutu resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi. 
1154
 Interview with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi. 
1155
 Interviews with Juvénal H. 53, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Pascal M., 
29, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo. 
1156
 Interview with Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi. 
1157
 Interviews with Pascal, 54, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, 
Kirundo; Juvénal H. 53, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi. 
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the state1158”. Many peasants share a general distrust towards intellectuals and their motives1159 re-
gardless of their ethnicity. “Politics isn't there for the people but to make money1160” is a common 
opinion. Juvénal e.g. thinks that the lack of jobs makes intellectuals opt for politics1161.   
For most Burundians, the political parties are at the origin of every crisis. Déogratias believes that 
"the political parties are an obstacle to the development and the reconciliation of the country because 
they make us go backwards, we can’t even unite when they are not united1162." Many participants 
called for a grand coalition or even a single-party government because in their understanding, only a 
unified political elite could actually reconcile Burundi and start to benefit of the population instead of 
bickering and quarreling over the spoils of the state. In Arsène's eyes, “they are not reconciling the 
population. They are not reconciling until now and they belong to the political parties and when they 
are there, they don't have liberty of expression because if they talk, maybe they will have some prob-
lems from the political party in power and that is even the reason why some of them are being killed 
these days1163.” No reconciliation, no justice and a culture of impunity are the driving factors for re-
venge. Contrary to Rwanda where the genocide was only very rarely connected directly to the so-
called 'Hutu-revolution', many Burundians who witnessed the massacres in 1972, understood the 
violence in 1988 or 1993 as revenge for earlier massacres of the army: "it was because of ’72. People 
were angry about what happened in ‘72. And had kept it in their hearts, because he doesn’t see any-
thing else. Here they lived together in peace without problems1164.“ Juvénal H. concurs: " La crise de 
‘88,  c'était pour se venger les faits qui ont eu lieu en 1972. Oui, les gens, les personnes se lançaient 
des paroles en disant que: 'toi, tu as tué les Hutus à partir de '72. Tu ne le ferras plus, je pourrais 
même, même le faire avant toi!'1165" Etienne explains that the killings in "Kamenge" in 1994 hap-
pened for the same reasons as in "Gakombe" in 1988: "They didn’t kill them in '93 but when they 
were coming to kill them in '94, they said that they were taking revenge of what happened in '721166." 
Impunity breeds revenge. This is why the current corruption of the judicial apparatus is extremely 
dangerous for reconciliation in Burundi. “The big issue we have here is that impunity because if they 
don’t punish, then they’re like permitting people to commit crimes. So, for him they should sit and  
and first settle the truth about what happened, and then punish those, and then punish those who did 
                                                          
1158
 “…qui ont mangé les frais de l'état. On les a appelé les bamenja, abamenja” - Interview with Juvénal H. 53, 
Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo.  
1159
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Sadi, 45, Hutu resident, Kamenge, Ngozi; Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP. “Rohero”, Ngozi; 
1160
 Interview with Claver, 66, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi. 
1161
 Cf. Interview with Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi. 
1162
 Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge"., Ngozi. 
1163
 Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1164
 Interview with Fréderic, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1165
 Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo.  
1166
 Interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
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that1167.” The process of judicial reform however has been co-opted by the party in power in order to 
legitimate and facilitate its expansion of political power. 
Creeping Authoritarianism and Corruption 
The process of creeping authoritarianism is similar in Rwanda and Burundi. As soon as the ruling par-
ty firmly holds the reins of government like the RPF in 2000 and the CNDD-FDD in 2010, quotas and 
representative considerations become secondary and inconvenient. Expanding neo-patrimonial net-
works and ensuring or demonstrating loyalty quickly becomes more important than actual govern-
mental performance, when the party actually appoints and controls the officials, instead of their local 
constituency1168. The difference between Rwanda and Burundi here is one of discipline. The RPF 
takes technocratic performance seriously and works toward its 'Vision 2020' with great vigor. Ka-
game implemented the Imihigo performance contracts, which allows for the close monitoring of local 
authorities by the president and parliament1169. Rwanda has put much more effort into establishing a 
viable bureaucracy that respects the rule of law and punishes petty transgressions more severely 
than cash-strapped Burundi. Here, many officials and dignitaries are exempted from paying taxes and 
treat their functions as personal fiefdoms. Burundi currently ranks 157th of 177 countries in Trans-
parency International's corruption ranking (Rwanda ranks 49th)1170. Nepotism is widespread, while 
the party is mainly interested in getting its share. With the judiciary directly dependent on the execu-
tive, authorities practically act with impunity1171. Claver from "Rohero" states: "Politics isn't there for 
the people but to make money1172." Burundi established the nominal institutions like the Ombudsman 
to ensure accountability towards the population, and the Commission Nationale des Terres et autres 
Biens CNTB to settle land disputes between returning refugees and settlers to foster reconciliation. 
The government has also held national consultations on the establishment of a TRC. However, both 
the Ombudsman as well as the CNTB are considered corrupt and infiltrated by the governing party. 
"The Ombudsman, he is the person who is there for the population, he is understood by the govern-
ment, this is a good thing but the problem is that he is not neutral; he came from the political party 
on power, so if he was neutral, it would be better1173."  
With its dominance established, the leadership relapses into totalitarian behavior oriented towards 
the main objective of staying in power. This situation becomes even worse when the regime faces a 
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 Interview with  Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
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 Cf. Ingelaere, 2011, 67-78. 
1169
 Cf. IRDP, 2010b, 38-49. 
1170
 Cf. Transparency International, "Corruption by Country/ Territory: Burundi", 
http://www.transparency.org/country#BDI_DataResearch (14 September 2014). 
1171
 Cf. Ligue Iteka, 2011, 34-40. 
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 Interview with Claver, 66, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
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 Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
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crisis that threatens their access to the spoils of the state. Midlarsky1174 expounds that genocide be-
comes much more likely given a state’s experience and expectation of loss in the context of war and 
often is the extreme reaction of a cornered regime that feels existentially threatened. This happened 
in 1972 when Michel Micombero decided to ‘decapitate’ the whole Hutu elite in reaction to a locally 
limited insurrection in the South of Burundi. The same mechanism could also be applied to the 
MRND in Rwanda, which was fighting a war against an external enemy, while simultaneously being 
challenged by the domestic opposition.  Even the massacres in the DRC follow similar patterns as 
Rwanda and Burundi originally intervened to protect their borders (and thus the state they captured) 
as well as the Banyamulenge, the Tutsi settling in the Kivus. 
Fortunately, such an existential crisis is not yet acute even though Burundi does not seem to come to 
rest. Regarding the scaled questions, the trust in neighbors, government, the army and the police still 
seems to be intact even though it is declining.  
Trust in Army and Police
1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident -1.8 1.4 -3.2 2.3 2.8
Tutsi N-C Resident 2.4 3.1 1.7 1.7 1
Hutu Refugee -2.5 -2.8 -2.8 4.5 2.8
Tutsi IDP / Refugee 2.7 2.3 1.8 3.2 1.7
Ex-Combatant -1.3 2.3 -1.8 3.5 0.5



















Burundi: How much do you trust the army or the police? 
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 Cf. Midlarsky, 2006. 
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Trust in the Government
1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident 0.1 3.2 -3.4 2.4 2.7
Tutsi N-C Resident 2.9 0.9 -2.6 2.5 2
Hutu Refugee -2.8 -1.3 -5 5 3.3
Tutsi IDP / Refugee 3 -0.8 -3.3 3.2 1.7
Ex-Combatant -1.3 2 -3.3 3.3 0






















Burundi: How much do you trust the Government? 
 
5.2.2. Land Disputes 
When it came to power, Nkurunziza's government knew that in an agrarian country such as Burundi, 
land disputes are one of the main sources of civic unrest and crime. I however heard multiple stories 
of IDPs who couldn't return to their fields and the courts did nothing: "He has his land but he can’t go 
back there because they would kill him and even when he sends somebody to cultivate, they will send 
the shepherd with the cows and they will just destroy what he has cultivated. And even when he was 
trying to grow bananas and then they were destroying it before it grows up1175.“  Michel from Rohero 
recounts the same story of Hutu in the hills uprooting his crops before he is able to cultivate1176. Ara-
ble land is an extremely scarce and sought-after resource in Burundi, thus these problems are a ma-
ture source of grievance exacerbated by the years-long segregation during the civil war and the 
streams of returnees who come back after having fled in 1993 or even in 1972. 
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 Interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
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 Cf. Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
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Land disputes however do not only pertain to problems between returning refugees and settlers1177, 
most land disputes I encountered were within families but even here, the courts usually ruled in fa-
vor of the party that paid better, leaving returnees disgruntled. Abel, an ex-combatant, recounts: 
"The uncle and his father were sharing the same land, and they had never like, ah, shared it and di-
vide it. So he went to see him and ask him for land to cultivate. Then he was asking him that he 
doesn’t know him, that he is not one of the family, because if he was, he would have been there when 
his dad died. When his grandparents died, he would have been there. So he didn’t want to give him 
any land. He said, if you want you can go on justice and fight for it. But he knows that the, the uncle 
has money, so he will never get it, and he doesn’t have money to go to court. So when he was demo-
bilized, he took the money that they gave him and bought a, a land for him and that’s where [he is 
today]1178.” Similar stories of life-and-death disputes within families are frequent1179 and the hope to 
win one's case for the often-penniless returnees, ex-combatants or ex-convicts is mostly small. Sadi: 
"when he came back from prison, he found that his uncle had taken everything they had in the family 
especially the cows, and now he is richer from his father’s cows and he can’t ask for it, he has like 20 
cows and he can’t get them back and even when he tells people, nobody listens to him1180." 
Under such circumstances, the high hopes of returnees or ex-combatants are disappointed quickly 
and the poorest stay poor. In general, Burundians consider themselves poorer than before the crisis. 
The country stagnates. Tutsi, better off before the crisis, are hit harder by the adverse economic 
conditions than Hutu. Particularly IDPs without access to their fields and Hutu refugees who came 
from abroad still feel the repercussions of the civil war. 
Economic Situation 1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident 3.4 2.3 -3 1.3 1.3
Tutsi N-C resident 3.1 2.4 -1.9 -0.1 -0.8
Hutu Refugee 4.3 1.3 -4.3 1.5 0.3
Tutsi IDP / refugee 3.6 -0.2 -4.8 -2.2 -1.9
Ex-Combatant 0.8 4.3 -4.5 1.3 1.5
Bdi Average 3.2 2.1 -3.2 0.7 0.3  
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 Cf. E.g. Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
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 Interview with Abel, 23, ex-combatant "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1179
 Cf. Interviews with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, "Rohero", 
Ngozi;  
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 Interview with Sadi, 45, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. clean verbatim from translator who spoke about 


















Economic Situation in Burundi 
Considering these conditions, it is no surprise that returning refugees are viewed with suspicion and 
the divisions between the groups deepen once again. For Michel, the returning Hutu add nothing to 
the community, "the people who are returning most of them are western Hutu who are here. They 
are really bad people from what he says. They can’t live together1181.” Irankunda who was chased 
from her land during the civil was agrees: "It creates lands problems. People are coming from outside 
and on their land, there are other people who have lived there for years. Then they have to leave1182." 
For Izabel on the other hand, returning from Tanzania, the Tutsis do not want reconciliation: 
"L’ethnicité dura longtemps puisque les Tutsi ne veulent pas partager les mêmes opinions que les 
Hutu. Les Hutu veulent la réconciliation mais, les Tutsi ne veulent pas mêmes les déplacés ont préféré 
rester dans les camps alors que les Twa ont regagné leurs collines1183." It is easy to see how this situa-
tion breeds conflict and could easily be exploited by ethnic entrepreneurs. 
 
5.2.3.  Unresolved ethnic Fault Lines – Tutsi IDPs and Segregation 
“There can’t be any truth and reconciliation like he is living, he can’t forgive the people who have 
wronged him when the house he lives in is about to fall down, when he doesn’t know where he will 
live in a few days. So for him, if the government doesn’t help him, he can’t think of forgiving those 
people. Maybe, if they could help him then, if he's not hungry, if he know what he has, where to live, 
he could think of forgiving them but he doesn’t understand how they ask him to forgive when he, he is 
still in the poverty they put him into1184.” 
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 Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1182
 Interview with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
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 Interview with Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
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 Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, „Kamenge“, Ngozi. 
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The discrimination of Hutu before 1993 was very pronounced in Burundi. Mwakikagile speaks of 
“black apartheid1185” and its after-effects are still perceptible in the expressions of older interview-
ees. Etienne R. for example, an old Tutsi farmer who used to own a lot of land, speaks of “Umuhutu 
wanyje1186” – my Hutu, and Thérèse, a peasant from “Gakombe” recounted: “Les Tutsis étaient nés 
pour gouverner, tandis que les Hutus étaient au service des Tutsis. […], c’est à dire chez les Tutsis, il y 
avait une discrimination puisqu'ils ne se partagaient pas les mêmes gobelets. Même s'il y avait la 
bière locale on devrait utiliser le gobelet pour donner les Tutsis. Ils ne partageaient pas les mêmes 
chalumeaux1187.“ The story about the different cups for Hutu and Tutsi was told almost identically by 
Izabel in "Kamenge1188". For Déogratias, the discrimination started with Micombero: "During colonial 
times, there were no social differences between Burundians, then maybe it started after independ-
ence when started the republic with the Prince Louis Rwagasore, then after the republic that’s when 
they started that the Tutsi were leading when the Hutu were not leading. And then that’s when the 
problems started but then in 71-72 that is when he started working and that is when the problems 
started in 721189.” In 1972, Micombero and the Tutsi-dominated army killed almost every educated 
Hutu, down to high school students: “They were taking only the people who were educated. Grown-
up people in secondary school, and then business men and even those who are working in the offices. 
Those were the ones who were taken […] Everybody was taken to the car [truck] and then later on, 
they learned that they had died1190.” Hutus were discriminated before, but then they were slaugh-
tered like cattle to prevent a counter-elite from forming1191. According to my participants cited 
above, this started the cycle of violence: the oppressed Hutu majority against the oppressive Tutsi 
minority. 
The civil war has reversed these conditions. With the election of Pierre Nkurunziza, many rural Hutu 
considered their cause fulfilled and often, Hutu rebels actually self-demobilized voluntarily1192. Large-
ly, ethnicity does not concern them anymore because the two biggest parties in conflict over power 
with each other, the CNDD-FDD and the FNL, both emerged from Hutu rebel movements. Thus, the 
principal issue that complicated their relationships with their Tutsi neighbors, ethnic discrimination, 
is gone. The main grievance Hutus still seem to have with Tutsi in Burundi is that groups of Tutsi IDPs 
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 Mwakikagile, 2013, 107 
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 Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi. 
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 Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo. Translation: “The Tutsi were born to rule 
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 Interview with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
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have settled in the administrative centres and represent a source of unrest there. The hope that the 
IDPs would retun to their hills – "[…]que les déplacés regagnent leurs terres1193" was uttered fre-
quently. 
Many Hutu peasants nowadays are relatively content with the power relations in the country and its 
leadership. They support Nkurunziza because he is a down-to-earth, devout Christian, because he 
introduced free health care for pregnant women and infants, and especially because he is a Hutu. 
When asked whom she voted for, Venantie K. exclaimed enthusiastically: "it’s the CNDD-FDD, the 
political party in power. As they see that now there is peace, it’s better than before. They chose the 
political power, the political party in power1194.”  
 
5.2.4. Differences between Research Sites 
Whereas the interethnic relations slowly ameliorate in "Gakombe" and "Kamenge" because Tutsi 
IDPs slowly return to their fields, the situation in "Rohero", the ex-camp predominantly inhabited by 
Tutsi IDPs and Upronists remains dire. Here, the emotional conviction of having lost the war and liv-
ing under siege-conditions permanently is most pronounced. Particularly the fear of the Imboneraku-
re, the CNDD-FDD's youth wing, is widespread: "And if you go out at night most of the time they can 
be killed by Imbonerakure […] that are working here. They’re supposed to work for the security in our 
country but they are the ones who kill them and also the documentation here in Burundi… During 
nights that’s when they start working and if they find you and they don’t know you, they will kill 
you1195.” 
Considering the differing ethnic narratives of the conflict and a lack of exchange, both narratives 
reinforce themselves within their respective communities. Fears and conspiracy theories become 
'mythico-history' in segregated communities.  
Lasting ethnic segregation leading to increasingly radicalized views is one of the biggest problems for 
reconciliation in Burundi. As with Rwandan survivors, Tutsi are overrepresented in the Burundian 
sample. „Rohero“evidently demonstrates a heavy overrepresentation of Tutsi views (75 percent) 
whereas Tutsi participation in „Kamenge“(18.75 percent) and „Gakombe“ (14.2 percent) come closer 
to the commonly cited statistical estimation of 14-15 percent. As in Rwanda, people who were dis-
placed by atrocities or lost family members are the ones most likely to harbor revanchist feelings. 
Tutsi, having lost their privileged status, risk becoming marginalized if Nkurunziza follows through 
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with his plans to alter the constitution1196. Thus, in “Rohero”, where ethnicized interpretations of the 
past and the feeling of having lost influence and property in the civil war seemed to be more preva-
lent, an overrepresentation of Tutsi-views appeared reasonable.  
As in Malkki’s1197 research site Mishamo, exclusive mythico-historical identities and narratives were 
preserved in this isolated and strongly homogenous community. For some residents, the narrative of 
Tutsi-discrimination even included a continued plan for extermination against the Tutsi: "from what 
is happening today, if it doesn’t change, the minority will disappear one day. There will be no more 
Tutsi people1198." Should the political conflict in Burundi once again come to involve an ethnic dimen-
sion, communities such as "Rohero" would form a reservoir for potential fighters not unlike the refu-
gee camps in Tanzania did during the civil war. Desperate Hutus such as Alexandre1199 and 
Dominique1200, recruited in camps abroad, built the backbone of the rebel movements whereas the 
national army recruited the youth of badly affected Tutsi IDP-settlements, such as Abel and Ezechiel 
from "Rohero" 1201. Such communities of disenfranchised Tutsi thus also run a higher risk of becoming 
targets for militias such as the Imbonerakure sent to repress rebellion. In order to heal Burundi, the 
suffering and economic hopelessness of communities such as "Rohero" has to be alleviated and seg-
regation has to be reversed by providing security for everybody. 
The assumption that views radicalize in isolation has been strongly affirmed by the statements of 
Tutsi in “Rohero” as well as Hutu participants in “Kamenge” demanding that the IDPs return to their 
hills, considering their continued presence and concentration in the center as one of the main obsta-
cles to peace1202. The deviating views in “Rohero” are also reflected in the answers to the scaled 
questions, particularly with regard to transitional justice and the economic situation. 
Scaled Questions 1988 1993 election 1993 crisis 2005 2011
Gakombe, Kirundo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.2
Rohero, Ngozi 0 0 0 -0.2 -0.6
Kamenge, Ngozi 0 0 0 1 0.5
Bujumbura & Ngozi 0 0 0 1.5 0
Burundi Average 0 0 0 0.6 0.3Approval of Transitional Justice  
                                                          
1196
 Cf. Reuters: US Urges Burundi to Drop Constitution Changes, Avoid ‘Dark Days’, 8. April 2014, on: 
http://www.voanews.com/content/reu-us-urges-burundi-to-drop-constitution-changes-avoid-dark-
days/1889081.html (10. April 2014) 
1197
 Malkki, 1995, 197 ff. 
1198
 Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1199
 Cf. Interview with Alexandre, 46, ex-combatant CNDD-FDD, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1200
 Cf. Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Dominique wanted to join the rebels 
in a Rwandan camp but changed his mind after absolving the initial trainings. 
1201
 Cf. Interviews with Abel, 23 and Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatants FAB and FNL from "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1202
 Cf. Interview with Venantie, 69, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi. 
Page 226 
 
Scaled Questions 1988 1993 election 1993 crisis 2005 2011
Gakombe, Kirundo 3.2 1.2 -2.7 1.2 0.7
Rohero, Ngozi 3 2.5 -3.5 -0.7 -0.7
Kamenge, Ngozi 3.3 2.4 -3.7 1.7 1.5
Bujumbura & Ngozi 4 4 0.5 1 1
Burundi Average 3.2 2.1 -3.2 0.8 0.6Economic Situation
 
This feeling of discrimination is also reflected in the ratings for human rights and democracy, which 



































Respect for Human Rights
1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident -2.3 1.3 -4.8 2.2 2.3
Tutsi N-C Resident 2 0.8 -4.1 1.1 1
Hutu Refugee 0 -0.3 -5 3 3.3
Tutsi IDP / Refugee 2.7 0.0 -4.2 2.7 -0.8
Ex-Combatant 0.5 3.8 -1.3 2.5 1.0
Bdi Average -0.2 1.1 -4.3 2.2 1.7  
 
Democracy
1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu N-C Resident -2.3 2.3 -4.3 1.8 1.5
Tutsi N-C Resident 0.3 0.9 -3.5 0.7 0.5
Hutu Refugee -2 1.3 -5 3 1.8
Tutsi IDP / Refugee 1.5 -2.8 -5 -1 -0.5
Ex-Combatant -0.8 2.8 -2 3.3 1.3
Bdi Average -1 1.4 -4.1 2.1 1.7
 
These diagrams indicate that Tutsi in Burundi feel proportionally more disadvantaged in the post-
conflict period and among them, IDPs assess the state of their current situation even more negative-
ly. In order to implement a successful reconciliation policy, IDPs have to be understood as a separate 









































With regard to choosing anonymity, there is a slight correlation between ethnic identity and the fear 
of disclosure. If we only count the cases with clearly assignable1203 ethnic identity (27 Hutus, 18 Tutsi, 
1 Twa), we can say that Tutsi (8 out of 18 participants =44.4 percent) rather chose some form of ano-
nymity than Hutu (6 out of 27=22.2 percent). In the two 'mixed' communities of „Gakombe” (12 of 14 
participants=85 percent) and „Kamenge“ (12 of 16 participants=75 percent) chose open public ac-
cess.. In „Rohero“ however, people were more prudent and only 9 out of 16 participants (56.25 per-
cent) chose open public access. 60% of Tutsi in „Rohero“ chose some form of anonymity (6 out of 
10=60 percent). In all probability, this is related to feelings of discrimination, marginalization, and 
distrust in the government, also expressed in the scaled questions. Among all Burundian Tutsi inter-
viewed, the IDPs further stand out (4 out of 5=80 percent choosing some form of anonymity) as par-
ticularly prudent. The six Hutu interviewees choosing to protect their identity were all residents, 
thus, as with Rwandan returnees, one could say that former Hutu refugees feel secure in the country 
and represented by its leadership. 
Regarding the 14 people who protected their anonymity in Burundi, six of them (42.8 percent) en-
joyed a higher education. These six participants are equivalent to 54.5 percent (6 out of 11=54.5 per-
cent) of all participants with a higher education. This number again hints at of the political character 
of violence in Burundi today. Educated people and community leaders have to fear more than ordi-
nary peasants do. 
  
                                                          
1203
 Excluding the interviews with Sadi (“Kamenge”) and Marie M. (“Gakombe“). 
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5.3.  Transitional Justice in Burundi: A Matter of Timing 
A judicial Stalemate 
In Burundi, practical efforts to set up institutions for transitional justice have been stalled from the 
very beginning1204 despite being stated policy. The stalemate derives mostly from the immense diffi-
culty of reaching a negotiated political settlement. The parties are very reluctant to jeopardize the 
fragile short-term stability by dealing with the violent past1205. Vanderginste however maintains that 
Burundi is more stable and peaceful than ever before in the last fourteen years despite refusing to 
deal with its violent past1206. Criticizing the lack of popular consultation on matters of transitional 
justice, he raises the fundamental question if an outcome of such a consultative process that “fa-
vours peace, stability and a return to normalcy instead of establishing accountability mechanisms, 
prosecuting and punishing1207” would even be acceptable to the international community. 
Regarding their attitude towards justice, not only the elite but also the population itself is deeply 
divided. As Ingelaere suggests, “a fundamental decision needs to be made between ‘digging up the 
past’ or ‘burying the past’1208.” Whereas a majority would like to leave the past behind, most Burun-
dians consider the unfettered impunity and the violent political culture the scourge of the country. 
Many participants are torn between longing for peace, closure and forgiveness on one side and un-
derstanding the necessity of punishment as a preventive measure for future violence on the other. 
Particularly because the reason for the mass killings of Tutsi in 1988 (Ntega-Marangara) and 1993 is 
commonly interpreted as the Hutu’s “revenge1209” for 1972 and the killing of ‘their’ president 
Ndadaye, the correlation between impunity and the resurgence of violence is crystal clear to every 
Burundian. Thus, many interviewees such as Thérèse waver with their assessments of forgiving and 
justice: ”Il faut pardonner les gens. Même en dieu, il nous donne pardon. S'il faut punir, on punira 
beaucoup de personnes.” Interviewer : “Et vous [ne] croyez pas que punir les gens aide à la réconcilia-
tion? “ T.: “Ça pourrait aider. Puisque ca donnait... s'il y a une sanction, [ça] donnait un modèle pour 
les autres. Même ceux qui n'ont pas encore commis une faute vont craindre si, s'ils vont commettre 
ca, ils seront aussi punis1210.“  
                                                          
1204
 Cf. ICTJ, http://www.ictj.org/en/where/region1/512.html (19.10.2010) 
1205
 Cf. Vanderginste, 2007, 3f. 
1206
 Cf. Vanderginste, 2007, 26 
1207
 Cf. Vanderginste, 2007, 26 
1208
 Ingelaere, 2009, 5. 
1209
 E.g. Interviews with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi Res, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, “Gakombe”, 
Kirundo; Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Fréderic, 59, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”; Juvénal H., Hutu 
resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Générose, 43, Hutu resident, 
“Rohero”, Ngozi. 
1210
 Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo. 
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This dilemma is strongly reflected and even exacerbated on the political level. This is mainly because 
many of the power holders of the civil war are still active in politics and a thorough judicial investiga-
tion into the pasts of many Burundian politicians and parties might still destabilize the fragile peace. 
Thus, transitional justice is mainly limited to land issues and even there, the apparatus is corrupt and 
slow as some of my interviews revealed1211. 
5.3.1.  The cautionary Tale of Burundi’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The establishment of the CVR in Burundi is the perfect example of how the Burundian government 
deferred the implementation of mechanisms of transitional justice that could eventually reveal in-
convenient truths about the current leaders of the country and their possible implications in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, particularly during 'la crise'. However, equipped with a factual 
monopoly on power after its smashing electoral victory in 2010, the CNDD-FDD has suddenly become 
interested in decisively pushing matters of transitional justice forward and working through the vari-
ous episodes of mass killing in Burundi. This has not always been the case. 
The establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission1212 and an international tribunal for 
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes1213 (should a UN inquiry find any evidence of such 
crimes) was already stipulated in the APRA. The implementation of these articles was however re-
peatedly re-negotiated, postponed and delayed for over a decade, thus the question of what might 
effect such a sudden shift of opinion in the last few years becomes particularly interesting. According 
to Vandeginste, there are three main reasons for this peculiar timing for launching the TRC: the prior-
itization of the peace process over transitional justice, the shift in the negotiated power equilibrium 
after 2010 and the decreasing influence of international actors1214. 
Nevertheless, before we analyze the reasons behind the eventual launch of the CVR, it is important 
to understand the long and arduous history of its establishment. Listed below is a timeline marking 
the most important developments with regard to its implementation in the past fifteen years1215:  
28. August 2000 the APRA stipulates for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and a UN commission of inquiry to “establish an international 
criminal tribunal to try and punish those responsible should the findings of the 
                                                          
1211
 Cf. Interviews with Abel, 23, ex-combatant FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohe-
ro", Ngozi; See chapter 5.2.2. 
1212
 Cf. APRA, 2000, Art. 6 (11), 18 
1213
 Cf. APRA, 2000, Art. 8, 22  
1214
 Vandeginste, 2012, 355-365. 
1215
 Cf. Vandeginste, 2011 & 2012; IRIN News Africa, Justice in a lawless World, June 2006, 
http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=7&ReportId=59485. (July, 25 2014) 
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report point to the existence of acts of genocide, war crimes and other crimes 
against humanity.1216” 
28. October 2001 the provision of the twin judicial mechanism (CVR and special court) is inte-
grated into the transitional constitution 
July 2002 President Buyoya formally requests the establishment of an international 
judicial commission of inquiry. 
November 2003 the General Ceasefire Agreement (GCA) with the CNDD-FDD is signed. 
January 2004 the government approves of an UN assessment mission. 
December 2004 Legislation for the establishment of a TRC is passed. 
2004-2005 the UN sends an assessment mission to investigate the feasibility of establish-
ing transitional justice mechanisms. Their report, submitted in May 2005, 
recommends the establishment of transitional justice mechanisms as fore-
seen in APRA, but proposes a hybrid national-international commission and a 
special chamber within the Burundian court system. 
20. June 2005 the UN Security Council Resolution 1606 backs the creation of the TRC and a 
Special Chamber of the Burundian court system modeled after the Bosnian 
war crimes chamber. 
2005-2007 the UN and the Burundian government negotiate about the implementation 
of the “Kalomoh report” of the assessment mission. Particularly the ques-
tions of amnesty prohibition, the relationship between the commission and 
tribunal as well as the degree of autonomy of the tribunal’s prosecutor be-
come the subjects of long disputes1217. The investigative independence of the 
prosecutor and the possibility of amnesties are still unresolved as of 20131218. 
12. December 2006 Burundi submits its “Plan Prioritaire pour la Consolidation de la Paix1219„ 
which declares impunity and the absence of public institutions for memory 
work to be the main obstacles for national reconciliation. 
November2007 the government and the UN discontinue their negotiations and commission a 
tripartite steering committee (Comité de Pilotage) to hold national consulta-
tions about the establishment of the TRC and special tribunal. The committee 
consists of state representatives Festus Ntanyungu and Francoise Ngendaha-
yo, representatives of civil society Joseph Ndayizeye and Eularie Nibizi and 
Ismaël A. Diallo for the UN (represented through UNHCHR and BINUB)1220.  
                                                          
1216
 APRA, 2000, Art. 6, 18. 
1217
 Cf. Vandeginste,  2011. 
1218
 Cf. Amnesty International, Burundi: Annual Report 2013, on: 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-burundi-2013 (March 6, 2014). 
1219
 Comité de Pilotage, 2010, 10. 
1220
 Cf. CSVR, Justice in Perspective, October 2011, http://webfactory.co.za/csvr/csvr/africa/burundi/80-
country/mechanism/431.html (25 July 2014). 
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4. December 2008 the last remaining rebel movement, the FNL agrees to a cease-fire in the CCA. 
20. April 2010 the tripartite Committee completes its report. It concludes that Burundians 
would desire a mixed truth commission with local and international person-
nel examining the period between 1962 and 2008 (“up to present”). Accord-
ing to the consultations, more than 80% of Burundians desire a judicial pro-
cess through the establishment of a hybrid special tribunal (with a preference 
for Burundian judges). Furthermore, the population expresses the wish for 
broad mandates and reparations1221.  
28. June 2010 the CNDD-FDD wins the presidential, parliamentary and communal elections 
with strong majorities, also due to the boycott by the opposition.  
December 2010 the tripartite Committee submits its Report to the UN and the President. 
2010 President Nkurunziza commissions a Technical Committee to prepare the 
establishment of transitional justice mechanisms. 
26. July 2011  President Nkurunziza announces the launch of the TRC for 20121222. 
October 2011 the Technical Committee submits its report, which rather downsizes interna-
tional involvement and proposes an essentially national TRC composed of 11 
Burundian members that is to select its cases independently. The mandate 
emphasizes truth telling more than justice and suggests that an eventual tri-
bunal should only start its work after the TRC fulfilled its mandate1223. 
17. April 2014 the CNDD-FDD pushes through the launch of the TRC. FRODEBU as well as 
UPRONA boycott the vote1224.  
3. December 2014 the Burundian parliament, boycotted by the opposition, elects the eleven 
members of the CVR under the leadership of Catholic bishop Jean Louis Na-
himana and Anglican archbishop Bernard Ntahoturi.The establishment of a 
special chamber of the Burundian court system is still uncertain.  
The participation in the national consultations on reconciliation and justice was massive. 3887 of 
4837 invited participants took part1225. The participants were however only asked to rate the already 
proposed mechanisms. They were neither asked if they favored other strategies nor encouraged to 
contribute to solutions themselves. 
Before 2012, the party factually pursued a strategy of ‘forgiving and forgetting’, bypassing the UN’s 
prohibition of amnesties through sophisticated mechanisms, even though the official rhetoric has 
                                                          
1221
 Cf. CSVR, Justice in Perspective, October 2011, http://webfactory.co.za/csvr/csvr/africa/burundi/80-
country/mechanism/431.html (25 July 2014); Comité de Pilotage, 2010. 
1222
 Cf. ReliefWeb, Burundi slates truth and reconciliation panel for 2012, 27. July 2011, 
http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-slates-truth-and-reconciliation-panel-2012 (25 July 2014) 
1223
 Cf. Vandeginste, 2012, 362-364. 
1224
 Cf. Nduwimana, Burundi creates reconciliation body that divides public opinion, 18. April 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-burundi-politics-idUSBREA3H0E020140418 (July 23, 2014);   
1225
 Cf. Comité de Pilotage, 2010.64. 
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promised a truth and reconciliation commission and a special court since the APRA of 2000 and never 
spoke of an amnesty for war crimes1226. The newest development is that a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has been established, but its members have been picked by the president, stirring up 
fear among members of the opposition that the CVR will leave members of the ruling party un-
touched and corroborate impunity1227. Contrary to the suggestions of the UN, the TRC to be launched 
is also strictly national, with its commissioners to be picked by president Nkurunziza himself. In the 
worst case, the CNDD-FDD will imitate the RPF’s strategy and use the TRC to discredit its political 
opponents, alienating its remaining partners FRODEBU and UPRONA. 
 
5.3.2. Justice or Forgiving and Forgetting? 
Values and Institutions 
In the national consultations about the appointment of a TRC and a special tribunal 83,39 percent of 
participants said that a judicial mechanism for grave crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity would be necessary1228. The profound disappointment with the establishment of 
functioning institutions of transitional justice is even shared by the UN. In 2005, the then Secretary-
General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, wrote to the president of the UN Security Council: "Three 
United Nations commissions of inquiry have been established in the last decade at the request of the 
Government of Burundi… No legal or practical effect, however, has been given to any of their recom-
mendations, and no action has been taken by any of the United Nations organs1229." 
Contrary to the national consultations about the establishment of the TRC and Special Tribunal1230, 
many Burundians I spoke to would prefer an international tribunal to a national court because they 
fear that a national tribunal would be dependent on and influenced by political powerholders such as 
the justice system today1231. Immaculée was one of the only participants in favor of Burundian judg-
es, but even she said, "if it’s not possible, they should take the international tribunal1232.” Supporters 
of president Nkurunziza in general are much less enthusiastic about transitional justice than others. 
In their eyes, people should forget the past because the advantages have turned their way recently 
                                                          
1226
 Cf. Vandeginste, 2011, 189-211.  
1227
 Cf. Nduwimana, Burundi creates reconciliation body that divides public opinion, 18. April 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-burundi-politics-idUSBREA3H0E020140418 (July 23, 2014). 
1228
 Cf. Comité de Pilotage, 2010, 62. 
1229
 IRIN News, Justice in a lawless World? Righs and Reconciliation in a new Era of International Law, June 
2006, on: http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=7&ReportId=59485 (July 25, 2014). 
1230
 Comité de Pilotage, 2010 
1231
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Abel,23, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; David, 29, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", 
Ngozi; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, 
Hutu refugee, "Rohero", Ngozi; Hari, 50, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Ka-
menge", Ngozi. 
1232
 Cf. Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
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and they consider the conflict resolved. Nevertheless, even among the critics of the government, the 
focus of transitional justice rather rests on restorative justice with a strong communal focus on co-
habitation and the acknowledgement of suffering which would actually strengthen social cohesion. In 
general, participants long for judicial institutions helmed by people of integrity like the Bahinganta-
he1233-counsels used to be before and (in some cases) during the civil war. These courts, committees 
of wise men in small communities, were seen as mediators and as a source of peace and unity on the 
local level. Their possible reinstatement as a tradition-based approach similar to Gacaca was dis-
cussed in the APRA, but they have not been installed officially as of today. Ingelaere1234 has examined 
the opinions of the local population with regard to the Bashingantahe-counsels and learned that 
people distinguished between the set of values the Bashingantahe represented, the Ubushinganta-
he, and the Bashingantahe as a concrete an institution. The counsels were generally seen as sources 
of peace and social cohesion. Their values were beyond reproach. However, particularly Hutus and 
ex-rebels challenged their legitimacy because some Bashingantahe were implicated in 'la crise'. Bu-
rundians' trust in institutions as such is shattered, but they long for people who embody the tradi-
tional values, the Ubushingantahe such asrighteousness, integrity, sociableness, sagacity, compas-
sion, social cohesion, coherence, faithfulness, transparence and justice1235. These are exactly the 
values, which Burundians do not see in most of their politicians. "What Burundi needs is true people 
who can sit and work on justice, people are punished, or are advised. They give a lot of lessons, then it 
would work. But if we go on building our country on lies it won’t work1236.”  
In his discussion of the Bashingantahe-counsels, Ingelaere concludes that rather than a reprocessing 
of the troubled past through new institutions such as Bashingantahe-counsels, Burundians would 
wish for a revitalization of universal Burundian values in their institutions,values which would place 
the needs of the many above the needs of the few. Mere transitional justice will fail here but "gen-
eral socio-economic and typical development related initiatives can facilitate these expectations1237." 
Access to Donor Funding 
From the perspective of Burundian peasants, symbolic acts of justice and reconciliation (e.g. sharing 
beer) combined with communal assistance to facilitate cohabitation, and a reform of the justice sys-
tem that fights the current culture of impunity makes much more sense than pouring international 
funding into a donor basket for transitional justice as stipulated in Burundi's 'Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper'1238. Regarding the international prohibition of amnesties for crimes against humanity, 
                                                          
1233
 Translation: "wise men". The militants oft he UPRONA used to call themselves Bashingantahe as well. 
1234
 Cf. Ingelaere, 2009. 
1235
 Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 12f. 
1236
 Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1237
 Ingelaere, 2009, 116. 
1238
 Cf. Vandeginste, 2012, 361f. 
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war crimes and genocide, the government however is obligated to implement transitional justice in 
order to access the money1239. Thus, an internationally funded TRC that acts on the wishes of the 
CNDD-FDD-dominated government is much more likely than respecting the desire of the population 
to move on. Such a donor-investment will probably increase the international legitimacy of the ruling 
party and provide much-needed jobs for the elite. However, given the context of single party domi-
nance in its implementation, it will most likely have a divisive effect on the peasantry, which, at least 
in non-segregated areas is already on the way devising non-violent ways of interethnic coexistence 
without governmental interference.  
Burying the Past 
Contrary to these current developments, a majority of Burundian peasants would be content to ‘bury 
the past’1240. Although generally ready to reconcile, great parts of the population have resigned from 
expecting justice after decades of impunity. Particularly the (Hutu-) government supporters and the 
peasant-women I spoke to do not believe anything good could come from reviewing the injustices of 
the past again1241. Resistance against forgiving and forgetting was mostly submitted from the side of 
isolated Tutsi, e.g. in “Rohero”, the factual losers of the civil war. These Tutsi and Upronists have 
been internally displaced and many claim to still being discriminated against1242. The longer the gov-
ernment waits to address the wrongs of the past, the further they will get marginalized and subse-
quently radicalized. For many Tutsi IDPs, transitional justice is necessary if they want to get back their 
lands. Thus for them, any kind of commemoration or symbolic reconciliation without justice is ulti-
mately worthless1243. 
The resignation, respectively the popularity of a ‘clean slate’-approach probably has its roots in the 
war-weariness of the population and the political postponement of any meaningful measures until 
more than a decade after the APRA had been signed. Many Burundians are fed up with being disap-
pointed by halfhearted attempts to establish mechanisms of reconciliation and transitional justice 
                                                          
1239
 Cf. Vandeginste, 2011; Ingelaere, 2009, 18. 
1240
 Cf. Ingelaere, 2009. 
1241
 Cf. interviews with Abel, 23, ex-combatant, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Ferdinand, 56, Hutu IDP, “Rohero”, Ngozi; 
Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, „Kamenge“, Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Madeleine, 54, Twa, 
„Kamenge“, Ngozi; Marie M., 80, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Marie C., Hutu resident, 55, “Gakombe”, 
Kirundo; Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirundo; Odette, 25, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, Kirun-
do; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Venan-
tie, 35, Hutu resident, „Kamenge“, Ngozi; Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Egide, 50, Tutsi IDP. 
“Rohero”, Ngozi; Fréderic, 59, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Sadi, 45, Hutu resident, Kamenge, Ngozi; 
Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi. 
1242
 Cf.e.g. interviews with Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, “Gakom-
be”, Kirundo; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Irankunda  
1243
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, “Ka-
menge”, Ngozi; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Léocadie, 72, Tutsi IDP, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Maniriho, 
32, Tutsi IDP, “Rohero”, Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”, Ngozi. 
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A further question to be posed would be where and when to begin and how to make amends. There 
are still thousands of Hutus such as Hari from "Kamenge", who are waiting for justice for their rela-
tives killed in 1972. However, the government is not the same as 1972 and there are no funds for 
reparations… While Rwanda might have alienated parts of its Hutu population with its strict albeit 
one-sided approach to justice, impunity is a cancer that gnaws at Burundi's social fabric. “The prob-
lem we still have here is that people are hungry, they are greedy, they want what others have, so they 
are still killing other people because they want to steal what they have and you can find like a family 
who has been killed. The following day, they go file a report to the governor, saying that people have 
been killed here and they were killed by thieves1244.” 
Pro Justice 
Both Burundians and Rwandans mainly blame their elites for causing the conflicts and view rural 
perpetrators as "people who just follow1245", as 'small fish'. The consensus among many participants 
is that local perpetrators have to be punished in order to combat impunity and prevent further mas-
sacres because they knew what they were doing. Statements that address the need to punish the 
complicity of ordinary people such as "I had to be punished because I followed others to kill1246” or 
"the nation should show all the people that when you did that, you were punished like that because 
the only thing Burundians fear is the punishment1247" are very common in both countries. The ex-
tremist politicians and intellectuals however are clearly identified as the main culprits1248. Even intel-
lectuals such as Arsène advise to “punish the leaders because the small population they are, most of 
them, everybody is illiterate. So they are somehow not conscious of what they are, they are 
ing.1249.” This emphasis on elite-guilt allows the rural population to detach the perpetrator from the 
deed and thus to hope for renewed peaceful coexistence: "it helps us as we know that was the rule of 
Hutu to kill. We can´t blame them, we have to forgive them1250.” (Hutu-)supporters of the current 
Burundian government such as Marie M., Izabel, Janvière, Madeleine, Marie C., Odette, Ferdinand, 
Venantie or Thérèse in general place much more emphasis on forgiving and forgetting. In their eyes, 
the struggle is over and people should overcome the past. Janvière e.g. “doesn’t believe in punishing 
them. For her they should rather forgive everybody1251.” Others have practical reasons to waive the 
idea of transitional justice altogether such as Violetta whose father was killed by the army in the civil 
                                                          
1244
 Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, Kamenge, Ngozi. 
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 Interview with Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi. Transcript directly from translator who talked 
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war: “they can catch a person who has killed or done something bad and they will start the investiga-
tion. They will put the person into prison. He will go there. He is fed. He can sleep and then after some 
years he comes back. And then he goes to live with, where he used to live with same neighbors whose 
people he killed1252.” Although Tutsi in general insist on justice more, many among them fear that 
punishing the perpetrators  could reignite old conflicts: “he would prefer reconciliation to justice, if 
they want to punish those people for example those from Tanzania, they will go back and maybe they 
would start another war. So, better work on reconciliation only1253.” This fear that punishment would 
destabilize the country is widespread. Odette even says that Gacaca-courts as in Rwanda would be 
“la naissance à la crise1254” – the birth of a crisis. Many CNDD-FDD-supporters in theory would be in 
favor of a TRC, reparations or even tribunals1255, but are afraid that with all the concurrent narratives, 
it would lead to further quarrels and would probably not end well. Henriette states:"so much has 
happened, perhaps it would be better to just forgive1256." Many Burundians joined the ruling party 
because they wanted a strong party to bring peace to the war-torn country. Burundians were fed up 
with political parties risking the peace process to obtain a bigger share of political power, which was 
one of the main problems prolonging the peace process from the signing of APRA on1257. The land-
slide victory of the CNDD-FDD in 20101258 confirmed this longing for more continuity, stability and 
unity in a powerful way. Although Nkurunziza’s government leaves much to be desired with regard to 
peace and stability, at least the president represents the majority1259 and publicly vows for peace and 
reconciliation. The prevention of new conflicts is the most important issue for the majority of Burun-
dians, and the danger of opening Pandora’s box is too high when re-addressing the atrocities of the 
past, as Venantie K. thinks: “they should not look for old issues because Burundians don’t like that. 
They don’t like punishments. […] Yes, we should forget about that. Even here, since Pierre Nkurunziza 
is in power, they have already started forgetting about that, because they live in peace, there is no 
war1260.” Burundians recognize that there are guilty parties and innocent victims on both sides of the 
conflict and many think it is impossible to punish them all, thus, they consider forgiving and forget-
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ting or at most a non-punitive truth and reconciliation commission like in South Africa the only realis-




5.4.  Conclusion Burundi: 'Non-Approach to Reconciliation' 
The 'Non-Approach' to Reconciliation 
Let us return briefly to the question about the necessity of a defined and stringent policy of reconcili-
ation. With regard to Burundi's experiences after 2005, the answer would have to be 'yes, but…' For 
many peasants, the civil war was a consequence of what happened on the national level. A surpris-
ingly big percentage of rural participants saw the events from 1993 to 2005 as a political crisis with 
ethnic undertones1261. A political problem needs a political solution and although the consociational 
design of Burundian politics defuses ethnic competition and although most peasants claim that they 
have personally reconciled with their neighbors and to a certain extent mutually recognize victim-
hood, the situation remains unstable mainly because of party politics. Burundian communities need 
good governance, economic development and a reliable justice apparatus, but they do not have the 
means or the power to achieve this on their own. The initiative needs to come from the political cen-
ter1262. This is also the view shared by most peasants: "small people don’t know. It’s an intellectuals’ 
issue, they are the ones who raised the first wars, they can raise another again but till now, there is 
hope, they are reassuring them that there is no war that can happen again and they hope that it’s 
true but they are not the ones to decide1263." 
The perception of the civil war as a tragedy that emerged from the center as a national political crisis 
and the fact that Hutu as well as Tutsi were victimized helps many Burundians to dissociate their 
neighbors from the massacres and pin the blame on intellectuals and politicians. The question 'do 
you believe ordinary Burundians are reconciling faster than the government?' In the modified ques-
tionnaire was generally reaffirmed1264, but in most cases, participants emphasized the insecurity and 
poverty that occupied their thoughts to a far greater extent: "where she lives, she says that there is 
some kind of peace. But from what she hears on the radio every day, people are being killed, so she 
says1265.  
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Hence, Burundian reconciliation politics are defined by a 'non-approach' to central issues concerning 
commemoration and memory, explicit recognition and apology or transitional justice. Assistance for 
victims is almost completely lacking and the population is left to its own devices while the elite is 
competing for political power. On one side, the fact that this ignorance from above pertains to all 
sides prevents greed and jealousy to emerge and breed ethnic resentment. Most of the hostility and 
disappointment in Burundian society today is directed against the political establishment. On the 
other side, the absence of a stringent, defined and effective reconciliation policy leaves old chasms 
such as segregation, poverty, unpunished crimes and ethnic competition in the grassroots intact. 
Particularly in isolated, rather monoethnic communities, the old wounds fester despite the consocia-
tional design on the national level that made Burundi's ruling oligarchy ethnically diverse. With 're-
venge' being the reason mentioned most as to why people killed in '88 and '931266, working through 
the past and building narratives should not be left to ethnically exclusive communities, particularly if 
grievances about being discriminated exist. Liisa Malkki1267 has described how such "mythico-
histories" were instrumental in radicalizing Hutu refugees after 1972. The Tutsi in "Rohero" might 
share a similar fate if their marginalization continues; they already see themselves more as victims of 
genocide than Hutu1268 and feel threatened above average. Facing an almost complete absence of 
reliable justice, revenge becomes an option as it did among Hutus in 1988 and 1993. 
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6. Comparative Analysis 
This chapter will compare the national approaches towards reconciliation and their local perceptions 
in the main areas of power and identity politics, coexistence and commemoration, and transitional 
justice. It will thereby try to incorporate the core principles of reconciliation politics identified in 
chapter 2.1.: memory, acknowledgement, apology and recognition, justice.  
Ethnic strife in Rwanda and Burundi in its essence has always been linked to power politics and the 
struggle for controlling the state. In these two poor countries, state power has always been the main 
avenue for the accumulation and reproduction of the dominant class1269. Reconciliation thus is not 
only a question of acknowledgement, apology or justice, but it must also take identity politics and 
the balance of power into consideration. Equal (or at the very least proportional) distribution of 
power within a liberalized and democratic environment is widely considered a cornerstone for miti-
gating inter-group tensions1270 as a “framework within which a peace constituency can be identified 
and built1271.” Reconciliation, understood as the building of a relationship based on mutual respect, 
can only be (re-)built on a solid foundation where both parties feel secure. In international relations, 
power sharing is often treated as the first step towards multiparty democracy, which still represents 
the standard prescription of the international community for reconciliation, security and just govern-
ance in post-conflict societies.1272 The detrimental effects of (externally imposed) democratization in 
the absence of strong national identities and consensus-based political culture however have thor-
oughly been demonstrated by the collapse of the transition to democracy in Burundi in 1993 and in 
Rwanda 1994. While Rwanda subsequently has rather chosen the path of building a strong national 
identity, Burundi emphasized the construction of a consensus-based political culture as the main 
strategy of peace building. Today, with both states dominated by strong ruling parties, they both 
stand at a crossroads. If the authoritarian forces within the ruling parties prevail, acknowledgement, 
memory, justice, apology and recognition will probably remain one-sided, as has been the case in 
Rwanda; or the tragic events will be buried in silence, as has been the case with the mass killings of 
1972 in Burundi. A democratic opening of political space, including a new and open debate about the 
atrocities of the past might reconcile the former antagonists and make genuine acknowledgement, 
apology and recognition possible, but it also risks destabilizing the state and would entail the willing-
ness of the state to assist or reimburse the newly recognized victims. This proves very difficult for 
poor countries and carries the risk of generating new conflicts between those eligible for assistance 
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and the ones who come away empty-handed, as illustrated by some Rwandan Hutu reactions to as-
sistance programs for genocide survivors.  
Up to now, we could speak of a “protracted transition1273” to democracy in both countries with both 
countries limiting political space after initially more open and consociational phases marked by over-
arching coalitions. The mix of electoral democracy with elements of neo-patrimonialism and authori-
tarian rule however reinforces societal fragmentation along particularistic interests. Such a political 
environment is conceivably ineligible for reconciliatory endeavors or for bringing all perpetrators to 
justice. Interestingly, the current situations in Rwanda as well as Burundi exhibit striking parallels to 
historic precedents in the other country. 
6.1. The National Level: Historical Parallels 
“Rwandan history has shown that exclusion of one group or another over an extended period of time 
is a recipe for disaster1274.” The same is true for Burundi. 
The two main national approaches towards dealing with the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy and implementing 
national unity and reconciliation, namely banning ethnic identities altogether and respectively creat-
ing a balance of power between the groups through consociational regulations, do have historical 
antecedents in both countries. In order to assess the potential for peace and reconciliation as well as 
the possible pitfalls of these models, it makes sense to revisit these predecessors and compare them 
with current politics. Interestingly, it does appear as if Rwanda and Burundi have switched places 
with regard to both the ethnic identity of power holders as well as the approaches towards national 
unity and reconciliation. 
 
6.1.1.  A “Rwandan Bagaza”? 
Today, Rwanda suppresses ethnic identity under the leadership of a party that is de facto controlled 
by returnees, most of them Tutsi who grew up in Uganda. The approach towards reconciliation, out-
lawing public references to ethnic differences in public, strongly resembles the Burundian elite’s 
strategy to foster national unity by suppressing ethnicity during Michel Micombero’s and particularly 
Jean Baptiste Bagaza’s reign (1976-1987)1275. As Déogratias, a Tutsi from “Kamenge” recalls: “Before, 
it was Micombero, then came Bagaza but it was always military forces, military government, 
then came Buyoya. With Micombero and Bagaza they couldn’t talk about Hutu and Tutsi 
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problems, it was hidden1276.” Next to banning all mentions of ethnic groups, Bagaza appar-
ently started some important reforms such as ending open discrimination1277, but effectively 
kept the political favoritism towards Tutsi from the south in place, even aggravating the situ-
ation with regard to severely limiting access to education for Hutus. Even though Bagaza's 
regime did not commit any large-scale massacres, it carefully maintained the ethnic status 
quo that Micombero's purge against the Hutu elite had established in 1972. 
Bagaza’s parallels with Kagame start by downplaying ethnic problems in favor of national 
unity, but do not end there. The anti-clerical direction of his politics aimed at the centraliza-
tion of power in the state and the UPRONA closely resembles the RPF’s efforts to control 
civil society and international NGOs1278. Bagaza’s unpopular top-down villagization project 
demonstrates parallels to the RPF’s Imidugudu-policy1279 as well as Nyerere’s Ujamaa-
project in Tanzania1280 with regard to their high modernist nature1281. Both Kagame’s and 
Bagaza’s reforms display a highly paternalistic character, aiming at the fundamental trans-
formation of ‘backward peasants’ into model citizens. The NURC describes the envisioned 
process as “molding a self respecting Rwandan, marked by distinct Rwandan values, and 
ready to accept positive changes for sustainable development1282.” The same focus on tech-
nocratic reform and development coupled with the elite’s blatant disregard for the tradi-
tions, conflicts, needs and views of the peasant masses is reflected in Bagaza’s reforms of 
settlements, church-state relations and agriculture that paved the way for the Hutu uprisings 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s1283. “Bagaza had nothing against peasants, even if most of 
them were Hutu, as long as they remained peasants and got no ideas above their 
tion1284.” Finally, as Kagame in 2010, Bagaza won his ‘reelection’ in 1987 by more than 90 
percent of the popular vote1285 and heavily relied on omnipresent secret services to safe-
guard his rule. Nevertheless, with regard to genocidal violence, Bagaza, with his extensive 
security apparatus managed to keep public safety and order: “The only period where it didn’t 
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happen was during Bagaza[‘s] time. Then nothing happened1286.” The price for keeping the calm was 
the development of an increasingly paranoid, corrupt and omnipresent police state that cracked 
down on dissent and seeked total control of the population. The erosion of legitimacy progressed so 
far that it eventually led to Bagaza’s deposition by Major Buyoya’s coup in 19871287. 
If Kagame's method for keeping the peace differ from Bagaza, then mostly because his attempts at 
population control and social engineering are even more extensive. The main difference between the 
regimes is that corruption has rather been reduced under the RPF's rule, which translates to a higher 
degree of trust in the state and an improved faith in socioeconomic mobility that cools the raised 
tempers of the disadvantaged to a certain point. For the moment, the RPF is in firm control of the 
country, but nobody knows what would happen if the regime faced an economic crisis and would 
become unable to sustain its extensive control of the population. Would the population remain ‘rec-
onciled’ or would they once again follow politicians propagating ‘Hutu emancipation’? Furthermore, 
as in Bagaza's case, a regime that excessively relies on secret services and population control is vul-
nerable to the influence of these enforcement agencies and ultimately palace revolutions, which in 
turn have the potential of utter destabilization.  
 
6.1.2.  A “Burundian Habyarimana”? 
Burundi is increasingly moving into the realm of Hutu majority rule. After the 2010 elections, the 
CNDD-FDD has stopped the dialogue with the opposition and subordinates state business as well as 
transitional justice under the goals of the party1288. If Nkurunziza follows through with his idea of 
changing the constitution to run again and in the process eliminates the ethnic quota regulations 
stipulated in the APRA, there is a substantiated fear that the de facto single party will become more 
and more ethnically exclusive. Diminishing resources force the CNDD-FDD today to focus on its core 
constituency of rural Hutu due to its miserable economic performance and rampant corruption. Iso-
lated Tutsi in particular feel marginalized already and fear of the CNDD-FDD’s youth wing, the Imbon-
erakure is widespread and well founded. Even more alarming are the rumors that the ruling party is 
arming and militarily training its youth wing. This information was recently leaked in a UN Cable and 
publicly criticized by Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, the head of APRODH, one of Burundi’s leading human 
rights groups. Mbonimpa has been arrested on May 15, 2014, a few days after his statement and 
                                                          
1286
 Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi. 
1287
 Cf. Lemarchand, 1995, 114-117. 
1288
 Cf. ICG, Burundi: Bye-bye Arusha?, 12 October 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-
africa/burundi/192-burundi-bye-bye-arusha.aspx (27 August 2014). 
Page 245 
 
accused of endangering Burundi’s internal security1289. The violent experiences with other youth mili-
tias such as the Sans Echec in Burundi's civil war or the notorious Interahamwe in Rwanda have been 
too recent and too horrifying to shrug such information off.   
Originating from a rebel movement, the CNDD-FDD has gone the reverse direction of Habyarimana’s 
MRND. The Burundian party has only started to pursue its single-party ambitions relentlessly after 
successfully expanding its political dominance through the elections of 2010. Even though the parties 
had to be ethnically inclusive to register, Nkurunziza clearly was elected into office in 2005 because 
he represented the hopes of the Hutu-population to finally gain access to political power. Not unlike 
Habyarimana in Rwanda, Nkurunziza is extremely popular among large parts of the Hutu peasantry, 
his core clientele. Congruent with the statements most Rwandan peasants made about life under 
Habyarimana before the genocide1290, many Burundian Hutus are actually content with the current 
state of affairs and characterize interethnic relations as generally good. Hutu residents particularly 
believe that their political impact has been amplified whereas many Hutu returnees seem disap-
pointed with the political realities in Burundi. Tutsi, particularly IDPs and people living in segregated 
areas, however feel increasingly excluded by the current regime. While trust towards the govern-
ment stagnates in general, the poorest elements of society, the Tutsi IDPs and the former Hutu refu-
gees, who feel the effects of the economic recession the most and feel the most disenfranchised. 
Burundi: Trust in Government
1988 1990 (Rwa) /1993-1 (Bdi)1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)2011
Burundi Average -0.2 1.1 -4.3 2.2 1.7
Rwanda Average -0.1 -4.8 1.5 4.0
Burundian Hutu -0.3 2.6 -3.6 2.9 2.4
Burundian Tutsi 2.6 0.2 -2.7 2.6 1.8  
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Trust in government: Rwanda and Burundi compared 
Perceived political impact in Burundi
1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu: Average -0.5 0.6 -2.8 0.6 1.3
Tutsi: Average 0.1 0.9 -2.1 0.9 0.4
Hutu refugees 1.3 -0.8 -2.5 0.5 -0.3



















Perceived political impact in Burundi 
It has been frequently overlooked that when Habyarimana took power from Kayibanda in 1973, he 
announced a ‘moral revolution’ and shifted the political identity of the Rwandan Tutsi from a race to 
an ethnic group, officially acknowledging their right to Rwandan citizenship1291. As long as MRND-rule 
was not threatened, Habyarimana’s government even featured Tutsi ministers and despite being 
discriminated in public education, a disproportionately high number of Tutsi managed to attain high 
                                                          
1291
 Cf. Mamdani, 2001, 132-159. 
Page 247 
 
positions in parastatal companies. Not unlike Burundi in 2005, Habyarimana introduced an affirma-
tive action quota system based on the population census: over 85 percent of the posts were reserved 
for Hutu, 10-15 percent for Tutsi and 1 percent for Twa1292. Forced by economic stagnation and de-
pendency on donors, the MRND had to open up political competition in the early 1990s. In the face 
of internal and external challenges to power, the MRND radicalized more and more, attempting to 
rally the Hutu masses behind the “Hutu Power”-ideology and recapturing its waning grip on power. 
The result was genocide.  
Just as the MRND with CDR and MDR, the CNDD-FDD has to share its core constituency with the FNL, 
another (former) Hutu party. In Rwanda, this fierce intra-ethnic competition for power and influence 
led to an increasing insecurity and lawlessness, culminating in the Gatabazi-Bucyana incident1293 and 
the purge of moderate Hutu at the beginning of the genocide. This climate of political violence in the 
wake of the introduction of the multi-party system is actually comparable to Burundi today. Hutu 
Power, the extremist, party-spanning movement that blamed the Tutsi for everything only emerged 
as a major political player when the external threat posed by the RPF became too strong for the 
weakened MRND to handle and many Hutu became worried of losing the political dominance alto-
gether. Fortunately Burundi currently does not face a predominantly Tutsi threat of any kind. 
Economic stagnation and a high degree of donor dependency however are both given facts in Burun-
di today. Even though Nkurunziza entered the presidential palace by a democratic election and his 
victory in the 2010 election rather than a coup awarded the CNDD-FDD its political dominance, the 
behavior of the party has started to resemble Habyarimana’s MRND in many deeply disconcerting 
ways. Militant youth wings, harassment, intimidation and even murder of opposition members are 
the order of the day. Corruption is rampant in the justice system, the party’s radicalized youth wing 
receives military training and fights members of other parties, wealth accumulation mostly requires 
political connections and now, even the quota regulations that prevented political competition from 
adapting ethnic fault lines are in danger of being waived. This worries many Burundians. In Juvénal 
H.’s words: “Si on ne fait pas la régulation des quotas, le Burundi va s'écraser1294“.  
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6.1.3. Doomed to repeat the Past? 
If we examine these historical parallels with the Bagaza- and Habyarimana-regimes, we have to ask if 
it might lie in the nature of the political economy in the Great Lakes (or in Africa) to impel these re-
gimes to act in seemingly preordained manners. 
Burundi: Patronage and Marginalization 
As long as it keeps other Hutu-parties such as the FNL in check, the predominantly Hutu CNDD-FDD 
can rely on a comfortable ethnic majority. It will always be tempted to marginalize the Tutsi if it 
serves its political agenda in any way, e.g. as a scapegoat. In a democracy, the Hutu, constituting the 
vast majority of the population in both countries, “will never lose an election to the Tutsi on the basis 
of one man, one vote1295.” The only two options open to Tutsi as a group in Burundi are either to ally 
themselves with another ‘Hutu’-party and thus becoming the tip of the scale in Burundian politics or 
to integrate themselves further into the ruling party while trying to shift the focus away from ethnici-
ty permanently. Both these options however become increasingly difficult in a de facto one-party 
system if the quota regulations are abolished.  
Considering the persistent lack of economic growth and the general disappointment of growing parts 
of society with the regime in Burundi, a scenario like in Zimbabwe becomes increasingly probable. In 
Zimbabwe, after years of economic decline, the ruling ZANU-party concentrated its patronage on its 
core constituency, the Shona, who represent the ethnic majority (82%). This concentration came at 
the price of marginalizing the Ndebele minority. Just like the CNDD-FDD in Burundi, the ZANU started 
as a rebel movement that came to power after a peace deal and had to deal with the disastrous eco-
nomic costs of a political crisis. Facing ever-increasing obstacles challenging his rule, President Muga-
be gave up on the painfully negotiated reconciliation politics that had ended the protracted war and 
instead focused on elite-centered redistribution of the state’s assets to keep his followers in line. In 
order to turn the focus away from its own corruption and enrichment, the ruling party subsequently 
radicalized itself. The old enemies became scapegoats for economic and political failure and the 
rhetoric quickly turned against the predominantly Ndebele ZAPU-party, culminating in ethnic cleans-
ings against the Ndebele in Matabeland from 1982 to 19851296.  
With reference to the fears of Tutsi in “Rohero” and “Kamenge”, the current armament and training 
of the Imbonerakure, the CNDD-FDD’s increasingly authoritarian record, and the neo-patrimonial 
tendencies of the government, this worst-case scenario does not seem too far-fetched. As a conse-
quence of the consociational design, political divisions and ethnic categories in Burundi do not over-
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lap for now. Political violence is far more likely than ethnocide. However, even though most Hutus no 
longer consider their Tutsi neighbors as principal opponents in their fight for political self-
determination and economic patronage, the Tutsis themselves have a different view. The poor and 
internally displaced Tutsi feel pushed at the margins of society. A new rebel movement rallying be-
hind 'being Tutsi' or adopting an ideology of national renewal, such as the UNAR in the 1960s in Bu-
rundi or the RANU/RPF 1980s in Uganda, could easily exploit the grievances and frustrations of young 
Tutsis. If the examples of Ezechiel or Abel tell us anything, it is that young, disgruntled men do not 
need a lot of convincing to join an armed movement1297. An insurrection that in some way could be 
interpreted as 'pro-Tutsi', however, would probably re-ethnicize politics and entail serious repercus-
sions by the CNDD-FDD government, possibly resulting in ethnic cleansing or even genocide. By 
abandoning consociationalist norms, the government runs the risk of instigating a similar develop-
ment as in Zimbabwe or pre-genocide Rwanda. Let us hope that Burundian politics actually have 
moved beyond issues of ethnicity as successfully as many participants claimed. 
Rwanda: Disguising or Deconstructing Ethnic Identity? 
If we return to the demographic imbalance between Hutu and Tutsi and turn to Rwanda, the RPF 
which was perceived as a predominantly Tutsi movement during the Rwandan civil war from 1990 to 
1994, did not have many other choices other than to deconstruct and discredit ethnic identities1298.  
Similar to Bagaza, Kagame understood instinctively that an openly Tutsi-government would be ex-
posed to strong external criticism and domestic resistance from the beginning. The previous Rwan-
dan Hutu-regimes had publicly interpreted the events of 1959 as the ‘Hutu revolution’, the emanci-
pation from the oppressive Tutsi-monarchy. A regime consisting of mainly Tutsi would have immedi-
ately re-invoked memories of Tutsi domination. Thus, the Hutu Pasteur Bizimungu became the first 
president of the transitional government and the RPF made fostering national unity and constructing 
a national ‘Rwandan’ identity two of its main objectives. The reasoning is straightforward: statistically 
speaking, the RPF could only rule with democratic legitimation if it shed its image as a ‘Tutsi’-party 
respectively if the connection between ethnic identity and political affiliation could be successfully 
eliminated.  
The RPF has worked tirelessly to publicly decry the politicization of ethnicity. The regime has made 
successful use of commemoration as well as transitional justice to demonstrate the profoundly nega-
tive effects of sectarian politics and ethnic divisions. Its ultimate goal is a unified ‘Rwandan’ identity 
because it would overrule the need for reconciliation altogether. Maximilien, a Tutsi intellectual 
working for a CSOG in Kigali boils it down to its essence: “La réconciliation? Ah... c'est quelque 
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chose... Ah, je préfère dire ‘l'unité’1299.” With ethnic identity out of the picture, Rwandan society 
would finally be ready to turn a new leaf. In theory, this does sound like the perfect solution. 
The problem however is that in practice the RPF implemented its policy of unity and reconciliation 
with the ulterior motive of simultaneously securing and justifying its politico-economic dominance. 
While preaching unity and political maturity, the Rwandan government has never actually trusted its 
(Hutu-) population. Tacitly, the Tutsis' need for protection is raison d'état. Transitional justice, com-
memoration and the fight against genocide denial have demonstrated the negative impact of ethni-
cized politics and bad governance very clearly and scientifically correct for the most part. Even so, 
these policies have also been utilized systematically to globalize Hutu-guilt, to solicit support and 
demand compliance from the international community via shaming, and to disrepute opposition 
candidates, particularly Hutu. The RPF has steadily refined its ideology, its networks, population con-
trol, and information management techniques to perpetuate its internal dominance and the full con-
trol of its external image1300. The result is an elusive state of affairs: with ethnic identities forced un-
derground, their relevance among the population has become extremely difficult to measure. Even 
after months of in-depth field research, it is very delicate to evaluate to what extent the official ide-
ology of national unity and reconciliation has truly permeated Rwandan society, respectively, if peo-
ple just comply with the official policy because they fear the consequences of disobedience.  
With reference to my interview data, I would describe the mindstate of most interviewees as a mix-
ture between the two. Well-educated urban dwellers and returnees in particular seem to embrace 
the new, nationally unified identity. Peasants often condition their opinion of government politics 
with respect to the possible personal benefits that their support could yield them1301. Young educat-
ed Hutus, Hutu bystanders who lost family members in the various atrocities and in some cases gen-
ocide survivors who feel abandoned represent the most critical groups. Ex-convicts often demon-
strate the strongest compliance with government politics but they also admit having been utterly 
traumatized by their prison stints and many are afraid of being re-arrested. Their statements far too 
often have the appearance of memorized slogans expressed primarily to dispel any kind of suspicion 
for harboring revisionist thoughts. Many others, particularly the apolitical, just go along with the new 
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 Cf. e.g. interviews with Vianney, 52 and Peter, 46 bystanders from "Gatsata", Gisagara or Augustin, 50, 
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the 'order of genocide'. Despite the pressure from authorities and peers, peasants would meticulously ponder 
the dangers and beneftis of joining the killing. Under the current circumstances, buying into the current ideolo-
gy of unity and reconciliation yields much more possible benefits than continuing to think in the old categories. 
Political opportunism however does not manifest a strong foundation for reconciliation.  
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national identity and follow the directions of the authorities as they did before, placing a strong but 
rather nondescript emphasis on the importance of good leadership: "There will not be any new vio-
lence because of our president Kagame. As God even created us as human beings not with ethnicity 
groups, there will not be a new violence with our president Kagame1302." 
Nevertheless, there are promising signs that even participants who view the government skeptically 
demonstrate a fundamental disposition to accept the new Rwandan identity and an eagerness to 
reconcile. Statements such as Jeanne d'Arc's, who believes that ethnic identities will vanish, are in-
creasingly common: "For me I need always to be called umunyarwanda - Rwandan, because I go in 
many places and you can't discover if I am either Hutu or Tutsi. So I wish I couldn't either be called 
Tutsi or Hutu. It has no importance1303.” Such statements restore hope for a shared future, but sadly, 
these positive assessments are always interspersed with frequent mentions of government repres-
sion and stories of discrimination when it comes to political rights1304 or access to posts and ser-
vices1305. Furthermore, many peasants who characterize the current interethnic relations as problem-
free said the same when asked about the pre-genocide period. Hence, despite the favorable disposi-
tions of large parts of the population, the question of whether Hutus and Tutsis could coexist on truly 
equal terms and on a basis of mutual respect in Rwanda largely depends on the government's capaci-
ty for inclusion into the infrastructure of power and the opening of the political discourse. While 
there are certain steps the government has undertaken to ensure the representation of Hutus (im-
plicitly), the confines of the political discourse about the past remain very narrow in Rwanda. 
Partition? 
Looking at the recurring episodes of mass violence, the politico-economic scenarios in Rwanda and 
Burundi share the appearance of a vicious circle doomed to repeat itself. If Hutus are in power, they 
can opt for democracy where majority rule puts them into the driver’s seat permanently. If Tutsis 
rule the country, they try to protect themselves by tightly controlling the access to power and at-
tempting to obfuscate, discredit or change identity politics. The poisoned historical legacy, the de-
mographic realities and the entanglement between politics and the accumulation of wealth exacer-
bated by the poverty of both countries perpetually pits both groups against each other. 
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According to the Pan-Africanist Godfrey Mwakikagile, for Rwandan or Burundian Tutsi, “to accept 
democracy or majority rule is suicidal1306.”He compares Tutsis to the Whites in South Africa and be-
lieves that there can only be democracy if they accept majority rule, which, taking into account the 
experiences of the past, would probably result in their marginalization if not worse. Mwakikagile 
dismisses coalition governments because of the vast numerical Hutu majority and believes that the 
bloody and longstanding conflict over power and land has exacerbated mutual hatred in a way that 
has rendered coexistence all but impossible.”The fundamental question is whether or not they want 
to live together1307”, he argues and takes up Daniel Arap Moi’s idea of a partition of Rwanda and Bu-
rundi into independent ethnostates. He seriously doubts that any plan of maintaining the territorial 
integrity of both states would be possible without further violence because it would only mean to 
"[…] forcing tribes which are enemies to live together and to work together regardless of how much 
they hate each other and kill each other, making cooperation of any kind almost impossible1308." 
Mwakikagile contends that a separation of the states along ethnic lines might prevent further blood-
shed and save hundred thousands. In his opinion, the only way to guarantee the safety of the Tutsis 
would be within their own state. Furthermore, according to Mwakikagile, a partition would have the 
additional advantage of not requiring international peacekeepers1309. 
There are obvious problems with such a plan of separation: it would include uprooting millions of 
people and ethnic cleansing, it would probably even further destabilize the region and it would al-
most certainly exacerbate and expand the conflict over land on a local, regional, and national level. I 
stongly doubt that it could be managed, let alone without international involvement and funding. 
Who would voluntarily give up his homeland? The Hutus in Rwanda? The Tutsis in Burundi? Both 
groups live in predominantly mixed settlements. Which criteria would determine who has to leave? 
When Israel was established with the support of the international community after the Holocaust, 
decades of violent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians followed, including frequent involve-
ment by their neighboring states. Why should this partition work any better? Furthermore, pluralistic 
societies such as Switzerland that chose permanent consociational coalitions as their ruling bodies 
have survived in the longterm without their tiny minorities even feeling marginalized. If a reliable 
system of minority protection is in place, the primary fault lines of political problems may change 
according to question.   
I however mainly disagree with Mwakikagile with regard to the reasons for the conflict. One point 
that has become perfectly clear during the interview process and furthermore gets support from the 
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field research of other scholars1310 is that ‘mutual hatred’ is not the main reason for the bloodshed in 
the Great Lakes region. In periods of peace, both groups coexist without too many violent incidents, 
mixed settlements and intermarriages are common in most regions1311. We should rather focus on 
the modus operandi of the state, the economic significance of political power, the exploitation of 
ethnic identity for political (and thus economic) gains and the circumstances of impunity and insecu-
rity that drive violence. This becomes evident by analyzing local coexistence and the progression of 
society-state relations. Ethnic violence has always boiled up in the context of a crisis in which nation-
al leaders exploited ethnic identity for political gains. The killing takes the character of a sudden out-
break that suddenly returns to normal. Changing these dynamics leaves us with two main leverage 
factorss: changing the identities and thus the fault lines or changing state-society relations and thus 
political culture. Rwanda as well as Burundi have attempted both, albeit in very different manners. 
 
6.1.4.  Changing the Hutu-Tutsi Dichotomy: Diverging National Strategies 
Lessons learned? 
With regard to all these worrisome developments, one might be tempted to paint a very dark picture 
of the future for both countries. There is hope however. Despite some striking parallels between the 
current regimes and their historical predecessors, both countries have made serious efforts with 
regard to alleviating the Hutu-Tutsi polarization. Despite their partly fundamental differences, both 
national strategies show some results. 
In Burundi, the status differences between Hutu and Tutsi initially were not as extreme as in Rwanda 
and were mitigated to a certain extent by the Ganwa-monarchy. the Tutsi-elites first reacted by vio-
lently thwarting the emergence of a Hutu counter-elite. Under constant pressure for modernization 
and political participation and after the carnage of 1972 created an atmosphere of constant danger, 
Bagaza and Buyoya however started to realize the necessity of compromise1312. Even though the civil 
war triggered violence on a genocidal scale, strong voices for peace such as e.g. Adrien Sindayigaya 
from Studio Ijambo were active throughout the whole conflict and the country became a laboratory 
for conflict resolution activities for over twelve years. The APRA in 2000 laid the foundation for a 
consociationally shared collective future and by no later than the signing of the GCA by the CNDD-
FDD in 2003; the war changed its nature from a conflict fought predominantly along ethnic fault lines 
to an armed political struggle between parties. Already in 1993, Hutu members of the ruling party 
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UPRONA had to flee as well because they were persecuted along their Tutsi friends, as the life stories 
of Ferdinand and Générose in “Rohero” bear witness1313. Since Prince Louis Rwagosore, the great 
symbolic figure for Burundian unity, the readyness to share the power was higher in Burundi than in 
Rwanda, which Uvin also attributes to “Burundi’s deep political culture, which has always had strong-
er elements of consociationalism and compromise than Rwanda’s1314.” The views of the population 
reflect this process: many Burundians did not consider 2005 an ‘ethnic’ election anymore. Some Tutsi 
voted CNDD-FDD and some Hutu remained Upronists. The quota system provided for the ethnic 
amalgamation of the political parties even though many Burundians assured me in private that the 
CNDD-FDD and FNL at large have retained their 'Pro-Hutu'-character whereas e.g. UPRONA or MSD 
are still implicity considered 'Tutsi-parties'.. For a majority of rural Burundians, this however is a sec-
ondary problem. Almost a decade of power sharing without permanently establishing peace, order 
and prosperity have convinced many Burundians that the political parties themselves, regardless of 
their ethnic affiliation, are at the origin of the country's crisis.  Burundians have become profoundly 
distrustful and cynical towards the state and politicians in general. Calls for a single-party state or a 
grand coalition are very common because in the citizens' eyes, “most problems come from the top, 
from the leaders because here, there are no problems. They live together. And the only people that 
can get problems are those, who are maybe representatives of a political party on the hill1315.”  
In Rwanda, the RPF took up the cause of ethnic inclusiveness right from its humble beginnings in 
Uganda1316. Even though it started mainly as a movement of Tutsi exiles, the RPF always took care to 
present its prominent Hutu members publicly. Prominent members include e.g. Pasteur Bizimungu, 
the first Rwandan president after the genocide or Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, the former RPF chair-
person and minister of the interior. Nevertheless, the rumors that most Hutu officials are in fact 
straw men to front for their Tutsi staff members proved to be very tenacious1317 and difficult to dis-
band. It cannot be denied that Rwandans, particularly Hutu, who resided within the country as adults 
in 1994 have very slim chances of gaining access to political office without having accusations 
brought up against them1318. At least the education system has clearly become more meritocratic. 
Young Hutu such as Robert, Ben, Umubyeyi, Gaspard or Jean-Pierre are allowed to study alongside 
young Tutsi such as Nadine, Elias or Chris and in some cases are even given scholarships. Even though 
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some young Hutu complain that the FARG makes it easier for survivors to study1319, discrimination is 
nowhere near the scale of 1980s and early 1990s, which seriously hampered Tutsi such as Maxi-
milien1320 to pursue a higher education. Furthermore, the young educated Hutu I spoke to, despite 
being critical of the current government, do not care for another ‘Hutu revolution’ or a return to 
ethnicity-oriented politics. Many would wish for an acknowledgement of their families’ suffering by 
the government or a gesture of apology with regard to the Hutu-victims of the RPA’s campaigns in 
Rwanda and the DRC but they still agree with the general orientation of politics towards national 
unity and reconciliation. Most of these participants identify as ‘Rwandans’ rather than ‘Hutu’ as ex-
plained above. 
'Guided Transition' or 'Whitewashed Despotism'? 
The consociational arrangements in Burundi and the RPF's emphasis on being an inclusive movement 
for Hutu and Tutsi do keep the government and administration of both countries ethnically inclusive 
up to a certain point. Despite the protestations of officials as well as many interviewees that the po-
liticization of ethnicity and the Hutu-Tutsi-polarization are problems of the past and that both coun-
tries have moved on from their violent history, the new balance however remains fragile as long as 
large parts of the population remain excluded from political co-determination. Consociational power 
sharing between ethnic groups is still a relatively new idea. Its routine implementation and resilience 
in times of crisis still has to be tested. The controversy with regard to the 2015 elections in Burundi 
could very well prove to be the endurance test for the quota-stipulations of the APRA.  
As mentioned above, banning ethnic identities has also been tried before and it failed, even if the 
RPF takes it a step further with regard to opening up the government and the army to their former 
ethnic antagonists than e.g. Bagaza or Buyoya did. The RPF compensates for this decision by subject-
ing the whole population to encompassing re-education according to the RPF’s vision and extensive 
surveillance1321. The vaguely worded laws against ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ thereby fullfil 
the function of a failsafe against insubordinate politicians or journalists1322.  
Both countries are trying to advertise their newfound national unity to the international donor com-
munity as a story of repentance and recovery, rising like a phoenix from the ashes as reformed multi-
ethnic polities. Yet, ethnic inclusiveness does not give the impression of being the central political 
cornerstone of either state when it comes to realpolitik. Rather, ethnic inclusiveness too often serves 
as just that: an advertisement, a façade providing legitimacy and justification for one-party rule with 
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some token posts and functions given to members of other ethnic groups or parties1323. In this re-
spect, ethnic inclusion fulfills the same function as elections: to satisfy external donors and to neu-
tralize accusations of exclusive Hutu- respectively Tutsi-rule1324. In times of relative peace and pros-
perity, this might be enough to quell criticism and keep extremism in check, but during critical epi-
sodes in the recent history of the Great Lakes, with political alliances becoming brittle and unstable, 
leaders always reverted to the primordial ethnic allegiances they knew their constituencies would 
understand instinctively. 
Interestingly, there were genuine efforts to build truly ethnically inclusive governments in both coun-
tries immediately after the hot phase of the respective conflicts ended. In Rwanda, the transitional 
government of national unity assembled a Hutu president and prime minister (Pasteur Bizimungu 
and Faustin Twagiramungu, later Pierre-Célestin Rwigema) a Hutu minister of the interior (Seth Sen-
dashonga), a Tutsi defense minister (Paul Kagame) and a genocide survivor as speaker of parliament 
from 1997 onward (Joseph Sebarenzi). Twagiramungu had fled to Belgium in 1994 already, Sen-
dashonga was assassinated in 1998, both Rwigema and Sebarenzi fled into exile in 2000, and when 
Bizimungu was forced to step down in March 2000, it “was the confirmation that the multi-ethnic 
façade of reconstruction in Rwanda was now at an end1325.” In 2000, twelve ministers were Tutsi and 
nine were Hutu compared to twelve Hutu and nine Tutsi in 19941326. In the same timespan, the RPF 
increased its ministerial portfolios from 8 of 21 in 1994 to providing eleven of twelve ministers in 
2000. In 2003, Paul Kagame who had led the RPF since 1990 got elected as Rwandan president with 
95.1% of the votes, to be reconfirmed in 2010. The RPF-controlled National Electoral Commission 
ensures that candidates who do not support government policies (and thus the RPF’s ideology) are 
not admitted to the electoral process1327 and elected local officials are often removed from office by 
the RPF1328. With many high-ranking RPF-cadres deserting in the past twenty years and a new genera-
tion of politicians moving up in the party's ranks, loyalty to the RPF’s ideology in some cases has re-
placed ethnic identity as a criterium. As of 2008, the cabinet was evenly split between Tutsi and Hutu 
with the key ministries remaining in the hands of Tutsi1329. Nevertheless, the RPF keeps a tight grip on 
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power: In the Rwandan parliament of 2014, the two officially allowed opposition parties PSD and PL 
only occupy 11 of 80 seats, reducing them to the role of extras. 
In Burundi, as mentioned above, the CNDD-FDD went through a similar transformation from a rebel 
movement to single party. From the APRA in 2000 to the signing of the GCA with the FNL in 2008, the 
peace process was very fragile. Nineteen parties were listed in the APRA1330 and even micro-parties 
that failed to cross the threshold of two percent in the elections of 20051331 were fighting for the 
spoils of the state. Peace and fair elections could only be achieved through strong South African 
pressure and support1332 and because the population was war-weary. Even the elites eventually real-
ized that neither side would be able to decisively defeat the other. However, with amnesties for 
crimes against humanity prohibited by the international community while simultaneously needing an 
incentive for rebels to join peace negotiations, the implementation of transitional justice mecha-
nisms were always considered a secondary priority after establishing a ceasefire1333. Furthermore, 
almost every side of the conflict had committed atrocious crimes, thus the authorities postponed 
transitional justice indefinitely. Even though Nkurunziza clearly won the parliamentary elections in 
2005, which were widely considered fair, he feared competition over his core constituency by the 
FNL. Hence, he re-established his movement as an ethnically inclusive ruling party with the objectives 
of attracting Tutsi voters as well1334, with the main objectives of bringing peace and stability, and 
ameliorating the living conditions of peasants. His programs promoting free primary education, free 
maternal care and childbirth and his devout behavior as a born-again Christian made him very popu-
lar among the Hutu peasantry. The years from 2005 to 2010 remained relatively calm apart from the 
FNL’s shelling of Bujumbura in 2008. However, when the FNL and other opposition parties failed to 
drum up enough support to seriously challenge the ruling party, they boycotted the elections. The 
subsequent landslide victory gave the CNDD-FDD almost absolute power. Facing stiff opposition, a 
number of corruption scandals, a stagnating economy, and waning popularity, the party defends its 
grip on power increasingly aggressive. Since before the elections of 2010, violence, threats and har-
rassment against opposition members have increased again and so has corruption. After the elec-
tions, the relations between the ruling party and the opposition, particularly FNL and MSD, grinded 
to a standstill with both sides accusing each other of grave human rights violations, corruption, and 
endangering peace. Under these circumstances, violence with impunity has become a daily occur-
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rence yet again and the police often seem to be involved1335. Even though Nkurunziza does not 
acknowledge the political character of these killings and blames them on 'bandits', the targets and 
the sites of the crime often imply political motives. "While the political motives behind some of these 
attacks remain obscure, they illustrate, at the very least, the state’s inability to stem the rising insecu-
rity, enforce law and order, and ensure protection for the population1336." 
Persisting violence and insecurity remains the main impediment to transitional justice and to a nor-
malization of politics that would allow a depoliticization of reconciliation. The majority of my inter-
viewees agrees with Dominique's view of the resurgence of violence in Burundi: "il croit qu'il aura 
une autre crise, mais ce ne sera pas une crise ethnique, mais une crise des partis politiques1337." For 
most Burundians, political violence is a persisting occurrence. They share the apprehension that ex-
trajudicial killings and attacks might escalate once again if impunity remains unadressed and the po-
litical parties refuse to cooperate. Hence, reconciliation in Burundi is not only a question of memory, 
acknowledgement, recognition, apology and justice. It is also one of personal security.  
As the ethnic fault lines of conflict have been swiftly overlayed by new political fault lines, the issue 
of ethnic reconciliation has moved to the back of the political agenda in Burundi. Nowadays, reconcil-
iation politics would have to take into account the victims of political violence and the conflict be-
tween FNL and CNDD-FDD as well. Thus, the consociational design of the power sharing agreement 
has been successful with regard to the aspect that it allowed new alliances to“cut across those earlier 
fault lines1338” as Verdeja says. The implicit mutual acknowledgement and recognition of suffering 
seems to gain acceptance, particularly in mixed communities. Nevertheless, with core issues of rec-
onciliation such as transitional justice either remaining unaddressed or running the risk of becoming 
onesided, and the explicit acknowledgement and recognition of guilt representing a risk for the polit-
ical prestige of any party, reconciliation work is still at its very beginning in Burundi. The harmoniza-
tion and mutual recognition of all the different narratives about the various crises alone might be a 
project too painful and stirring for such a fragile state to master, as the cautious approach towards 
establishing a national TRC suggests. In the current political climate, a public national debate would 
probably escalate into mutual accusations, finger pointing and victim shaming. Uvin explains: "Most 
people on both sides see themselves as victims and the other as aggressor; each sees its own acts as 
necessary for survival while the other group's acts are patently unjust1339." Even though e.g. Ezechiel 
                                                          
1335
 Cf. Ligue Iteka, 2011, 35-39; HRW, 2010 & 2012. 
1336
 HRW, 2012, 46. 
1337
 Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation (verbatim translator): "He 
thinks that there will be another crisis but it won't be ethnic, it will be a crisis of the political parties." 
1338
 Verdeja, 2009, 3. 
1339
 Uvin, 2009, 169. 
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who had fought in the war said that he would accept punishment for his deeds1340, he hinged it on 
the condition of punishing the leaders as well. At least the readiness of having the political and mili-
tary representatives of one's own group during the civil war stand trial however was higher than 
expected. Taking into consideration the general distrust in politicians and intellectuals in Burundi, 
this however is hardly surprising.  
Still, with the discussion about crime and punishment necessarily debated by politicians who may 
seek political advantage through accusing the other side, in Burundi's case, it might actually be better 
to lay the past to rest and concentrate on the future, as a majority of my participants recommended. 
On the other hand, Burundi has tried glossing over an episode of mass violence before, and the bot-
tled-up hatred and frustration from 1972 violently erupted in 1988 and 1993. Even with ethnic enmi-
ties moved to the background in current conflicts over political power, the old fears and grievances 
might resurface in new rebellions as soon as the framework conditions change. Adding an ethnic 
dimension to the current political conflict in Burundi might be the most dangerous escalation. 
  
                                                          
1340
 Cf. interview with Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant FAB & FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
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6.2. Local Perception of Reconciliation Politics 
6.2.1. Coexistence and Forgiveness 
In general, Rwandans as well as Burundians evaluated their overall relations with people of differing 
ethnic backgrounds as positive. Many interviewees expressed views stating that the population as 
such was already reconciled, that they had forgiven the people who wronged them, and that ongoing 
problems were only the consequences of the elite’s struggle for power (in Burundi) or of people har-
boring old reactionary ethnic ideologies respectively governmental repression (in Rwanda). The posi-
tive ratings curve in Burundi however flattens in recent years and particularly Burundian Tutsis are 
significantly less satisfied with the current interethnic relations than their Rwandan counterparts are. 
Overall Relations with people of differing ethnicity: Rwanda and Burundi
1988 1990 (Rwa) /1993-1 (Bdi)1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)2011
Burundian Hutu 1.6 2.6 -3.4 3.1 3.9
Burundian Tutsi 2.2 0.1 -3.4 2.4 2.5
Burundi Average 1.9 1.6 -3.4 2.9 3.5
Rwa: bystanders & ex-convicts 1.8 -4.4 0.5 4.1
Rwa: returnees & survivors 1.1 -4 1.9 4
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Overall relations with people of differing ethnicity: Comparison Rwanda and Burundi 
The Dangers of Segregation 
The scaled questions monitor that the differences between communes in Burundi are more pro-
nounced than the differences between ethnic groups. The differences between the communes and 
the national average are almost negligible in Rwanda. The one point that could be argued is that the 













/ 2005 (Bdi) 2011
Gatsata, Gisagara 2.1 -4.7 0.8 3.8
Gatumba Huye 1.3 -4.6 1.2 4.2
Kigali 1.8 -3.1 3.1 4.2
Rwanda Average 1.7 -4.3 1.3 4
Gakombe, Kirundo 2.4 2.6 -3.8 3.2 4.4
Rohero, Ngozi 2.5 0.1 -4.3 2.1 2.3
Kamenge, Ngozi 1.6 1.3 -3 3.4 3.6






































Overall interethnic Relations: Comparison Research Sites 
In Burundi however, the picture differs. "Rohero" represents the remnants of ethnic segregation 
during the civil war and, as described in chapter 5.2.4., its inhabitants still adhere strongly to the con-
flict-era identities and fault lines due to the loss of their lands. With regard to ethnic animosities, the 
Tutsi IDPs settling in the centers are also the main source of anxiety among the Hutu from the sur-
rounding hills, who wish for the Tutsi to return to the hills: “Burundians just come together. The Tutsi 
go back to their lands and they live in peace1341.” For this to happen however, impartial security and 
justice with regard to territorial disputes have to be guaranteed. Otherwise, the Tutsi will opt for the 
comparatively safer option of settling close to each other and necessarily leaving their fields to the 
Hutus like Etienne, Michel, Maniriho or Irankunda factually have1342, leaving them poor and frustrat-
ed. Uvin1343 recommends that aid agencies specifically target vulnerable communities such as "Rohe-
ro". As the example of Rwanda demonstrates, providing economic opportunities tends to tone down 
                                                          
1341
 Interview with Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1342
 Cf. Interviews with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; 
Maniriho, 32, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1343
 Cf. Uvin, 2009, 183f. 
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radicalized views as do regular contacts with people from the other group as in the other communi-
ties "Kamenge" and "Gakombe".  
"Gatumba" in Rwanda actually is a good example about how to mitigate segregation. Here, the gov-
ernment and as well as a private collective called Abasoro have provided houses for genocide survi-
vors in the center. The houses are grouped together, so the survivors feel relatively safe in the im-
mediate vicinity of other survivors and returnees. Most of the survivors I interviewed in "Gatumba", 
however, are members of AMI and stay in regular contact with ex-convicts. They collaborate in 
community work and help each other tending their fields or building their houses, sometimes with 
financial assistance from the government. Even though the government takes influence in such asso-
ciations through seminars and speeches, all the group members of AMI report an amelioration of 
relations with members of the other group. The regular contact has re-humanized the 'other' and 
with understanding the emotions and feelings of their neighbors, the disposition towards trust and 
coexistence slowly improved and the fear of survivors was mostly reduced to specific persons1344. 
Detaching the Perpetrator from the Deed 
In general, participants do not consider coexistence with people from differing ethnic groups as a 
major problem today. This points to the fact that ethnicity, at least among the rural majority of the 
population, only assumed a stratifying quality in times of crisis whereas ethnic identity does not 
seem to have been particularly important during times of economic prosperity and political normal-
cy. It however also cautions us to take the current normalization of interethnic relations for granted 
and durable as long as there is no fundamental political crisis. 
In Rwanda as in Burundi, many survivors claim to have forgiven their malefactors because they un-
derstand the necessity to live together. They place the bulk of the responsibility on the elite for incit-
ing the population. Often, the harmonious relations before the conflict are invoked as a counter-
image to express hope and confidence in the future. “If they confess, she could forgive them, because 
even before genocide happened in Rwanda, Tutsi used to marry Hutu and other Hutu used to marry 
Tutsi, they used to live in a good harmony in a good relation1345." Intermarriage is a powerful image 
that comes up very frequently when people are asked to explain reconciliation:"reconciliation is 
when they get together once again and, he can give his daughter to marry to the other ethnic group 
and vice versa1346." The other very powerful image that frequently appears as a figure of speech is 
the act of 'sharing beer'(Akayoga - traditional Banana Beer) which is seen as synonimous for reconcil-
                                                          
1344
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Luce, 42, survivor; Maurice, 58, ex-convict; Annunciata, 58, survivor; Jeanne d'Arc, 
34, survivor; Yohan N., 68, ex-convict; Costasie, 65, survivor; Boniphilde, 40, survivor; François, 52, bystander, 
all from "Gatumba", Huye. 
1345
 Interview with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1346
 Interview with Fréderic, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
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iation in both countries: “la réconciliation pour elle, c’est le partage de la bière, ici et là, entre la 
population1347." The symbolism even works in the opposite direction: Etienne, an IDP from "Ka-
menge" told me that he discovered that the relations between Hutu and Tutsi were deteriorating 
when he prepared a big vat of traditional beer and his Hutu neighbors refused to come and drink 
with him as was custom1348.  
These definitions of reconciliation do reveal some interesting facts about the rural perception of the 
conflicts. In general, genocide and civil war are understood as disasters that had their origins else-
where, as a sudden leviathan that swallowed whole communities, victims as well as perpetrators. 
Most rural dwellers perceive peasants n general as the victims of the ruling classes. Even though 
some Burundians speak of 1972 and say that in "'93 they take revenge and kill the Tutsi people1349", 
they still place vengeance in the context of the political struggle for power and Ndadaye's assassina-
tion. Mutual hatred between Hutu and Tutsi was rarely mentioned reasons for the killings. Rather, 
the killings are understood as the result of elite manipulation, thus reconciliation is also considered a 
task for intellectuals and politicians, even though particularly Burundians do not fully trust them.  
 
6.2.2. Politics and Economy: interlocking Dynamics 
When I asked Rwandan participants about governmental programs they considered beneficial to 
reconciliation, peasants mostly mentioned programs that do not explicitly aim at reconciliation as 
such but rather assist the disadvantaged. Civic education schemes like Ingando or Itorero and pro-
jects aimed at establishing justice such as TIG and Gacaca were only mentioned in the context of 
reconciliation when participants were explicitly asked about the significance of these programs for 
reconciliation1350. Commemoration was never spontaneously referred to as a reconciliation program 
in Rwanda, which actually puts answers with regard to its reconciliatory benefits into perspective. 
While most participants did not differentiate between governmental projects and NGOs, programs 
that provide assistance in some manner, preferably financial, were generally seen in a positive light. 
Poverty and Conflict  
In poor countries such as Rwanda and Burundi, the focus on assistance that alleviates the conse-
quences of the civil war and the genocide is understandable. Poverty is still considered one of the 
                                                          
1347
 Interview with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1348
 Interview with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1349
 Interview with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1350




main problems and for many participants1351 remains a principal reason for the violent character of 
conflict. In Rwanda as well as Burundi, reparations are often the main demand with regard to transi-
tional justice. Examples of rich people being targeted first during episodes of mass violence are 
abundant and can be found in almost all conflicts. Costasie recounts that in the Rwandan 'Hutu revo-
lution' of 1959, mostly the rich Tutsi were targeted because the Hutu wanted their property1352. Ma-
rie C. repeats the same thing about the victims of 1972 in Burundi1353 who were actually targeted 
because they aspired to join the elite. In Rwanda, I heard stories about Hutu who were harrassed by 
the Interahamwe because they were rich and influential1354 or successful Tutsi that were marked as 
targets and beaten before the genocide even started because others were lusting for their position, 
as was the case with Chris' father1355. With reference to the relationship between poverty and inse-
curity, Déogratias explains that "Burundians are poor, so when you come and propose them to go to 
fight for the good of the country, they will come because they have nothing to do. So for him, when he 
is looking at that, with this disorder, nothing is done, and truth and reconciliation can’t work1356.” 
Abel and Ezechiel, the Tutsis who joined the FNL after they had been involuntarily demobilized as 
former child soldiers in the FAB both cited economic reasons for joining a movement where being 
Tutsi actually endangered them personally1357. Under these conditions, becoming a rebel was a ca-
reer choice for disenfranchised youths like them. Poverty changed the significance of war from a 
tragedy for society to a viable economic opportunity for Abel and Ezachiel as individuals. Hence, the 
economic and political realms cannot be separated in the Great Lakes. "When people are poor they 
think that it is in politics that they will find richness and they will go look for it as they could maybe in 
doing bad things and going in rebel groups.1358." 
Assistance, Reparations and Jealousy 
Thus, governmental assistance and poverty alleviation are extremely important with regard to recon-
ciliation. It is no coincidence that Burundian participants counted free heathcare for infants and 
pregnant women and free primary school1359 among governmental efforts benefitting reconciliation 
                                                          
1351
 Cf. Interviews with Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Ka-
menge", Ngozi 
1352
 Cf. interview with Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1353
 Cf. Interview with Marie C., 55, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1354
 Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali says the Interahamwe were looking for his father, threatened the family and 
asked for money 
1355
 Cf. Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali. 
1356
 Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1357
 Cf. interiviews with Abel, 23 and Ezechiel, 31, both ex-combatants from "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1358
 Interview with Maniriho, 32, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1359
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Odette, 25, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Ka-
menge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi-resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
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or that Rwandan interviewees emphasized on the public housing program 'Anti-Nyakazi'1360, Gi-
rinka1361 or the free mutuelle de santé for survivors1362. Especially genocide survivors reported on 
having received assistance, either through the FARG1363 or through various other state programs such 
as Girinka1364 or NGOs like Abasoro1365. For many genocide survivors such as Nadine, Kayitare or Elias, 
this assistance proved vital to survive and to pursue a career.  
Governmental assistance however also arouses jealousy. For one, even survivors need to be well-
connected and have the proper documentation to be eligible for assistance through the FARG. While 
all survivors I interviewed in Kigali had received funding, Costasie, Teresa and Boniphilde were denied 
assistance1366. The possession of cows is a symbol of status in Rwandan culture, thus particularly the 
Girinka-program that aims to supply each Rwandan family with a cow combined high hopes with 
bitter disappointment and accusations of corruption. Whereas people who still hope for a cow, rent 
or some form of assistance seem remarkably well-disposed towards the government1367, others are 
becoming increasingly disillusioned over broken promises and what they consider unfair state alloca-
tion policies. Marie-Françoise recounted that her house was knocked down due to the Anti-Nyakazi 
policy, but the government failed to build a new one1368. John, Françoise, Mukaga Kwaya and Boni-
philde felt cheated by the Girinka-program1369. Paul and Yohan N. complained that they could not pay 
the health insurance but the government was forcing them1370, and almost all ex-convicts as well as 
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 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Annuncuiata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", 
Huye; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara;  
1361
 Cf. Ibid. 
1362
 The mutuelle is paid by the state for genocide survivors, thus mainly survivors mentioned it positively. Cf. 
Interviews with Annunciata, 58, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marie-
Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1363
 Cf. Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Annunciata, 58, survivor, 
"Gatumba", Huye; Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Christine, 49, survivor, 2Gatumba", Huye; Marie-Françoise, 
52, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1364
 Cf. Interview with Marcel, 40, survivor; Augustin, 50, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. With Augustin, the 
interview does not make it perfectly clear if he received a cow through Girinka or through another program. 
1365
 Cf. Interview with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1366
 Cf. Interviews with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; 
Teresa, 72, "Gatumba", Huye.  
1367
 Cf. Interviews with Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara and Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", 
Huye. 
1368
 Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. The 'Anti-Nyakazi'-program is a great example for the 
Rwandan government's obsession with its external image as a fast-developing economy. Nyakazi, houses with 
traditional straw-roofs are systematically demolished and should be replaced with stable, government-funded 
houses with roofs made from corrugated metal. However, as Marie-Françoise's example demonstrates, demol-
ishing the unattractive, backwards Nyakazi often takes priority over building new houses for their owners.  
1369
 Cf. Interviews with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; 
Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1370
 Cf. interviews with Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohan N., 68, "Gatumba", Huye. Yohan N. even 
reported that the government takes away his lifestock, when he fails to pay for the mutuellede santé. 
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many bystanders felt suffocated by the burden of reparations1371. Many Hutus think that the state 
should assist the perpetrators with regard to reparations or that the payments should stop altogeth-
er because they mostly strain people who are poor already1372. Even though most participants agreed 
that genocide survivors should be eligible for assistance, there are increasing calls for equal treat-
ment of Hutus: "I may give you a suggestion because if you see how the genocide survivors are helped 
from primary to secondary. Until they attend the university and for the other side, they don't attend 
classes. They [the genocide survivors] have many privileges. That is a barrier of keeping reconciliation 
or prevention because someone have advantages and another one can't even get1373.”  
The perception of unequal treatment with regard to governmental assistance eats away at social 
cohesion. This is where Hutus really feel discriminated against because in many cases, governmental 
assistance is the key to higher education: "it's not the orphans only who have the problem in this 
country. Yes, they were hurt, they were hurt in a bad way but they are not the only people who have 
problems in this country. Because, you know, there is some organization, which helps the children of 
survivors. Yeah. They help them to pay them the money of school fees and the others but that organi-
zation [was] made [by] the government. But if you see: They, they don't care about the other people, 
the other children of the other people who are poor1374." Although the concept of aiding survivors is 
laudable, its exclusiveness combined with reparations and unacknowledged crimes against Hutu, risk 
destroying the image of meritocracy that the RPF is so eager to build.  
Under conditions of abject poverty, the degree of contentment with the current regime in Rwanda is 
closely associated with the financial benefits and the opportunities for socio-economic advancement 
the regime is able to provide. If people feel unfairly disadvantaged, support can change to the oppo-
site rapidly. The most disgruntled parties in Rwanda today are often survivors that are excluded from 
assistance as well as the families of perpetrators or killed Hutus who are not eligible for support and 
yet suffer under the burden of reparations and mandatory taxes such as the mutuelle de santé. 
In Burundi, there were never any reparations. Apart from "Gakombe", where the state apparently 
paid the community to rebuild the destroyed houses of some of the victims after the Ntega-
                                                          
1371
 Cf. Interviews with François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", 
Huye; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice,58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Rugango, 81, ex-
convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Thasienne, 38, "Gatumba", Huye;  
1372
 Cf. Interviews with Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; 
Thasienne, 38, "Gatumba", Huye; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Ga-
tumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. Interestingly, Maximilien (38, survivor, Kigali) claimed 
that nobody has to pay reparations. 
1373
 Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1374
 Interview with Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali. 
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Marangara-crisis in 19881375, the government has generally remained inactive when it came to sup-
port. "He doesn't see anything been done here to address those who, most of them, they lost people, 
they have lost their cows, their houses were burnt, they have lost everything but they weren't.... There 
was no reparation, nothing was given to them, so there is nothing been done here.1376” Although the 
population considers assistance and reparations important1377, assistance is mostly only provided by  
NGOs such as CARE or Agro-Action Allemande1378. Burundians of all ethnicities are frustrated with the 
situation and usually blame it on power-hungry politicians. In Michel's opinion, "it’s even getting 
worse. People are being killed and it is as it had been before with only one political party1379." 
A paradoxical Situation 
Thus, we have a paradoxical situation: in Rwanda, where the state attempts to address the dire situa-
tion of genocide survivors and to alleviate the effects of the genocide through assistance, jealousy 
directs itself against the beneficiaries because the non-beneficiaries feel treated unfairly. This con-
stellation is predetermined to cause further ethnic divisions. In Burundi, however, where the state 
does almost nothing, the anger concentrates on politics in general, affecting interethnic reconcilia-
tion to a lesser extent.  
The lesson here is clear and similar to commemoration and the debate on ethnic identity: if Rwanda 
wants to become the ethnically inclusive state it professes to be, it needs to open up the discourse 
about the genocide or finally put it to rest without constantly reminding the Hutus of their guilt as a 
group. Most of all, it needs to extend assistance to Hutu in a way that reduces the jealousy. Equal 
access to education1380, old age-pensions and health insurance (as far as it does not impoverish peo-
ple further as in Yohan N.'s case) are good starting points, but highly visible programs such as Girinka 
or 'Anti-Nyakazi' should become more inclusive. Reparation payments do have an important moral 
function with regard to atonement but they strain the development of social cohesion if they contin-
ually keep the families of perpetrators at the brink of abject poverty1381. This pertains especially to 
perpetrators who were merely convicted of theft or looting and did already serve long prison sen-
tences and TIG.  
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 Cf. Fréderic (59, Hutu resident) and Thérèse (60, Hutu resident) both from "Gakombe", Kirundo recounted 
that the government (Buyoya's government) had rebuilt their houses. 
1376
Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1377
 Cf. E.g. Interview with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, Kamenge, Ngozi. 
1378
 Cf. Interviews with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo and Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", 
Ngpzi. 
1379
 Cf. Interview with Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1380
 Robert, 25, bystander from "Gatsata", Gisagara was very thankful for his government grant. Of all the 13 
Rwandan interviewees with a higher education, he however was the only Hutu who talked about receiving a 
grant. 
1381
 Thasienne (38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye) mentioned that she had to pay reparations on behalf of her 




In Burundi, already the decision to introduce welfare or some other kind of assistance program for 
the victims of past atrocities would improve the situation greatly. If the CNDD-FDD continues to ig-
nore the suffering of the peasants, it risks alienating the losers of the civil war in the short-term and 
even its own constituency in the long term. The discontent of badly integrated groups such as ex-
combatants, former refugees and IDPs is increasing already.  
Burundi: Overall trust in the Government
1988 1993/1 1993/2 2005 2011
Hutu Residents 0.1 3.2 -3.4 2.4 2.7
Tutsi Residents 2.9 0.9 -2.6 2.5 2
Hutu Refugees -2.8 -1.3 -5 5 3.3
Tutsi IDP 3 -0.8 -3.3 3.2 1.7
Ex-Combatants -1.3 2 -3.3 3.3 0
















Burundi: Trust in the State 
Corruption and Trust in the State 
In Rwanda, the RPF’s rather successful fight against (petty) corruption is an improvement that should 
not be underestimated. Whereas the ‘politics of the belly’ thrived under his predecessors, Kagame's 
regime has fared comparatively well in combating corruption. The government installed a number of 
administrative bodies such as the Ombudsman or the Public Procurement Authority, which are inde-
pendent to a certain degree and dedicated to the objective. The regime has even forced some high 
officials to stand down because of corruption allegations1382. Even though there are serious allega-
tions that Rwanda's inner circle of power is accumulating its wealth in an informal greyzone through 
unregulated and untaxed trade with commodities from the DRC as well as profits from financial in-
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 Cf. Transparency International, “Country Report Rwanda”, 
http://www.transparency.org/country/#RWA_DataResearch_Reports (29. August 2014). It should however be 
noted that 'corruption' is a very popular accusation to 'persuade' inconvenient politicians to stand down. This 
happened e.g. to Sebarenzi and Rwigema.   
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terests in protected businesses with domestic monopolies untouched by the abovementioned insti-
tutions, such operations rarely affect ordinary Rwandans directly1383.  
Technocratic efforts towards effectively establishing the rule of law are important to reconciliation 
because they foster equal opportunities in societies long shaped by favoritism and exclusion. Particu-
larly the fight against petty corruption is important in the local context because it builds confidence 
in the state and in meritocracy despite other shortcomings of the regime. Many Hutus can envision a 
future in the new Rwanda because they perceive the authorities (at least on the national level) as 
legitimate, relatively fair and impartial. In Burundi, where corruption is rather out in the open, most 
crimes remain unprosecuted, and impunity reigns supreme1384, citizens have lost their trust in au-
thorities and intellectuals. Increasing parts of society view the state as inherently exploitative and 
corrupt. Hence, the disposition towards resorting to violence in order to achieve goals such as justice 
and co-determination is comparatively higher. Peter Uvin thus advises a preventive approach to law 
enforcement for Burundi, which would not necessarily address the crimes of the past but focus on 
combating impunity in current cases, enhancing local accountability, restraining central leaders from 
utilizing violence for political aims and generally providing an improved climate of political and eco-
nomic fairness1385. For the situation to improve, Burundians need a vision. They need the confidence 
that their hard work actually pays off and that the wealth they generated cannot be taken away by 
corrupt officials or armed bandits acting with impunity. The decreasing confidence of Burundians in 
the state and its organs manifests itself clearly in almost all the scaled questions addressing the par-
ticipants' relationship with the government. It is even more pronounced among Tutsis. 
Trust in the government
1988 1990 (Rwa) /1993-1 (Bdi)1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994 (Rwa)2003 (Rwa) / 2005 (Bdi)2011
Burundi Average -0.2 1.1 -4.3 2.2 1.7













1988 1990 (Rwa) /1993-1
(Bdi)
1993-2 (Bdi) / 1994
(Rwa)






                                                          
1383
 Cf. Reyntjens, 2013, 163ff. 
1384
 Cf. HRW, 2010 and 2012. 
1385
 Cf. Uvin, 2009, 176ff. 
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Trust in the government: comparison Rwa/Bdi 









/ 2005 (Bdi) 2011
Burundian Hutu -1.9 0.9 -3.3 2.7 2.4
Burundian Tutsi 2.2 2.8 1.7 2.3 1.4
Bdi Average -0.2 1.6 -1.4 2.6 2.1











1988 1990 (Rwa) /1993-
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Trust in Army and Police: Comparison Rwa/Bdi 
As demonstrated, the assessments regarding trust in the government, trust in the army and the po-
lice closely resemble each other. Trust in the government quickly fades if a regime fails to provide 
security or opportunities to improve the population's economic situation, hence increasing competi-
tion, exacerbating tensions and hampering reconciliation on a very fundamental level. In such an 
economically difficult situation, the army and especially the police, as the state's main security 
agents, often become the increasingly corrupt instruments of governmental repression1386 because 
they are dependent on public funding. With all the emphasis on righting historical wrongs, such cor-
relations should not be taken lightly because they already breed the next crisis before the last has 
been resolved. Regardless of ethnic tensions, acknowledgement, recognition and apology, poverty is 
still a main driving force for young men to join armed movements and repression of any kind fuels it. 
Burundi is still a country of recently demobilized warriors ready to resort to violent measures if the 
state fails to provide opportunities. With rumors about new rebel movements circulating, most Bu-
rundians are sure that the next crisis is looming if economic ascent remains limited to the members 
of the political elite. As Alexandre, a demobilized CNDD-FDD rebel from "Kamenge" said: "the main 
                                                          
1386
 Cf. HRW, 2009 and HRW, 2012. 
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problem is poverty. People are poor and he knows that with poverty, with that hunger, they can do 
whatever they’re asked to do1387." 
6.2.3. The political Management of Ethnicity 
Rwandan vs. Burundian Approach 
In general, many Burundians favor the Rwandan approach to national unity, but not to justice and 
commemoration. 
Despite frequent criticism by international scholars against its authoritarian approach, Rwanda does 
seem to get a lot of strategies right with regard to reconciliation politics, at least from the perspec-
tive of ordinary Burundians. Many Burundians across all participant categories actually consider the 
Rwandan strategy of abandoning ethnic categorization as superior to the Burundian approach of 
introducing ethnic quotas. "Le modèle Rwandais est meilleur, le fait de parler des ethnies n'a plus 
d'importance. Il trouve que même les partis politiques, ce sont des partis politiques qui sont à l'origine 
des problèmes. Il vaut mieux que tous les partis politiques se rassemblent et se consentent mutuelle-
ment, après il vont comprendre qu'ils sont tous des Burundais1388."  
In Rwanda vice versa, only a few intellectuals actually consider the Burundian quota system as a 
worthwile alternative, mainly because it would prevent the dominance of one group1389. Opinions 
such as “il faut mettre fin aux ethnies, puisque ce sont les ethnies qui ont été à l'origine des mas-
sacres1390" are prevalent among many rural Burundians. Even though most participants consider the 
prevailing violence in the country to stem from the greed and power hunger rather than ethnic divi-
sions, ethnicity is still considered to perpetuate discrimination and sectarian thinking1391. The prefer-
ence of most Rwandans for a national identity is shared and reflected by many Burundians such as 
Etienne, Ezechiel or Venantie K. who believe that equality within an overarching Burundian identity 
would eventually also bring political unity1392.  
In mixed communities such as “Gakombe” or “Kamenge”, many participants, particularly Hutus, con-
sider the ethnic problem a matter of the past that has successfully been resolved. Now, they urge to 
                                                          
1387
 Interview with Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1388
 Interview with Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation (transcript from translator 
who speaks about Dominique in the third person): "the Rwandan model is better, the fact that speaking about 
ethnicity has no more importance. He even thinks it's even the political parties, the political parties are at the 
origin of the problems. It would be better if all the political parties would assemble and mutually consent. Af-
terwards they would understand that they are all Burundians." 
1389
 Cf. Interviews with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Gaspard, 26, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, 
bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara.  
1390
 Interview with Térèse, 60, Hutu resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo: „We have to terminate ethnic groups be-
cause the ethnic groups have been at the origin of the massacres.” 
1391
 Cf. e.g. interview with Ferdinand, 56, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1392
 Interviews with Etienne R., 72, Tutsi IDP, “Kamenge”, Ngozi; Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, 




address the political divisions: “L'homme fait ce qu'il sait. [Il] ne faut pas dire que... comme cette 
place est réservé pour les Hutu, il faut amener les Hutu et les mettre là. Plutôt il fallait faire que tout 
le monde... Plutôt... un Burundais soit considéré comme un Burundais toujours. Sinon les choses des 
éthnies, je pense que ça n'a plus d'importance pour le moment. […] Quant à moi, je pense que ces 
choses de dialoguer ces éthnies n'a plus de valeur. Plutôt il faut songer à développer le pays en 
tout1393.” However, considering persistent fears concerning marginalization among Tutsi who still 
think ethnic identity is very important1394, this assessment seems a bit premature. 
Among people with a higher education, the argument that the quota-regulations deny access to of-
fice to the most capable people and prevent meritocracy is very common. “I think that ethnic ten-
sions remain because the way we are doing that, when they are working, those quota regulations, 
they must look on your ethnic group and this means that if you are not the ethnic group that they 
want you'll not get a job. (…), I think that we should much more look on the capacities of the person 
instead of looking on the ethnic group1395.“  Even if the promotion of Rwandan nationalism is built 
upon a convenient and ideologically framed image, it appears to be met with a positive response in 
the region. My Burundian translator Vanessa believes that e.g. the successful fight against corruption 
and the orderly towns reflect the regime’s efforts towards instilling a sense of pride and communal 
spirit in Rwandans that Burundians lack.1396 Even the more controversial aspects of Rwandan post-
conflict poitics such as maximum justice and banning ethnic identities were often lauded in Burundi, 
where impunity is considered one of the most pressing problems by many including Human Rights 
Watch1397.  
Deceptive Appearances and dysfunctional Politics 
There are people who beg to differ however. Burundians such as Immaculée comprehend how the 
policy of national unity in Rwanda globalizes Hutu-guilt: "for her she thinks the quota regulations is 
better. For her, when you say a Hutu or a Tutsi, you are not insulting the person, it’s an identity, the 
person is like that. She thinks that later on, maybe when they want to balance it first so that nobody 
feels neglected and after all, maybe we will find out that when you say you are a Hutu, it doesn’t 
mean you are killer. But in Rwanda she thinks that when you are still afraid of that, when they say a 
Hutu. But for her, it’s an identity. Just say it like that. Do not say that 'you are all Rwandans'. Yeah, 
                                                          
1393
 Jacques, 26, Tutsi resident, „Gakombe“, Kirundo. Translation : “Man does as he knows. We shouldn’t say 
something like this space is reserved for Hutus and bring them there.Rather we should… Rather a Burundian 
should always be considered a Burundian. With regard to ethnic groups, I think this ha no more importance at 
the moment. […] I for one think that these things such as dialogues between ethnic groups are useless. We have 
to think about developing the country as a whole.”  
1394
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Juvénal H., 53, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, 
"Rohero", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1395
 Vanessa, 25, Tutsi resident, Bujumbura. 
1396
 Personal Conversation with Vanessa. 
1397
 Cf. HRW, 2012 
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there are categories of people. There are ethnic groups and it’s like that. Consider it like ethnic groups 
not like a qualification1398." Such insights into the exercise of power through categorization in Rwan-
da however usually come from Burundians with higher education such as Immaculée or Pierre, who 
even considers the ethnic situation in Rwanda to be a time bomb: "ce sont les apparences trompe-
uses. Nous, je me dis que même s'il y a des problèmes, on est tous avancé. Parce que nous, on se parle 
ouvertement entre Hutu et Tutsi. […] Moi je pense que ce qui se passe là au Rwanda, c'est pour moi 
une bombe en retardement qui risquera un jour d'embraser toute la région1399." 
In Rwanda, particularly young intellectuals share these insights1400. However, even in rural Rwanda, 
most of the participants do not make the connection between quota regulations and preventing one 
ethnicity to usurp complete power. Rather, political discord itself is considered dangerous and unde-
sirable. Most of the participants make the connection between politics, conflict and "le grand ven-
tre1401", the role of politics as the sole economic incubator for power holders. They know from their 
own painful experiences that political conflicts in these two poor, overpopulated countries all too 
often escalate into feuds and end in mass violence. Thus, many members from all Rwandan groups, 
not just survivors and returnees, are actually content with the way Kagame runs his country without 
meaningful opposition, as long as he keeps the peace1402. They seem to be used to a top-down sys-
tem that expects them to comply with the authority’s orders. Some, as Vianney1403 or Yusuf1404 even 
consider speaking about ethnic identities in the open (as practiced in Burundi) a potentially sectarian 
practice, demonstrating the Rwandan penchant for secrecy. 
In Burundi, public opinion chooses a similar direction. Calls for a grand coalition1405 or even a single 
party government1406 that provides national unity are widespread among the population. These 
wishes are consistent with the assessment of many Burundians that "the problem lies in the fact that 
                                                          
1398
 Interview with Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1399
 Interview with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Translation: "Those are deceptive appearances. 
We… I tell myself that even if there are problems, we all advanced. Because we speak with each other openly, 
Hutu and Tutsi. […] I think what happens in Rwanda, for me, it's a time bomb that risks to burn the whole region 
one day." 
1400
 Cf. Interviews with John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Interview with Robert, 25, "Gatsata", Gisagara; 
Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Cf. chapter 
3.2.5. 
1401
 Cf. interview with Marie M., 80, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1402
 Cf. Interviews with Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisaga-
ra; Christine, 49, survivo, "Gatumba", Huye; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, 
"Gatumba", Huye;  
1403
 Cf. Interview with Vianney, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1404
 Cf. Interview with Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1405
 Cf. Interviews with Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Dominique, 37, Hutu refugee, 
"Gakombe", Kirundo; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Ka-
menge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1406
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Marie M., 80, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu resident, 




leaders are not working together, political parties have problems. And even in ‘93 it was the same. 
People were living together they just follow the movement, which was starting but coming from the 
leaders1407.”  Multiparty-democracy, one of the Western standard prescriptions for nation building, is 
rather considered a danger by peasants in Burundi: "the political parties are an obstacle to the devel-
opment and the reconciliation of the country because they make us go backwards; we can’t even 
unite when they are not united1408." Even if some dismiss the Rwandan model as deceptive, the con-
flict in Burundi persists even without ethnic antagonisms: “you can always say there is no Hutu, there 
is no Tutsi, they are all Rwandans when they know that one group is discriminated. Even if they go to 
school [together], when they finish they can’t get a job. It is better here, where it is determined 60%-
40%. But here the problem is that even Hutu among themselves they don’t agree, they all look for 
political power and it’s a problem1409.” 
For most peasants in both countries, the ideology of national unity and reconciliation still seems 
more attractive, as they comprehend ethnic differences as harmful.  
Consociational Experiments 
As mentioned above, there is some admiration for the consociational Burundian solution among 
Rwandan and especially Western intellectuals. In 2006, René Lemarchand cautiously lauded the me-
ticulous arrangement following Lijphardt’s1410 consociational formula with regard to ethnic power 
sharing that stood in strong contrast to largely one-sided attempts at peace and reconciliation in 
Rwanda and the bargaining process between the diverse warring factions that went on in the DRC at 
the time. “If the Burundi experiment holds any promise, this is in large part because of the carefully 
calibrated distribution of ethnic identities and party affiliations in the government, the National As-
sembly, the Senate, the communal councils, and, most importantly, the army1411.”Apart from that, 
Lemarchand concluded that in 2005, the conditions for power sharing were favorable in no small 
parts because of the ‘political conjuncture’ and the course of the conflict, with the parties being war-
weary, ready for compromise and exposed to international pressure.  
The Burundian intellectuals I interviewed were divided on the issue of ethnic quotas. Jacques, Vanes-
sa, Immaculée and Candide thought that these stipulations provide the wrong incentives: “Ce qui est 
mal c'est qu’on ne considère pas... donc la moralité de quelqu'un, la personnalité et même les compé-
tences1412." Candide added that multipartyism only exists on paper and that the people who actually 
                                                          
1407
 Interview with Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1408
 Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1409
 Interview with Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi. 
1410
 Lijphardt, 1977. 
1411
 Lemarchand, 2006, 19. 
1412
 Interview with Candide, 50,Hutu resident, Ngozi. 
Page 275 
 
benefit from peace are the former warlords who fought their way to the negotiating table1413. She 
said that ultimately, quota regulations only serve the powerful, just as the single party system did 
before. Tutsi often claim that quotas are not implemented or are bent to benefit Hutu on the local 
level1414 whereas others complain that only 50/50 would be a fair representation1415. 
The other half of the intellectuals I interviewed staunchly supports the quota regulations. "They 
should use the quota because when you have the quota, everybody is taken into account, not like 
[Rwanda]... they don't talk about it, there is no Hutu, there is no Tutsi but the majority has more force 
and can discriminate the minority. Then it's better that they use the quota regulations and it teaches 
them to respect one another, that they divide, they share the power and they respect one 
er1416.” Pierre, Déogratias, Viola and Gertrude all agree that the introduction of the quota-system 
significantly reduced ethnic tensions even though they have not eliminated the problem1417. Not 
unlike the policy of unity and reconciliation in Rwanda, the quota system heralded in a certain notion 
of national citizenship and inclusion that also caught the peasants' eye1418. "Noone is excluded from 
the society, there would be even a hope that maybe in some years we will even forget about it and 
live together in peace without thinking about ethnic groups1419.” 
Differences and Similarities in Perception 
In general, intellectuals trust the state less and are rather skeptical with regard to the success of its 
reconciliation policies. Nevertheless, there is a certain overarching consensus in both countries that 
the impact of ethnicity on gaining political office has declined since the conflicts. In theory, whereas 
ethnic identities were banned in Rwanda and thus should have lost importance significantly more, in 
Burundi, they should theoretically have gained relative importance because of the quota regulations. 
In public perception however, the impact attributed to ethnic identity in politics has declined similar-
ly in both countries. 
                                                          
1413
 This strategy of guerilla attacks and remaining outside the peace process until conditions are favorable for 
negotiating has been a well-documented feature of the Burundian peace process and was probably one of the 
reasons why it took so long. Cf. Reyntjens, 2005b. 
1414
 Cf. interviews with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi and Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", 
Ngozi; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1415
 Cf. interviews with Venantie K., 25, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Hari, 50, Hutu resident, Kamenfe 
1416
 Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, teacher, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1417
 Cf. Interview with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1418
 Cf. Inteviews with Hari, 50, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Violetta, 30, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", 
Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Sylvestre, 69, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 
52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident "Gakombe".  
1419
 Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, Ngozi. 
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Impact of Ethnicity 1988
1990 (Rwa) 
/   1993-1 
(Bdi)
1994 (Rwa)/              
1993-2 (Bdi)
2003 (Rwa) 
/ 2005 (Bdi) 2011
Rwa: Higher Education -4.3 -4.8 -0.2 2.0
Rwa: Lower Education -1.5 -4.0 1.7 3.5
Bdi: Higher Education 2.3 1.6 -0.7 1.9 2.3
Bdi: Lower Education 0.7 1.9 -3.1 2.4 2.5
Burundi Average 1.1 1.8 -2.5 2.3 2.5


























parison: Perceived Impact of Ethnicity (higher rating=less impact) 
With regard to the question ‘How would you estimate the chances of people of your ethnicity to gain 
access to political office?’, there are however pronounced differences between the countries, which 
actually speak for the Rwandan option, external reasons such as security and economic development 
notwithstanding. In Rwanda, people perceive a general improvement of conditions (decreasing im-
pact of ethnicity) when they compare current conditions with pre-war conditions. In Burundi, the 
change is only considered minor and even becomes problematic if we compare the perceptions of 
Hutu and Tutsi. 






(Bdi)/             
1994 (Rwa) 
2003 (Rwa) 
/ 2005 (Bdi) 2011 
Burundi Average 1.1 1.8 -2.5 2.3 2.5 
Rwanda Average 
 
-2.2 -4.2 1.3 3.1 
Burundian Hutu -0.1 2.5 -2.8 3 3.3 
Burundian Tutsi 2.8 0.9 -1.9 1.1 1 
Rwa: Survivors & Returnees -2.8 -4.3 1.5 3.8 


























Rwa: Survivors & Returnees
Rwa: Bystanders & Ex-convicts
 
Comparison: Impact of ethnicity on politics according to ethnic groups 
Apparently, most Rwandans including ex-convicts and bystanders believe that their groups’ chances 
of gaining political office have rapidly increased since the genocide. This evaluation might be retroac-
tive and coined by national re-education, but it still speaks to social cohesion. On the contrary, most 
rural Burundian Tutsi feel disadvantaged with a former Hutu movement governing the country even 
though their minority rights as a group are constitutionally established. This impression only deepens 
if we look at the responses to the scaled question: ‘would you consider your country a democracy in 









/ 2005 (Bdi) 2011
Burundi Average -1.0 1.4 -4.1 1.5 1.1
Rwanda Average -0.5 -4.3 1.5 3.6
Burundian Hutu -2.2 2.3 -4.1 2.1 1.7
Burundian Tutsi 0.7 -0.3 -4 0.3 0
Rwa: Survivors & Returnees -1.5 -4.4 0.5 2.6


























Rwa: Survivors & Returnees
Rwa: Bystanders & Ex-Convicts
Comparison: Is your country a democracy? 
Even Hutus are disappointed with the development of Burundian democracy since 2005. Tutsi are 
even more pessimistic and their ratings are already on the verge of becoming negative. In Rwanda on 
the other hand, bystanders and ex-convicts even give the government better marks than survivors 
and returnees, painting a picture of interethnic harmony. This evaluation should however be treated 
with caution. As mentioned before, the Rwandan government goes to great lengths to influence pub-
lic opinion1420. Furthermore, seven participants in Rwanda (approximately 15 percent) refused to 
answer the question pertaining to democracy, whereas all Burundian participants agreed to answer. 
Even though Rwandans give their democracy higher ratings than Burundians, Burundians do think 
that they have a higher impact on politics, peaking in the elections of 1993 and 2005. In Rwanda, the 
question about interviewees’ perceived political impact is where the dominance of Tutsi becomes 
manifest. This is hardly surprising considering the fact that ex-convicts in Rwanda have their political 
rights revoked but it does give rise to questions about the validity of their assessment of democracy. 
Marks of +5 among ex-convicts without political rights1421 do leave a strong impression that the par-
ticipants tried to answer politically correct. The answers with regard to the definition of the term 
‘democracy’ in the qualitative parts of the interviews however hint at the fact, that most participants 
have no clear definition of democracy and rather rated their overall satisfaction with the govern-
ment1422. The fact that questions relating to ‘trust in the government’ got very similar ratings as the 
                                                          
1420
 Cf. chapter 4.2.1. 
1421
 Yusuf and Innocent from “Gatsata”, Gisagara as well as Rugango and Yohani N. from “Gatumba” gave marks 
of +5 with reference to democracy in Rwanda 2011. 
1422
 The diverse definitions of „democracy“ proved extremely heterogeneous. They ranged from popular sover-
eignty (cf. Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali) over “freedom” (e.g. Jeanne, 32, returnee, Huye), “independence” (Ka-
remera, 73, returnee, “Gatsata”, Gisagara), and “peace” (Christine, 49, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye or Augustin, 
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‘democracy-question’ also suggests that participants understood the question as an evaluation of the 
government's work.  
Political Impact 1988
1990 (Rwa)/      
1993-1 (Bdi)
1993-2 (Bdi) /             
1994 (Rwa)
2003 (Rwa) / 
2005 (Bdi) 2011
Burundi Average -0.1 0.7 -2.6 0.7 0.8
Rwanda Average -0.7 -2.3 -0.1 0.4
Burundian Hutu -0.5 0.6 -2.8 0.6 1.3
Burundian Tutsi 0.1 0.9 -2.1 0.9 0.4
Rwa: Survivors & Returnees -0.4 -2.5 1.1 1.5
























Rwa: Survivors & Returnees
Rwa: Bystanders & Ex-convicts
 
Comparison: Personal political impact 
Which Approach works better? 
In sum, we can adhere to the idea that both the ideology of unity and reconciliation and ethnic quota 
regulations have their distinct merits with regard to bridging the trenches between the former an-
tagonist groups. The majority of the population in both countries perceives interethnic relations in 
general as less of a political factor than before the conflicts. In general, the old ethnic divisions are 
believed to have lost considerable importance. Have Rwanda and Burundi successfully reconciled? 
Are ethnic divisions a problem of the past? 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
50, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara), to concepts such as “social welfare” (Boniphilde, 40, survivor, “Gatumba”, 
Huye), “development” (Vincent, 43, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara) and “unity and reconciliation” (Françoise, 
53, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara). 
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Sadly, such an assessment would be premature. Popular perceptions only reflect a certain point of 
time and are only conditionally convincing when it comes to determining overarching societal trends. 
As mentioned before, ethnicity only obtained its divisive quality in times of crisis, and there are wor-
rying signs here. 
In Burundi, the ratings for the government are dropping in almost every aspect since the elections of 
2005. Particularly the Tutsi feel underrepresented in politics. The impression that politics only serve a 
self-centered, greedy and quarrelsome elite is widespread. Looking at the declining democratic cre-
dentials, the constitutional minority rights and quotas seem to actually only serve a few well-
connected Tutsi politicians who arranged themselves with the party in power, while Tutsis in rural 
communities become increasingly isolated. Against the background of chronic quarrels, rampant 
insecurity, rent-seeking behavior and the reproach of moral bankruptcy against the parties, the calls 
for a coalition government or a single-party state are quite understandable. Regarding the political 
developments since 2010, the more likely scenario is that the CNDD-FDD attempts to remove the last 
remnants of checks and balances as long as it holds unmitigated power. Up to now, the opposition, 
the media, and civil society are still putting up resistance, but the government is increasingly cracking 
down on dissent1423. 
At least on the surface, the Rwandan government fared better in the opinion of its population. This is 
in no small part due to the establishment of security, law and order, and economic recovery. Rwan-
dans, particularly the Hutu majority, do not seem to care too much about the unilateral management 
of society and their insufficient political impact as long as the government provides opportunities and 
assistance1424. To the contrary, they perceive the country as more democratic than it used to be. 
Many Rwandans actually do believe that ethnic division was the reason for the genocide and there is 
a genuine hope among Rwandans that without practical use, ethnic identities will vanish with 
time1425. This hope relies on the conditions in Rwanda remaining favourable for development, with a 
strong and determined government promoting national unity that is able and willing to integrating 
the growing elite of young, critical Hutus and addressing their grievances openly and constructively. 
Up to today, the RPF however has defended its claim to leadership aggressively and often equates 
criticism with ‘genocide ideology’ or ‘genocide denial’, forcing Hutus who have lost their relatives to 
either accept “enforced ethnic amnesia1426” or to choke back their anger. This behavior breeds re-
sistance and it is mostly Kagame’s strict discipline, his iron grip on power, good technocratic record, 
                                                          
1423
 Cf. HRW, May 2010; Ligue ITEKA, Annual Reports April 2011 & March 2012.  
1424
 Cf. Chapter 4.7. 
1425
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Costasie, 65, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Karemera, 73, returnee, “Gatsata”, Gisaga-
ra; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Jeanne d’Arc, 34, survivor, “Gatumba”, Huye; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, 
“Gatsata”, Gisagara; Peter, 46, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, “Gatsata”, Gisagara;  
1426
 Lemarchand, 2009, 73 
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public emphasis on meritocracy, and his access to (international) funds that keep the Hutu calm for 
now and the anger below the surface. Some Tutsi understand this very well: “My first worry is at the 
leadership level. We are very grateful that we have had someone like Kagame, for the moment, who 
didn’t encourage revenge, who didn’t encourage any divisionist ideas, who also punished people from 
his government who brought him that idea. So my first worry and my first fear is not having someone 
stepping in his shoes, and staying in the middle of these ethnic groups.1427.” From this perspective, a 
threatening undertone suddenly resonates in an ex-convict’s statement about the relevance of eth-
nicity: "The first thing is when we have peace and security, otherwise if I know your ethnic group and 
you are my neighbor I will always know who you are. But what matters is peace and security1428.” 
 
6.2.4.  Commemoration and Apology 
When comparing the two countries, it should be remarked that Rwandans talk about personal for-
giveness as a part of reconciliation far more often, while in Burundi, the focus still rests on the mere 
management of coexistence. In Rwanda, asking for forgiveness is mandatory to get out of prison, 
thus confession and apology are acts that much more Rwandans than Burundians have experienced. 
Even though many Rwandan genocide survivors complain that these apologies are not personal and 
sincere enough, many appreciate the closure and recognition of suffering that apology, commemora-
tion and transitional justice may provide. In Rwanda, genocide survivors maintain that commemora-
tion ceremonies help them address their grief. Even if they run the risk of being overwhelmed and re-
traumatized, most survivors consider commemoration necessary for reconciliation and particularly 
for prevention. 
Criticism brought forward against Commemoration 
No participants I encountered in Rwanda actually wanted to deny survivors the right to commemo-
rate. According to the statements I recorded, there is a strong overarching consensus about com-
memoration being necessary for genocide prevention and reminding the population about the hor-
rors of genocide. The main criticisms relate to the graphic and traumatizing manner in which com-
memoration is celebrated1429, its ethnic specificity evoking feelings of exclusion among Hutu1430, and 
                                                          
1427
 Interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali. 
1428
 Interview with Paul, 44, ex-convict, „Gatumba“, Huye. 
1429
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Faustin, 40, 
survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Ga-
tumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Gisagara. 
1430
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye; Ben, 
25, bystander, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Annunciata, 58, survivor,"Gatumba", Huye; Christine, 49, survi-
vor, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Augustin, 50, bystander; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, 
Kigali; John,56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara;  Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Mukaga Kwaya, 43, 
bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. 
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the fact that commemoration itself keeps ethnic identities relevant1431. Still, in comparison to Burun-
di where the majority opts for a 'forgive and forget'-approach, only very few participants, mainly 
bystanders, said that they wanted to forget1432. Although commemoration as a concept for preven-
tion is rarely questioned fundamentally, commemoration's benefits for reconciliation and its unilat-
eral manner of implementation is subject to much criticism. As Kibonge, a bystander from Huye 
pointed out: “if we commemorate only one side, there is no unity and reconciliation1433." 
In Burundi, forgiveness and commemoration are secondary topics compared to insecurity and jus-
tice. Most interviewees prefer to forget about 'la crise' because they do not see how a public debate 
or commemoration about the atrocities committed in the past could ameliorate the current condi-
tions. For most participants, especially those who have lost relatives, remembering the past holds no 
consolation:" Il faut mieux oublier ce qui c’est passé. […] Il ne faut pas se souvenir de ce qui s'est pas-
sé. Il faut mieux oublier ça. Puisque c'est un des évènements malheureux1434." Particularly among the 
losers of the civil war and among men, the feeling is prevalent that commemoration would only re-
mind them of what they lost and add to their frustration1435. For these participants, the fear that 
ethnic tensions could resurface by establishing official commemoration ceremonies like in Rwanda 
outweighs the hope that commemoration could have a preventive effect. Participants such as Marie-
Chantal are wary of the whole topic and believe that "Commemoration only brings hate and pain1436". 
The Non-performance of Burundian politics plays into this assessment. Many Burundians profoundly 
distrust the ability of their politicians to establish national commemoration without globalizing guilt 
or using it to further their own political agenda, particularly if said politicians were the actors instru-
mental in the unfolding of the catastrophes they are about to commemorate and have a motive for 
hiding the truth. The past still has such a strong impact on Burundi's political reality that a non-
partisan, statesmanlike perspective on reconciliation, which would be necessary to establish national 
commemoration in a form that acknowledges the losses of both sides and functions integratively, is 
still difficult to imagine.  
Truth first 
                                                          
1431
 Cf. interviews with Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara and Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye. 
1432
 Cf. interviews with Françoise, 53, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jeanne, 52, returnee, Huye; Augustin, 50, 
bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara;  
1433
 Interview with Kibonge, 43, bystander, Huye. 
1434
 Interview with Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation: "It's better not to remember 
the past. […] We should not remember what has happened. We should forget that. These are sad events." 
1435
 Cf. interviews with Juvémal, 59, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; 
Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi-resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Juvénal H., 53, 
Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Thérèse, 60, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, 
"Kamenge", Ngozi; Fréderic, 39, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Dominique, 37, Hutu resident, 
"Gakombe", Kirundo; Abel, 23, ex-combatant FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1436
 Interview with Marie-Chantal, 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
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Furthermore, the succession of steps towards reconciliation is of importance. One of the reasons 
that the process of acknowledgement, recognition and apologyin Burundi has not yet made signifi-
cant progress is that the events of the past remain shrouded in rumors. Even though the TRC should 
finally take up its work, the narratives differ widely and in many cases, there is no national consensus 
about which atrocities actually happened in the civil war and who caused them. In Rwanda, the gov-
ernmental narrative about the genocide is narrow, onesided and focuses on placing the guilt on the 
génocidaires and their ideology. Nevertheless, this narrative is clearly defined and could serve as a 
starting point for an open public debate if the RPF would allow it. Burundi on the other side still has 
to go through the difficult process of acknowledgement and recognition - reconciling the differing 
narratives with each other. The argument that “the truth is necessary but not the commemora-
tion1437” is valid particularly with reference to the convoluted process of establishing Burundi's 
TRC1438. Its potential for socio-political transformation and contribution to political accountability 
remains questionable in the highly politicized context of its operation1439.  
If commemoration should support reconciliation, Burundi first needs a narrative narrative estab-
lished through the active and free participation of the population and the diverse groups it consists 
of. "After the truth and reconciliation commission, then they could sit together and try to settle a day, 
even build some memorial centers to remember what happened. Because they would have said that 
this happened, why this happened, why and when and maybe set one day or set different memorial 
centers and each of these days, the whole country would remember the people they have lost1440.” 
The narrative hence should recognize the diverse reasons for suffering and address each group's 
particular grievances. Without a narrative, every attempt at explicit acknowledgement and recogni-
tion, be it in the form of a commemoration ceremony, a national day of mourning or even a museum, 
will most probably be doomed to fail. People will either perceive commemoration as rather exclusive 
and one-sided like the Rwandan ceremonies are seen by the majority of Hutus I interviewed, or, per-
haps even worse, remain segregated from the start with Hutu mourning Hutu and Tutsi mourning 
Tutsi and thus even deepen societal divisions. "Même aujourd'hui, ici, il commémore le 15.8.1988. Ils 
se souviennent des gens qui ont trouvé le mort par la crise de 88. Les Hutus sont invités par les Tutsis, 
mais il ne trouve pas que les Tutsis ont un intérêt à commémorer la crise de 88 puisque les Hutus ont 
manqué1441." 
                                                          
1437
 Interview with Abel, 23, ex-combatant FAB and FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1438
 Cf. Chapter 5.2. 
1439
 Cf. Vandeginste, 2012. 
1440
 Interview with Déogratias, 52, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1441
 Interview with Juvénal H., 53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. Translation (the translator speaks about 
the participant in the third person): "Even today, here, he commemorates the 15
th
 of August 1988. They re-
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Arguments in Favor of Commemoration 
Burundian commemoration ceremonies are mostly local1442. Thus, in general, most interviewees in 
Burundi had rather inofficial commemorations in mind. For most Burundians, the question if official 
commemoration would help them to address their grief was theoretical in nature. Proponents of 
commemoration mostly emphasize on the preventive and cohesive impact they hope commemora-
tion would have and dissociated the issue from their personal grief1443. Among the Burundian partici-
pants who would welcome official commemoration, an above-average number were women1444. 
Contrary to the opponents of commemoration, they emphasize the integrative character of mourn-
ing together and, similar to many Rwandan survivors believe that the process of grieving together 
could actually have a cohesive and preventive impact on society. The consensus here is that com-
memoration would remind people of the horror that ethnic divisions created1445 and make everybody 
understand that they are " […] not the only one[s] who suffered from that, it was the whole coun-
try1446". Particularly reconciliation associations where Hutu and Tutsi could sit and talk such as AMI in 
Rwanda1447 and religious ceremonies were frequently mentioned: “Quand les Tutsi et les Hutu sont à 
la messe ils se comprennent puisqu’ils partagent la même prière. On ne peut pas se méfier du Tutsi 
qui s’assoit à coté de toi et à un Hutu qui s’assoit à côté de toi. Tout le monde partage la même 
prière. […] La commémoration religieuse est très importante car les chrétiens se rendent à la messe 
pour prier ensemble sans aucune discrimination, mais ça dépend de la volonté des gens1448."  
Most participants who lost family members in Rwanda viewed official commemoration ambiguously. 
On the one hand, survivors are often thankful that commemoration acknowledges and recognizes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
member the people who died in the crisis of 1988. The Hutus are invited by the Tutsi but he does not think that 
the Tutsi are interested in commemorating the 1988 crisis because it was the Hutu who lost." 
1442
 Fréderic, 59, Hutu resident from "Gakombe" speaks about commemoration ceremonies in Bugabira; Hari, 
50, Hutu resident from "Kamenge" speaks about ceremonies taking place in Chimimba and Juvénal H., 53, Hutu 
resident from "Gakombe" says that he commemorates the 15
th
 of August 1988, when the massacres started. 
1443
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant, "Rohe-
ro", Ngozi; Léocadie, 50, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Hari, 50, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu 
refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Fréderic, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident, 
"Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1444
 Cf. Interviews with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Léocadie, 50, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; 
Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Venantie K., 25, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Irankunda, 30, 
Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", 
Kirundo. 
1445
 Cf. Interviews with Ezechiel, 31, ex-combatant FAB & FNL, "Rohero", Ngozi; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Ka-
menge", Ngozi; Immaculée, 52, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi; Fréderic, 59, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; 
Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo. 
1446
 Interview with Karemera, 73, returnee, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1447
 Cf. e.g. interview with Irankunda, 30, Tutsi IDP, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1448
 Interview with Générose, 43, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. Translation: "If Tutsi and Hutu meet at the 
mass, they understand each other and share the same prayer. You cannot be wary about the Tutsi who sits next 
to you or the Hutu who sits next to you. Everybody shares the same prayer. […] Religious commemoration is 
very important because the Christians go to mass to pray together without any kind of discrimination but it 
depends on the free will of the people." Cf. also Interview with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
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their suffering1449 and unites them with other survivors1450. On the other hand, the majority of survi-
vors stated that they suffer from retraumatization during commemoration week1451: "since she at-
tends commemoration, she gets trauma, she finally got a permission never to attend commemora-
tion1452.” Very frequently, participants even stated that they would feel "angry1453", "scared1454", 
"humiliated1455" or "excluded1456" again. Thus, even though a majority of Rwandan participants evalu-
ated commemoration positively with regard to its preventive function and appreciated the lessons 
they were taught, its contribution to social cohesion has to be taken with a grain of salt. 
Instrumentalization of Commemoration Ceremonies 
Next to the much clearer situation with regard to guilty parties in the genocide, Rwanda had a long 
period of relative peace that allowed the wounds of the genocide to heal to a greater extent than in 
Burundi, where peace is still relatively new and fragile. Fear that commemoration might resuscitate 
the old divisions thus is much more common in Burundi. This fear is often reflected in Burundians' 
rather cautious and assessing attitudes towards memory and commemoration. 
Rwanda is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The official narrative of the genocide has been so 
pervasive that the proponents of commemoration in Rwanda often view people who do not join the 
ceremonies as revisionists or old génocidaires with a guilty conscience. Commemoration week, when 
public life in Rwanda shuts down for 'Kwibuka jenoside yakorewe abatutsi', is not only a week of na-
tional mourning. The omnipresent mantra-like repetition of the official narrative1457 that has replaced 
the recounting of individual stories of suffering in many official ceremonies1458 is not only a pledge for 
'Never again'. It has also become a demonstration of power for the RPF and its mythico-history. 
There is a strong peer pressure and pressure from above to join commemoration if you want to avoid 
being socially shunned. "So the problem is still on those people who did the killings because they nev-
                                                          
1449
 Cf. interviews with Annunciata, 58, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye 
1450
 Cf. interview with Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali. 
1451
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Faustin, 40, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Costasie, 65, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; 
Christine, 49, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Boniphilde,40,  Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Marie-Françoise, 29, 
survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Annunciata, 58, Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye;  
1452
 Interview with "Boniphilde",40,  Hutu survivor, "Gatumba", Huye. Transcript from translator who spoke of 
Boniphilde in the third person. 
1453
 Cf. interviews with Emmanuel, 37, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", 
Huye. 
1454
 Interview with Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1455
 Interview with Gaspard, 26, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1456
  interview with Marita, 47, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1457
 Cf. chapter 4.1.4. 
1458
 Some Rwandans complained that ceremonies used to be different, focusing more on the victims whereas 
today, the focus rests more and more on how the government has turned tragedy into a success story (cf. in-
terviews with Maximilien, 38, survivor, Kigali and Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali). Others criticiz the traumatizing 
character of commemoration ceremonies and would rather have them changed into something more whole-
some(cf. interviews with Théodosine, 24, returnee, Kigali; Rugango, 81, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye). Cf. 
Thomson, 2013, 127-159. 
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er wish to participate in commemoration ceremonies1459” is a very popular view, particularly among 
survivors and ex-convicts. Although personally, I considered commemoration week extremely one-
sided when I attended the national ceremony at Amahoro-stadium and analyzed the press coverage 
in 2011, many participants did not seem to care too much about Hutu-victims not being explicitly 
mentioned. Yusuf considered 'genocide against the Tutsi' to be "simply a term being used at the mo-
ment. Maybe we don’t know how long it will last, maybe one day it will change1460” and Vincent be-
lieved that “nobody is growing a bad heart because of that. Because he thinks it is inclusive, that’s 
what he says. And when it comes to going to remember, everybody can go to the council memorial 
site. They can gather there and remember people who died during the genocide1461." There are also 
other views however: "I don't see it really helping with reconciliation because it's just one-sided. Be-
cause for me, my father got killed by the RPF. […]For me, I'm not even allowed to speak out in the 
open that my father was killed by the RPF yet I know that. You can't erase that in my memory as I 
said1462." 
Not a Priority 
In general, we could say that reprocessing memory is important particularly on an individual level. 
Many bereaved found consolation in the public acknowledgement and recognition of their suffering. 
However, neither Rwandan Hutu nor Burundians consider official commemoration a top-priority for 
reconciliation. As commemoration is always connected to trauma, most survivors do not look for-
ward towards commemoration week and others fear that the old divisions might resurface through 
commemoration. In general, its merits with reference to prevention and closure are less disputed 
than its benefits with reference to reconciliation, particularly considering the current character of 
commemoration ceremonies in Rwanda.  
Although most Rwandans would welcome the inclusion and acknowledgement of Hutu victims in 
official commemoration, they would probably tolerate the partiality of the narrative if it would be 
limited to commemoration. The main grievances lie elsewhere1463. Concerning Burundi, the question 
of commemoration and memoryclosely relates to the other issues tied into the process of coming to 
terms with the past: truth and reconciliation, transitional justice, and identity politics. The govern-
ment has to make a definitive decision between 'burying' the past or working through these issues 
and coming to terms with them. Should  'working through' succeed, it would require a fundamental 
                                                          
1459
 Interview with Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1460
 Yusuf, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1461
 Vincent, 43, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Original transcript from translator who speaks about Vincent in 
the third person. 
1462
 Interview with Robert, 25, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1463
 The issue that upset Rwandan peasants the most was inequality with regard to financial assistance and 
state repression regarding various official policies (planting crops, ethnic identity, reparations, justice). 
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effort in harmonizing the different narratives and an explicit acknowledgement and recognition of all 
victims of the various Burundian crises. 
 
6.2.5. Transitional Justice 
Rwanda: Justice as Regime Legitimation 
Nowhere is the difference between Rwanda and Burundi's post-conflict politics more conspicuous 
than in the area of transitional justice. Whereas Rwanda went to considerable lengths to punish eve-
ry perpetrator of the genocide, the Burundian government has only announced the definitive estab-
lishment of a truth and reconciliation commission in 2012. The special tribunal to preside over cimes 
against humanity, war crimes and genocide, which the APRA stipulated as well, has not been instated 
yet, as of the time of this writing. 
My research questions regarding transitional justice in Rwanda mainly concerned the Gacaca-courts 
because most of my participants had experiences with Rwanda's unique form of transitional justice. 
Gacaca-courts have precipitated very controversial evaluations among Rwandans as well as interna-
tional observers. While the proximity to the population and the unclogging of the justice system are 
mostly lauded, the latter criticize the refusal of access to lawyers for defendants, the strong emphasis 
on pressing confessions, the overextension of the lay judges, the insufficient security for witnesses, 
as well as the influence of the RPF combined with its refusal to prosecute RPF-crimes1464. The former 
emphasized the positive attributes of reducing sentences, facilitating closure and finding the truth 
through confession, combating impunity, and unclogging the justice and prison systems. Participants' 
complaints about Gacaca were related to similar issues as the scholars mention, but apart from the 
perceived onesidedness of the courts and their exploitation for revenge and enrichment1465, they 
placed much more emphasis on the difficulties of paying reparations.  
Most people I interviewed emphasized the positive points over the negative. Especially survivors 
agreed that punishment was necessary in order to prevent revenge or further atrocities1466 as well as 
                                                          
1464
 Cf. Particularly the laws against 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism' had a detrimental effect on Rwandans' 
willingness and ability to express themselves. Cf. HRW, 2011, 131; Rettig, 2008, 45. 
1465
 Cf. interviews with François, 52, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Thasienne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", 
Huye; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye: Yohani N., 68, "Gatumba", Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; John, 
56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, "Gatsata", Gisagara. Umubyeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", 
Gisagara. 
1466
 Cf. Interviews with Anasthase, 71, returnee, "Gatumba", Huye: Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Vianney, 52, by-
stander, "Gatumba", Huye; Delta Foxtrott, 39, returnee, Kigali; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Innocent, 55, ex-
convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara;  François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Jeanne, 32, returnee, Huye; Kibonge, 
43, bystander, Huye; Nadine, 25, survivor, Kigali; Canisius, 61, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara.  
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for the perpetrators to make amends for their deeds1467. Taking the killers off the streets for the se-
curity of the suvivors and enable coexistence was generally perceived as a requirement for continued 
coexistence: "Those who did the killings, if they could stay near them, there would be another... […] 
No there would be another killing. They would kill again, if they didn't put them in the prison1468.”  
Even though participants frequently criticized the corruptibility and amateurism of judges, one of the 
factors that was recommended the most, was the local character that made the experience of justice 
immediate and speaking about what happened in the genocide necessary1469. This allowed some 
survivors to achieve closure, particularly with regard to the disclosure of the location of the bodies of 
their relatives, which is culturally significant in Rwanda1470. Confessions and apologies, which were 
mandatory to be released from prison, helped survivors to cope with the loss and to forgive, even 
though some survivors considered the apologies not heartfelt enough1471, not personal enough or 
even felt forced to forgive1472. Nevertheless, acknowledging their suffering and making the truth be 
heard through confessions and punishments was a probably the most important point for survivors 
ven if the apologies were not satisfying1473. "The importance of Gacaca was to explain what hap-
pened. Those who did the crime, they had to explain the process of what happened1474." 
The Gacaca-courts are mainly controversial because of their exclusive focus on the genocide against 
the Tutsi. Three years after the courts ended, it remains to be seen if the government reacts to the 
main criticism and addresses RPF-crimes as well. The outlook however is rather bleak with Kagame 
publicly stating that the elements responsible for extrajudicial killings have already been pun-
ished1475. Transitional justice in Rwanda certainly had its benefits particularly with regard to closure, 
prevention, accountability (at least partial) and public information. It may however also have deep-
ened the divisions between the communities when it comes to coexistence and reconciliation1476. 
                                                          
1467
 Cf. Interviews with Boniphilde, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Maurice, 58, ex-
convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Peter, 46, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1468
 Interview with François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. Also see interview with Canisius, 61, bystander, 
"Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1469
 Even though there were many stories of abuse and manipulation regarding the Gacaca-courts and some 
said that the lay character of the courts invited corruption (cf. Thasienne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1470
 Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali; Jeanne d'Arc, 34, survivor, "Gatumba", Kigali; Paul, 44, ex-convict, "Gatumba", 
Gisagara; Yohani, 54, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye; Marcel, 40, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Luce, 42, survivor, 
"Gatumba", Huye. Chris, 29, survivor from Kigali attended many Gacaca courts and is still looking for his fa-
ther's body. He says he knows that it is irrational but as long as he hasn't found it, a part of him still thinks he is 
alive. 
1471
 Cf. Conversation with Kayitare, 31, survivor, Kigali; Luce, 42, survivor, "Gatumba", Huye; Annunciata,  
1472
 Cf. Interview with Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, "Gatsata", Gisagara. 
1473
 Cf. interviews with Christine, 29, survivor, "Gatumba", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Marcel, 40, survi-
vor, "Gatumba"; Maurice, 58, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1474
 Interview with Teresa, 72, "Gatumba", Huye. 
1475
 Cf. Kagame, 2009, xxiv. 
1476
 Cf. In Interviews with François (53, bystander) and Yohani N.  (68, ex-convict), both told me about murders 
in "Gatumba"after the genocide where the survivors who perpetrated the crimes were not held accountable. 
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The Rwandan think tank IRDP pointed out that the Gacaca-courts as an exercise of transitional justice 
left wounds that have to heal in the post-Gacaca period, hinting at the partiality of the process. The 
report emphasized the importance of a social space of exchange that would "include the citizens' 
ownership of strategies aiming at solving ethnic related conflicts1477." Hence, despite the fact that 
Gacaca were anchored at the local level and the concept planned to include restorative elements 
from the beginning, there is a certain understanding in Rwanda that justice was imposed by the vic-
tor of the civil war. There is still a strong need for the restoration of relationships on equal footing, 
and for a truly collective memory, which can only emerge through an open debate on ethnicity and 
the genocide. 
Burundi: A long Prelude to Justice 
Burundians have slightly different objectives for transitional justice than the traditional ones such as 
accountability, truth, reparation or reconciliation1478. With impunity and lack of economic opportuni-
ties representing the biggest problems of the post-conflict period, governance and development in 
the sense of poverty reduction are at the top of the list, making justice a secondary priority. Déogra-
tias explains: "we have first the problem of poverty, which makes people do whatever they want, they 
are looking for food and they will do whatever they can to get it. Another thing is the overpopulation 
because with the family planning, they are trying to teach the population. The president is trying to 
work well, he has a code of conduct that he follows, but the people around him, other politicians are 
not working, that’s where the problem lies1479." Disillusioned and distrustful with regard to the cur-
rent political establishment in Burundi, most participants have very little hope in the establishment 
of an impartial institution for transitional justice. In Burundi, rather than acknowledging the inter-
ethnic crimes of the past, which too often becomes a global condemnation of entire communities, it 
would be necessary to rebuild trust and confidence in the state and the justice system first1480. 
If transitional justice is viewed in the narrow sense of punishing the guilty, if the CNDD-FDD takes a 
cue from the RPF's authoritarian handbook and uses transitional justice to satisfy need to legitimate 
its rule and promote its specific discourse; it will only divide and destabilize the country instead of 
reconciling it. Even though an assessment might be premature, the timing of the establishment Bu-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Yohani N. (68, "Gatumba") maintains that survivors could get anybody arrested based solely on rumors. For 
other examples pertaining to problems wit Gacaca, c.f. interviews of Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, "Gatsata", 
Gisagara; John, 56, ex-convict, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Elias, 29, survivor, Kigali; Umu-
byeyi, 27, bystander, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Thasienne, 38, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Robert, 25, bystander, 
"Gatsata", Gisagara; François, 52, bystander, "Gatumba", Huye; Gaspard, 26, "Gatsata", Gisagara; Ben, 25, 
bystander, Kigali. 
1477
 IRDP, 2010, 37. 
1478
 Cf. also Ingelaere, 2009. 
1479
 Interview with Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1480
 Cf. Lemarchand and Niwese, 2007, 165f. 
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rundi's TRC and the reaction of the opposition parties suggests the conjecture that the TRC will be 
heavily influenced by the CNDD-FDD and that it will shield the party from having to take responsibil-
ity for past crimes1481. In the current volatile environment, the CNDD-FDD government should in any 
case resist the temptation of resorting to punitive justice for the time being, even though the APRA 
and the Burundian law of 27 December 2004 oblige it to deny amnesty for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide1482. The fact that Burundi has to establish institutions of transitional justice 
in order to access the donor funds supplied for these purposes further complicates the issue of am-
nesty prohibition. A tribunal widely considered partial that convicts political opponents of the ruling 
party might be the final straw that brings the situation to boil over into violent conflict. 
Despite the lingering legacy of the war and the tense economic situation that exacerbates competi-
tion, there is a social basis for issue-based non-ethnic politics in Burundi1483. Burundians do want to 
move beyond ethnocentricity. Considering my data, even punishing the leaders of the civil war would 
not fundamentally disrupt interethnic peace1484, if an independent, impartial (and possibly interna-
tional) authority would judge these leaders fairly1485. This would ring true especially if immediate 
economic relief for the population would accompany justice. Both a TRC as well as a special tribunal 
could be beneficial to reconciliation as long as the TRC encourages cohabitation respectively the tri-
bunal acts impartially, does not condemn globally and builds back trust and confidence in the state. 
Up to now however, Burundi has blatantly disregarded any recommendations and the advice of the 
multiple commissions of inquiry with regard to transitional justice1486.  
'Maximum Justice' versus 'No Justice' 
At first glance, it may appear paradoxical but the truth is that Burundi had very similar reasons for its 
'non-approach' to transitional justice as Rwanda had for its 'maximum justice'-approach. The crux of 
the matter is the difference between the Rwandan and Burundian points of departure with regard to 
power political settings and their influence on justice.  
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 Cf. Cf. Nduwimana, Burundi creates reconciliation body that divides public opinion, 18. April 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/18/us-burundi-politics-idUSBREA3H0E020140418 (July 23, 2014). 
1482
 Cf. Vandeginste 2011, 200. 
1483
 Cf. Uvin, 2009, 189. 
1484
 In general, the leaders of the civil war have lost most of their sympathies among the population. Compas-
sion for politicians is very limited. Cf. e.g. interviews with Henriette, 49, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Dé-
ogratias, 59, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1485
 Cf. Interviews with Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Michel, 65, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", Ngozi; 
Abel, 23, Tutsi ex-combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; David, 29, Hutu ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Pierre, 53, 
Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi. 
1486 Cf. IRIN News Africa, “Justice in a lawless World? Righs and Reconciliation in a new Era of Intern-
tional Law”, June 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/indepthmain.aspx?InDepthId=7&ReportId=59485. 
(25 July 2014) 
Page 291 
 
The RPF in Rwanda started out as the victorious party of a civil war that had defeated the Hutu ex-
tremists but consisted primarily of Tutsi, a persecuted national minority. In order to stabilize the 
country and make it secure for Tutsi, it made absolute sense from the RPF's perspective of domi-
nance to chase down and imprison every alleged perpetrator, embark on a policy of national unity, 
and to outlaw the ethnicist ideology. For the Tutsi and thus the RPF, this was a matter of life or 
death, and transitional justice was their chance to end impunity and instill a change of thinking in the 
Hutu majority.  
In Burundi on the other hand, the CNDD-FDD came to power through negotiations and elections. The 
ex-rebel movement was not even part of the APRA in 2000 but actually fought its way to the negoti-
ating table later, committing numerous atrocities. When the CNDD-FDD came to power in 2005, the 
main other rebel movement, the FNL, remained outside the peace process. For persuading the FNL 
to join the peace process, the CNDD-FDD needed to provide an incentive, which they found in offer-
ing temporary immunity from prosecution, which implicitly had been granted to the original signato-
ries of the Pretoria agreement as well1487. The power sharing agreement in Burundi thus functioned 
as an elite bargain that established a power equilibrium between guilty parties that had not managed 
to defeat each other by military means. In order to keep the peace and ensure stability within this 
fragile power-sharing framework, transitional justice had to be put on hold for reasons of political 
expediencey and stability. The inherent danger, that unearthing the past would provoke parties to 
opt out of the peace process were so clear to all parties involved that even the international commu-
nity did not press the issue1488. The 2010 elections however shifted the power equilibrium. From its 
new position of dominance, the CNDD-FDD could justify its rule and consolidate its position by hand 
picking the members of the TRC and potentially the special tribunal. They can influence the TRC's 
work or the tribunal's judgements much in the same way as the RPF has utilized transitional justice 
and commemoration to solidify its interpretational sovereignty over the genocide. Exploited in this 
context, transitional justice becomes a tool for political defamation, exclusion and division. 
Thus, on a power political level, political stability and expediency has been one of the main rationales 
behind transitional justice in both countries. The question is how this translates to the perceptions of 
transitional justice at the grassroots. 
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 Even though Burundi formally accepts the amnesty prohibition of the United Nations. Cf. Vandeginste, 
2011, 189-211. 
1488
 Cf. Vandeginste, 2011 & 2012. 
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Approval of transitional Justice: Comparison Rwanda and Burundi
1988
1990 (Rwa) / 
1993 election 
(Bdi)
1994 (Rwa) / 
1993 crisis (Bdi)
2003 (Rwa) / 
2005 (Bdi) 2011
Burundi Average 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3





























Transitional Justice: Comparison Rwanda and Burundi 
The answers to the scaled questions suggest that Rwandans in general are content with the course 
transitional justice has taken whereas Burundians grow increasingly wary of their justice system's 
non-performance.  
There are multiple factors that may explain the positive evaluation of transitional justice in Rwanda: 
 The understanding of transitional justice mentioned above: at least some Tutsi were able to 
find truth and closure; among many Hutus, the Gacaca-courts are viewed as the institution 
that released them, not the reason for their imprisonment.  
 Strong pressure for conformity exerted from above to give politically correct answers1489.  
 The extensive re-education of the Rwandan population was applied to my research ques-
tions. 
 Justice with regard to the genocide is generally interpreted as more important than the 
crimes of the RPF, 
With regard to Burundi, the decreasing curve suggests that something has to be done with regard to 
transitional justice. This becomes even clearer when we compare the research sites: 
                                                          
1489
 Although top-down socio-political pressure for political correctness is a given, particularly with regard to ex-
convicts (highest approval rate of 3.7), I would hesitate to interpret the high approval rate as a result pure co-
ercion. In reality, approval of transitional justice is probably considerably lower but considering participant 
observation, I met many Rwandans who were genuinely impressed by the process of transitional justice and 
had sophisticated opinions about its benefits and failures. Cf. chapter 4.5. 
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Approval of transitional Justice: Comparison Research Sites
1988
1990 (Rwa) / 
1993 election 
(Bdi)
1994 (Rwa) / 
1993 crisis (Bdi)
2003 (Rwa) / 
2005 (Bdi) 2011
Gakombe, Kirundo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.2
Rohero, Ngozi 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.6
Kamenge, Ngozi 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.5
Burundi Average 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3
Gatsata, Gisagara 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 3.7
Gatumba, Huye 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 3.1
Kigali 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 2.7




































Transitional Justice: Comparison Research Sites 
The comparison between research sites illustrates clearly that the appreciation for efforts towards 
transitional justice in "Gakombe", where twelve out of fourteen participants were Hutu, still rises 
while it has already dropped below zero in "Rohero", which is predominantly populated by Tutsi. As 
with matters of coexistence, assistance, or the management of ethnicity, Tutsi in Burundi start feel-
ing marginalized. Transitional justice however is the most dangerous political issue because a partial 
reprocessing of the events of 1972 and or the behavior of the Tutsi-led army in the civil war might 
reignite old anti-Tutsi-sentiments. This time, the Tutsi would however not be protected by the army. 
Rwanda did have its share of problems with regard to Tutsi-victims getting intimidated or even mur-
dered but in general, the RPF regime was interested in most of them speaking out against their tor-
turers and abusers because making the atrocities of the genocide public, furthered the RPF's political 
agenda. In Burundi however, the CNDD-FDD would not have much incentives to let Tutsi-IDPs or oth-
er victims accuse the powerholders. Given the miserable record of the police and the justice sys-
tem1490, Tutsi plaintiffs or truth-tellers would have to live in constant fear of retaliation, which is not a 
conducive societal climate for establishing a TRC. To Ingelaere, even the Gacaca-approach in Rwanda 
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 Cf. HRW, 2012. 
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is a deterring example: "Before the state-sanctioned installation of the Gacaca courts, popular prac-
tices and narratives show that the past was primarily tacitly explored without much discursive con-
tent. The Gacaca courts substantially altered this non-discursive process of cohabitation due to the 
introduction of a logic of prosecution in the midst of a peasant society1491." In his eyes, the Western 
model of 'forensic truth-telling' antagonizes groups further, while traditional forms of justice are 
rather non-discursive and lack prosecutorial logic1492. 
As the diagrams above show, next to the almost complete impunity for crimes that perpetrators cur-
rently face in Burundi, even the Rwandan approach of one-sided justice is preferable to most, as long 
as it implements a modicum of rule of law. In Burundi, transitional justice as well as reconciliation 
needs to be initiated on the national level with a strong focus on communal issues such as trust 
building, truth telling, confessions and pardon, joint activities, cohabitation initiatives that end segre-
gation, governmental mediation and process facilitation. The social tissue has to become strong 
enough so that it is not disrupted by a public debate or a judicial reprocessing of the past.  
It is too early for a final evaluation but even if we consider Rwanda's approach towards transitional 
justice partial and Hutus feel treated unfairly, the Rwandan population in general views this status 
quo as a strong progress from the culture of impunity that reigned in Rwanda between 1990 and 
1994. In Burundi, impunity is still prevalent, if a basic level of security and justice cannot be estab-
lished, key objectives of reconciliation such as acknowledgement, memory, apology and recognition 
will continue to be put in second place after security and stability. Retroactive transitional justice 
might help to reestablish trust and confidence in the state if it proves fair and impartial but in the 
current situation, the feasibility of establishing an independent national institution of transitional 
justice has to be questioned. If it primarily focuses on the present, an impartial justice system could 
help defuse tensions between parties. The promises however look bleak. In Rwanda, the dominance 
of the ruling party has turned transitional justice into a tool to globalize and perpetuate Hutu guilt 
and to silence critics. For the CNDD-FDD, this is even simpler. Although they had to take their coali-
tion partners and minority representatives into consideration before 2010, the floodgate has been 
opened by the elections. With the CNDD-FDD representing the majority of the population and inter-
national funds available for transitional justice, the temptation for utilizing it for regime legitimation 
is high, while the obstacles are negligible. 
                                                          
1491
 Ingelaere, 2009, 117. 
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7.1.  Coexistence: Ethnic Balance vs. National Unity 
A Summary 
Both Rwanda and Burundi attempt to change their dynamics of violence through changing sociopolit-
ical frameworks and establishing peace, ethnic coexistence and reconciliation. The overall objectives 
coincide. Their approaches however diverge strongly.  
Burundi mainly concentrated on balancing out politics at the national level. In this aspect, the post-
settlement political design succeeded. The consociational political design with ethnic quotas has sub-
stantially reduced ethnic tensions on the top level. By its explicit acknowledgement, Burundi from 
2005 onward has successfully utilized ethnicity as an instrument of de-escalation instead of radicali-
zation. Contrary to Rwanda, where the conflict potential of polarized ethnic identities has been bur-
ied underneath restrictive laws, the political move to make explicit ethnic inclusiveness mandatory 
has led to new cross-ethnic alliances among the Burundian elite. There has always been a disposition 
towards consensus and power sharing in Burundian political culture. Much more than in Rwanda, the 
character of crisis is distinctively political1493 and has been since the later stages of the civil war, when 
Buyoya recognized he could not withhold power from the Hutu forever. These political fault lines 
actually add more exceptions to the Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy than the Rwandan victim-perpetrator 
differentiation does1494. In direct comparison to Rwanda, ethnicity is out in the open, public opinion is 
still a lot less controlled and the private media and civil society are mostly independent. The inter-
mingling of categories as well as the fact that the main conflict nowadays takes place between the 
Hutu parties FNL and the CNDD-FDD makes it difficult for politicians to play the ethnic card, thus 
reducing the danger of widespread ethnic massacres as in the civil war. Even though no significant 
new identities have emerged and the process of de-polarization could still be reversed by changing 
the constitution, the fault lines of conflict at the top-political level have at least changed through 
acknowledgement and recognition of ethnic identity as a source of conflict, at least on the national 
political level.  
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 Labruyère, 35, a Tutsi resident from Ngozi speaks about the "masque éthnique de la violence", describing 
the tactics of extremist politicians to disguise politico-economic interests as ethnic differences. 
1494
 Some examples are e.g. Ferdinand, 56, and Générose, 43, Hutu Upronists who fled to Rohero as well as 
Sylvestre, 69, from "Kamenge",  also a Hutu who joined UPRONA. Abel, 23 and Ezechiel, 31, are Tutsi from 
"Rohero" who fought for the FNL. Sadi, 45, from "Kamenge" claims steadfastly not to know his ethnicity. Dé-
ogratias (59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge") and Arsène (35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe") who are Tutsi but joined 
the CNDD-FDD. In Rwanda on the other hand, there were only Boniphilde and Annunciata who, as Hutu charac-
terized themselves as survivors because they were widows of Tutsi husbands. Bystanders, returnees and ex-
convicts are ethnically exclusive categories. Cf. chapters 3.2.4. to 3.2.6. 
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On the grassroots and with regard to apology, recognition and particularly justice and memory, the 
state of affairs in Burundi looks much worse. The state has postponed and dragged on the implemen-
tation of mechanisms for transitional justice for more than a decade. It mostly left memory work and 
reconciliation to civil society and Burundian citizens themselves. Although the regime implicitly 
acknowledges both the suffering of Hutu and Tutsi during the civil war, up to now the actions to im-
plement justice mechanisms or alleviate the consequential hardships have been limited to a bare 
minimum. The families of the victims of 1972 or 1988 still wait for explicit acknowledgement, recog-
nition and apology for their suffering from the government.  
The past as a whole remains largely unaddressed. In the wake of 1972 and 1988 as well as during the 
long and arduous peace process and after the civil war, international as well as domestic actors con-
sidered the government's legitimacy and stability to be more important than memory work or recon-
ciliation politics. This foot-dragging with regard to justice and generally the silence pertaining to past 
atrocities have led many Burundians to the conviction that forgiving, forgetting and moving forward 
is the most promising way to cope with the complicated past. Nevertheless, the past lingers on in old 
prejudices, land disputes, and conflicting narratives. The continuous segregation of the population in 
many areas has the potential of reversing the interethnic peace process should Tutsi be further mar-
ginalized in national politics. 
Before the elections of 2015, the country remains in limbo. Although Nkurunziza is still popular 
among peasants and even Tutsi voted for the CNDD-FDD, insecurity and corruption are rampant, the 
political parties refuse any meaningful dialogue since 2010 and major political players are mostly 
preoccupied with defending their positions of political power. Burundians in general have lost hope 
in politics. Distrust in the state and the justice system is on the rise. Key issues such as ethnic segre-
gation, impunity and land reform have not been approached resolutely enough. After more than a 
decade of avoiding coming to terms with the past, the government seems to be ready to finally make 
a decision between 'digging up' or 'burying' the past1495. However, judging from the reactions of civil 
society, international observers, and opposition parties, it is the wrong decision, solely designed to 
support the partial narrative of the ruling party. 
Rwanda has achieved some important key objectives of reconciliation politics, at least with regard to 
the genocide. Concerning justice, the Rwandan state has succeeded in trying the majority of geno-
cide suspects with the exception of some who managed to hide abroad. It has also spearheaded the 
development of community-based trials, the Gacaca. With regard to the recognition of suffering, the 
state has established assistance programs for genocide survivors such as the FARG, re-integration 
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 Cf. Ingelaere, 2009, 5. 
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programs for perpetrators such as TIG, and supports a wide array of civil society initiatives that aim 
at facilitating reconciliation. Furthermore, through institutions such as the NURC and the CNLG, the 
regime has succeeded in thoroughly sensitizing its population about its national discourse on the 
genocide. National Unity and the common culture of all Rwandans are emphasized everywhere and 
seem to have permeated to the general population. 
These signs of progress however cannot hide the fact that there is an increasing controversy with 
regard to the design and implementation of Rwandan reconciliation politics. Rwanda's official dis-
course about acknowledgement, recognition, apology and justice is very narrow, partial and mostly 
reflects the views of returnees. It monopolizes truthtelling and only applies it to the genocide against 
the Tutsi but not to alleged RPF/RPA-crimes in Rwanda or the DRC. To a certain degree, the regime 
utilizes cultural imperialism with regard to identity politics and commemoration. It has all but si-
lenced dissent and open debate. This has forced ethnic identities underground and makes their ex-
tant rallying power difficult to assess. With the atrocities against Hutu remaining unaddressed for 
reasons of national stability, Hutu-guilt globalized, high modernist experiments in agriculture and 
effective political power limited to a few hand-sorted key players, Rwanda risks producing a growing 
class of disgruntled Hutu-intellectuals and perpetuating a feeling of oppression among rural Hutu. So 
far, the state's attempts at ‘Rwandification’ might actually work as long as the population perceives 
opportunities for personal socioeconomic advancement and the conditions of the economy and na-
tional security do not deteriorate. Kagame and the RPF are still very popular among Rwandans, but 
they need to turn a new leaf. 
This becomes even more urgent as the RPF-regime's 'genocide credit' with international donors 
crumbles because the atrocities and shady dealings with conflict minerals and gold in the DRC gain 
international coverage. Rwanda regularly severes ties with its proxies in the DRC due to international 
pressure. Such was the fate of the RCD-Goma, the CNDP and the M23, which all slumped after 
Rwandan backing was pulled1496. It however gets increasingly difficult for Kagame to dissociate 
Rwanda from the conflict in the DRC. Despite its status as darling of the aid industry1497, the continu-
ous destabilizing involvement in the DRC risks drying up Rwanda's international budget support, 
which in turn is necessary to develop the country and sustaining the confidence of the population. 
To summarize the two national approaches to coexistence: while both countries strive for reconcilia-
tion and coexistence, Rwanda emphasizes on national unity and tries to implement it through high 
modernist, top-down policies with the aim of eliminating ethnic identities altogether. Burundi focus-
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 Revealingly, CNDP-leader Laurent Nkunda was arrested in Rwanda and M23-general Bosco 'Terminator' 
Ntaganda also turned himself in to the authorities in Kigali. 
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 Cf. Chapter 4.2.2. 
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es on establishing a constitutional balance between ethnic groups, but apart from sharing power at 
the top level, has adopted almost no concrete measures to address issues such as transitional justice, 
commemoration, or assistance for victims. Both ruling parties demonstrate increasingly authoritarian 
tendencies in order to stabilizing the country, justifying their rule and securing peace and reconcilia-
tion with due regard to the respective party's particular needs and visions. Finally, in both countries, 
the practice of linking reconciliation politics to the necessities of power politics risk derailing the very 
peace process they are attempting to safeguard. 
 
7.2.  Inconsistent Approaches towards Coexistence and Reconciliation 
The main problem of the approaches to coexistence described above, 'national unity' respectively 
'ethnic balance' is that their strategic application with simultaneous consideration of power politics 
renders them inconsistent. Both approaches to coexistence are implicitly combined with two differ-
ent concepts of reconciliation. We could roughly describe these as 'working through' and 'forgive and 
forget'. The combinations of the approach to coexistence and the approach to reconciliation are less 
than ideal in both countries. 
Rwanda: 'National Unity' and 'Working Through' 
As set out in chapter 4, the RPF started out as a party representing a minority. Its only two possible 
scenarios for building a common future for Rwandans where the RPFs core constituency, the Tutsi, 
remain a co-determinant political force to be reckoned with are: 
a) Following through with its policy of unity and reconciliation and ultimately eliminating the very 
concept of ethnic groups in the process, thus establishing the RPF as a Rwandan unity party, or 
b) Switching to a consociational arrangement as Burundi has and hoping that the RPF will be per-
ceived as a national party crossing ethnic boundaries or that a united Tutsi minority becomes the 
tip of the scale in a political arena of predominantly Hutu parties. 
Option B is highly unlikely, as it would negate the discourse of national unity that the RPF has been 
promoting for the past twenty years. A system-switch would also add a rather unpredictable compo-
nent to Rwandan politics and it would almost certainly imply a significant loss of power for the in-
cumbents, as Buyoya's defeat in Burundi after introducing multiparty democracy in 1993 has demon-
strated. Furthermore, a quota model does not seem to be very popular among peasants, who fear it 
might lead to sectarian politics again. Hence, the RPF will most likely abide by its distinct program of 
promoting national unity while legitimizing its rule with recourse to the genocide against the Tutsi 
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that followed the last experiment with unchecked multiparty democracy. This recourse to the geno-
cide including its distinct projects, namely national commemoration, transitional justice, and specific 
assistance programs for survivors, however, is exactly what renders the discourse of national unity 
inconsistent. 
If "we are all one people1498" as the RPF promotes and the historical differences between Hutu and 
Tutsi are about to be reduced to the point of non-existence, then a policy of forgiving and forgetting 
as many Burundian peasants call for would be much more effective for promoting national unity and 
reconstructing society from scratch. Instead, the RPF has fully dedicated itself to 'Never Again'. The 
genocide is omnipresent in Rwandan public life, especially during commemoration week. The country 
does not officially celebrate its independence; it does only mourn the beginning of the genocide on 
April 6. The ubiquitous lessons and sensitizations informing citizens about the genocide are inescap-
able and mandatory for ex-convicts, politicians and university students. The party's drive for 'maxi-
mum justice' has imprisoned masses of innocent Hutu, many died in prison, adding further grievanc-
es to the old wounds. Official commemoration acknowledges the victims of the genocide but by 
glossing over the Hutus who were killed from 1990 up to the Congo Wars, it consistently reminds 
their relatives of historical Hutu guilt while neither acknowledging nor recognizing their losses. Re-
nounced civil rights for ex-convicts and reparation payments; respectively almost exclusive assistance 
for survivors finally makes Hutu painfully aware of the unequal treatment of Rwandans in Kagame's 
state. Transitional justice, commemoration, apology, acknowledgement and recognition are pillars of 
the Rwandan policy of unity and reconciliation but they are implicitly reserved for the victims of one 
side. Abandoning the identities that brought about so much grief in Rwanda and building a common 
future is a noble goal, but it is doomed to fail as long as the genocide is still allowed to categorize 
Rwandans, dividing them through the inequality created by the very policies designed to eliminate its 
legacy. 
Actually, even the Burundian 'non-approach' to transitional justice would have probably harmonized 
far better with politics of national unity and the outlawing of ethnic identities. With a two-sided 
strictly restorative or symbolic approach to transitional justice such as e.g. in the South African TRC, 
Gacaca might have avoided the tense atmosphere with mutual accusations of defendants or the 
practice of abusing courts for settling personal scores. Such an approach might have truly urged the 
population to apologize, forgive and move on as equals instead of having the side effect of globaliz-
ing guilt and permanently reducing the defendants to second-class citizens by renouncing their 
rights. The genocide is universally considered an atrocity never to be repeated and participants in 
general never questioned assistance to survivors. The only point of critique with regard to assistance 
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 Interview with Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, "Gatumba", Huye. 
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frequently uttered in interviews was that the families of (dead) perpretrators or Hutu who were 
jailed innocently receive neither assistance nor reparations. In the current scenario however, com-
memoration is forced upon the losers of the civil war by the victors as an annual admission of guilt. 
The purported inclusiveness of the new Rwandan national identity is voided by the unequal treat-
ment of Rwandans at the hands of a government that still does not trust the majority of its popula-
tion. 
Burundi: 'Ethnic Balance' and 'Forgiving and Forgetting' 
Due to the long, fragile and difficult peace process, the state of Burundi and its international partners 
have up until now treated transitional justice as a secondary priority, which factually amounts to 
almost fifteen years of practiced 'forgiving and forgetting' even though the government has formally 
accepted the amnesty prohibition of the international community1499. It is still too early to evaluate 
the impact of the newly formed TRC or if and when the Burundian government will follow through 
with establishing a special tribunal but the context of operation for an impartial truth finding com-
mission is rather unfavorable since the elections of 2010.   
For facilitating coexistence, Burundi is pursuing a strategy of balancing the intact ethnic conflict era-
identities through a complex system of proportionality, ethnic quotas, qualified majorities and Tutsi 
overrepresentations in the key areas of the army, administration and parliament. This is the ap-
proach generally favored by Western scholars and, if applied correctly, it guarantees equal chances 
for Hutu and Tutsis and reduces the significance of ethnicity as a political conflict factor. On the top-
level, this works. Nevertheless, there are certain problems with the consociational approach: even 
with a political balance established, the historical conflict potential as well as the groups' self-
awareness and their differing narratives remain untouched. Mutual accusations of having started the 
conflict are also more common in Burundi than in Rwanda.  
In order to address and heal the historical grievances and to establish a narrative of the collective 
past that is shared by both groups, would mutually recognize their suffering, and lay the fundament 
for a shared memory, the consociational approach would necessitate 'working through' the violent 
past1500. One of the aspects of the Rwandan policy of unity and reconciliation often evaluated posi-
tively by survivors was closure, apology and recognition. Survivors felt enabled to turn a new leaf 
after they knew that the truth was established and their loss was officially recognized. In Burundi, 
interviewees considered the impunity of perpetrators as one of the biggest obstacles to peace and 
reconciliation next to poverty and the struggle for politico-economic power. Combating impunity, 
establishing the truth and offering recognition however, requires a conscious and proactive effort by 
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 Cf. Chapter 5.2. 
1500
 Cf. Rigby, 2006, 52f. and Lemarchand, 2009b. 
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the government to address the past and reprocess it. In a country where many politically active na-
tional leaders are responsible for atrocities in the past and where a group's historical suffering is in-
extricably linked with its ethnic identity, this of course may put political stability in jeopardy. Hence, 
Burundi's political establishment has tacitly agreed to a conspiracy of silence as long as nobody has 
the upper hand. Crimes committed in the context of civil war or ethnic strife as in 1972 are conven-
iently forgotten.  
The Burundian population, particularly the supporters of president Nkurunziza would actually wel-
come a consistent policy of 'burying the past'. Even some Rwandans less affected by the past such as 
bystanders and returnees would agree with this view. However, the ongoing struggle for political 
power between the CNDD-FDD and the opposition parties, especially the FNL, has extended the con-
spiracy of silence into the present, leading to a widespread culture of political violence and impunity. 
Revenge and vigilantism are daily occurences while the wounds of 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 remain 
untreated and only wait for a political entrepreneur that demands justice for his ethnic group to ex-
ploit them. It speaks for the design of the Burundian power sharing agreement that the political con-
flict did not take on an ethnic dimension so far. Unfortunately, this could change soon if Nkurunziza 
abolishes the post of the Tutsi vice president and perhaps even further minority representations or if 
the new Burundian TRC handpicked by president Nkurunziza will act as partial as assumed by the 
opposition.  
Paradoxically, even though Burundi has undertaken far less measures to facilitate reconciliation than 
Rwanda did, this has also prevented Burundian reconciliation politics to become instrumental to 
oppression in an authoritarian state as of yet. In a balanced-out system without commemoration or a 
shared memory, neither transitional justice nor explicit acknowledgement of suffering from the 
state, all parties remain silent. They however remain apart.  
General Requirements for Reconciliation Politics 
Considering all four approaches to coexistence and reconciliation and their inconsistent combina-
tions, we can identify a few prerequisites to reconciliation and peaceful coexistence that are im-
portant regardless of the approach.  
First, equality is probably the most important requirement for reconciliation to succeed. If citizens 
call the equal treatment of all conflict parties into question, reconciliation is always perceived in the 
context of dominance and thus considered partial and dishonest at best. In such a scenario, people 
feeling oppressed will only pay lip service to the policy regardless of its specific design. Next to poli-
tics, equality in the sense of recognition particularly pertains to assistance and support for poor 
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members of the community and victims of mass violence. Poverty is a direct driving force of conflict 
and if it is combined with jealousy and greed against aid-recipients from another group, it breeds 
extremism. Vulnerable groups such as survivors and families of convicts in Rwanda or marginalized 
Tutsi and demobilized soldiers and rebels in Burundi should be targeted for assistance specifically, 
but without denying support to others. Ex-convicts should have their civil rights reinstated after hav-
ing served their sentence. Being rehabilitated as a full-fledged member of society is the whole pur-
pose of punishment, atonement and reintegration via TIG, thus political rights should be reinstated 
as well. 
Second and closely related to equality is the imperative of impartiality with regard to justice and 
commemoration. If a post-conflict state chooses to 'work through' the past or combat impunity, it is 
paramount that all defendants are treated equally. I disagree with Clark1501 here, who maintains that 
the genocide in Rwanda has been such an outstanding crime that it had to be brought to justice first 
and that there would be room to judge RPF/RPA-crimes later. The exclusive focus of Gacaca on the 
genocide led to their perception as victor's justice among Hutus even if these Hutu acknowledged 
that the genocide had been primarily a crime against Tutsi and that its resurgence should be pre-
vented. As long as the defendant conceives his trial as fair and impartial, he may understand his pun-
ishment as an act of cleansing not as an act of oppression and deprivation of liberty. Some ex-
convicts I interviewed tried to make sense of their prison terms in this manner, but mostly they were 
just glad to having survived the prisons. Even though a society can opt for not addressing the past, 
impartial rule of law is just as important with regard to transgressions in the present because the rule 
of law acts preventively if it is truly impartial. Conversely, impunity for crimes in the past perpetuates 
itself and incites revenge if the group dynamics remain unchanged or if the justice system is corrupt-
ed. Hence, the most urgent problem the Burundian government needs to address is impunity, at 
least with regard to current crimes, because it perpetuates the suffering.  
Third, reconciliation politics are a matter of balance. Most participants in Rwanda as well as in Bu-
rundi expressed their preference for transitional justice and commemoration compared to forgiving 
and forgetting, provided that these endeavors would not disrupt the balance between Hutu and Tutsi 
or would disturb the peace. Post-conflict societies are very fragile environments and conflicts are 
easily sparked anew when old grievances are dragged forth or (tacit) agreements are broken. I do 
welcome the amnesty prohibition for crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, but in the 
contexts of Rwanda and Burundi where the future hinges largely on social cohesion and a common 
interpretation of the past, restorative or symbolic justice are less conflict-laden than traditional puni-
tive justice. Therefore, I would favor a hybrid approach that combines 'forgiving' with restorative 
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 Cf. Clark, 2009, 297-320. 
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justice and truthtelling. The value of acknowledgement and apology for restoring balance is often 
underestimated. In both countries, many people affected by the violence said that they would not 
necessarily be appeased by the punishment of the perpetrator, but by his heartfelt apology and the 
alleviation of the hardships that his actions caused. Even with regard to RPF/RPA-crimes, most Hutu 
said that they would be content with a symbolic admission of guilt. Punishing the leaders either 
needs a societal consensus about their guilt as in the case of the génocidaires or Ndadaye's murder-
ers or it requires a strong social tissue that could bear the conviction of a popular leader without 
disaggregating into ethnic camps again. For the ethnic balance to remain intact, the Burundian gov-
ernment should provide targeted support particularly to disgruntled Tutsi-communities such as "Ro-
hero", and leave the stipulations of the power sharing agreement untouched if it does not want the 
conflict to aggravate and spill into identity politics. 
Lastly, an open debate about identity issues and the past dissociated from politics would be highly 
desirable. Even if the country opts for forgiving and forgetting, divided societies are usually in dire 
need of a collective past and shared symbols. Without forcing it upon people through heavy-handed 
re-education, which often only intimidates them to the point of remaining silent, such a merging of 
narratives needs time, effort, open-mindedness and social cohesion. Furthermore, scientific research 
should not be constrained or interfered with, even if it differs from the dominant opinion. Trying to 
control the historical discourse means closing one's eyes to new insights and will eventually breed 
more criticism. By co-opting or silencing civil society and the media and aggressively defending inter-
pretational sovereignty with regard to criticism from academia or international NGOs, the Rwandan 
government has blocked almost every unfiltered feedback loop when it comes to the negative as-
pects of its policies. Nkurunziza's CNDD-FDD demonstrates the same totalitarian ambition and seeks 
to imitate the RPF's success, but lacks the discipline that a stern leader such as Kagame and mecha-
nisms such as Imihigo have instilled in Rwanda. If Rwanda however remains ignorant towards criti-
cism, particularly from its own peasants, its ambitious policies will probably fail as well. If we take 
other African experiences with large-scale top-down development –projects as references, high 
modernist projects lacking popular feedback loops are prone to arrogance, ignorance and ultimately 
disaster1502. 
 
7.3.  The Framework Conditions of Policy Implementation are Key  
Popular Preferences 
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 Cf. chapter 2.3. 
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The establishment of security and rule of law as far as it pertains to the everyday life of Rwandans 
may have been Kagame’s greatest contribution to Rwanda’s medium-term stability. It may also be 
the biggest difference to Burundi, where violence has never fully stopped and is sanctioned by “blan-
ket impunity protecting the perpetrators1503.”  
With respect to popular perceptions about changing the lethal Hutu-Tutsi dichotomy, the important 
aspect in certain cases may not be the approach chosen, but its implementation. As a Swiss citizen 
who grew up in a consociational state that has managed its plural society reasonably well by intro-
ducing a complex system of balances, quotas and minority representations, I do have a strong pref-
erence for the consociational Burundian model. Although the preconditions in Switzerland did not 
involve mass violence and the system is reformed permanently, its design enabled the Swiss gov-
ernment to include emerging counter-elites gradually, thus avoiding violent confrontations for over 
150 years. Instinctively, it seems more honest to me to acknowledge the divisions that run through 
society and to address the problems they cause directly by sharing power between the antagonist 
groups than to brush over these divisons and declare them an externally imposed (colonial) inven-
tion. Nationalist leveling down is particularly problematic if the public profession of unity is under-
mined by hidden discriminatory practices as described above. 
Personal preferences notwithstanding however, Rwanda’s policy of unity and reconciliation is the 
subject of much more praise among the Rwandan and Burundian rural populations than Burundi’s 
consociational experiment, which finds most of its adherents among intellectuals and foreign schol-
ars. Policy design itself however is not the principal reason for this popular preference. There is plen-
ty of criticism among Rwandans, especially Hutus, with reference to the one-sidedness of commemo-
ration1504, transitional justice1505 or the repression of dissent1506. Conversively, even though it did not 
end impunity or stop the violence completely, a majority of Burundians also acknowledges that the 
establishment of quota regulations succeeded to change the fronts from 'ethnic' to 'political'1507. 
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 HRW, 2012, 2. 
1504
 Cf. Interviews with Canisius, 61, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Cécile, 40. Bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; 
Gaspard, 26, bystander, „Gatsata“, Gisagara; Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatata”, Gisagara; Umubyeyi, 27, by-
stander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Vincent, 43, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, “Gatsata”, 
Gisagara; Mukaga Kwaya, 52, bystander, “Gatumba”, Huye; Jean-Claude, 23, bystander, Kigali; John, 56, ex-
convict, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Marie-Françoise, 29, survivor, “Gatsata”, Gisagara. 
1505
 Cf. e.g. interviews with Thasienne, 38, bystander, “Gatumba”, Huye; François, 52, bystander, “Gatumba”, 
Huye; Françoise, 53, bystander, “Gatata”, Gisagara; Jean-Pierre, 29, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Rugango, 
81, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye; Robert,25, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Marita, 47, bystander, “Gatsata”, 
Gisagara; John, 56, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Ben, 25, bystander, Kigali.  
1506
 Cf. interviews with Robert,25, bystander, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Chris, 29, survivor, Kigali; Jean-Pierre, 29, 
“Gatsata”, Gisagara; Gaspard, 26, “Gatsata”, Gisagara; Yohani N., 68, ex-convict, “Gatumba”, Huye; Paul, 44, ex-
convict, “Gatumba”, Huye. 
1507
 Cf. e.g. Interviews with Pierre, 53, Hutu resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Venantie K. 25, Hutu resident, "Ka-
menge"; Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Juvénal H.53, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; 
Pascal M., 29, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; Etienne, 72, Tutsi IDP, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Abel, 23, ex-
Page 305 
 
Thus, the model itself is only a secondary point of criticism. No, the main reason for preferring the 
Rwandan model is that through the determined implementation of the national reconciliation policy, 
the Rwandan government has visibly demonstrated its will to break the cycle of violence – on its own 
terms. Programs such as Gacaca, Girinka, the FARG, and even camps, and workshops such as itorero 
and ingando have had a serious impact on the lives of almost all Rwandans. Even though the partiali-
ty and controversies remain, the Rwandan government has backed up its claims with concrete 
measures. In Burundi on the other hand, most rural dwellers cannot identify any concrete govern-
ment programs intended to alleviate the consequences of the civil war or the previous episodes of 
mass killing. In most cases, consociationalism did not permeate into the daily life of rural Burundians. 
Apart from sporadic mentions about speeches or seminars that promoted reconciliation1508, the in-
terviewees did not experience any significant initiatives from above aiming for change and the CNDD-
FDD is considered a Hutu-party by disappointed Tutsi ex-members such as Arsène1509. There is a 
growing subset of the population, which believes that the conditions in Burundi today are the same 
or worse1510 compared to the crisis.  
Politico-economic Overlaps and the Significance of Exclusion 
Regardless of opting for a national unity approach, quotas, 'working through' or 'forgetting', one of 
the most important factors for defusing these conflicts is to separate the close association between 
politics and wealth accumulation. This factual overlap turns political conflict into a matter of life or 
death for opposing groups. Referring to the recent history of the Great Lakes, the Hutu-Tutsi dichot-
omy has always been about politico-economic dominance and exclusion. With the exception of some 
small intermezzos, both groups have always treated politics as a zero-sum game with a clear winner 
and loser. The case of post-2005 Burundi and the behavior of the MRND prior and during the geno-
cide in Rwanda illustrate this very well. With ethnic differences losing importance due to the quota 
regulations in Burundi, the main fault lines of the conflict are now political party affiliations. The los-
er-winner-dynamic however did not change. Rather, it was exacerbated through the elections of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
combatant, "Rohero", Ngozi; Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Gertrude, 46, Hutu refugee, 
"Gakombe", Kirundo; Izabel, 37, Hutu refugee, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Marie-Rose, 52, Tutsi resident, "Rohero", 
Ngozi; Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Viola, 37, Hutu resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; David, 
29, ex-combatant, "Kamenge", Ngozi; Janvière, 38, Hutu resident, "Rohero", Ngozi. 
1508
 Alexandre, 35, ex-combatant from “Kamenge”, Ngozi mentioned that the commune and an NGO called MI 
PAREC assisted his demobilization and sent him to seminars. Déogratias, 59, Tutsi resident and Izabel, 37, Hutu 
refugee, both from “Kamenge” talked about officials trying to sensibilize people for reconciliation. Izabel, Viola 
(37, Hutu resident, “Rohero”) and Michel (65, Tutsi resident, “Rohero”) also spoke about associations similar to 
AMI in Rwanda where they could find assistance. Apart from that, Nkurunziza’s projects of free primary school, 
healthcare for children and birth assistance were mentioned but even if these developments are positive, they 
are not specifically aimed at reconciliation  
1509
 Cf. Interview with Arsène, 35, Tutsi resident, "Gakombe", Kirundo; 
1510
 Cf. Interviews with Juvénal, 59, Tutsi resident, „Rohero“, Ngozi; Marguerite, 55, Hutu resident, “Gakombe”, 
Kirundo; Hari (50, Hutu resident, “Kamenge”, Ngozi) even said that he would actually prefer the UPRONA back 
in power even though they killed his brother during the civil war.  
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2010. As David, an ex-combatant from “Rohero” states: “L’ethnicité disparaitra mais après sa dispari-
tion il y a d’autres divisions qui vont naître1511.” 
This dynamic is lethal. According to Lemarchand, the central pattern of violence in the Great Lakes is 
exclusion: "ethnic polarization paves the way for political exclusion, exclusion eventually leading to 
insurrection, insurrection to repression, and repression to massive flows of refugees and internally 
displaced persons which in turn become the vectors of further instability1512." Even though Burundians 
(as well as Rwandans) consider their leaders responsible for the crisis, the same leaders are simulta-
neously considered responsible for initiating change and including the former enemies in the coun-
try's politics. In Burundi, there is a growing disillusion with the non-performance of politics. Particu-
larly in isolated communities such as "Rohero", far too less is being done to facilitate communal co-
habitation. The steps taken in Rwanda may be one-sided and can rightly be criticized for their top-
down implementation, but in Burundi, there has been little to no national initiative with regard to 
truth-telling, acknowledgement, apology, justice or joint communal activities. On the local level, 
many Burundians have already made tremendous progress with regard to collaborating again, par-
doning each other or even intermarrying. The local problems would be solvable, but on the national 
level, progress remains blocked due to the interconnection between political power and wealth, 
which means the local level remains deprived of economic assistance, justice, good governance and 
initiatives for more social cohesion1513. Due to the dependence of the economy on politics in Africa, 
the absence of service delivery from the center to the periphery risks derailing the Burundian recon-
ciliation process as a whole. Abject poverty and the absence of economic opportunities are im-
portant driving forces for armed insurrection as the stories of the veterans Abel and Ezechiel demon-
strate who served in both the FAB and later the FNL. The combination of political standoff, corrup-
tion, overpopulation, dependence on agriculture with very limited land resources and an ongoing 
culture of violence and impunity makes the situation in Burundi extremely volatile. Up until now, 
most Burundians consider the newly established institutions that should promote accountability and 
good governance such as the CNTB (Commission Nationale Terre et autres Biens), the office of the 
ombudsman or the CENI (Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante) as little more than figleafs 
for the ruling party's corruption and authoritarian ambitions. The Burundian CVR in its current design 
risks sharing the fate of these institutions. The very limited functionality of public institutions that 
should actually act as political warchdogs or guarantee the equality of Burundians before the law will 
exacerbate the tensions further, leaving either the recourse to sectarian violence or the establish-
ment of a dictatorship (including the complete repression of dissent) as the two most likely scenari-
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 Interview with David, 29, H. ex-combatant FAB, "Kamenge", Ngozi. Translation: Ethnicity will disappear but 
after its disappearance, other divisions will appear. 
1512
 Lemarchand, 2009a, 31. 
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 Cf. Ingelaere, 2009. 
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os. If political power and accumulation of wealth are not dissociated from each other, politics will 
continuously tend to deteriorate into sectarian life and death struggles prone to ethnic radicalization 
in the Great Lakes. 
 
7.4.  Conclusion and Outlook 
Considering society as a whole, reconciliation is primarily a politico-economic problem in both coun-
tries. Citizens themselves, even those haunted by horrible memories and trauma, are mostly ready to 
forgive, reconcile and move on. Rwanda and Burundi are poor and densely populated. There simply is 
no alternative to coexistence for them. Thus, most participants choose to live with the past. Either by 
forgiving and forgetting, or by addressing it through workshops, building communal associations, 
attending Gacaca or collaborating in self-help groups. Even with promising signs of reconciliation at 
the grassroots however, politics and particularly the relation between political power and wealth 
accumulation remain great problems. Elites under pressure resorting to politics of exclusion have 
driven the population into genocide and mass violence. Hence, true reconciliation has to begin by 
changing the dynamics of politics in both countries.  
Violence: Patterns and Regionalization 
With the CNDD-FDD fighting the FNL and the RNC establishing a Rwandan opposition movement 
recruited primarily from RPF-dissidents, not mainly exiled génocidaires like the FDLR, a decidedly 
political dimension has been added to the ethnic fault lines that shaped the violence in the 1990s. 
Despite conflicting accusations, rumors and suspicions on all sides aiming to accuse the antagonist 
movements of ethnic discrimination1514, the conflicts in both countries have assumed the dynamic of 
ruling party versus opposition movements with the latter permanently on the verge of taking up 
arms or already in armed insurrection. Most of the armed movements however are too weak to top-
ple a government and do not have significant international or domestic support at their disposal. 
Thus, they often cross the border into the vast territory of the DRC where they can hide better than 
in the overpopulated hills of Rwanda and Burundi and support themselves through plunder or the 
exploitation of the local population. Some of these groups are little more than armed bandits, but 
they still represent a security threat to Rwanda or Burundi. 
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 The RPF is working hard on proving an alliance between RNC, FDLR and FDU-Inkingi and blaming it for gre-
nade attacks in Kigali in order to discredit the external opposition. Cf. Rolley, Sonja: " Général Joseph 
Nzabamwita: «L’alliance entre le RNC et les FDRL est une alliance criminelle", 28 January 2014) on: 
http://www.rfi.fr/sports/20140127-general-joseph-nzabamwita-alliance-entre-rnc-fdrl-est-une-alliance-
criminelle-proces-terreur-karegeya-nyamwasa/ (6 October 2014). Hutus on the other side accuse the RPF of 
hidden ethnic discrimination (Cf. chapter 4.4. and 6.2.3.). In Burundi, particularly Tutsi accuse the government 
of discrimination whereas Hutu mostly consider ethnic problems resolved. Cf. chapter 5.1.2. and 6.2.1. 
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Since the refugee wave in 1994 and at least since the ADFL-insurrection in 1996, Rwanda and Burundi 
have increasingly exported their conflicts into the eastern DRC1515. Tens of thousands of Rwandan 
Hutu refugees disappeared here since 1996. The eastern DRC effectively is a lawless territory where 
guerilla movements thrive on the rough terrain, natural resources and the very weak central power. 
Sites of mass crime can easily be cordoned off. Particularly Rwanda fell back on the guerilla tactics of 
resource exploitation by proxy after the successful invasion of Zaïre in 1996, providing its army and 
elites with an increased income. There are even rumors that Rwanda is planning to annex the Kivus 
and that the CNDD-FDD is training its Imbonerakure in the eastern DRC1516. One of the main reasons 
why the situation in the DRC is not coming to rest is because the Kivus serve as retreat area for 
Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian insurgents and as a resource-rich arena for the Great Lakes' pow-
er holders. Hence, many national crises tend to spill over into the DRC. If the RPF or the CNDD-FDD 
alienate their opposition to the point that armed insurrection or should the ruling parties lose their 
grip on power, the eastern DRC will almost certainly be pulled into the conflict as long as the Congo-
lese government or the MONUSCO cannot get these eastern provinces under control, which still 
seems very unlikely. Invasions from abroad in times of weak central power already have a long tradi-
tion in the Great Lakes: the RPF invaded from Uganda in 1990, and Rwanda and Burundi both invad-
ed the DRC in 1996 and 1998. Even the massacres in Rwanda in the 1960s happened after armed 
invasions of exiled Tutsi from Burundi. 
Genocidal violence in the Great Lakes thus follows a very distinct pattern: distribution battles for 
politico-economic power provoke a political crisis and force politicians to rally their supporters. In 
such situations, politics often quickly assume an ethnic dimension and the confrontation expands 
rapidly and through a cataclysmic event (e.g. the assassination of the president in 1993 and 1994, 
insurrections in 1963 (Rwanda), 1965 and 1972 (Burundi)), the violence unfolds and either the revolt 
or its suppression become genocidal. To stop these genocidal dynamics, the distribution battles need 
to at least lose their element of ethnic competition. The rule of law thus has to separate political 
power from wealth accumulation as well as build new identities that bridge the ancient chasms. 
Comparing my findings in Rwanda and in Burundi, I would probably ascribe better chances for peace 
to Rwanda, which can count on a much greater international aid budget and invests it wiser, particu-
larly by furthering the rule of law and the private sector, thus limiting the possibility of an economic 
crisis that pitches the groups against each other. Nevertheless, I still think that Burundi would have 
the better long-term chances for eliminating ethnic competition and truly reconciling its ethnic 
groups because the dialogue is much more open and the group interests run across ethnic borders. 
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 Cf. Prunier, 2009. 
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 Cf. Bekele & Fardeau, When Pierre Claver Mbonimpa is Jailed, All Burundians Are At Risk, HRW, 3 June 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/de/node/126105 (27 August 2014). 
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Burundi however faces massive problems with impunity and corruption and its almost complete iso-
lation from global revenue streams renders economic competition political and political competition 
lethal. In addition, the Burundian elite is too self-absorbed with internal power struggles to tackle 
these problems. 
Rwanda, with its seemingly amazing recovery, its complex schemes and paradox developments, is 
the more interesting subject for foreign scholars than Burundi. Because the Rwandan regime is ob-
sessed with its external image and its information management, academic scholars themselves quick-
ly become an active part in the discussion of Rwanda's historiography. Furthermore, even with all the 
alleged atrocities of the RPF-government in the wake of the genocide and in the DRC, Rwanda is for 
the most part safe for Western researchers, making it a popular destination for doing research. 
If Rwanda could be considered an African miracle with a well-hidden double bottom, Burundi repre-
sents the umpteenth installation of the failure of democracy in Africa by an externally brokered 
peace agreement. It is a tragic example for how little the world still cares for politics of exclusion and 
human rights violations in remote African regions – despite the international wake-up call, that was 
the Rwandan genocide. A fortiori because Rwanda has attracted such a large crowd of Western ana-
lysts, the neglect bestowed on Burundi is even more startling. 
Rwanda: Life after Kagame is uncertain 
The success of the different measures taken by Rwanda and Burundi to prevent the ethnicization and 
thus the escalation of conflict from repeating themselves depend on the factor time and the credibil-
ity of national politics. The true opinion of Rwandans is well hidden and difficult to uncover by out-
siders.  
With all the rumors about massacres in the DRC, the prevailing culture of silence and the rise of au-
thoritarianism, Kagame's legacy with regard to reconciliation will only become truly apparent when 
he steps down and the country opens up to genuine political competition. Only an open political 
competition will reveal if 'divisionist' tendencies have really been resolved and the RPF is considered 
a national party for all Rwandans or if these tensions were only suppressed.  
Even though partially, the Rwandan past has been reprocessed rather comprehensively with regard 
to certain aspects of the genocide such as ethnic extremism, combating impunity and prevention 
through (re-)educating the population. Other root cases such as the culture of obedience, the author-
itarian organization of society, and the zero-tolerance approach towards political dissent remain as 
dominant and widespread as before the genocide. Suppressing a public debate about the past keeps 
everyone in the dark about how prevalent sectarian ideology still is among the population. Even 
worse, the RPF's rigid censorship, which makes addressing the grievances of Hutu or Tutsi impossible 
Page 310 
 
under the current law could tempt disgruntled Hutu politicians to exploit ethnic identity as a rallying 
flag against 'Tutsi-rule' just like before the genocide. This is particularly sad because with the excep-
tion of the opposition in GB, there are currently only negligible traces of ethnic competition in the 
daily lives of Rwandan peasants, they do appear mostly reconciled. Paradoxically, Kagame might 
even have been elected in 2010 without excluding every serious opposition candidate from the pres-
idential race before the election. Many Rwandans see the merits of his development policies, securi-
ty and economic recovery. Particularly assistance programs such as Ubudehe or Girinka are viewed 
almost universally positive. If the state does not perform according to its public declaration, locals 
usually blame local officials. 
Considering the still fresh memory of the genocide in Rwanda, most Rwandans take the message 
'Never Again' seriously. Understanding the genocide as the watershed it has been for the current 
generation and viewing Rwanda as a nation of young people who grow up without ethnic labels, 
many of my participants actually expressed the hope that ethnic identities might increasingly lose 
importance and vanish with time. The RPF however has to seek the dialogue with the desperate, the 
disappointed and the discontent. The president and his party have enough political sway to allow the 
discourse about accountability for the past to leave more room for dissenting voices without having 
to renounce their leadership or jeopardizing the project of national unity.  
In a first step, the government should reduce the application of Rwanda's laws against 'divisionism' 
and 'genocide ideology' to truly revisionist attempts of denial and stop utilizing them broadly to quell 
any form of criticism. The party should also make good on genuine reconciliation by acknowledging 
the RPFs transgressions (at least symbolically), looking for a way to explicitly including Hutu victims in 
commemoration and ending covert ethnic discrimination. Particularly the last point, combined with 
extended governmental assistance for vulnerable Hutu, is paramount for the anti-ethnic ideology to 
take hold among bystanders and ex-convicts. There is a growing elite of Hutu intellectuals who feel 
as if they and their (often deceased) parents serve as scapegoats for the RPF's ideology and justifica-
tion to rule. If these intellectuals become susceptible to resorting to ethnic identities for rallying their 
fellow Hutus because of the RPF's censorship or the partiality of its reconciliation politics, the recon-
ciliation process of twenty years would have to be declared a failure and the ensuing competition 
would probably become violent rapidly. 
With regard to international criticism, I would like to point out that, in my opinion, the failure to in-
terfere in Rwanda during the 1990s does not remove the international community's right to criticize 
the Rwandan regime. To the contrary, the international community and particularly the West do 
have an obligation to help rebuilding the country we did nothing to stop from burning. Exactly be-
cause we failed in 1994, we should remain vigilant with regard to negative developments. The geno-
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cide could probably have been stopped before it started if the many Western representatives of di-
plomacy and development assistance would not have turned a blind eye on Rwanda’s politics or even 
supported structural violence with their actions. Hence, if it proves to be founded and aims at elimi-
nating injustice, criticism of the current regime is not only appropriate, but also necessary. 
Combined with sticking to certain governmental initiatives currently in place e.g. in the areas of good 
governance and implementing the rule of law, adherence to the recommendations outlined above 
would probably help to prevent further bloodshed. In such a scenario, time and stability work in fa-
vor of the RPF. As long as the country prospers, develops and wealth at least trickles down to the 
peasants, Kagame's 'window of opportunity1517' stays open. Most Rwandans are willing to accept 
authoritarian leadership and even the discourse of the 'liberators' if they detect concrete advantages 
for their daily lives. They can see their own unequal treatment or suffering either as a sacrifice for 
peace and prosperity or as an offence against their human rights by an unjust oppressor. With Ka-
game's ruthlessness starting to show and international goodwill and funds drying up however, the 
window is closing fast. 
Burundi: Disappointed Hopes 
Burundi's story is less promising, but also less cryptic. Nkurunziza, apart from his excentric brand of 
born-again Christianity and the fact that he is the first Hutu president, falls in line with other fairly 
typical African 'big men'. His rule disappointed many of the initial hopes as a representant of the 
Hutu majority who was elected in free and fair elections.  
The CNDD-FDD proceeded to plundering government coffers and appeasing the now multi-ethnic 
elite with rents and government posts up to the point of economic stagnation. Facing democratic 
challenge, the ruling party ultimately reacted increasingly violent to keep the opposition at bay. De-
spite new institutions such as the Ombudsman or the Anti-corruption court, there is no good govern-
ance-policy as in Rwanda. There is no radiant development record and no hidden truth in the shad-
ows to uncover.  
Burundi's misery is out in the open and it has been at least since the elections of 1993. Whereas 
Rwandans cultivate a culture of silence regarding ethnic identity, most Burundians talk about their 
ethnicity and its instrumentalization by political parties rather freely. Nevertheless, we could talk 
about a conspiracy of silence in Burundi when it comes to past atrocities because most parties are at 
least partially guilty for either promoting violence or prolonging the war. Even if the quota regula-
tions did change the dynamics of conflict, they did resolve neither the inherited problems of the past 
nor the deadliness of political competition. Although members of opposition parties are disappearing 
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 Cf. chapter 4.7. 
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now instead of Hutu intellectuals as in 1972, some Burundians perceive the practices of eliminating 
politico-economic competition as eerily similar1518. The disassociation of political competition from 
ethnicity however marks the difference between a low-intensity guerilla war shaped by extrajudicial 
killings and outright mass violence.  
Nevertheless, there is a chance to resolve the conflict altogether and even more than in Rwanda; 
external influence is highly instrumental for peace building. In a state utterly dependent on interna-
tional assistance such as Burundi, there is leverage on the side of the donor community. Repression 
of the media should not be tolerated as long as no hate speech is involved; neither should the out-
lawing of demonstrations or the arrests of opposition members, journalists or human rights activists 
on bogus charges. The donor community should push significantly harder for the establishment of 
(bottom-up) accountability on every level of the bureaucracy and for anti-corruption legislation and 
for criminal justice to be rigorously enforced. What Burundi needs most however is international 
attention. Its tragic history has too long stood in the shadow of the drama that unfolded in Rwanda. 
Even compared with Rwanda, its similarly small and poor northern twin, Burundi has often been 
treated as a secondary priority by the international community. In 2015, a new round of elections will 
attract at least some international attention. Thus, it is of prime importance to voice criticism now, as 
long as the violent tendencies can still be reversed.  
The road towards the 2015 elections is a crossroads for Burundi. There are still chances for democra-
cy if the campaign proceeds undisturbed and Nkurunziza follows the advice of Kagame and Kenyatta 
to give up on his idea of ruling for an unconstitutional third term. The ruling party has to resist the 
temptation to use its influence to give itself an advantage by e.g. banning candidates or limiting free-
dom of speech or assembly, eventual spoilers will face strong difficulties in persuading the popula-
tion that armed insurrection would change anything for the better. With a broadly supported coali-
tion government and increased international assistance closely monitoring the progress, Burundi 
would have a new chance for reconstructing its political system and implementing good governance 
practices and the rule of law. The CVR could pursue its work in a far less politically charged atmos-
phere and perhaps even the issues of acknowledgement, recognition and apology of past crimes 
could finally be addressed without risking the destabilization of national politics. 
 If the authoritarian tendencies however consolidate themselves and the CNDD-FDD proceeds on its 
path taken, the scenarios described above, the marginalization of Tutsi and opposition, armed insur-
rection, despotism and even a re-ethnicization of conflict sadly appear far more likely. 
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Consent Form English 
 
Consent Form 
I (the participant/ Interviewee) agree to participate in an oral history  study / program of research 
conducted by Philippe Rieder for his dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Frank Chalk of the De-
partment of History of Concordia University (email: drfrank@alcor.concordia.ca) 
PURPOSE: I have been informed that the purpose of the project is to collect life stories and opinions 
about local reconciliation after the violent history of the last twenty years. This study is interested in 
the change of relationships between neighbors due to political developments since 1990. The inter-
views are conducted in Southern Rwanda and Northern Burundi and will be used as field data for a 
comparative doctoral thesis on local reconciliation in Rwanda and Burundi. 
PROCESS: The interview will take about two hours but I can quit or prolong the interview any time I 
want. The interview can be conducted at any place that I am comfortable with (e.g. my home). The 
interviewer will use audio equipment to record my life story and the answers I give to questions. 
I can choose to discuss any aspect of my life in the last twenty years. I can also refuse to answer any 
questions. The interviewer will ask open-ended questions and hopes for me to respond at length and 
guide the course of the interview. I’m free to answer questions in any way I wish and ask the 
interviewer questions myself.  
Everything spoken in the interview between the interviewer, the translator and me is confidential. I 
will not have to state my name at any time and can use a fake name. 
After the interview, I will be shown the transcript (written version) of the interview as soon as it is 
written down. At this point, I may change my answers or withdraw my consent if I want to. If I 
withdraw consent, the transcript and audio recording will be destroyed. The interview data will 
only be made available to the public in an archive and/ or published in the thesis if I agree explicitly. 
RISKS AND BENEFITS: Reconciliation, genocide and civil war are very delicate subjects. The conse-
quences for expressing one’s political opinions could in certain instances be very severe, involving 
physical harm. In Rwanda and Burundi, sadly there have been cases where people with differing 
political opinions have been assaulted and even killed by disagreeing parties. As the interviewer is 
critically aware of this risk, confidentiality and trust between the interviewer, the translator and 
the interviewee will be very important and the interviewer will do everything in his power to en-
sure the confidentiality of the interview data.  
If I (the participant) agree to speak about my personal feelings, opinions and experiences, I can al-
ways remain anonymous. I do not have to reveal information I am not comfortable to speak about. 
This includes my ethnicity (which is illegal in Rwanda), my party affiliation or any of my activities dur-
ing the time of violent conflict that could endanger my security. The interviewer has also informed 
me that I should not tell him about eventual crimes I have committed but have not already been 




I however may speak about these things if I choose to. The interviewer and the translator are bound 
to the confidentiality. The interviewer will only note my name if I agreed to use it and even then, only 
my first name will be cited in the research. For anonymous participants, pseudonyms or job descrip-
tions (“peasant”; “unemployed youth”) will be used. My data will be treated with the utmost confi-
dentiality. 
The process of revisiting the painful experiences of mass violence can also be  deeply emotional and 
even traumatic for participants. The interviewer will make sure I have access to free, local and 
culturally aprropriate counselling if he or I feel this would be necessary (FACT (Forum des Activistes 
Contre La Torture), Women for Women International, and the Women's Polyclinic of Hope). 
As the interview will contribute to a dissertation and possibly a book, with your permission, your 
story and opinion will be heard and may contribute to a better understanding of local needs and 
views of reconciliation. 
CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION: Please look at the following conditions and options with the inter-
viewer. Feel free to ask questions if anything appears unclear. 
___I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent at any time during the interview or stop and 
discontinue the interview. 
 
Regarding public access to my interview, I agree to (please choose one): 
___Open public access – My identity (first name) may be shown in any publications or presenta-
tions that may result from this interview. 
___I agree to the possible broadcasting and reproduction of sound from my interview (by any 
method and in any media by the interviewer). 
___I agree that my interview, or portions of it, be made available on the internet (through web 
pages and/or on-line databases). 
___I agree that transcripts and/or recordings of my interview will be stored at a Canadian local 
archive for long-term preservation. My interview may be accessed by researchers and the public at 
the Iriba Center for Multimedia Heritage in Kigali and the Centre for Oral History and Digital Story-
telling in Montreal that hold copies to preserve my answers for history. 
OR 
___Anonymity including public storage: My identity will only be known by the translator and the 
researcher but will not be disclosed in the dissertation. 
___I however give permission to store my written interview data (transcripts) for public access at 
the Centre for Oral History and Digital Story-telling in Montreal and the Iriba Center for Multimedia 
Heritage in Kigali. The securely filed audio files will be destroyed. 
___I agree that the written version of my interview, or portions of it, be made available on the 





___Complete Anonymity – My identity will be known only to the interviewer and the translator; 
others will not gain access to my identity unless they gain special permission from myself, the in-
terviewee. Once the dissertation is completed, the securely filed audio recording will be destroyed 
by the interviewer Philippe Rieder (though a copy of the interview may be given to you). 
 
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT. I FREELY AND 
VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
INTERVIEWEE (Fake name possible): 
NAME (please print) ______________________________________________________ 
SIGNATURE ____________________________________________________________ 
Date and Place (optional)_______________________________________________ 
INTERVIEWER: 









If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact 
the Research Ethics and Compliance Advisor of Concordia University, at 514.848.2424.x 7481 
or ethics@alcor.concordia.ca. Regarding all other questions, please contact Philippe Rieder 






SCRIPT FOR READING THE CONSENT FORM OUT TO ILLITERATE PARTICIPANTS 
(to be translated into Kinyarwanda in the same way as the consent form) 
Co-investigator: If I want to hold an interview with you, I am required to ask you for your permission 
to record and document what you say. This is necessary, so you have a guarantee that I do not take 
advantage of you and I can document that you have worked with me voluntarily. 
It is very important for you to understand that you do NOT have to answer any of my questions if you 
don’t want to and that you can stop the interview any time. You can also ask me to destroy the re-
cordings after the interview if you do not want them to be published or used for any reason. 
I will now read the consent form out to you. The purpose of the consent form is to inform you about 
the proceedings of the interview, its risks and benefits for you and especially the options you can 
choose from with regard to anonymity. You can interrupt me at any time and ask if sentences are not 
clear to you. 
(Reading out the Consent Form) 
The most important parts about the consent form are the information about the possible risks that 
could arise from this interview and the options you can choose with regard to publication. I repeat 
that the interview contains questions about your political opinions and perhaps you want to remain 
anonymous if you fear that people disagreeing with you might react aggressively if they hear about 
your positions. 
I also have to repeat that if you have committed crimes that you have not been convicted of yet, you 
should keep information about them to yourself or speak of them in general terms in order not to 
incriminate yourself even though everything said in the interview stays confidential. 
With regard to publication, you can either stay completely anonymous – that means you make up a 
fake name and the recordings of the interview will only be heard by me and my translator. The re-
cordings will be stored securely and only for my own use. 
The second option is to state a fake name but agree that the recording is stored publicly in Canada 
for scholars and the public to view. It may also appear on a restricted Internet-platform by the Centre 
for Oral History and Digital Story-telling in Montreal and the Iriba Center for Multimedia Heritage in 
Kigali.   
The third option is open public access. This means that you state your name and agree that the re-
cording is stored publicly in Canada and perhaps on the members-only Internet-platform of the Cen-
tre for Oral History and Digital Story-telling in Montreal and the Iriba Center for Multimedia Heritage 
in Kigali. Open public access also means that you allow me to cite you by name in my dissertation. 
Before we start the interview, I will know ask for your permission to interview you and record your 
answer before we start. Please state the date of the interview, and say 
“I ___________(your first name or fake name) take part in this study freely and voluntarily. I have 
been explained the consent form and understand it completely. I choose complete anonymi-
ty/anonymity including public storage/open public access.” 
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Explain how recording Equipment works / Interview process 
Introduction of researcher and translator 
Introduction of research project: Dissertation at Concordia University, Researching about reconcilia-
tion between neighbours in the aftermath of mass political violence, life-story interviews with some 
questions about political knowledge, personal opinions and changing attitudes 
Explain Structure of Interview: 
Life-story interviews (qualitative); Questions about the understanding of political terms and personal 
priorities (qualitative); Scaled questions about the participant’s changing status in society (quantita-
tive) 
Explain process of Question-translation-Response-translation  
Explain how Olympus VN-2100PC works – Recording Sample, Storage on the internet, anonymi-
ty…give to participant to try… 
 
Script Consent Form 
(Provide a consent form in Kinyarwanda / Kirundi or translate on the spot – see above) 
 
Qualitative semi-structured interviews  
Life-story 
In this part, I would like to hold a conversation where participants allow me to compare their life 
conditions and attitudes towards their neighbors during the conflict with the current conditions 
they live in. Ideally, this conversation will touch certain topics about coexistence, past violence or 
reconciliation which might be further elaborated on in the discussion about the understandings of 
terms in the second part. The fat questions are the most important and the ones marked Rwanda/ 
Burundi are only to be applied in the respective country. 
Classification 
The participant will be asked to state following information about themselves: 
Gender, Age group in 2011 (Young adults 20-30 years, adults 30-50 years, seniors 50 years +) 
Education (illiterate, primary, secondary and higher) 
District or city the participant lives in 
Profession (Farmer/stock breeder/unskilled worker, public-sector employee, private sector employee 
and self-employed, unemployed, student) 
Now, the participant can choose from one of the following groups to classify himself: 
Rwanda:   
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Survivor (persecuted in 1994, lived in country when genocide started) 
Ex-convict –In the first interviews characterized as perpetrator (accused in Gacaca/ Trial – this would 
also apply to non-accused people who characterize themselves as perpetrator) 
Bystander (not accused in Gacaca/ trials, not persecuted but in Rwanda when the genocide started) 
Returnee (immigrated after genocide, since 1994).  
Ex-combatant (RPF (and Ex-FAR as far as they have not been accused in Gacaca / Trials) 
Burundi: Since transitional justice has been largely stalled and ethnic identities are still legal, the 
categories in Burundi will be slightly different:   
Non-combatant Hutu residents during civil war period (1993-2005) who lost relatives (survivors) 
Non-combatant Hutu refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees) 
Non-combatant Tutsi refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees) 
Non-combatant Tutsi residents during civil war period (1993-2005) who lost relatives (survivors) 
Army soldiers or pro-Tutsi rebels in the civil war (ex-combatants) 




“Did you live here all the time or did you come here?” / “When and why did you come here? Was it 
difficult to begin your life here/ rebuild your existence?” 
 “Tell me about your family’s relations to your neighbors when you grew up?/ started primary 
school/ started elementary school/ married?” 
“How do you remember your parents’ (or your) relationship to the state authorities when you grew 
up?/ started primary school/ started elementary school/ married?” 
“Why did you/ your parents flee / who killed them?” 
“Were there any specific challenges to rebuilding your existence after the war/genocide?” 
Rwanda 
“How did the relationship to your neighbors change when the RPF attacked in 1990 (Rwanda)/ during 
the civil war? / When Habyarimana got assassinated and the genocide started? / When the RPF be-
came the government (Rwanda)? / After 2003?” 
“How has your economic / political situation changed since the genocide ended? / you came here? / 
the last elections?/ the Gacaca? 
Burundi 
“How did the relationship with your neighbors change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war 
started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When 
Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?” 
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“How did your economic / political situation change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war 
started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When 
Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?” 
 
Discussion of the Understanding of terms - Question Groups  
 
Identity 
Is belonging to an ethnic group important for you to understand your place in history / society? 
Do you care about a person’s ethnicity? Does knowing one’s ethnicity change the way you look at 
him/ her? 
How would you describe your relation to members of the former antagonist group? 
Can you trust people from the former antagonist people / friends / would you marry somebody from 
the other group? 
Burundi: How would you characterize the most important group you belong to? National, ethnic, 
political, family, religion, profession? 
Rwanda: Do you believe the banning of ethnic identities in Rwanda improve the relationship be-
tween former antagonists? 
Burundi: Do you think the quota regulations for Burundian parties reduce ethnic tensions? 
Will genocide ideology (Rwanda)/ ethnic categories (Burundi) remain relevant in the families or will 
they gradually vanish – what do you think? 
How do you assess the role of the media in your country, does it help people to reconcile? 
 
Memory 
What do you think about (official) commemoration? 
Did you lose relatives due to violence in the last two decades? If yes, do you feel official commemo-
ration ceremonies help you to address your grief and make it socially acceptable? 
Rwanda: Do you think official commemoration ceremonies help people to reconcile? 
Rwanda: Do you think keeping the memory of the genocide helps prevention? 
Rwanda: Does commemoration help ALL Rwandans? Is it good the way it’s organized or should it 
change?   
Burundi: Do you think anything is done to address the violent past in Burundi? 
Burundi: Is there any way the government has helped you to overcome the grievances of the past? 




Do you think you can forgive the people who wronged you? / Do you think the people you wronged 
can forgive you? Do you feel guilty? Do you feel hate? 
 
Term questions 
How would you describe “Peace” (amahoro) personally? 
How would describe “reconciliation” (ubwiyunge)?  
How would you describe “democracy” (demokarasi)? 
 
Reconciliation and the State 
Can the government facilitate reconciliation/ forgiveness (or is it a personal/ social matter?) 
Are there any specific policies you know that you believe might help neighbors to forgive each other 
and live together? 
Have you ever in the past or do you currently benefit from a governmental program aimed at recon-
ciliation? If yes, how has it helped you? 
Does the government do enough for reconciliation? 
What are the most important lessons Rwandans/Burundians should learn in order to live together 
peacefully and that genocide/ war does not occur again? 
Burundi: “Do you know of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission? Do you think such a commission 
would help people to reconcile? 
If you would be president, how would you improve the way Burundi/Rwanda is governed today? 
 
Justice 
Is (transitional) justice necessary for reconciliation?  
Rwanda: Do you think transitional justice in Rwanda has been fair and impartial? Was it necessary to 
try everyone or would the planners have sufficed? 
Rwanda: What do you think of Gacaca? / Have you been personally affected by Gacaca? / Was the 
punitive aspect of Gacaca necessary? 
Rwanda: Has everybody who deserved it been tried? Who should be tried additionally? (RPF-
massacres? / fugitive génocidaires?  
Burundi: Do you think enough is done for bringing justice to those who killed in the war? Do you 
think transitional justice is important for peaceful coexistence?” 
Burundi: Do you know of any government initiatives to bring justice to those who killed in the war?  






Where do you see the greatest dangers for Rwandans / Burundians living together peacefully in the 
future? 
Are there groups of people in the country you feel threatened by? 
Do you think there will be renewed violence in our lifetimes? 




These questions are based on Ingelaere’s (2010, 278f) concept of the “ladder of life”. These are sub-
jective rankings based on individual perception of relations over a number of years. The interviewee 
is asked to rank his individual perception of certain circumstances of his life on a ranking from (+6 
(positive change) to 0 (indifference) to -6 (negative change)) in the years 1990 (begin war), 1994 
(genocide), 2003 (new constitution), 2011 (Rwanda) resp. 1990, 1993 (begin civil war), 2005 (Pretoria 
agreement), 2011 (Burundi). The criteria encompass : 
 
Overall relations 
How have your overall relations with people of differing ethnicity 
changed if you compare your situation in 
1990    _______ 
1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
How did your personal economic situation change? 
1990   _______ 
1993 (Bdi) /1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa) /2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
How much do you approve of transitional justice if you compare your opinion in  
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
 
Political representation   
How do you think did your family’s impact on politics change in  
1990    _______ 
1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5 would you consider your country a democracy in following years 
  _______ 
1993(Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
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2003(Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5 how would you estimate the significance of ethnicity for political power if 
you compare the situation in  
1990    _______ 
1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
 
Personal physical security   
On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust your neighbors if you compare your situation in  
1990    _______ 
1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5: How much do you trust the army/police?  
1990    _______ 
1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust the government today compared to 21(Rwa)/ 18 
(Bdi)/17 (Rwa)/8 (Rwa)/6 (Bdi)years ago??  
1990    _______ 
1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
Do you think human rights are more respected today than 21(Rwa)/ 18 (Bdi)/17 (Rwa)/8 (Rwa)/6 
(Bdi) years ago?  
1990    _______ 
1993 (Bdi)/1994 (Rwa) _______ 
2003 (Rwa)/2005 (Bdi) _______ 
2011   _______ 
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Modified Questionnaire Burundi 
Audio Consent  
 “I ___________(your first name or fake name) take part in this study freely and voluntarily. I have 
been explained the consent form and understand it completely. I choose complete anonymi-
ty/anonymity including public storage/open public access.” 
Thank you very much for your cooperation. 
Sign Consent Form 
 
Qualitative semi-structured interviews  
Life-stories during last two decades 
In this part, I would like to hold a conversation where participants allow me to compare their life 
conditions and attitudes towards their neighbors during the conflict with the current conditions they 
live in. Ideally, this conversation will touch certain topics about coexistence, past violence or reconcil-
iation which might be further elaborated on in the discussion about the understandings of terms in 
the second part. The fat questions are the most important and the ones marked Rwanda/ Burundi 
are only to be applied in the respective country. 
Classification 
The participant will be asked to state following information about themselves: 
Gender 
Age group in 2011 (Young adults 20-30 years, adults 30-50 years, seniors 50 years +) 
Education (no education, primary, secondary and higher) 
District or city the participant lives in 
Profession (Farmer/stock breeder/unskilled worker, public-sector employee, private sector employee 
and self-employed, unemployed, student) 
Now, the participant can choose from one of the following groups to classify himself: 
Burundi: since transitional justice has been largely stalled and ethnic identities are still legal, the cat-
egories in Burundi will be slightly different:   
Non-combatant Hutu residents during civil war period (1993-2005) (survivors)  
Non-combatant Hutu refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees) 
Non-combatant Tutsi refugees who returned during or after the civil war (returnees) 
Non-combatant Tutsi residents during civil war period (1993-2005) (survivors) 
Army soldiers or pro-Tutsi rebels in the civil war (demobilisés, ex-combatants) 







“Did you live here all the time or did you come here?” / “When and why did you come here? Was it 
difficult to begin your life here/ rebuild your existence?” 
 “Tell me about your family’s relations to your neighbors when you grew up?/ started primary 
school/ started elementary school/ married?” 
“How do you remember your parents’ (or your) relationship to the state authorities when you grew 
up?/ started primary school/ started elementary school/ married?” 
“Why did you/ your parents flee / who killed them?” 
“Were there any specific challenges to rebuilding your existence after the war/genocide?” 
Burundi 
“When did you become aware of your ethnic identity?” 
“How did the relationship with your neighbors change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war 
started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When 
Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?” 
“How did your economic / political situation change when Ndadaye got assassinated and the war 
started? / When Buyoya took power? / When the Pretoria Peace agreement got signed? / When 
Nkurunziza came to power? / After the last presidential elections?” 
“What was the difference between Ndadaye’s election and Nkurunziza’s election?” 
“What are the biggest differences between Burundi now and Burundi during the crisis?” 
“Did genocide happen in Burundi and if yes, who committed genocide?” 
“Do you think “la crise” was an ethnical or a political conflict?” 
 
Discussion of the Understanding of terms - Question Groups  
Identity 
Is belonging to an ethnic group important for you to understand your place in history / society? 
Do you care about a person’s ethnicity? Does knowing one’s ethnicity change the way you look at 
him/ her? 
How would you describe your relation to members of the former antagonist group? 
Can you trust people from the former antagonist people / friends / would you marry somebody from 
the other group? 
Burundi: How would you characterize the most important group you belong to? National, ethnic, 
political, (family), religion, profession, region? 
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Rwanda: Do you believe the banning of ethnic identities in Rwanda improve the relationship be-
tween former antagonists? 
Burundi: Do you think the quota regulations for Burundian parties reduce ethnic tensions? 
Will ethnic categories (Burundi) remain relevant in the families or will they gradually vanish – what 
do you think? 
How do you assess the role of the media in your country, does it help people to reconcile? 
 
Memory 
What do you think about (official) commemoration, could it help reconciliation or would it divide 
former enemies? 
Did you lose relatives due to violence in the last two decades? If yes, do you feel official commemo-
ration ceremonies help you to address your grief and make it socially acceptable? – 21.10.? How can 
commemoration be designed as an inclusive event? 
 Do you think keeping the memory of the genocide helps prevention? 
Burundi: Do you think anything is done to address the violent past in Burundi? 
Burundi: Is there any way the government has helped you to overcome the grievances of the past? 
Burundi: What do you think should be done to address the grievances and injustices of the war in 
Burundi? 
Burundi: “Do you know of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and special tribunal in Burundi ? Do 
you think such a commission would help people to reconcile? / Is finding out the truth about the past 
necessary for reconciliation? 
Do you think you can forgive the people who wronged you? / Do you think the people you wronged 
can forgive you? Do you feel guilty? Do you feel hate? 
 
Term questions 
How would you describe “Peace” (amahoro) personally? 
How would describe “reconciliation” (ubwiyunge)?  
How would you describe “democracy” (demokarasi)? 
Reconciliation and the State 
Can the government facilitate reconciliation/ forgiveness (or is it a personal/ social matter?) 
Are there any specific policies in place now that you believe to help neighbors to forgive each other 
and live together? 
Have you ever in the past or do you currently benefit from a governmental program aimed at recon-
ciliation? If yes, how has it helped you? 
Burundi: If you regard the boycott of the elections 2010 by some parties: do you believe ordinary 
Burundians are reconciling faster than the government? 
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Does the government/do political parties actually play a beneficial role with regard to reconciliation? 
Are you involved in land conflicts? What do you believe the government should do in order to resolve 
land conflicts?  
Burundi: Is it important for peace and reconciliation that all the refugees return to Burundi or does 
their return create further problems? Which problems? 
Burundi: Regarding governmental efforts such as decentralization, the establishment of an inde-
pendent Human Rights Commission and the institution of the Ombudsman – do you think civil socie-
ty and individual citizens have more effective power today than before “la crise”? 
What are the most important lessons Burundians should learn in order to live together peacefully 
and that genocide/ war does not occur again? 
If you would be president, how would you improve the way Burundi is governed today? 
 
Justice 
Is (transitional) justice necessary for reconciliation?  
What do you think of Rwandan Gacaca? (explain Gacaca if necessary) 
What do you think about the South African TRC as a model for Burundian transitional justice? (ex-
plain Model) 
Burundi: Do you think enough is done for bringing justice to those who killed in the war? Do you 
think transitional justice is important for peaceful coexistence? 
Burundi: Do you know of any government initiatives to bring justice to those who killed in the war?  
Burundi: Regarding the many army officers and rebel leaders holding power in Burundi: Could pun-
ishing the war criminals of “la crise” actually be dangerous for peace and stability in Burundi? 
Burundi: Can a Truth and Reconciliation Commission/ Special Tribunal even be successful with so 
many leaders of the civil war still holding political office? What would be necessary for such a Com-
mission to succeed? Would an International Tribunal be an alternative or would such a tribunal be 
too distant from ordinary Burundians to have any effect on reconciliation? 
What should the government do differently in the future with regard to transitional justice and rec-
onciliation? 
Fears 
Where do you see the greatest dangers for Rwandans / Burundians living together peacefully in the 
future? 
Are there groups of people in the country you feel threatened by? 
Do you think there will be renewed violence in our lifetimes? 





These questions are based on Ingelaere’s (2010, 278f) concept of the “ladder of life”. These are sub-
jective rankings based on individual perception of relations over a number of years. The interviewee 
is asked to rank his individual perception of certain circumstances of his life on a ranking from (+6 
(positive change) to 0 (indifference) to -6 (negative change)) in the years 1990 (begin war), 1994 
(genocide), 2003 (new constitution), 2011 (Rwanda) resp. 1990, 1993 (begin civil war), 2005 (Pretoria 
agreement), 2011 (Burundi). The criteria encompass: 
 
Overall relations 
How have your overall relations with people of differing ethnicity 
changed if you compare your situation in 
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
How did your personal economic situation change? 
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
How much do you believe in the progress/ implementation of transitional justice if you compare your 
opinion in  
2005 (Bdi)  _______ 
2011   _______ 
 
Political representation   
How do you think did your family’s impact on politics change in  
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
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2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5 would you consider your country a democracy in following years: 
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5 how would you estimate the chances of people of your ethnicity to gain ac-
cess to political office if you compare the situation in…  
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
 
Personal physical security   
On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust your neighbors if you compare your situation in  
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5: How much do you trust the army/police?  
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
On a scale from -5 to +5: How much would you trust the government?  
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
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1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
How do you assess the general respect for Human Rights in following years? 
1988    _______ 
1993 (Bdi) election _______ 
1993 (Bdi) crise  _______  
2005    _______ 
2011   _______ 
 
